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Press freedom is an essential feature of a democratic society. Without press 
freedom a constitutional democracy cannot function properly, to the extent 
that the degree of press freedom becomes an indicator of the level of democ-
racy in a particular country. That historically press freedom in Indonesia has 
been the exception rather than the rule is therefore telling, but even today, 
when Indonesia’s democracy seems to have become relatively stable, press 
freedom is constantly under threat.
Press freedom has never been guaranteed explicitly in Indonesia’s Consti-
tution, but can be subsumed under the concept of freedom of expression, 
which in 1945 was already mentioned in Article 28. In spite of this provision, 
Indonesia has seen many preventive and repressive rules enacted by subse-
quent regimes since it became independent, targeting films, books, paint-
ings and other forms of expression. As this book will demonstrate, the press 
in particular has been targeted by the authorities, through restrictive and 
repressive legal or non-legal actions, including censorship, banning, crimi-
nalisation, and violence.
1 “I think it is not a difference in perspective, but a difference in will. The power holders 
simply want the press to be accountable to them. And we simply don’t want that! We 
must criticise the power holders if we see that they do things wrong. We have to stick to 
the law.” This is a statement by the famous journalist Lubis to students of journalism at 
the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of Padjadjaran University, published in Polar, 
8th Edition, Year III, April 1995, in “Pers Sekarang Terburuk Sepanjang Sejarah,” in Hadi-
madja (ed.) (1995: 226). This response addressed the question whether the press and the 
ruler have a different conception of a free and responsible press.
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The ‘constitutional recognition’ of freedom of expression thus seems to have 
had little influence on reality. The implementation of freedom of expression, 
including press freedom, has been determined by political-economy con-
figurations which seemed to care little for such constitutional inhibitions. 
Nonetheless, this constitutional guarantee has always remained an impor-
tant rallying point for political opposition. The struggle for press freedom 
has been part of the struggle for democracy and the constitution has at least 
always provided legitimacy to this effort, and thus influenced the dynamics 
of challenging the government or other state institutions. Law matters, even 
if it is being subverted. This study tells the story of press freedom in Indone-
sia and how law has been used to alternatively promote and undermine it.
In order to achieve this purpose, this book combines a legal with a social-
science perspective. Such studies about press freedom are rare. There is a 
growing number of studies about the press in Indonesia from a social or 
political perspective, but they seldom intend to inspire legal studies, or the 
other way round. Thus, this study intends to fill a gap, by providing a com-
prehensive analysis of the history of press laws and their implementation,2 
through the executive, the judiciary, and sometimes private actors. It also 
elaborates on how various actors perceive press freedom. What makes this 
study particularly important is that after the fall of Soeharto, intitially the 
position of the press seems to have improved tremendously, but that in 
practice it has come under increasing pressure, even if pressure of a differ-
ent nature than under the preceding regimes.
In short, this study aims to clarify:
a. how the concepts of freedom of expression and press freedom have evolved in 
Indonesian law;
b. how press freedom as one of the main pillars of constitutional democracy has 
been guaranteed or curbed by the Indonesian legal system;
c. how press freedom has been shaped in practice by various state and non-state 
actors and factors; and
d. how this can be evaluated from a rule of law perspective.
The research will end with a number of recommendations for more effec-
tively guaranteeing press freedom in the framework of Indonesia’s rule of 
law.
2 The meaning of ‘implementation’ here is broader than commonly understood by lawyers 
– it relates to how laws, regulations and policies are brought into practice, and how they 
are infl uenced by political, social and cultural factors (vide: Randall Peerenboom, 2004).
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1.1.2. Academic Background
As already mentioned there is a growing number of studies about the Indo-
nesian press, most of them written within disciplines such as communi-
cation studies, political science, sociology, or history. Likewise, there are 
numerous legal studies on press and/or press freedom. In particular the lat-
ter are quite limited in scope, not only because they seldom pay any atten-
tion to the political and social context of the topic, but because they usually 
limit themselves to explanations or commentaries on legislation without 
taking into account judicial rulings.
Probably the most cited legal study of press law in Indonesia is the one by 
Oemar Seno Adji (1990), who analysed the development of press crime in 
Indonesia. His book has inspired courses on press crime that are taught at 
most faculties of law.3 More recent legal works on press freedom in Indo-
nesia are those of Samsul Wahidin (2006), Rudy Satryo Mukantardjo (2002) 
and Amir Syamsuddin (2008), all of them written as PhD-theses. Wahidin’s 
is a purely doctrinal study, coloured by a very optimistic view of the new 
press law and how it will be implemented. Mukantardjo’s dissertation is 
broader in scope and ambition and addresses press freedom from a legal-
political history and criminal law point of view. It contributes to an under-
standing of the historical context in which criminal law concerning the press 
arose, especially Article 154 of the Penal Code (one of the so-called ‘hatred 
sowing’ articles). Amir Syamsuddin’s thesis provides an elaborate analysis 
of the meaning of public order and public interest in relation to press legal 
cases. Rather similar to Mukantardjo, Syamsuddin’s work concentrates on a 
particular article, Art. 310(3) of the Penal Code, which serves as the basis for 
a defence of press activities in criminal procedure. While providing a useful 
point for debate for the present dissertation, none of these studies extend 
beyond criminal law as a means to control the press and moreover only 
cover a particular aspect of criminal law.
The most comprehensive legal study on press freedom is Harahap (2000). 
Unlike the above this book extends beyond criminal law issues, also touch-
ing on constitutional law and private law in relation to press freedom. More-
over, Harahap also pays attention to the implementation of some of the laws 
he discusses and offers a welcome starting point for this study to explore or 
discuss particular issues. However, Harahap’s study is far from comprehen-
sive, both in the legal-analytical and the practice-related part. In addition to 
these legal studies, there are a number of legal analyses about press freedom 
by NGOs such as AJI and ISAI (Sudibyo 2004) and LBH Pers (2010), or by 
media watch practitioners (Syah 2002).
3 Such courses are taught under a variety of titles, such as Tindak Pidana Pers (Criminal 
Offences by the Press), Kejahatan Pers (Press Crimes), and Delik Pers (Press Offences).
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Social scientific studies of the Indonesian and the Netherlands-Indies’ press 
are more numerous. There is a long list of such studies that have been impor-
tant to the present book, such as the historical studies of Adam (1995), Smith 
(1969), Said (1988), Surjomihardjo (2002), Termorshuizen (2001, 2011), Faber 
(1930), Matters (1998) and Oey Hong Lee (1971). Important studies about the 
press in more recent times include those of Romano (2002), Nurudin (2003), 
Sen and Hill (2007), Steele (2005), Eisy (2007) and Ispandriarno (2008). Stud-
ies about the New Order period – or part of it – include Dhakidae (1991) 
and Hill (1994; 2010). Hill’s work is of particular importance because it pays 
relatively more attention to the operation of press law and legal cases.
These studies of a legal and a non-legal nature need to be linked in order to 
gain a more comprehensive insight into press freedom. To this end, the pres-
ent study will explain how press freedom has been shaped by Indonesia’s 
legal system, by tracing and discussing all relevant laws, how they have been 
used in and out of court, how various actors have attempted to influence 
these laws and their implementation and what all of this teaches us about 
press freedom in Indonesia.
1.2. Theoretical Framework
Before starting the task set out above, I will first discuss several theories of 
press freedom, press law and how these relate to democracy. On this basis 
I will construct a conceptual framework that will form the basis of my analy-
sis.
1.2.1. Socio-Legal Study
This research uses a socio-legal perspective. It is interdisciplinary in nature 
and has the objective of integrating aspects of disciplinary perspectives, law 
and social science, into a single approach. The objective of this approach is 
“ultimately to combine knowledge, skills, and forms of research experience 
from two (or several) disciplines in an attempt to transcend some of the 
theoretical and methodological limitations of the disciplines in question and 
create a basis for developing a new form of analysis” (Banakar and Travers 
2005: 5).
In studying press freedom and its relation to the law, the benefit of this 
approach is that it helps to understand and provide the context of social and 
political configurations that influence law and its implementation. Thus, this 
study is not merely an attempt at developing legal doctrine. Legal analysis 
is important, but in this case it is used to further an understanding of more 
comprehensive problems of law and its application. Connecting a study of 
legislation, court decisions, and policies to practice is not only an empirical 
exercise but also enables me to evaluate whether judges have fairly exam-
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ined cases, whether policy makers have enacted proper policies, and so on. 
The analysis of context and its normative implications can thus be used to 
inform the legal analysis.4
Research about the press may look at social, political, economic, and 
legal problems. A socio-legal study opens the way by its interdisciplinar-
ity to “produc[e] new forms of knowledge in its engagements with direct 
disciplines” (Moran 2002: 16). Legal analysis is needed in such a venture for 
a proper understanding of press freedom in Indonesia – and because there 
is so little of it much of this thesis will consist of thorough legal analysis of 
Indonesian press law. The new form of knowledge in this study concerns the 
role of the legal system and its political-economic context in shaping press 
freedom.
The research will thus be able to show how a similar normative frame-
work of press freedom may operate in different ways depending on the 
political-economic context. To give an example, the prohibition of censor-
ship against the press became part of the Press Law in 1966. A similar provi-
sion is part of the 1999 Press Law. Yet, the way in which this provision has 
to be explained is by linking the law to its context – and hence the need for 
a socio-legal study.
1.2.2. Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression is a human right that has been included in the con-
stitutions of many countries across the globe. This freedom can be found in 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says that,
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Although introduced in 1948 and agreed to by virtually every country in 
the world, there is still no unanimity on how to interpret this freedom. Nev-
ertheless, its adoption as a human right underlines that the right to express 
oneself is an entitlement, not a privilege. It assumes that humans cannot 
live a meaningful life without the right to express themselves. Freedom of 
expression is furthermore closely related to various other fundamental free-
doms such as those of speech, association, religion as well as freedom of the 
press.
As regards the concept of ‘press’ this research follows the definition of the 
concept of press stipulated in Art 1.1 jo Art. 3 of the 1999 Press Law:
4 ‘Context’ in this regard refers to Selznick’s principle of ‘fi delity to context.’ Contexts may 
be transcended by invoking general purposes and principles, including of a normative 
nature (Selznick 2002).
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The press is a social institution and an instrument of mass communication that performs 
the journalistic activities of covering, seeking, acquiring, owning, recording, analysing, 
and disseminating information both in the form of writing, sound, picture, sound and pic-
ture, and in the form of data and graphics or in any other form, by using printed media, 
electronic media, and all kinds of available channels. (Art. 1.1)
Although the research will look at many press cases, including electronic 
and broadcast media, its focus will be on the printed press.
1.2.3. Press Freedom as Freedom of Expression
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press fall under the umbrella of ‘free-
dom of expression.’ Freedom of expression is concerned with communica-
tion, which always involves two sides and therefore requires two kinds of 
protective rights: the right to express and the right to hear that expression. 
According to Alexander, the right of the audience to hear an expression is 
even more important than the right of the speaker to express it (Alexander 
2005: 7-11).5 For conceptual clarity this study will refer to the right of the 
audience as the right to freedom of information.
The most obvious form of communication is language, the expression of 
information through words, whether orally or in writing. However, infor-
mation can also be expressed in non-verbal symbols, visually, musically, or 
by feeling. A particular form of expression which is at the centre of much 
debate about freedom of expression is persuasion. This refers to an effort 
to change the position of the receiver of the expression. Persuasion is often 
thought of as arguments which attempt to convince the hearer of the merits 
of the speaker’s position, but may be cloaked in storytelling, ritual practices, 
or artistic practices. Persuasion is a typical example of an ‘idea’ states may 
wish to protect. The state’s definition of the types of ideas worthy of protec-
tion then may also influence the amount of protection awarded to particular 
media (Guinn 2005: 3-4).
A second way to understand the nature of expression is to consider how 
it functions in a social setting. The first function expression may serve 
from this perspective is personal or self-centred and constitutes an essen-
tial dimension of self-identity. Freedom of expression in terms of the self 
represents a fundamental liberty interest of the individual against the state, 
where the state simply has no authority or right to intrude upon the indi-
vidual’s expressive needs or interests. The second function of expression is 
to advance or support an important social activity or function of the com-
munity’s polity. This social function is needed to maintain a public space 
5 By considering that freedom of expression is not only the right of the speaker, but also the 
right of the audience, press freedom becomes not only the right of the journalist or media 
owner, but also the right of the public to have credible information.
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and assure the greatest potential diversity of expressions, including posing 
public challenges to the ruler (Guinn 2005: 4-6, cf. Meyerson 2001: 295, 298).6
1.2.4. Theories of the Press
Press freedom is in no way monolithic. All press systems reflect the values 
of the political and economic systems of the nations within which they oper-
ate (Hachten and Scotton 2002). This has led scholars to provide a typology 
of this relation, which is relevant to this study and will therefore be dis-
cussed in this section.
1.2.4.1. Siebert et al.’s Four Theories of the Press7
Many press and/or communication studies depart from the seminal work 
called Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1956), which 
established the dominant paradigm in analysing global media systems and 
assessing levels of press freedom in countries and regions throughout the 
world. Siebert et al. are concerned with the relation between the press and 
its political environment, which they divide into four types, or models: the 
authoritarian, the libertarian, the Soviet and the “social responsibility.” 
These four types are still acknowledged by many mass media researchers to 
describe how different media systems operate in the world.
The first is the authoritarian regime, where the government has absolute 
power and control over the press, such as ownership, content, license, and 
the use of mass media. The authoritarian state requires direct governmental 
control of the mass media, and the media are not allowed to print or broad-
cast anything which could undermine the established authority. Any offense 
to the existing political values is avoided. The fundamental assumption of 
the authoritarian state is that the government is infallible. It may punish 
anyone who questions the state’s ideology or challenges its policies. In such 
a situation, the press cannot be free to deliver information to society, it is 
only used as a machinery to serve the state.
6 Alexander (2005: 9) lists the following criteria to check whether an issue involves free-
dom of expression:
– Freedom of expression is implicated whenever conduct that is intended to communi-
cate a message is suppressed or penalised.
– Freedom of expression is implicated whenever an audience is prevented from receiv-
ing a message.
– Freedom of expression is implicated whenever conduct intended to communicate a 
message is suppressed or penalised with the result that an audience is prevented from 
receiving the message.
– Freedom of expression is implicated whenever an activity is suppressed or penalised 
for the purpose of preventing a message from being received.
7 Although Siebert et al. call them “theories” they are actually more models or types. I will 
use these two interchangeably to refer to their “theories.”
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By contrast, in the second, libertarian model the press is not an instrument 
of the government, but rather a device for presenting evidence and argu-
ments on the basis of which people can check the government and make up 
their minds as to whether its policies are adequate. Therefore it is imperative 
that the press is completely free from any state control and influence.
The third type is the Soviet one, which is closely tied to a specific commu-
nist ideology. Siebert traces the roots of this model back to the 1917 Russian 
Revolution and the postulates of Marx and Engels. The media organisations 
in this system were not intended to be privately owned and were to serve 
the interests of the working class, but the Soviet system appeared similar to 
the authoritarian model, in that in both types the government, and notably 
the party, is superior to the media. The mass media in the Soviet model are 
expected to be self-regulatory with regard to the content of their messages 
and to provide a complete and objective view of the world according to 
Marxist-Leninist principles. Since the beginning in the mid-1980s and con-
tinuing after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia itself has made the transi-
tion to a mass media model closer to the social responsibility model (see 
below), while communist countries such as China have drifted away from 
the Soviet to the authoritarian model.
The fourth type is called the social responsibility model, a name inspired by 
the ideas of the US Commission on Freedom of the Press in the late 1940s. In 
this model the press is basically free, but it has certain obligations to society 
that can be expressed as “informativeness, truth, accuracy, objectivity, and 
balance.” According to Siebert et al. (1956), the goal of the social responsi-
bility model is to diversify the media, reflecting “the diversity of society 
as well as [providing] access to various points of view.” By contrast to the 
libertarian model, the social responsibility one is to provide minority groups 
with access to and influence on different mass media. Most media systems 
in Western Europe today come close to the social responsibility model.8
1.2.4.2. Oloyede’s Socio-Political Systems Approach
Some scholars have constructed alternative models for classifying press sys-
tems after Siebert’s theory. A recent one that has been quite influential and 
is more contemporary is Oloyede (2005), who has elaborated on the social 
responsibility model, which he discusses in relation to a division of socio–
political systems into three categories: (i) the capitalist liberal democracies 
of North America and Western Europe; (ii) the socialist system, and (iii) the 
developing world.
8 As will become clear the “social responsibility” model promoted by Soeharto’s New 
Order resembled the authoritarian model far more closely than the “social responsibility” 
model coined by Siebert et al.
Press Freedom: Introduction, Theoretical Framework, and Research Approach 9
About North America and Western Europe, Oloyede mentions that although 
press freedom evolved in a capitalist liberal democracy, what developed was 
a system of social responsibility of the press. Central to this social responsi-
bility is an attempt to reconcile a set of three divergent principles, i.e. those 
of individual freedom and choice, of media freedom, and of media obliga-
tions to society. Press freedom is therefore not only subject to regulation by 
the “self-righting process of truth” in a “free market place of ideas” as under 
libertarianism, but also to community opinion, consumer action and profes-
sional ethics. These may be enforced by the courts. This leads to a system 
where the Western concept of press freedom is built around three main prin-
ciples: (i) the prohibition of government interference with the press in the 
form of censorship or similar prior restraint [although prior restraints are 
justified under carefully limited circumstances], (ii) the principle that any 
restriction on press freedom must be applied or subject to review by the 
courts, and that courts alone have the right to impose penalties; and (iii) the 
principle of complete private ownership of the print news media and largely 
private ownership of the broadcast media.
The socialist system in Oloyede’s account is quite similar to Siebert’s Sovi-
et model. About developing countries Oloyede mentions that they are in 
between the other two, but he adds an important insight: “regardless of the 
ideology of a Third World nation, strong developmental efforts by ruling 
elites in Third World nations do not leave much room for a free and inde-
pendent press in the Western tradition.” This means that we can distinguish 
a specific type of development media/development journalism. As we will 
see later in this book, this insight is certainly applicable to the Indonesian 
context, especially during Guided Democracy (1957-1965) and the New 
Order (1965-1998).
1.2.4.3. Political Culture Theories about Press Freedom
A number of other relevant theories about press freedom add to the mod-
els discussed above by further contextualising the functioning of the press. 
They not only consider the influence of the state, but also look at other 
sources of power influencing press freedom in the particular context of 
Indonesia. The concept of political culture as central to this type of theory 
has been emphasised by Romano (2003). She discusses the new political cul-
ture that emerged after Soeharto stepped down under Presidents Habibie 
and Wahid, which can be characterised as one of bold and dynamic report-
age and increased freedom to organise and associate. It showed how the 
relationships of political power and communication changed under the 
influence of a new political structure. Those favouring a liberalisation of 
journalism and the political system were using the transitional period to 
pass legal and constitutional changes in order to prevent the elite from 
returning to an authoritarian system as soon as it would no longer be con-
venient to maintain an image of open dialogue with other sectors of society 
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(Romano 2003: 174). In this model the role of the state in shaping and influ-
encing press freedom is still central, but the focus turns from the interaction 
between state and society to how this interaction is shaped by the relation-
ship between social groups. Press curbing, for instance, may not be initiated 
by the government, but by business elites and their militias, while the state 
apparatus takes no action to prevent or protect the press.
Sen and Hill have further elaborated on this theoretical perspective by argu-
ing that “what is much more disputed is exactly how media, culture and 
politics are articulated, how one phenomenon shapes the other, and what 
else needs to be taken into account….” (Sen and Hill 2007:1). They call for 
examining a “media ecology” which consists not only of the government’s 
media policies, but also of “cross-border cultural transfers” and other factors 
within and beyond the control of government (Sen and Hill 2007: 13).
In the same vein, Yin (2003) has argued for explaining press freedom by 
looking at the local and regional context, rather than departing from Siebert 
et al.’s somewhat outdated four models of press freedom, and thus doing 
justice to the complexity of Asia or other third world regions and countries. 
Yin argues that in building a new paradigm for press theories, new ways 
of thinking should be adopted as press control comes in many ways and 
forms, including social and professional institutions. Press theories do not 
have to be limited to address the issue of press freedom and government 
control alone, they can describe stages of press development and the level of 
public involvement as well.
1.2.4.4. Press Theories in this Research
The concepts and theoretical ideas above may be used for two purposes. 
First, they contribute to the terminology that can be used to describe some of 
the findings in this research. And second, they have sensitised the researcher 
to the different factors and actors that may help explain press freedom in 
Indonesia during different periods.
All of these theories point at the political environment as the most important 
influence on press freedom. This is the point of departure for Siebert et al.’s 
typology of 1956, as well as for scholars such as Oloyede who built on their 
work. The theories that focus on political culture add to this by picturing 
a more dynamic context of press freedom. They indicate that press control 
comes in many ways and forms, including social and professional institu-
tions. Although the law is both an outcome of politics as well as a tool to 
control the press, the present research does not limit itself to press laws and 
government control alone: it also looks at stages of press development, the 
level of public involvement and other factors influencing the functioning of 
the press.
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1.2.5. Press: Freedom and Limitation from a Normative Perspective
Next to the above typological and analytical ideas on press freedom there is 
a literature of a more philosophical nature that looks at press freedom from 
a normative perspective. What is the proper balance between freedom and 
limitation and what should be the yardstick to measure this? This question 
has been the subject of scholarly debate as long as there has been a press and 
this debate is unlikely to ever draw to a close. This section will discuss some 
of the main positions that have been advanced by different theorists, with 
particular attention for the question of how limitations on press freedom 
have been justified in order to protect other fundamental rights.
1.2.5.1. Libertarian Theories
The most extreme position is taken by libertarian theorists, who argue for 
complete or virtually complete freedom of expression. A rather recent ver-
sion of this argument is McQuail (1987), who holds that press freedom at its 
genesis was based on the notion that individuals should be free to publish, 
including in the mass media, whatever they like without interference from 
the government or anyone else. This freedom is an extension of other free-
doms, particularly those of conscience and free speech, and underpins all 
major civil, political and religious rights. Lichtenberg (1987: 353) has added 
that the press must be free of government interference just because the gov-
ernment can never be trusted to correct it. In other words, the prospect of 
regulators regulating their own potential critics involves a basic conflict of 
interest.
1.2.5.2. Mill’s Harm Principle
In exploring the idea of freedom of expression, scholars often refer to the 
seminal work of John Stuart Mill On Liberty (1859), which discusses the 
appropriate scope of human liberty. The latter comprises, first, the inward 
domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience (in a comprehen-
sive sense); liberty of thought and feeling; and absolute freedom of opinion 
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or 
theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to 
fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct 
of an individual which concerns other people, but, being almost of as much 
importance as the liberty of thought itself and resting in great part on the 
same reasons, according to Mill the two are practically inseparable. Second-
ly, human liberty requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan 
of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like without impediment 
from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even 
though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Third, 
from this liberty of each individual follows the liberty, within the same lim-
its, of combinations of individuals: the freedom to unite, for any purpose 
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not involving harm to others, the persons combining being supposed to be 
of full age, and not forced or deceived (Mill 2008: 16-17).
By this argument, Mill proposes one of the central tenets of his theory: the 
so-called ‘no harm principle,’ which until today has remained a central point 
of reference in discussions about human liberty. According to Brink (2001: 
121), Mill draws a clear distinction between restrictions on liberty based 
upon the harm principle and restrictions based on paternalist and moralist 
considerations, and that he suggests that only the former are legitimate.
Scanlon (1972: 204-226) has further elaborated on the harm principle in rela-
tion to freedom of expression. Harmful acts include, first, acts of (violent) 
expression, for instance by assault, which can bring about injury or damage 
as a direct physical consequence. It seems clear that an appeal to freedom of 
expression in such a case cannot prevent the imposition of a criminal pen-
alty or the success of a civil action. Second, an act of expression can harm a 
person by causing others to form an adverse opinion of him or by making 
him an object of public ridicule. Third, as Justice Holmes said, “The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shout-
ing fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Fourth, an act of expression may 
contribute to the production of a harmful act by someone else, and at least 
in some cases, the harmful consequences of the latter act may justify making 
the former a crime as well. And fifth, an action which would bring about a 
drastic decrease in the general level of personal safety by radically increas-
ing the capacity of most citizens to inflict harm on each other should be 
subject to restrictions as well.
The idea of harm itself has been specified in relation to freedom of expres-
sion as harm to social interests instead of personal harm. Guinn (2005) has 
drawn attention to the potential conflict between free expression – which 
itself serves some social interests – to other social interests. Thus, when the 
act of expression promotes an important social interest (or value), restrict-
ing that act would require the identification of an equally compelling inter-
est (or value) that would be harmed by the act of expression. Where free 
expression or the interests it serves are deemed important, these cumulative 
concerns justify the development of a ‘preventive’ policy of protecting free 
expression. The state may decide to refrain from regulating expression not 
because these acts advance a social value or interest, but out of concern that 
the attempt to control that expressive act may have the unintended conse-
quence of limiting or ‘chilling’ other expressions that would advance soci-
ety’s interests. Such a policy is based on the fear that any fault in the wall of 
protection represents the first step on a slippery slope of declining freedom.
According to Guinn the type of expression most suitable for protection is 
political expression in a broad sense. Their content is explicitly concerned 
with political ideas, including the advocacy of state policies, criticism of 
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state action, and the promotion of political representatives. Non-protectable, 
because devoid of social value, are expressions creating danger, hate speech 
and obscenity.
The result of Guinn’s argument comes very close to Principle 11 of the Cam-
den Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality:9
11.1. States should not impose any restrictions on freedom of expression that are not in 
accordance with the standards set out in Principle 3.2.10 and in particular, restriction should 
be provided by law, serve to protect the security and public order, or public health or mor-
als, and be necessary in a democratic society to protect these interests. This implies, among 
other things, that restrictions: (i) are clearly and narrowly defined and respond to a press-
ing social need, (ii) are the least intrusive measure available, in the sense that there is no 
other measure which would be effective and yet less restrictive of freedom of expression; 
(iii) are not overbroad, in the sense that they do not restrict speech in a wide or untargeted 
way, or go beyond the scope of harmful speech and rule out legitimate speech; (iv) are 
proportionate in the sense that the benefit to the protected interest outweighs the harm 
to freedom of expression, including in respect to the sanctions they authorize.; 11.2. States 
should review their legal framework to ensure that any restrictions on freedom of expres-
sion conform to the above.
1.2.5.3. Habermas’s Public Sphere
As has been argued above, press freedom has a special character which it 
derives from its role in spreading information, in particular information of 
a political nature. This freedom brings along a particular responsibility: the 
mass media ought to understand themselves as the mandatory of an enlight-
ened public whose willingness to learn and capacity for criticism they at 
once presuppose, demand, and reinforce. Just as the judiciary they ought to 
preserve their independence from political and social pressure; they ought 
to be receptive to the public’s concerns and proposals, take up these issues 
and contributions impartially, augment criticisms, and confront the political 
process with articulate demands for legitimation (Habermas (1996: 378-379).
9 The Camden Principles were developed by the NGO ARTICLE 19 following discussions 
involving UN and other offi cials, civil society representatives and academic experts in 
2008/2009. They represent “a progressive interpretation of international law and stan-
dards, accepted state practice (as refl ected, inter alia, in national laws and the judgments 
of national courts), and the general principles of law recognised by the community of 
nations” (ARTICLE 19 2009: 2).
10 Camden Principle 3.2.: “Domestic legislation should guarantee that:
i. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law.
ii. Everyone has the right to be free of discrimination based on grounds such as race, 
gender, ethnicity, religion or belief, disability, age, sexual orientation, language, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, nationality, property, birth or other sta-
tus.”
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Habermas (1996: 368) adds that freedom of the press, radio and television, 
as well as the right to engage in these areas, safeguards the media infra-
structure of public communication; such liberties are thereby supposed to 
preserve openness for competing opinions and a representative diversity 
of voices. He highlights the importance of the public sphere in establish-
ing communicative action. This public sphere can best be described as a 
network for communicating information and points of view (i.e. opinions 
expressing affirmative or negative attitudes). The streams of communication 
are in the process filtered and synthesised in such a way that they coalesce 
into bundles of topically specified public opinions (Habermas 1996: 360).
1.2.5.4. Press Freedom and its Limitation: An Overview
What is the relevance of the ideas and concepts above to this research? In 
my view they provide the broad normative framework needed for the legal 
analysis of press freedom conducted in this dissertation. Acts of expres-
sion can be both violent and arbitrarily destructive, and it seems unlikely 
that anyone will maintain that as a class they should be immune from legal 
restrictions (Scanlon 1972: 207). Mill’s ‘harm principle,’ its elaboration on 
freedom of expression by Scanlon, and Guinn’s and Habermas’ ideas on 
balancing the interests of freedom of expression and other socially impor-
tant interests are important analytical tools to examine limitations on press 
freedom – not only for analysing cases, but also for re-examining laws and 
policies. The bottom line is that press freedom must be protected in order to 
promote a democratic society and respect for human rights.
1.2.6. Press Freedom, Democracy and Rule of Law
Arguably, press freedom is the most important fundamental freedom in pro-
moting democracy and the rule of law.11 In the words of Friedrich, “freedom 
of the press is considered a cornerstone of constitutional democracy… the 
emergence of constitutional government and in particular the crystallisation 
of the system of popular representation as we know them are inextricably 
interwoven with the growth of the modern press” (quoted in Alger 1996: 
10). In 1792 John Milton already stated (in the classic Areopagitica) that a free 
press will advance a democracy by performing the function of a watchdog in 
preventing the government from abusing its citizens and manipulating polit-
ical processes. As a social institution, the press plays a unique role in inform-
ing the public, shaping public opinion, and checking abuses of government 
power. This unique role is sometimes referred to as “the fourth estate”: the 
press acts as a fourth, ‘unofficial check’ on the three official state branches. In 
this manner it has been key to promoting the expansion of civil and political 
11 Cf. the remarks above about Habermas.
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rights and civil liberties. The press is also central to promoting a balance of 
power in developing the political economy, because it can represent the pub-
lic in controlling, understanding, and informing the government about the 
course and consequences of its policies (Meyerson 2001: 299).
Regardless of the ideological differences in the various socio-political sys-
tems of the world, press freedom as a logical extension of man’s inalienable 
freedom of expression is of universal validity (Oloyede 2005: 101). In prac-
tice, however, press banning, tort suits for libel and slander, defamation, 
intimidation or killing of journalists and many other acts have continued to 
threaten press freedom around the world. Such violations do not only come 
from the government, but also from paramilitary or other social groups. If 
there is no safety for journalists in reporting, it is easy to repress freedom of 
expression in general.
Press freedom is constitutionally protected in Indonesia under the article 
about freedom of expression. As such it is part of the framework forming 
the basis for constitutionalism, which can be defined as the political doctrine 
that claims political authority should be bound by institutions restraining 
the exercise of power. Human rights are a central component of constitu-
tionalism, as is the separation of powers (Lane 1996: 19). Constitutionalism 
can be considered as a particular form of the rule of law. This thesis intends 
to discuss press freedom in the normative light of constitutionalism. In so 
doing, it does not limit itself to a doctrinal analysis of laws defining press 
freedom, but also looks at factors influencing both these laws and their 
implementation.
The basic functions of the rule of law are, first, to curb arbitrary and inequi-
table use of state power, and second, to protect citizens’ property and their 
lives from infringements or assaults by fellow citizens (Bedner 2010: 50-51). 
In the context of press freedom both these functions are relevant. They may 
be achieved through different mechanisms (or elements), which in various 
combinations together constitute a particular form of the rule of law. Bed-
ner’s article provides an overview of legal and empirical questions one may 
ask to assess whether these elements have been realised, thus combining 
them into a single model (Bedner 2010: 70).12
States also differ in the degree to which they are democratic and how inva-
sive they are in regulating the press. Combining these two continuums leads 
to the following typology:
12 I will not list them here, but the relevant questions will be referred to in the chapters con-
cerned.
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The first type is the protective or liberal-democratic state under the rule of 
law, where the state guarantees the freedom of the press and uses its power 
to protect the press from infringements by other citizens. The second type of 
state is the libertarian one, where the state leaves the press completely to its 
own devices: it does not infringe on press freedom, but neither does it pro-
tect the press against any actions by citizens that may undermine press free-
dom within the limits of the law (such as concentration of press ownership 
or harassment by civil suits). The combination of a non-democratic state 
without rule of law and a lack of state interference leads to a situation where 
the press can be harassed at will by the powerful – citizens and officials 
acting on behalf of their own interests alike. And finally, a non-democratic 
state without rule of law but where the state does interfere is repressive or 
authoritarian.
This typology has been used in the present study to identify how the 
Indonesian state and its press policies have moved along both axes. As we 
will see, the Indonesian state has taken all four forms at different points in 
time. The next chart indicates in more detail what types of intervention are 
associated with these four types.
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1.3. Research Approach and Methodology
The present research started in January 2009. At that time press freedom in 
Indonesia had come under serious pressure when compared to the previ-
ous early years of Reformasi. Journalists and editors increasingly fell victim 
to legal and non-legal attacks from social and political elite figures who felt 
their interests were harmed by press reports. The situation became worse 
in 2010, when journalists were killed in Maluku and Papua. Many other 
physical attacks against journalists and editors occurred throughout the 
country, and the government banned Radio Era Baru in Batam and passed 
several measures limiting press freedom. Various anti-press legislations 
were passed by the government. In 2010, Reporters Sans Frontières ranked 
Indonesia at 117, which was the worst position since 2002, but in 2012 Indo-
nesia even dropped to 146, out of 179 countries. In short, this research was 
conducted at a time of deteriorating press freedom.
As already mentioned such press repression has a long history, which start-
ed even before Indonesia became independent. Some of the legal provisions 
that are still important today – such as those in the Penal Code – were creat-
ed first by the Dutch colonial government of the Netherlands-Indies. There-
fore, this research takes a long-term perspective of press freedom, looking 
at the separate topics which together constitute freedom of the press as they 
have developed in the Netherlands-Indies and following them on until the 
present.
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The first of these topics is constitutional law, which I mainly address on the 
basis of the different constitutional texts and the debates surrounding their 
adoption. The second is the development of laws and policies. I have com-
bined their discussion with a brief description of contemporary landmark 
cases, but also with a discussion of the political and legal context in which 
they were adopted or adjudicated. Mechanisms of press self-regulation are 
included as well.
In this manner the research aims to provide a comprehensive understand-
ing of press freedom, combining legal inquiry with an analysis of the law’s 
implementation and the factors which shape this process. It is therefore of 
an interdisciplinary nature, as alluded above, or more precisely, a socio-
legal study. Legal scholarship is at its centre, but this is combined with 
socio-political analysis. Because it involves those different perspectives, the 
research required not only exploring legal norms and text documents, but 
also undertaking empirical fieldwork.
Yet, the largest part of this thesis consists of a thorough analysis of criminal, 
civil and administrative court decisions, from independence until the pres-
ent. Only a few of these judgments were examined before by other schol-
ars.13 Some of them concern interpretations of the progressive Press Law that 
was adopted in 1999 (Law 40/1999), but they also involve the Penal Code, 
the Civil Code, the Pornography Law (Law 44/2008), the Broadcasting Law 
(Law 32/2002), the General Election Law (Law 8/2012), and the Electronic 
Information and Transaction Law (Law 11/2008).
It may seem remarkable that such an analysis has never been undertaken 
before, but in the Indonesian practice of legal research court decisions are 
usually ignored and by some they are not even considered a source of law 
(Bedner 2013: 263).
I spent the first ten months of 2009 in Leiden, designing the research and 
doing literature research. I started by collecting all relevant laws, regulations 
and policies, taking 1848 – the year the Netherlands-Indies was given its 
first constitution-like document – as my starting point. These materials were 
available in the Van Vollenhoven Institute’s library or could be found on the 
Internet. Furthermore, I gathered all information I could find about press 
cases, both in- and outside of the court, and I conducted a literature review, 
both of legal doctrinal writing about the press as historical and social-scien-
tific scholarship.
13 Notably by Hill (1994), Millie (1999), Bedner (2002: 177-182), Agustina (2004), and by the 
NGO LBH Pers (2010).
Press Freedom: Introduction, Theoretical Framework, and Research Approach 19
In October 2009 I started my field research. I focused mainly on press cases 
and disputes that occurred after the fall of Soeharto, but I also conducted 
interviews in order to obtain information about such cases and disputes 
during the regimes of Soeharto and Soekarno. I had several interviews and 
discussions with Atmakusumah Asraatmadja,14 whose memories enabled 
me to acquire a thorough understanding of several legal landmark cases, 
especially those of the newspaper Indonesia Raya.15
I used the fieldwork not only to interview journalists and others about the 
problems they faced regarding press freedom, but also to collect judgments 
from courts to be examined for the legal part of this thesis. I also observed 
court sessions about press cases, attended seminars/conferences, trainings 
of journalists, attended strikes, engaged with regional and local social-advo-
cacy networks, and engaged in other activities which promoted my getting 
information as well as obtaining critical input.16 In the middle of the research 
process, I became actively involved in establishing the Press Legal Aid in 
Surabaya. All of this gave me the opportunity to stay up to date on major 
changes in the field.17
In summary, the fieldwork served to:
1. collect data, especially official and unofficial documents;
2. conduct interviews – altogether I interviewed more than 150 informants, 
mostly journalists, but also judges, policemen, lawyers, press council 
members, media owners, editors in chief, NGO-activists, government 
officials, broadcasting commission members, and historians/experts on 
the press;
3. observe the situation in the field, by attending court sessions, visiting 
secretariats of journalist associations, visiting media offices, and engag-
ing in seminars, discussions, hearings at local or national parliament, 
etc.
14 One in Leiden (May 2009), one in Amsterdam (April 2010), and two in Jakarta (2009 and 
2011). One of these interviews was attended by David Hill, the author of The Press in New 
Order Indonesia, which was very helpful in better understanding the historical context of 
press freedom.
15 See Chapter 3.
16 The ANRC (Australia-Netherlands Research Collaboration) enabled me to do research 
and discuss some of my fi ndings in the Asian Research Centre, Murdoch University, in 
March and April 2012.
17 I was inspired by Cohen’s approach to media research: “Clarify and explain the applica-
tion of law to media, society, and individuals; suggest legal reform; identify the impact of 
law on society and institutions; identify the impact of society and institutions on law; 
examine and explain judicial decision-making; and examine the process and quality of 
media coverage of the law” (Cohen 1986: 14).
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I started to conduct my research in seven fieldwork sites: Medan, Jakarta, 
Surabaya, Makassar, Denpasar, Mataram and Kupang. The research sites 
were selected on the basis of the following criteria: first, number of legal 
cases, second, the presence or absence of serious political and social ten-
sions, third, the presence or absence of violence against the press, fourth, 
the presence or absence of a strong or weak press freedom movement, and 
fifth, financial and time constraints. The sites were chosen after discussions 
with informants, and information obtained through the Internet. During the 
period of fieldwork I decided to include two others, Banda Aceh and Jaya-
pura, because of serious press cases which emerged there. At these research 
sites I spent from several days to several weeks, depending on the number 
of court cases to be examined, the number of interviews I could conduct and 
the number of other meaningful activities I could engage in. Altogether I 
carried out a year of field research.
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way on the basis of a 
list of questions I drafted in Leiden, at the beginning of the research. How-
ever, I continuously adapted it on the basis of new insights from my field 
research. In triangulating findings, I also used small group discussions, 
mostly with journalist associations at the field level.18
1.3.1. Structure of the Book
Chapter 2 starts with an overview of the constitutional history of freedom 
of expression and freedom of the press. It explores the debates about and 
ideas underlying these rights, starting with the 1945 Constitution, and con-
tinuing with those about the Constitutions of 1949 and 1950, those in the 
Konstituante (the Constitution Making Assembly) during 1956-1959, and 
finally those during the amendment process of the 1945 Constitution during 
1999-2002. This discussion provides a basic overview of the various political 
positions regarding press freedom as they will also come to the fore in the 
subsequent two chapters.
Chapters 3 and 4 consist of a legal-political history of press freedom in Indo-
nesia, Chapter 3 starting with the Netherlands-Indies and continuing until 
the beginning of the New Order (1966), Chapter 4 discussing the New Order 
until the present. These chapters provide a general overview of the develop-
ment of press freedom, incorporating political and legal developments, with 
an emphasis on changes in legislation and policy and landmark court cases.
18 Semi-structured interviews and group discussions complement one another in the type 
of information they generate (Bryman 2004: 126).
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Chapter 5, 6, and 7 are of a legal nature and focus in depth on how the Indo-
nesian courts have protected – or sometimes failed to protect – press free-
dom. Chapter 5 looks at criminal law cases, Chapter 6 at civil law (main-
ly tort) cases, while Chapter 7 discusses administrative law cases (mainly 
licensing disputes).
Finally, Chapter 8 brings together the major findings of the study by provid-
ing an answer to the research questions set out in this introduction. I will 
also make a number of suggestions based on these findings to promote press 




The development of human rights ideas in Indonesian constitutional history 
has been influenced by the human rights discourse as it first emerged after the 
American War of Independence and during the French Revolution. These rev-
olutions were the first to highlight political rights and civil liberties, includ-
ing freedom from torture, freedom from extra-judicial punishment, freedom 
to unite, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression. The American Bill 
of Rights of 1791, which provides the guarantee of press freedom, and the 
French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789 became major land 
marks in political thought worldwide, including in the European colonies.
The idea to embed fundamental rights and freedoms in a constitution was 
further stimulated by the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and incorporating human rights provisions 
into a constitution is now characteristic of most modern constitutions. Since 
1948, the normative framework of human rights in the UDHR has been fol-
lowed and operationalised by numerous international covenants or conven-
tions on human rights, and gradually been adopted by states – including 
Indonesia – as a recognition of an international legal order constructed to 
maintain international relations (Wiratraman 2007).
The idea of human rights is thus closely linked to the concept of constitution-
alism. According to Wignyosoebroto (2002: 415-417; 2003: 19), ‘constitutional-
ism’ incorporates the pursuit of grounding rights and freedoms in a consti-
tution, thus limiting strictly and clearly the power of the state, listing what 
is legitimate authority or, adversely, what is arbitrary power or misuse of 
power. In other words, constitutionalism is a political doctrine which claims 
that political authority shall be bound by institutions in order to limit the rul-
ing power (Lane 1996: 19). The diverse approaches within constitutionalism 
are sometimes explained as a dichotomy between liberal approaches, which 
centre on rights-possessing individuals who seek equality before the law, and 
socialist approaches, which grant rights to the community at the expense of 
the individual and which allow community interests to be determined by the 
state (Hassall and Saunders 2002: 33).
Understanding the constitutionalism regarding freedom of expression in 
Indonesia, including press freedom, requires an inquiry into the constitu-
tion and constitutional debates. It concerns the extent to which freedom of 
2 Constitutional Ideas, Freedom of 
Expression and Press Freedom
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expression has been discussed in promoting rights and what guarantees the 
constitutional framers had in mind to make sure that freedom of expression 
would be effectively guaranteed.
The present chapter will focus on these constitution-making processes and 
their debates regarding freedom of expression and press freedom under 
the Indonesian Constitution. It looks at the minutes of the debates dealing 
with either drafting or amending the Constitution, especially in 1945, 1949, 
1950, 1956-1959, and 1999-2002. At the same time, it is also necessary to pay 
attention to the absence of such debates in the period 1959-1999, as this will 
help to understand the jump from the Konstitutante (Constitutional Council) 
debates in 1956-1959 to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) sessions 
in 1999-2002. In the absence of (recorded) debates, the proposals on consti-
tutional change in the period 1959-1999 will be explained by looking at why 
the idea of constitutional reform had failed.
2.2. Freedom of Expression in BPUPKI and PPKI Sessions
Freedom of association and assembly, and freedom 
of expression of thought and of issuing writing
 and the like, shall be prescribed by statute.
(Article 28, Indonesia’s Constitution, 1945)
In order to understand the nature of the debate about the 1945 Constitution, 
it is necessary to understand the political situation at the time. During World 
War II, with the Japanese about to lose the war, the Dutch sought to re-estab-
lish their authority in Indonesia. Before their defeat, however, the Japanese 
started helping the Indonesian nationalists to prepare for self-government. 
On 7 September 1944, Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso promised Indonesia 
independence, although no date was set.1
About half a year later, this promise led to the establishment of the Investi-
gating Committee for Preparing Indonesia’s Independence (BPUPKI), a Jap-
anese-organised committee, which was to support independence in Indo-
nesia.2 The first task of this committee was to prepare independence and 
to draft a constitution. This development contributed significantly to the 
revolutionary character of the transition to independence (Feith 1962: 2).
1 The promise of independence was continued by appointing Soekarno and Hatta as lead-
ers of the nationalists, whose antagonism to the Dutch had led them to look at the Japa-
nese as an evil, but necessary ally. The two started the process of preparing for indepen-
dence in May 1945, hoping to secure it before the expected victory by the allied forces 
(Cribb and Brown 1995: 15).
2 Dokuritu Zyunbi Tyoosakai or Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia. The 
organisation was founded on 29 April 1945 by Lieutenant General Keimakici Harada, the 
commander of the 16th Army in Java.
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The first debate on the freedom of expression as a constitutional right in 
Indonesia took place during one of the meetings held by the BPUPKI. The 
BPUPKI members were divided into several sub-committees (Bunkakai) and 
the so-called Committee of Fundamental Law (Panitia Hukum Dasar). The 
Committee of Fundamental Law had 19 members and was chaired by Ir 
Soekarno. It was renamed the Constitutional Committee (Panitia Undang-
Undang Dasar), with most of its members assigned to sit on the so-called 
Small Committee of Constitutional Drafters (Panitia Kecil Perancang Undang-
Undang Dasar), chaired by Prof Mr Dr Soepomo. There were two official ses-
sions, chaired by Dr Radjiman Wedyodiningrat. The first session was held 
between 28 May-1 June 1945, and discussed the philosophical underpinning 
of the state;3 the second session was conducted between 10-17 July 1945, and 
dealt with the state’s form, its territory, citizenship, the draft constitution, 
economy and finance, defence, education and teaching.
The Constitution Committee’s first meeting took place on 11 July 1945 in 
the Tyuuoo-In building.4 The draft of the constitution was first debated, fol-
lowed by checking its language. The concept and rules around the freedom 
of expression, as articulated in Article 28 of the Constitution (UUD 1945),5 
were only touched upon briefly. In BPUPKI’s second session, on 15 July 
1945, Soekarno spoke of the importance of moving away from individual-
ism and asked the members of the BPUPKI to not incorporate freedom of 
thought into the constitution as a ‘right of the citizen’. For Soekarno, the 
idea of ‘social justice’, which was formulated in the Preamble of the Consti-
tution, was a fundamental statement against individualism:
Your excellencies! We want social justice. For what the Grondwet says, that humans not 
only have freedom of speech, the right to vote, the right to have meetings and sessions, if 
there is no sociale rechtvaardigheid? For what purpose do we make a Grondwet, if the Grond-
wet can’t provide for suffering and starving people? A Grondwet which contains “droit de 
l’homme et du citoyen” cannot prevent poor people’s starvation and their consequent death. 
Therefore, if we really want to establish our state on the principles of kinship,6 help, mutu-
al assistance,7 and social justice, throw away any ideas of individualism and liberalism. 
(Bahar et al. 1995: 259-260)
What is interesting about Soekarno’s idea is that it reflects an ‘indivisibil-
ity’ principle. This refers to the inseparability or integration of two types 
of human rights, the civil and political rights on one hand, and economic, 
social and cultural rights on the other. Soekarno regards what he calls ‘free-
dom of speech’ as a right that is inseparable from the ‘right to food or free-
dom from starvation’. This opinion reflects closely a human rights theory, 
3 Dasar Negara.
4 Currently this building is the Foreign Affairs Department.




which is based on the idea that both types of rights are needed for a digni-
fied human life, and all human rights have an equal status (Ravindran 1998; 
Leckie 1998). This principle was also discussed during the drafting process 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Morsink 1999: 290-296; Free-
man 2002: 34-42).
After Soekarno had spoken before the BPUPKI session, Hatta replied as fol-
lows:
… [B]ut I worry about one thing, if there is no belief or commitment to the people in the 
Constitution about the right to speech and expression – the right in the Constitution that 
we are drafting now – we may establish a state model with which we disagree. Because in 
the state’s law as we have it now, we see a “kadaver discipline” situation as we have seen in 
Russia and Germany, and this is my point of objection. Regarding the incorporation of the 
“droits de l’homme et du citoyen,” it is indeed unnecessary to include them here (Constitu-
tion), because they are just the requirements for protecting human rights against ruthless 
kings in the past. These rights are incorporated in the grondwet-grondwet (fundamental law) 
after the Franse Revolutie (French Revolution), just for fighting such ruthlessness. But we 
are founding a new state. We should consider requirements in order for our state not to 
turn into an authoritarian state based upon power. We want a state that rules, we awaken a 
new society based on mutual assistance, common endeavour, our aim to improve society. 
Nevertheless we should never give unlimited power to the state so that on top of that new 
state, a state based on power arises. Therefore, it is good to provide an article to prevent 
fear of using freedom of speech for citizens. (Bahar et al. 1995: 262)8
Hatta’s statement thus underlined the importance of “freedom of speech” 
for making power accountable.9 This line of argument was consistently 
championed by Hatta during the BPUPKI sessions. In the end, it was due 
8 “.. [t]etapi satu hal yang saya kuatirkan, kalau tidak ada satu keyakinan atau satu pertanggungan 
kepada Rakyat dalam Undang-Undang Dasar yang mengenai hak untuk mengeluarkan suara, 
yaitu bahwa nanti di atas Undang-Undang Dasar yang kita susun sekarang inimungkin terjadi 
suatu bentukan negara yang tidak kita setujui. Sebab dalam hukum negara sebagai sekarang ini 
mungkin timbul suatu keadaan “kadaver discipline” seperti yang kita lihat di Rusia dan Jerman, 
inilah yang saya kuatirkan. Tentang memasukkan hukum yang disebut “droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen.” memang tidak perlu dimasukkan di sini, sebab itu semata-mata adalah syarat-syarat 
untuk mempertahankan hak-hak orang seseorang terhadap kezaliman raja-raja masa dahulu. Hak-
hak ini dimasukkan dalam grondwet-grondwet sesudah Franse Revolution semata-mata untuk 
menentang kezaliman itu. Akan tetapi kita mendirikan negara yang baru. Hendaklah kita mem-
perhatikan syarat-syarat supaya negara yang kita bikin jangan menjadi Negara Kekuasaan. Kita 
menghendaki negara pengurus, kita membangunkan masyarakat baru yang berdasar kepada 
gotong royong, usaha bersama, tujuan kita ialah membaharui masyarakat. Tetapi di sebelah itu 
janganlah kita memberikan kekuasaan yang tidak terbatas kepada negara untuk menjadikan di 
atas negara baru itu suatu negara kekuasaan. Sebab itu ada baiknya dalam salah satu pasal, misal-
nya pasal yang mengenai warga negara, disebutkan juga di sebelah hak yang sudah diberikan 
kepada misalnya tiap-tiap warga negara jangan takut mengeluarkan suaranya.” (1998: 286)
9 The opinion that freedom of speech and freedom of expression should be regarded as 
fundamental freedoms cannot be separated from Hatta’s ideas during the BPUPKI ses-
sions. Although it was hardly debated, freedom of expression was fi nally guaranteed by 
the Constitution, even if some restrictions remained in place. See also Soebadio Sastro-
satomo (1995: 25), who argues that human rights articles, especially on the freedom of 
expression, were adopted into the Constitution because of Hatta’s efforts.
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to Hatta’s persistence on this issue that freedom of expression was guaran-
teed in Indonesia’s Constitution (Sastrosatomo 1995: 25). Although its form 
was limited due to the parliament’s capability of restricting it, this could be 
regarded as a necessary compromise in the initial process of building the 
country.
Hatta advocated a similar stance on press freedom. He argued that press 
freedom should be guaranteed, and, therefore, that censorship and press 
banning (persbreidel) should be prohibited. Nevertheless, he accepted the 
imposition of certain limitations by acts of parliament – the formal voice of 
people’s representatives in the political system. In principle, he argued, the 
limitation had to be bound by legislation, in order to respect other rights.
This position differed from what he had defended earlier. During a speech 
at an Indology Student Association meeting in Utrecht on 4 November 1930, 
Hatta had already discussed the need for fundamental freedoms, and how 
people’s pressure on the colonial government had led to the annulment of 
Article 11 of the Regeringsreglement (the Netherlands-Indies Constitution), 
which prohibited the gathering of political organisations (Hatta 1930: 8). 
Limiting freedom of expression including press freedom should never be 
done “in a conservative way,” so he argued. As he wrote in Daulat Rakjat 
(No. 8, 30-11-1931), press freedom in the Constitution of Belgium was much 
broader than in the Dutch Constitution (as stipulated in Article 7), because 
under the Dutch Constitution, press freedom could be limited by the law. If 
the ruler is conservative, it is likely that “what is given by the right hand is 
taken away by the left hand.” Thus, originally, Hatta argued for a more lib-
eral way of protecting press freedom. During the constitution-drafting pro-
cess, however, he agreed to the idea of limiting press freedom through leg-
islation on the grounds that the limitation could not contradict the essence 
of constitutional rights.
The idea of press freedom was also advocated by Liem Koen Hian, chief edi-
tor of Sit Tit Po. He argued during the BPUPKI session on 15 July 1945 that 
press freedom must be guaranteed by Indonesia’s Constitution. According to 
Liem, “[i]n proposing fundamental rights (grondrechten), not only the right of 
assembly and the right to discuss, but also right to print (drukpers), and the 
onschendbaarheid van woorden (inviolability of words) should be guaranteed. 
Press freedom is needed to reduce the badness of state and society” (Adine-
goro 1963: 62).
However, Liem’s proposal was rejected by Soepomo, and press freedom 
was left out of Article 28 of the Indonesian Constitution. In the role of ‘law 
expert’, Soepomo could exert considerable influence over the BPUPKI ses-
sions, and he disagreed with Hatta’s way of regarding and incorporating 
into the Constitution a number of fundamental rights. Nonetheless, he pro-
posed a compromise article to accommodate Hatta’s ideas as follows:
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… Mr Chairman excellency, if the guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitution, 
which is based upon the principle of the family system, would not be established, it does 
not mean at all that people who organise themselves, can neither speak nor assemble… 
Absolutely not. The principle of the family system and of deliberation which have been 
accepted as Indonesian state foundations, automatically include people’s freedoms to 
unite and assemble.10
.... Both the Committee chairman and myself have explained at length that the reason why 
the Committtee did not include it [freedom of expression] in the fundamental rights (grond-
rechten), is because this idea would be contrary to the family system, our draft’s systematic, 
but we have also explained, that because it was not included, this does not mean at all that 
people cannot hold meetings or gatherings and so on, because those things are in a modern 
state automatically regulated by law.... Hence, we propose a compromise provision, but 
never one against the systematics of this constitutional draft.... (Bahar et al. 1995: 276, 321)11
Soepomo thus argued that to insert grondrechten (fundamental rights) into 
the Constitution would go against the underlying principle of kinship and 
the system designed on that basis.12 The most fundamental opposition came 
from Yamin, who said:
I only ask to really consider this, because what we are talking about is people’s rights. If 
this is unclear in our Constitution, there is a mistake of the Grondwet; a Grondwettelijke fout 
[Constitutional Error] would be a big sin to the people who are expecting their rights from 
the Republic. For instance as to what addresses citizens, it should never be considered that 
only citizens will have rights; residents will be protected by this Republic as well. (Bahar 
et al. 1995: 323)13
10 “[P]aduka Tuan Ketua, jikalau jaminan hak-hak dasar orang seseorang dalam Undang-Undang 
Dasar yang bersifat kekeluargaan itu tidak diadakan, itu sama sekali tidak berarti, bahwa rakyat 
berserikat, tidak boleh bersuara atau tidak boleh berkumpul, sama sekali tidak. Dasar kekeluargaan 
dan dasar permusyawaratan yang telah kita terima sebagai dasar-dasar Negara Indonesia, dengan 
sendirinya menghendaki kemerdekaan rakyat berserikat dan berkumpul.” (1998: 301).
11 “[T]adi dengan panjang lebar, baik oleh Ketua Panitia, maupun oleh saya sendiri diterangkan apa 
sebabnya Panitia tidak memasukkan dalam hukum dasar tadi yang dinamakan grondrechten, ial-
ah oleh karena pemasukan itu menentang sistematik kekeluargaan, sistematik rancangan kita, 
akan tetapi kami telah menerangkan juga, bahwa tidak dimasukkannya sama sekali tidaklah berar-
ti, bahwa rakyat tidak akan mempunyai kemungkinan bersidang atau berkumpul dan lain-lain, 
sema sekali tidak, oleh karena hal-hal itu dalam negara yang modern dengan sendirinya sudah 
tentu diatur dalam Undang-Undang. ...Oleh karena itu, kami usulkan suatu aturan yang men-
gandung kompromis, akan tetapi tidak akan menentang sistematik rancangan anggaran dasar 
ini...” (1998: 346).
12 According to Sri Soemantri, “… these different thoughts should be scrutinised, whether 
the situation has infl uenced personal thought or not. It is because Professor Soepomo 
was involved during the Constitution (UUD 1945)-making process and the UUDS-mak-
ing process. The UUD 1945 was formulated during the Japanese occupation. Soepomo, as 
a professor of adat law, has always promoted the principle of the family system which he 
based on elements of Hegel’s theory.” (Kompas Sabtu, 14 Agustus 2004).
13 “Saya hanya minta perhatian betul-betul, karena yang kita bicarakan ini hak rakyat. Kalau hal ini 
tidak terang dalam hukum dasar, maka ada kekhilafan daripada grondwet, grondwettelijke fout, 
kesalahan Undang-Undang Hukum Dasar, besar sekali dosanya buat rakyat yang menanti-nanti-
kan hak daripada republik, misalnya mengenai yang tertuju kepada warga negara, jangan difi kir-
kan bahwa hanya warga negara yang akan mendapat hak, juga penduduk akan diperlindungi oleh 
republik ini” (1998: 348).
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Yamin thus demonstrated a view promoting universalism of human rights, 
i.e. not limiting or distinguishing between human rights by dividing them 
into particular ideological or political blocks.
Finally, Soepomo proposed what he called a ‘compromise formulation’, by 
adding an article saying that:
Citizens’ freedoms to discuss and assemble, to express thought by oral or written and other 
forms will be prescribed by law. (Sekretariat Negara 1998: 346)
The right, thus, did not become a subjectief recht (subjective right), as pro-
posed by Soetardjo but was named a liberty/freedom (kemerdekaan) through 
a vote by the members of the BPUPKI. At the next session, on 16 July 1945, 
Soepomo proposed to further adjust the article according to Djajadiningrat’s 
proposal. Thus Article 28 became, “The freedoms to unite and assemble, 
to express thought in oral, written and other forms are prescribed by law” 
(Bahar et al. 1995: 360).
One day after the promulgation of independence, the Committee for Pre-
paring Indonesia’s Independence (PPKI/Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia) started its sessions. The PPKI was established on 7 August 1945, 
and started work after the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945. 
At the first session of the PPKI on 18 August 1945, the BPUPKI draft of Arti-
cle 28 of the Constitution was read out again by PPKI Chairman Soekarno, 
and it was finally and formally approved. This formulation was maintained 
until 1949 and would also be valid between 1959 and the second amend-
ment of the 1945 Constitution in 2000.
The proposals and debates about the freedom of expression in the BPUPKI 
meetings show that it was considered as an important means to fight the 
abuse of power. Founding fathers Soekarno, Hatta, Yamin, Soepomo and 
others demonstrated that they had a thorough understanding of the con-
cept. The different ideological perspectives in relation to liberalism and indi-
vidualism which were presumed to endanger the tradition of mutual assis-
tance, were finally resolved by the introduction of a short and simple article 
on freedom of expression as a fundamental freedom under the Constitution, 
which included freedom of the press.
For this reason, many discussions about press freedom relate to Article 28 of 
the 1945 Constitution. Yet, this constitutional right eventually proved insuf-
ficient to offer clear protection of press freedom. There are three reasons for 
this. First, the concept is very broad and open to interpretation. Second, the 
article had to be operationalised by legislation. Lastly, the words ‘prescribed 
by statute’ in Article 28 were later changed into specific rules, which seri-
ously restricted the freedom of expression. This also explains Bedner’s con-
clusion that “freedom of opinion and expression is not guaranteed by the 
Constitution” (2001: 177).
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2.3. Freedom of Expression in the 1949 Federal Constitution 
and UUDS 1950 Draft
In the early years of Indonesia’s independence, the Dutch government still 
tried to claim authority and control over Indonesia. Part of its strategy was 
to promote a federal state form, to which end the Netherlands supported the 
establishment of a union of regional states such as Indonesia Timur, Pasun-
dan, Jawa Timur and others.14 The federal principle was actually accepted 
by both the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, in the Linggarjati 
Agreement, concluded in November 1946. During these discussions, both 
sides also agreed to promote fundamental human rights as formulated in 
the United Nations Charter and to respect them in both the Republic and the 
other states forming part of the Union (Drooglever 1997: 69).
A few months later, in 1947, the Dutch started their first military action 
against the Republic,15 followed by a second attack in 1948. The latter back-
fired, but elicited a negative response from the international community.16 
As a result, the United Nations forced the Dutch government to resume 
negotiations with the government of the Indonesian Republic, the so-called 
Renville negotiations (Kahin 2003: 401; Nasution 1979). On 18 March 1948 
the Dutch presented a working paper on the Constitution. Only a few days 
later, the Indonesian Republican Committee headed by Soepomo presented 
a draft of its own, which contained the principal outline of a constitution for 
the United States of Indonesia. This draft included the protection of human 
rights as referred to in the United Nations Charter (NIB XIII: 222-3; 276-9, in 
Drooglever 1997: 70-71).
The United Nations’ Security Council Resolution of 28 January 1949 once 
again made clear what importance was attached to the freedom of expres-
sion. It recommended the establishment of a commission to guarantee fair 
and democratic general elections as well as freedom of expression (Para. 4 
14 For a closer look at political developments in the early years of independence, and how 
the Dutch government tried to reclaim power by politically supporting the federal gov-
ernment, see George McTurnan Kahin (2003).
15 The Dutch government preferred to use the term politionele acties, instead of ‘agression’.
16 The states which supported Indonesia in condemning the Dutch military attack included 
Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, and many other Asian states, especially the states 
that attended the Asian Conference in New Delhi on 20 January 1949. It should be noted 
that India was the pioneer of Asian and African states in mobilising international support 
for Indonesia’s independence struggle at that time (Nasution 1979: 9-63).
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(e) a-b).17 This resolution became an important reference for the negotiations 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands about the provisional constitution 
for the new state. These negotiations, called the Roundtable Conference 
(KMB),18 took place in The Hague from 23 August to 2 November 1949. The 
Indonesian side was represented by the government of the Republic of Indo-
nesia and members of the Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg (BFO),19 led by 
Mr Mohammad Roem. The other participants were the Dutch government 
and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia.20 The negotiations led to 
three major points of agreement: first, the establishment of the United States 
of Indonesia (USI; Negara Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS); second, the transfer 
of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, and third, the establishment 
of a union between the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia.
The draft constitution for the United States of Indonesia, henceforth referred 
to as the 1949 Federal Constitution, was formulated by the delegates of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the BFO.21 It had already been discussed before 
the official negotiations started, and once again Soepomo was its main archi-
tect.22 The draft had also been approved by the Central Indonesia National 
17 UN Security Council Resolution Para. 4 (e) a-b: “The Commission, or such other United 
Nations agency as may be established in accordance with its recommendation under 
paragraph 4 (c) above, is authorized to observe on behalf of the United Nations the elec-
tions to be held throughout Indonesia and is further authorized, in respect of the territo-
ries of Java, Madura and Sumatra, to make recommendations regarding the conditions 
necessary (a) to ensure that the elections are free and democratic, and (b) to guarantee 
freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is 
not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.”
18 Konferensi Meja Bundar.
19 The Meeting for Federal Consultation, also known as the PPF delegation. The chairman 
of the BFO/PPH was Sultan Hamid II, who also represented the delegation from West 
Kalimantan/Borneo.
20 UNCI (United Nations Commission for Indonesia) is the organisation established by the 
United Nations.
21 The fi nal document was concluded in Scheveningen and added as an appendix to the 
Agreement Charter (Handvest van Overeenstemming) between the Republic of Indonesia 
delegation and the BFO delegation about The Draft Planning of the United States of Indo-
nesia Constitution, 29 October 1949 (Het Secretariaat-Generaal van de Ronde Tafel Conferentie 
1949: 54-55). Nevertheless, the republicans and federalists had already discussed and 
negotiated a constitutional design during a pan-Indonesia conference in Yogyakarta.
22 According to Drooglever (1997: 79), the republican arrogance and the federalist weakness 
was refl ected furnished by an act of Soepomo, who at the end of a long discussion on an 
unrelated subject fl ung a small note on the table with the casual remark that he supposed 
that the gentlemen would agree with its contents, and that they would do so without a 
word.
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Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat/KNIP).23 It was officially adopt-
ed on 14 December 1949 and came into force on 27 December 1949.24
Then, on 19 May 1950, the Republic of Indonesia and USI agreed to rebuild 
a Unitary State of the Republic Indonesia (NKRI, Negara Kesatuan Repub-
lik Indonesia), as mandated since the promulgation of independence on 17 
August 1945. This was written in the so-called Agreement Charter between 
the Government of the United States of the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, who were represented by their 
respective Prime Ministers, Mohammad Hatta (RIS) and A. Halim (RI).25
In the session on 19-20 July 1950, after the draft of the Provisional Consti-
tution of the Republic of Indonesia had been presented, agreement was 
reached and finally, the new constitutional draft (the Provisional Consti-
tution of the Republic of Indonesia or UUD Sementara Republik Indonesia/
UUDS) was formally enacted by Law No. 7 of 1950 (State Sheet of RIS (Lem-
baran Negara) 56/1950). From the point of view of a constitutional lawyer, 
enacting a constitution by using lower legislation is incorrect, but – similarly 
23 The Vice-President’s Proclaim (Maklumat Wakil Presiden) No. X of 16 October 1945 autho-
rised the legislative power of the KNIP, whilst MPR and The People’s Representative 
Council (or DPR) had not been established yet.
24 Two important things should be noted. First, the 1949 Federal Constitution was provi-
sional in nature, as defi ned by Article 186, which stipulated: “The Constituante (Constitu-
tion Making Council), together with the Government are asked soon to formulate the Republic of 
Indonesia Constitution that will change this provisional constitution.” Second, the USI estab-
lishment was based on the 1949 Federal Constitution, which also recognised the territory 
of the Republic of Indonesia. Article 2 of the 1949 Federal Constitution recognised the 
Republic of Indonesia as a part of the USI, which territory was mentioned in the Renville 
agreement. From the point of view of the constitution’s applicability, the UUD 1945 still 
existed in the Republic of Indonesia, whilst the 1949 Federal Constitution still existed in 
the USI. Hence, Indonesia used to have two constitutions, each of which was applicable 
to a different territory. The federal state in the form of the KMB could no longer exist, 
because power had been consolidated in the early years after independence, so that the 
idea of the United States of Indonesia became unpopular. Both in the Netherlands as well 
as in Indonesia, the result of the KMB was opposed, not only for the legal consequences, 
but also for political and psychological reasons. See for example Mr Moh Roem’s speech, 
the Chairman of the Republic of Indonesia delegation in The Second Minister Conference 
Union Indonesia-Netherlands, S-Gravenhage, 20-29 November 1950 (Secretariat Uni Indo-
nesia-Belanda 1950: 24).
25 The follow-up to this agreement was the preparation of a draft constitution and the estab-
lishment of a Joint Committee (Panitia Bersama). The Joint Committee was chaired by Prof 
Dr R. Soepomo (representing RIS) and Mr Abdul Hakim (representing RI). The result of 
this committee was noted in Rentjana Konstitusi Sementara Republik Indonesia (the Provi-
sional Constitution Draft of the Republic of Indonesia), which was set up by the Joint 
Committee of the United States of the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Indone-
sia. The result was submitted to and authorised by the Working Council of the Central 
Indonesia National Committee (Badan Pekerja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP, 
authorised on 12 August 1950 and also known as the People’s Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)) and the Senate of the United States of Indonesia (Senat Repub-
lik Indonesia Serikat, authorised on 14 August 1950).
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to the 1949 Federal Constitution – the UUDS 1950 was provisional in nature, 
as clearly formulated in Article 134.26
The main difference between the 1950 Constitution and the 1949 Federal 
Constitution concerned the form of the state. Regarding human rights there 
was only one change. The 1949 Federal Constitution had incorporated the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and thus contained a solid 
list of fundamental rights and freedoms. These were directly transplanted to 
the 1950 Constitution (Purbopranoto 1979: 28). The fundamental rights and 
freedom provisions in the Annex of Statute of the Indonesia-Netherlands 
Union were also stipulated in Part V and VI of the UUDS 1950. In addition, 
Article 21 of the 1950 Constitution introduced the right to strike, which nei-
ther the 1949 Federal Constitution nor the 1945 Constitution had included.27 
The 1950 Constitution formulated the freedom of expression as follows:
Article 19: Every person has the right to hold and express opinions.28
Article 33 and 34 of the 1950 Constitution stipulate a number of limitations 
on rights and freedoms, and how the authorities should apply these.
Article 33: The exercise of the rights and freedoms listed in this part can only be limited by 
legislation in order to guarantee their recognition and respect for them and to fulfill the just 
requirements for peace, morality, and prosperity in a democratic society.29
Article 34: No provision in this part can be interpreted so as to mean, that a ruler, a group, 
or an individual can derive any right from it to try something or to commit any deed deny-
ing rights or freedoms as clarified within the Constitution.30
The above articles thus allowed for limiting rights and freedoms under 
certain considerations. This was stated by Yamin, who argued that legisla-
tion may only further regulate constitutional rights, but never narrow them 
down (Yamin 1956: 183). This observation is important in evaluating the 
degree of constitutionality of legislation, which limits the freedom of expres-
sion. It may be used to ascertain whether the law only serves the interests of 
the regime, or whether it genuinely protects freedom of expression. This will 
26 Article 134 of the UUDS 1950 states: “The Constituante (Constitution Making Council), 
together with the Government are asked soon to formulate a Republic of Indonesia Constitution 
that will change this provisional constitution.” This article is similar to Article 186 of the Fed-
eral Constitution.
27 Civil rights groups, especially Indonesian labour movement groups, faced a real struggle 
to obtain this right. The inclusion of this right in post-WWII constitutions following civil 
rights groups pressure also occurred in the USSR (1946), France (1946), and Italy (1947) 
(Soepomo 1950: 9-10, 42).
28 This provision is similar to Article 19 of the Konstitusi RIS.
29 This article is similar to Article 32 of the Konstitusi RIS and Article 29 section 2 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
30 This article is similar to Article 33 of the Konstitusi RIS and Article 30 of the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights.
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be further discussed in the next chapter of this thesis. Nevertheless, despite 
this point of concern, the scope of guarantees of rights and freedoms in the 
1950 Constitution and the 1949 Federal Constitution was considerable, cer-
tainly for its time. As noted by Poerbopranoto in 1953 (1953: 92), “the 1949 
Federal Constitution and 1950 Constitution are the only constitutions that 
adopted human rights as a United Nations Organisation decision (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) into a Constitution Charter.”
Moreover, these two constitutions provided a far more detailed and com-
plete formulation of rights than the Constitution of 1945. Yet, although both 
contributed to the development of human rights in Indonesia, they paid no 
serious attention to press freedom as a special issue. While it might have 
made no difference if they would have done, this foreshadowed what was 
to follow and what will be discussed in further detail in the next chapters: 
press freedom in practice was constantly endangered. In other words, these 
progressive articles on human rights were hardly important in the eyes of 
the governments in their dealings with the press.
2.4. Freedom of Expression in the Konstituante Council Sessions 
(1956-1959)
The Constitutional Council or Konstituante was officially formed on 10 
November 1956 and held meetings for almost two and a half years. As man-
dated by Article 134 of the 1950 Constitution, the Konstituante together with 
the government, was in charge of drafting a new Constitution. It was elected 
at the same time as Parliament during the general elections of 1955. The 
majority of the parties constituting the Council fell ideologically into three 
groups:31 those based on religion,32 those based on socialism,33 and those 
based on so-called ‘indigeneous nationalism’ (Cribb and Brown 1995: 52).34
In his doctoral dissertation, Adnan Buyung Nasution (1992) explained how 
the idea of freedom of expression as debated by the Konstituante cannot be 
separated from the historical context of the early years of independence, 
when Indonesia had numerous steps to take in order to develop a constitu-
tional government. One such step was to embed freedom of expression into 
the new constitution. As expressed by one of the Konstituante members:
31 Other scholars have distinguished different categories, such as Feith and Castles (1970) 
who divided Indonesia’s political thinking into fi ve groups: (1) radical nationalism; (2) 
Javanese traditionalism; (3) Islam; (4) democratic socialism; (5) communism.
32 Nahdlatul Ulama, Masyumi, Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) and Partai Syarikat Islam 
Indonesia (PSII).
33 Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI).
34 PNI, Partai Indonesia Raya (PIR), and Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN).
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Not only to become a people free to express its opinion, free to choose any life philosophy 
and religion, free from arbitrariness and oppression by power, free from want, but also to 
become a healthy and rational people. (Koesnodiprodjo 1951, in Nasution 1992: 20-21)
In the Konstituante session of 12 August 1958, a Drafting Committee was 
established to wrap up the debate about human rights and to formulate a 
decision about the human rights discussed in the plenary session (Risalah, 
1958/IV: 1877-1878). An important distinction made by the Konstituante was 
between ‘human rights’, which applied to all human beings, and ‘citizen 
rights’, which only applied to those with the Indonesian nationality. The 
drafting report, submitted one week later, contained 24 human rights arti-
cles, which were agreed upon, 18 citizen rights, and 13 additional rights, 
which were to be adopted as human rights or citizen rights, but which still 
had to be further considered by the Preparatory Committee. This last group 
included the right to freedom of expression and opinion. The report listed 
14 proposals for formulating other articles, including the right to freely print 
and publish (hak kebebasan tjetak-mentjetak) (Risalah, 1958/IV: 1881).35
The latter proposals were never put to a vote or returned to the Preparatory 
Committee for a final formulation. According to Nasution (1995: 242), these 
rights, including press freedom, should be interpreted as general observa-
tions that were never officially formulated but ought to be recognised.
The right to freedom of expression arose again, when the Konstituante dis-
cussed which human rights it would adopt. The right ‘to have and express 
opinions, either orally or in writing’, was mentioned on list number 6, and 
held ‘third category’ status, which meant that it was “recognised by the Kon-
stituante as a citizen right, and that its extension to become a human right to 
include people who were not citizens, was being considered and that there 
was need for a further definitive formulation” (Risalah, 1958/VI: 3161, in 
Nasution 1995: 245). The Constitution Preparatory Committee was asked to 
continue discussions on whether the 13 rights in the ‘third category’ should 
become human rights or citizen rights.
Among the 13 rights listed was the limitation on the freedom of expres-
sion discussed above, but now defined with far more caution than in the 
1950 Constitution: “Establishing rights and freedoms as explained in this 
part can only be limited by legislation, just for guaranteeing and respecting 
non-derogable rights and freedoms and for fulfilling the requirements of 
legal justice, peace, decency, and prosperity in a democratic society.” These 
requirements look quite reasonable, but this of course depends in the end 
35 This draft was proposed by the Human Rights/Citizen Rights and Obligations Drafting 
Committee, signed by Kuasini Sabil (Chair) and M. Soetimboel (Vice), Bandung 16 
August 1958.
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on the interpretation of the article by the authorities and – ultimately – the 
judiciary.
The next stage was the Chairman’s proposal for drafting ‘rights’. ‘Rights’ 
under the Constitution Preparatory Committee were accepted by acclama-
tion. The proposal also defines the ‘third category’ of rights which includes a 
more comprehensive article on freedom of expression, since such article also 
regulates derogation in the Indonesian Constitution.
Unlike the debates about the 1949 Federal Constitution and the 1950 Con-
stitution, the Konstituante addressed the difference between the concepts of 
‘every person’ (setiap orang) and ‘citizen’ (warganegara). During Session II, 
in 1958, Muhammad Tahir Abubakar, from the Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia 
(PSII Faction) proposed to Constitution Commission II that, “the basic mate-
rial which covers human rights and citizen rights should be formulated by 
using the word ‘every person, without the word ‘citizen’,” since the term 
‘every person’ included ‘citizen’.36 In a later session, Soedijono Djojoprajitno 
from Murba Pembela Proklamasi (Murba party) objected to the use of the word 
‘person’ (orang) in human rights provisions, because this would include for-
eigners. He proposed to replace all instances of the use of the word ‘person’ 
with ‘citizen’ (warganegara), except when asylum issues were concerned.37 
The Konstituante decided not to follow this suggestion, but to distinguish 
between two kinds of rights subjects: ‘every person’ (setiap orang) versus 
‘citizen’ (warganegara). In relation to the former, every human being would 
be protected by the Constitution.
One other important provision related to freedom of expression was the 
right to submit complaints or petitions to the government. It was agreed 
upon by acclamation in the following wording: “(1) Everyone alone as 
well as together with others has the right to freely submit complaints to 
the government either orally or in written form; (2) Everyone alone as well 
as together with others has the right to submit petitions to the government 
either orally or in writing.” (Risalah Perundingan, 1958/VI: 3281).
In summary, the debates of the Konstituante between 1956-1959 about free-
dom of expression and freedom of the press showed new and interesting 
ideas for rights and freedoms, which were more concrete and detailed com-
pared to the ideas during earlier constitutional debates. The Konstituante 
36 Konstituante of the Republic of Indonesia Session II (1958), Session 26, Thursday, 14 
August 1958, p. 1768. Thirteen basic materials which included Group II as mentioned by 
Constitution Commission report II No. 36/III/Red/58, 10 March 1958, which stated that 
“basic material that was as yet undefi ned as to in which group it should be included: 
human rights or citizen rights.”
37 Konstituante of the Republic of Indonesia, Session II (1958), Session 29, Tuesday, 19 
August 1958, p. 1849-1850.
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even tried to formulate a special article to establish the press as an important 
pillar for constitutional democracy. However, this is more obvious from the 
formulation resulting from the debates than from the debates themselves.
The work of the Konstituante was eventually overturned when Soekarno 
released the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 (Dekrit Presiden). It put an end 
to the sessions of the Konstituante and proposed to return to the 1945 Con-
stitution. Ironically, this had already been suggested by Yamin, who earlier 
had shown himself a supporter of a liberal constitutional model (Lev 1966: 
247). Some argue that the Konstituante only had itself to blame for failing to 
finish the task on time. Regardless of whether this is true or not, Soekarno’s 
presidential decree paved the way to a truly authoritarian state (Nasution 
1995: 259).
2.5. Transition to the New Order: The Absence of Constitutional 
Change (1959-1998)
After Soekarno’s Guided Democracy and the political turbulence and mass 
murders of 1965-1966, Soeharto established the authoritarian New Order 
regime. The Temporary People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusy-
awaratan Rakyat Sementara/MPRS) adopted Decree No. XX/MPR/1966 on 
statutory hierarchy, which legalised the 1945 Constitution and placed it at 
the top of this hierarchy.
The procedure to change the Constitution was laid down in MPR’s Decrees 
I/MPR/1983 and IV/MPR/1983 and in lower legislation, especially Law 
No. 5 of 1985. According to constitutional law expert Sri Sumantri (1987), 
this system was too complicated for practical implementation. Politically, 
changing the 1945 Constitution was even more difficult. Soeharto interpret-
ed the Pancasila and the Constitution as ‘pure and consistent’ (murni dan 
konsekuen) and anyone proposing any changes was accused of being dis-
loyal to the Pancasila and the UUD 1945. Constitutional lawyers were later 
often said to have behaved as if they ‘suffered from a toothache’ (sakit gigi),38 
in the sense that they had failed to provide criticism and just followed the 
regime.
The MPR produced two decrees about freedom of expression and press free-
dom, IV/MPR/1978 and II/MPR/1983. These fully supported the authori-
tarian New Order approach as can be read from the following quote:
38 According to Professor J.E. Sahetapy, a criminal law expert from Airlangga University. 
Interview on 10 May 2011, Jakarta.
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Building and developing a national press or media should be based on the spirit and soul 
of the Pancasila, so that the press can support a Pancasila society. In increasing and spread-
ing ‘enlightenment’ throughout the country we need to increase the usefulness of the 
media such as radio, television, film, news agencies, etc. In order to increase the role of the 
press in development we need a healthy, free and responsible press, which can function as 
a disseminator of information and has the objective to achieve constructive social control, 
channelling people’s aspiration and expanding people’s communication and participation. 
For this purpose we need to be develop a positive interaction between the press, govern-
ment and society. For securing a healthy, free and responsible press the Basic Press Law 
should be reviewed. It needs to prepare regulatory instruments which can secure a healthy 
press development in the light of the implementation of Pancasila Democracy. (Lubis 1997: 
264-265)
The legislation based on these decrees will be discussed in the next chapter.
2.6. Debates during the Constitutional Amendment Process 
(1999-2002)
After Soeharto stepped down in 1998, the wave of Reformasi that swept over 
Indonesia included a process of amending the 1945 Constitution. In order 
to prevent systematic human rights violations in the future, public pressure 
rose to limit the power of the president and to prevent misuse of power 
by providing guarantees for the protection of human rights. Human rights 
could no longer be kept from the reformation agenda in Indonesia post-Soe-
harto.39 This also appeared from the enactment of Law 39/1999 on Human 
Rights and Indonesia ratifying the major international human rights treaties.
The MPR’s debates about constitutional reform centred on Article 28 of the 
1945 Constitution, into which all new human rights were eventually includ-
ed.40 In the 1945 Constitution, the human rights provisions could be found 
in Articles 27, 28, 29 (2) and 31 (1). In the Elucidation to the Constitution two 
relevant categories were included: citizen rights (Articles 27, 30, 31(1)) and 
welfare (Articles 28, 29(1), 34).
39 During Reformasi the following pieces of legislation related to human rights were enact-
ed: MPR Decree XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights, Presidential Decree 129/ 1998 on 
Indonesia’s National Action Plan on Human Rights, Law 5/1998 on Ratifi cation of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, Law 8/1998 on Consumer Protection, Law 9/1998 on Freedom of Expression in 
the Public Sphere, Law 29/1999 on Ratifi cation of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Law 39/1999 on Human Rights, Law 
40/1999 on Press, and Law 26/2000 on the Human Rights Court.
40 Freedom of expression was included in Article 28E(3), but a specifi c provision about 
press freedom was never added. The main resource for the discussion is Naskah Kompre-
hensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945: Latar 
Belakang, Proses dan Hasil Pembahasan, Buku VIII: Warga Negara dan Penduduk, Hak Asasi 
Manusia, dan Agama, published by the Constitutional Court (2008).
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The first discussion on human rights was held in the Ad Hoc Committee 
III Forum (Panitia Ad Hoc/PAH III) in 1999. The discussion was continued 
by PAH I between 1999 and 2000. It resulted in a revised draft of Article 28, 
which was brought before Commission A during the annual session of the 
MPR. The final revision was agreed upon during the MPR’s annual session 
in 2000. During the sessions of the PAH, numerous representatives from 
professional organisations, human rights based NGOs and constitutional 
law experts provided their opinions.
For the discussion about press freedom, the PAH invited the Indonesian 
Journalists Association (PWI),41 the Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI),42 
and the Indonesian Press and Broadcast Society (MPPI).43 Freedom of 
expression was discussed several times. In the Third Session of PAH I, on 
6 December 1999, Abdul Khaliq Ahmad of the Nation’s Awakening Party 
(Fraksi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), stated:
As a nation which upholds democracy, the state should provide autonomous freedom for 
every citizen to create and express him or herself, also to choose his or her profession and 
his or her way of life. For that reason, according to the Nation’s Awakening Party, don’t 
you think that it is proper for the Constitution as a constitutional basis, a fundament, and 
beacon to provide specially or explicitly for human rights?
Similarly, Hamdan Zoelva of the Crescent Star Party (Fraksi Partai Bulan Bin-
tang) suggested formulating special articles on human rights in addition to 
Articles 27 and 28, and thus to change the structure of the Constitution.
This idea was fleshed out by Tarigan from the journalist association PWI 
during the Eighteenth Session of PAH I in 2000. According to Tarigan, Arti-
cle 28 should be amended to incorporate the freedom to express one’s opin-
ion, with specific reference to the press.
Our suggestion regards Article 28 because this article does not guarantee freedom of the 
press as a right. I have said that the formula of Article 28 defines that the freedom to unite 
and assemble, to express one’s thought orally or in writing and in other forms are pre-
scribed by law. There is no explanation of the word ‘right’, which becomes even clearer if 
we look at the Elucidation. The Elucidation to Articles 28, 29 and 34 is not talking about 
rights, but about representing the status of the inhabitants (kedudukan penduduk) […]. These 
articles (Article 28, 29, and 34) are not perceived as citizen rights, but are about the status or 
position of the inhabitants of Indonesia. (Mahkamah Konstitusi 2008: 96-97)44
What Tarigan referred to is the formulation of Article 28 as a right. The Elu-
cidation to the 1945 Constitution indeed speaks only of the status of inhabit-
ants (kedudukan penduduk), not about their rights, but this can virtually be 
41 Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia.
42 Aliansi Jurnalis Independen.
43 Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiar Indonesia.
44 The Eighteenth Session of Ad Hoc Committtee of 2000, page 69. 
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discounted as the Elucidation has never been recognised as a formal part of 
the Constitution. In any case, Tarigan argued that the formulation of Article 
28 did not really provide strong constitutional protection for press freedom, 
a priority which was indeed absent during the constitution-making process 
in 1945.
The MPR sessions, in which human rights articles were discussed, were 
attended by numerous non-governmental activists, such as representatives 
from the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI)45 
and the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI).46 The PBHI, through 
its Chairman Hendardi, recommended a comprehensive and explicit inclu-
sion of citizens’ fundamental rights, i.e. first, the protection of human dig-
nity; second, the guarantee of individual freedom; third, equality before 
the law; fourth, freedom of religion and belief; fifth, freedom of expression; 
sixth, freedom to unite and assemble; seventh, the right to reside and move; 
eighth, the right to work and a proper salary; and ninth, property and heri-
tage rights. Press organisations, such as the PWI, AJI and MPP, focused more 
specifically on press freedom as a pillar of freedom of expression. Tarman 
Azam from PWI proposed that Article 28 of the UUD 1945 should be main-
tained, but suggested to add a new paragraph saying “[p]ress freedom is 
guaranteed by the state based on the right to information as an Indonesian 
human right as regulated by MPR Decrees and Law.” Didik Supriyanto 
from AJI went even further saying that,
Press Law 40/1999 has been more or less guaranteeing press freedom, because under Arti-
cle 4 it is mentioned that: first, press freedom is guaranteed as a citizen’s right; second, the 
national press cannot be censored, banned, or stopped from broadcasting. Moreover, the 
following two sub-articles mention that to guarantee press freedom, the national press has 
the right to seek, receive and impart ideas and information and has to be responsible for 
its reporting before the law, and the journalist has the right to refuse [to reveal his sources]. 
Nevertheless, the guarantee to press freedom, just as the freedom to unite or the freedom 
of speech, should be accommodated by the Constitution as a citizen’s fundamental right. 
Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, textually or practically cannot guarantee press freedom. 
(Mahkamah Konstitusi 2007: 166-167)
Didik continued saying that,
The guarantee of press freedom similar to the freedom to unite and freedom of expression 
as fundamental rights, should be recognised and adopted into the Constitution. Article 
28 of the 1945 Constitution, neither textually nor in practice secures press freedom. Press 
freedom and freedom of expression are human rights which human beings are entitled to, 
not because the state grants these rights. Because of that, there is no privilege of the state 
to limit human rights, moreover this state has been established on the principle of liberty. 
In this regard, we could learn from the American experience in practicing the constitution.
45 Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia.
46 Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia.
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After 180 years of application of the Constitution of the United States of America,47 a first 
amendment was proposed in order to secure fundamental rights related to freedom of 
expression and press freedom. This amendment stated that Congress is not allowed to 
make legislation, which limits press freedom and freedom of expression. For that reason, it 
is necessary for the amendment of the 1945 Constitution to mention explicitly that the state 
should secure freedom of expression, freedom to unite and freedom to assemble. In addi-
tion, it should be mentioned that no regulation can limit those freedoms […]. The rule for 
press freedom should be given to society, either a code of ethic assembly, journalist associa-
tions, or a society-based press organisation.48
Lukas Luwarso from AJI added that press activities had been threatened by 
Penal Code articles:
We have Press Law 40/1998, which it is textually quite good. Moreover, a number of for-
eign observers have said that Indonesia’s Press Law is the best in Asia. But the problem is 
that the Press Law we have and that has been fought for by Parliament and the press has 
not been applied or operationalised yet. For what reason? We have the Penal Code which 
contains 35 articles threathening the press. The articles about defamation, libel, the haatzaai 
artikelen (hatred sowing articles) can be implemented to contain press reports.
AJI’s statement was supported by the MPPI, represented by Leo Batubara,
who argued specifically for deleting the word ‘prescribed by statute’ in Arti-
cle 28. This argument was founded on past experience, when press laws 
Law 11/1966 and Law 21/1982 were applied to suppress press freedom.49
Despite their arguments, the critical perspectives brought forward by the 
journalist organisations and NGO activists were not seriously discussed in 
the reformulation of Article 28.
The main discussion focused on whether it was necessary to include all 
human rights articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, whether only a limited number 
should be introduced, or whether the relevant articles should be left as they 
were. For instance, Drs H.A. Rosyad Sholeh from the Golkar Party (Fraksi 
Utusan Golongan) questioned the need for incorporating all human rights 
into the constitution. And if indeed so, he suggested preventing repetitive 
47 The statement is incorrect, because the First Amendment was adopted in 1791, and it was 
four years after the passing of the Constitution. It may well be possible that his statement 
was misinterpreted by the subsequent team.
48 Ibid, page 59-60, Mahkamah Konstitusi (2008: 167-168).
49 Ibid, page 61-62, Mahkamah Konstitusi (2008: 169).
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formulations, such as the right to express one’s thought and opinion, which 
was mentioned several times in other legislation.50
Several debates during the plenary session, especially those about the Sec-
ond Amendment and those attended by civil society groups, were con-
cerned with articulating a true spirit of constitutionalism, paying special 
attention to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, many debates were far 
removed from notions of constitutionalism and merely addressed techni-
calities, such as format, structure and other such subsidiary questions. In 
the end, repetition in the formulation of the human rights articles could not 
be prevented either, including the formulation of freedom of expression (see 
Article 28 and Article 28E section (3) of UUD 1945).
This result was disappointing for journalists and others supporting press 
freedom. The absence of a special clause addressing press freedom reflected 
the lack of attention and unwillingness by MPR’s members to take seriously 
press freedom in Indonesia. Even if the MPR invited many journalist organ-
isations and press freedom experts during the amendment process, the idea 
of guaranteeing press freedom in the Constitution still gained insufficient 
support. Perhaps these representatives were afraid of a truly liberal press 
after so many years of repression.
However, in several discussions between 2007-2008, the Regional Repre-
sentative Council (DPD)51, which together with the national Parliament 
constitutes the MPR, completed a draft to amend the constitution. In this 
document, the DPD proposes a special article guaranteeing press freedom. 
It remains to be seen what will come of this suggestion.
50 The idea of limiting the number of human rights articles was proposed by the Struggle 
for Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuagan). According to 
their spokesman Muhammad Ali human rights had already been adopted in Indonesia’s 
legal system, especially by Law 39/1999 on Human Rights, which contains 106 articles. 
Therefore, he argued, human rights did not need to be unnecessarily detailed in the Con-
stitution. Golkar Party’s Dra. Siti Hartarti Murdaya also objected to the ‘deconstruction’ 
of the 1945 Constitution by inserting many human rights articles, which in her perspec-
tive started to look jelimet (complicated) and containing too much overlap. Because this 
process had been so quick, she feared that the Constitution would lose its 1945 spirit and 
soul of the Independence Proclamation.
51 The People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), comprises the members of the DPR and the 
DPD. Article 22D of Indonesian Constitution restricts the DPD to dealing with law on 
“regional autonomy, the relationship of central and local government, formation, expan-
sion and merger of regions, management of natural resources and other economic 
resources, and Bills related to the fi nancial balance between the centre and the regions.” 
The DPD can propose particular laws to the DPR and must be heard on any regional laws 
proposed by the DPR.
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2.7. Conclusion: Constitutionalism and Freedom of Expression
This overview of constitutional debates shows in what way the legal con-
cept of freedom of expression was ultimately broadened and given a clear 
constitutional basis. Although the 1945 Constitution still holds no explicit 
provision on press freedom, Article 28’s clause on freedom of expression is 
generally deemed to also include press freedom.
As we have seen, the wish to provide a constitutional foundation for free-
dom of expression has been the subject of profound debate since 1945, when 
during the BPUPKI sessions it was considered in the context of kinship/
mutual assistance and social justice versus liberalism-individualism. The 
BPUPKI discussions finally resulted in the elegant but ambivalent formu-
lation of Article 28 of the Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945), which rel-
egates the regulation of the freedom of expression to lower levels of leg-
islation. Even if they ended in a compromise, the debates on the freedom 
of expression in 1945 show that the ‘founding fathers’ of Indonesia were 
capable of thinking critically about some of the basic principles and univer-
salism of human rights. Nevertheless, the result was disappointing from a 
human rights perspective, as the final draft of the 1945 Constitution only 
provided a very limited number of human rights articles, whereas during 
the debates the importance of human rights for every Indonesian citizen had 
been underlined. The debates show that there was a general willingness to 
realise and guarantee freedom of expression in order to prevent the misuse 
of power, and there seemed to be agreement about this point – even if the 
participants supported different reasons and perspectives and proposed dif-
ferent ways to achieve this.
The debate on freedom of expression disappeared during the drafting pro-
cess of the 1949 Federal Constitution and the Provisional Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia (UUDS 1950), but reappeared during the Konstituante 
sessions as well as during the amendment process of the 1945 Constitution 
in the MPR in 2000.
The Konstituante sessions highlight how freedom or human rights could 
be limited or restricted by means of the so-called derogation articles. This 
idea reappeared in 2000 during the debates about the Second Amendment 
of the 1945 Constitution, but the debate in the Konstituante was sharper and 
deeper. In the end the Konstituante agreed that “[e]stablishing rights and 
freedoms as explained in this part can only be limited by legislation with the 
purpose of guaranteeing and respecting non-derogable rights and freedoms 
and fulfilling the requirements of legal justice, peace, decency, and prosper-
ity in a democratic society.” This idea was finally adopted into the Second 
Amendment of 2000, in Article 28J, section (2).
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Furthermore, articles on the right to information and the right to complain 
against the state, as a requirement for obtaining freedom of expression was 
discussed by the Konstituante in a very comprehensive manner. However, 
these debates had few direct results due to the re-enactment of UUD 1945 by 
Soekarno’s decree on 5 July 1959. This idea of the Konstituante was extremely 
relevant for the political context at that time, as well as for the New Order 
period, when access to information was extremely difficult, tightly con-
trolled by the Soeharto regime which acted as a single authority to claim 
or justify information flows. In this situation, arbitrary and repressive rule 
could not be controlled and there was no constitutional clause to mount in 
public debates.
Yet, eventually, it reappeared in the 2000 Amendment. Article 28F provides 
a guarantee on access to information. The conceptual development of free-
dom of expression in the Indonesian Constitution has thus evolved progres-
sively. The formulation of Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution was the result 
of the efforts by Muhammad Hatta, who as a thinker and Indonesian social-
ist showed perseverance and courage in highlighting the importance of free-
dom of expression in the new constitution. What he did not fully achieve at 
the time was finally realised more than half a century later, when human 
rights articles and freedom of expression were incorporated into the 1945 
Constitution in order to prevent arbitrary and misuse of power.
However, the formulation of a specific article on press freedom failed. Press 
freedom’s constitutional basis is freedom of expression, and to an extent 
freedom of information. This is not enough. The concept of press freedom is 
still unclear and open to misuse. This has been the failure of those members 
of the MPR who refused to recognise press freedom as a major pillar for 
constitutional democracy. Hence, the legal arena to promote and strengthen 
press freedom is laid down in legislation, but will be seriously endangered 
if law-makers do not consider the principles of the rule of law.
Furthermore, the constitutional debates in the past demonstrate how free-
dom or liberty to express opinions or thought in oral or written form has 
been debated many times and has become part of constitution- making his-
tory. Moreover, the development of conceptual and constitutional thoughts 
is inseparable from the context of the political dynamics. Certainly, the rel-
evance of those debates goes beyond being historical documents, but should 
be a challenge to explore, position, and enlighten the constitutionalist spirit 
of human rights in a more democratic Indonesian constitutional law system. 
In this regard, press freedom still ought to be incorporated as a constitu-
tional right, if Indonesia is serious about recognising press freedom as one 
of the pillars of a constitutional democracy.
3.1. Introduction
A legal history of the press in Indonesia is the story of the politics of differ-
ent regimes and to what extent they were willing to allow dissident voices. 
During the colonial period, from the moment the Dutch East India Com-
pany (VOC)1 first arrived, controlling public expression was a primary con-
cern of the government. Laws and decrees targeted journalists, editors and 
publishers in order to silence dissident voices, and from the 1910s prevent-
ing the emergence of a nationalist press demanding independence became 
a particular concern. These colonial laws and decrees were adopted by the 
newborn Republic through Article II of the Transitional Rules of Indonesia’s 
Constitution in 1945.2 They included notorious articles addressing crimes 
against the public order in the Netherlands-Indies Penal Code (Wetboek 
van Strafrecht voor Nederlands-Indië or WvS. Ned. Ind), such as ‘sowing 
hatred’, insulting state bodies, ‘inciting’ (opruiïng), defamation, and crimes 
against decency.3 Yet, many laws and regulations limiting press freedom 
were added by the Indonesian legislator later on.
This chapter examines such laws and decrees against press freedom from 
a legal-historical perspective. It starts with the colonial period, and then 
analyses how freedom of expression and press freedom were adopted into 
Indonesian laws and policies after independence, until the end of Guided 
Democracy in 1965. I will moreover try to explain these developments and 
therefore include in this analysis a description of the relation between legis-
lation or policies and their political context.
1 Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie.
2 Presidential Decree 2/1945 confi rmed this by recognising “all the state institutions and 
regulations as long as they are not contradictory to the Constitution.”
3 The formulation of these articles was based on the Dutch Wetboek van Strafrecht (WvS). 
However, the hatred sowing articles (haatzaai-artikelen) were specifi cally meant for the 
Netherlands Indies, in order to allow the government to take measures against those 
criticising the government. One of them, Article 155, was applied many times, including 
in 1930 against Soekarno (Soekarno 1989).
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3.2. The Netherlands Indies and the Japanese Occupation
3.2.1. The VOC Administration
The story about ‘modern’ press restrictions by legislation in what is now 
Indonesia started with the rule of the VOC in the eighteenth century. In 
1712 the Heeren XVII of the VOC even went so far as to prohibit all press 
publications in the Netherlands Indies. The main reason was that the VOC 
did not want its trade rivals to obtain relevant knowledge from commer-
cial news published for a broad readership (Faber 1930: 13-14). Curtailing 
advertisement in particular made it easier for the VOC to maintain its trade 
monopoly.
This measure was actually taken before the emergence of a proper press. It 
was only some thirty years later that the first newspaper was introduced to 
the Netherlands Indies, when on 7 August 1744 trader Jan Erdmans Jordens 
first published the Bataviase Nouvelles en Politique Raisonnementen (Batavia 
News and Political Reasonings) in Batavia. Governor-General Gustaaf Wil-
lem Baron van Imhoff gave permission for the publication, but changed his 
mind two years later (on 20 June 1746) after the Director of the VOC asked 
him to ban the paper. The reason was the same as in 1712: the VOC attempt-
ed to keep any information relating to its activities as secret as possible in 
order to avoid competition, even though – ironically – the information pub-
lished in the Bataviase Nouvelles was not critical at all and had little trade 
value. This decision showed the extent to which the VOC feared for any 
publication to affect its monopoly of power in the Netherlands Indies (Ter-
morshuizen 2001: 27-32). Hence, the social and political roles of newspapers 
during the VOC administration were limited.
This situation only changed after the bankruptcy of the VOC, the subse-
quent take-over of the colony by the Dutch state, the Napoleonic Wars and 
the British Interregnum from 1811 to 1816. After the British had returned 
the Netherlands Indies to the Netherlands the first newspaper appeared in 
1817: the Bataviasche Courant. It consisted of a part containing official notices 
to the public and an informal part (Termorshuizen 2001: 46-47; Faber 1930: 
32-36). It was followed by the Bataviasche Advertentieblad (1827),4 Nederlands 
Indiesche Handelsblad (1828),5 Soerabajasche Courant (1831),6 and Samarangsche 
Advertentieblad (1845).7 There were also newspaper publications with Malay 
4 Bataviasche Advertentieblad was more an advertisement paper than a newspaper (Termors-
huizen 2001: 47).
5 Nederlands Indiesche Handelsblad was a newspaper published by the government, its con-
tent consisted of news and messages relating to trade in the Indonesian archipelago (Ter-
morshuizen 2001: 56).
6 Soerabajasche Courant, its name changed to Soerabaya Courant in 1861 started as an adver-
tisement paper, but soon became more of a newspaper.
7 Samarangsche Advertentieblad was an advertisement newspaper.
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names and in Malay language, such as Bramartani (1855), Soerat Kabar Bahasa 
Melajoe (1856), Selompret Melajoe (1860), Bintang Timor (1862), Djeroe Mar-
tani (1864), and Biang Lala in Jakarta (1867). All of them were published on 
Java. The newspapers mainly contained public notices, such as government 
announcements, updates on official activities, and new regulations.
Between 1817 and 1848 the government left these publications alone, which 
is not as remarkable as it may seem because they were not very critical of the 
former’s policy. This situation only started to change after the constitutional 
reform of the Dutch state and its colony from 1848 until 1854.
3.2.2. The Dutch Constitution of 1848 and the Government Regulation for 
the Netherlands-Indies (Regerings Reglement) of 1854
The Dutch Constitution of 1848 and the Regerings Reglement for the Nether-
lands-Indies of 1854 provided a new legal underpinning for Dutch rule in 
the Netherlands Indies. They provided the points of departure for freedom 
of expression in the Netherlands Indies for the largest part of the colonial 
period. Significantly, Article 8 of the 1848 Constitution provided for press 
freedom: “No one needs prior permission to express through the press any 
thoughts or feelings, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law.” 
Dutch liberal MPs, led by Thorbecke, struggled against the conservatives to 
insert the same provision into the 1854 Regerings Reglement, as they believed 
freedom of the press was needed as a tool to monitor the Dutch govern-
ment. Promoting press freedom was for a large part inspired by their own 
experience of suppression under the authoritarian government of Willem I. 
However, the liberal MPs were opposed by the conservative faction led by 
ex-Governor-General (1833-1836) Jean Chrétien Baud, who promoted clear 
limitations on press freedom. The conservatives feared that the fact that the 
native population of the Indies was being “somewhat exploited” might be 
“exhibited” by opposition newspapers and could then be employed as a 
weapon against the government (Faber 1930: 40).
The result was a compromise, but closer to the liberal than to the conserva-
tive point of view. Article 110 of the Regerings Reglement stipulated that:
The supervision of the press by the Government must be regulated by ordinance in agree-
ment with the principle that the publication of ideas and sentiments by the press and the 
admission of printed manner from outside the Netherlands must not be submitted to any 
restriction except such as is needed to ensure public order.
3.2.3. Drukpersreglement (1856)
Unfortunately, the elaboration of Article 110 of Regerings Reglement into the 
Regulation on Printed Matter in the Netherlands Indies of 1856 (Reglement 
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op de drukwerken in Nederlandsch-Indie, or the so-called Drukpersreglement),8 
showed little of its liberal intent. Thirty-five articles under the Drukpersregle-
ment were enacted on 8 April 1856 by a Royal Decree (Koninklijk Besluit) in 
Amsterdam, then officially proclaimed as an Ordinance by the Governor-
General in the Netherlands-Indies on 10 November 1856.
The Drukpersreglement clearly aimed at stifling criticism of the colo-
nial government (Adam 1995: 17). It was scornfully called a “brainchild of 
darkness” by Thorbecke (Faber 1930: 40) and it immediately led to serious 
protests and even a riot by journalists and others in the Netherlands Indies 
(Termorshuizen 2001: 77). The Drukpersreglement was seriously criticised in 
Parliament in 1857, but the MPs could do little more than express their dis-
may – the regulation was to remain in place until the end of Dutch rule over 
the Indies.
The Drukpersreglement introduced a system of pre-censorship for the 
press, which was formulated under article 13:
Of each paper printed in the Netherlands Indies, or printed elsewhere bar the Netherlands 
and published in the Netherlands Indies, the printing house or publisher is obliged to 
submit a signed copy to the head of the local administration (het hoofd van het plaatselijk 
bestuur), another copy to the public prosecutor (officier van justitie), and a third copy to the 
general secretariat. The printing house or publisher will receive a free proof of receipt. Vio-
lation against this provision shall be liable to a fine of 50 to 1000 guilders.
This pre-censorship system meant the end of press freedom in the Nether-
lands Indies, since it was no longer allowed to publish thoughts and feelings 
through the press without prior authorisation. Every new magazine, journal 
or periodical needed permission from the Binnenlands Bestuur.9 In addition, 
the Drukpersreglement introduced criminal liability for defamation (smaad), 
insult (hoon), or slander (laster) against the King of the Netherlands or his 
family (article 23) or against public officials (article 25).
The government proved moreover willing to use its powers: in 1864 it fined 
a journalist from the Java Bode, in 1868 an editor of the Soerabajasche Handels-
blad, in 1869 the Celebes Courant, and Jeroe Martani, and in 1873 the Sama-
rangsche Courant and – again – the Java Bode.10 These cases mostly related to 
defamation and insult. The government even exiled the editor of the Sama-
rangsche Courant and a journalist from the Java Bode. Both cases were unsuc-
cessfully challenged in the court (Said 1988: 16).
8 Koninklijk Besluit No. 54, 8 April 1956, Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie 1856 No. 74: 
Reglement of de Drukwerken in Nederlandsch-Indie.
9 According to Gerard Termorshuizen this is the reason why at least 95 percent of the print-
ed newspapers from the Netherlands Indies can be found in the Algemeen Rijksarchief 
(General State Archives) in The Hague, Personal communication, Leiden, 27 March 2010.
10 Unfortunately, I could not fi nd clearly to what extent the threat of a fi ne infl uenced jour-
nalists or papers to publish or not to publish.
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The obligation to submit to the authorities an unsigned copy of all manu-
scripts before publication was also challenged by the printer/publisher of 
the Soerabaja Courant in 1869. He argued that this obligation could not pos-
sibly apply to daily newspapers. When he refused to submit the first num-
ber of his Courant to the public prosecutor before publication, a prosecu-
tion followed. Surprisingly, the Soerabaja Court decided that the defendant 
was correct. According to the judges daily publications were regulated by 
another article.11 The court acquitted the accused, and this judgement was 
confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 4 June 1869 (Faber 1930: 
40-41). This case shows that there was at least the possibility to challenge the 
government and that newspapers were henceforth subject to a less stringent 
regime, but it did not alter the repressive nature of press regulation.
3.2.4. Press and Ethical Policies
Bumiputera Hindia Olanda yang baru bangun patut 
mendapat hak dan bebas (rechten en vrijheden),
baik dengan tulisan, baik dengan bicara.12
(Tirto Adhi Soerjo, 1909a)
In the early twentieth century the new ‘Ethical Policy,’ inspired by C. Th. 
van Deventer’s article “A Debt of Honour” (Een Eereschuld), led to a differ-
ent government view of press freedom (Maters 1998: 79-80). The wish to 
repay the ‘surplus millions’ the Netherlands had reaped from the Indies by 
improving the socio-economic welfare of ‘the natives’ through educational 
and economic measures (Deventer 1899) was accompanied by the birth of a 
new consciousness among the Indonesian people in the closing years of the 
nineteenth century (Adam 1995: 90-107; Ricklefs 1981).
Newspapers in the Netherlands Indies were an important source of infor-
mation on the situation in the colonies and contributed to the criticism 
underpinning Van Deventer’s quest. A well-known example of a critical 
journalist is Pieter Brooshooft (1845–1921), who wrote many articles about 
oppression and inequities of the colonial system, and about the moral duty 
of the Dutch to repay the Indies what the Indies was due. As the editor of 
the largest and liveliest of the Dutch-language Indies’ newspapers, De Loco-
motief, Brooshooft sent reporters all over the Netherlands Indies to investi-
gate what was wrong. He paid special attention to the so-called ‘declining 
Native welfare,’ the actual reduction in living standards of large parts of the 
11 I have not been able to fi nd this article, while Faber in his writing also did not give any 
further explanation about this issue.
12 “Netherlands-Indies indigenous inhabitants who have just awoken ought to get rights 
and freedoms, both in writing and in speaking.”
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population in substantial areas of the colony at the end of the nineteenth 
century (Vickers 2005: 17).
In 1906, the changed atmosphere led to an amendment of the Drukpersregle-
ment. It was initiated by the Minister of Colonial Affairs, who also requested 
the Governor-General to formulate a new penal code for the Netherlands 
Indies. The 19 March 1906 Royal Decree13 abolished the notorious pre-cen-
sorship system. According to its Article 17, printing houses were responsible 
for the entire content of the newspapers or periodicals they published, if 
the author could not be prosecuted or convicted, or if the judgment could 
not be executed against him (Faber 1930: 42). Although censorship was still 
possible, the changes to the Drukpersreglement thus contributed to more free-
dom of the press in the Netherlands Indies, and in particular promoted the 
involvement of Chinese and Indonesians in public debates waged in the 
press. Criticism of unjust policies gained a platform and promoted more 
political consciousness among Indonesians (Maters 1998).
Before the introduction of the so-called ‘Ethical Policy,’ there was actually 
no ‘native’ press of political importance, but in 1903 R.M Tirto Adhi Soerjo 
established Soenda Berita and in 1907 Medan Prijaji (Termorshuizen 2011: 
148).14 He managed to get the funding for Soenda Berita by selling his own 
property in Batavia, and found support for his effort with the Regent of 
Cianjur. The newspaper quickly developed an agenda of knowledge promo-
tion and preparing the reader for the coming modernisation. It addressed 
topics as health, medicine, medical review, bacteriology, meteorology, law, 
governance, Islamic law, photography, and wayang (folk puppetry). It also 
introduced specific rubrics for women, such as cooking, tailoring, and 
housekeeping, some of them even written by female authors. According 
to Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the Soenda Berita was really a ‘one-man busi-
ness’ (Toer 1985: 39-40). Medan Prijaji was of a more political nature. Next 
to providing general news, the newspaper aimed at promoting justice for 
Indonesians – through legal aid, providing access for marginalised people 
to forums of complaint, providing information for job seekers in Batavia and 
pushing citizens to become involved in organisations and to organise them-
selves (Toer 1985: 46). Soerjo developed several other publications, such as 
Soeloeh Keadilan (1907) and Poetri Hindia (1908) and set the stage for many 
other newspapers, journals and magazines.
On top of the changes to the Drukpersreglement came the liberal policies of 
Governor-General J.B. van Heutsz, who took office in 1904. Soerjo applaud-
ed the appointment of Van Heutsz, because he had finally brought the war 
13 Koninklijk Besluit, 19 March 1906, Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1906 No. 270.
14 R.M. Tirto Adhi Soeryo was awarded the title of Father of the National Press by Soeharto 
in 1973, and National Hero by Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2006 (by Presidential 
Decree 85/TK/2006).
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in Aceh to an end “and the people in Java had been under a heavy burden 
to provide the funds for the Aceh War” (1904: 31-32).15 Soerjo also noted that 
before Van Heutsz’s appointment newspapers could not criticise the gov-
ernment for arbitrariness of its officials. This was now allowed, as long as 
it did not constitute an attack on the honour (eer) and moral value (zedelijke 
waarde) of persons or of officials – but one could use sharp wordings. In 
Soerjo’s words: “This leeway (policy) is enough for the press to write about 
influential persons who govern in arbitrary ways. The more the Malay press 
dares to state its thoughts, the more attention the government will pay. Such 
attention is the aim of Governor-General Van Heutsz. He likes supporting 
the press. He allows journalists to attend official parties and visit prohibited 
areas, he even gives financial support – taken from the 25 percentage budget 
reduction of the Dutch railways – to journalists. He also very much respects 
and gives attention to the Malay press, and sees the press as useful for the 
governed nation” (Toer 1985: 53).16 Indeed, Van Heutsz encouraged Malay 
language journalism, and thus provided the opportunity for Soerjo and his 
colleagues to publish their articles. Soerjo also became friends with Van Kol, 
Stigter (director of the Koningin Wilhelmina School), and other ‘ethicals,’ 
and even enjoyed direct personal access to Van Heutsz (Shiraishi 1987: 132).
Yet, this did not prevent Soerjo from getting into trouble in a case which 
demonstrated that the boundaries were still tight. In 1909 Soerjo was pros-
ecuted for a ‘persdelict’ concerning an article about an official from the indig-
enous administration, Mas Tjokrosonto (Wedono17 in Cangkrep, Purworejo) 
and one from the Dutch administration, A. Simon (Aspirant Controleur). In 
the article these officials were called ‘snotaap’ (naughty boy), ‘ambtenaar 
broddelaar’ (messy official) or ‘ambtenaar stupperaar’ (stupid official).18 On 
the basis of Article 25 of the Drukpersreglement, Soerjo was prosecuted after 
Simon had filed a complaint for defamation (smaad), insult (hoon), or slander 
(laster), and was ultimately sentenced by the Court of Appeal (Raad van Jus-
titie) to two months of seclusion away from his home (Soerjo 1909b).
15 This is somewhat ironic, since the Military Governor in Aceh Van Heutsz had conducted 
a scorched earth policy in which 60,000-70,000 Acehnese lost their lives (an estimated 
37,000 troops were killed on the Dutch side) (Vickers 2005: 13). However, Van Heutsz’s 
military success had turned him into a popular hero of expansion, and therefore he was 
in a position to silence some of the conservative criticism on the ‘Ethical Policy.’
16 I have not been able to fi nd where Toer got his quotation from.
17 Offi cial position at the sub-district level.
18 The case was about the article “Betapa Satoe Pertolongan Diartikan” (‘How An Act of Help 
Should be Understood’) in Medan Prijaji no. 24 of 30 June 1908. It referred to earlier arti-
cles in Medan Prijaji, no. 19 and 20 pp. 224-235 and 244-258, “Persdelict, Oempatan dan 
Penistaan: Aspirant Controleur A Simon contra Tirto Adhi Soerjo, Hoofredaktur Medan Prijaji” 
(“Press crime, Detraction and Defamation: Candidate Controller A. Simon Against Adhi 
Soerjo, Chief Editor of the Medan Aristocrat”).
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3.2.5. Haatzaai Artikelen (1914)
The climate of press freedom changed substantially after the introduction 
of the amendment of the Wetboek van Strafrecht in Nederlands Indië (Penal 
Code in the Netherlands Indies) in 1914.19 In response to the emergence of 
a nationalist movement and the growth of a vernacular press which was 
increasingly critical of the Dutch government in the Netherlands Indies, the 
Dutch authorities introduced stricter controls on the press. Prior to these 
amendments, on 2 June 1913, Minister of Colonial Affairs De Waal Malefijt 
wrote to Governor-General Idenburg:
Strong action should be taken against the public preaching of revolt against the Dutch 
authorities, against those extremely tiresome efforts to discredit the best intentions of the 
Government, against the sowing of hate and discordance between the various races which 
has become the order of the day. Tolerating this manifestation or leaving their repression to 
the constantly varying opinion of the judiciary in the Indies – which in practice amounts to 
the same thing – is like committing political suicide…. Introduction of a preventive control 
has, of course, been made impossible by the changes to the press rules in 1906. Therefore, 
a new means of repression should be looked for, not by the judiciary but by administrative 
authorities (Wal 1967: p. 239).
Indeed, at that time administrative intervention into press matters was no 
longer permitted. The authorities in the Netherlands Indies had to resort to 
criminal prosecution when they thought an author or a journalist had gone 
too far in discrediting the government and, therefore, had to be accused of 
attempting to disrupt public order and tranquillity (Maier 1991: 68-70). De 
Waal Malefijt’s successor as Minister of Colonial Affairs, Mr. Th. B. Pleyte 
(1913-1918), was pushed by Parliament to take the initiative to keep a tighter 
control on the press. It was in this context that the Netherlands Indies’ Penal 
Code was amended. It gave the authorities the power to take action when-
ever they deemed this necessary (Maters 1998: 98).
Following British India, where the government in 1908 enacted the News-
papers (Incitement to Offences) Act, in January 1914 the Dutch Parliament 
introduced several articles restricting press freedom (Termorshuizen 2011: 
155-156). Most notable were Articles 63a and b, the so-called haatzaai artikel-
en (hatred sowing articles):20
Article 63a: He, who by words, signs or depictions or in any other way gives rise or promotes 
feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against the government of the Netherlands or the 
Netherlands Indies, shall be punished with a penal servitude sentence of five to ten years.
19 Royal Decree of 7 Januari 1914 no. 28 (S. 205), (Royal Decree on amending and supple-
menting the Penal Code for Europeans in the Netherlands Indies and amendment of the 
Regulations on printed matters in the Netherlands-Indies).
20 Other provisions, however, are more recent. The articles 137c and 137d about insulting a 
group in society and incitement to hatred or discrimination were formulated in 1934. The 
extensions in Articles 137e and 137f were added after Indonesia became independent, in 
1971 and 1991.
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Article 63b: He, who by words, signs or depictions or in any other way gives rise to or 
promotes feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against different groups of Dutch nation-
als or residents of the Netherlands Indies, shall be punished with imprisonment varying 
between six days and five years.
A month later, Governor-General Idenburg released Decree 32/1914 (S. 206 
and 207), which introduced similar measures with harsher punishments for 
the Indonesian population committing such offences – to up to ten years of 
hard labour in chains. After the unification process of the Penal Code, which 
resulted in a single Code applicable to all population groups, these articles 
were refined to become Articles 154, 155,21 156,22 and 157.23 The new formula-
tions were meant to prevent different interpretations (Termorshuizen 2011: 
156). They were usually applied in connection with other notorious articles 
from the Penal Code about crimes against public authority (especially Arti-
cles 20724 and 20825).
In fact, the haatzaai-artikelen were not such a novelty. The Drukpersreglement 
in 1857 already enabled the prosecution of journalists and editors for ‘defa-
mation’ of the Governor-General or for inciting people to hatred of or con-
21 Section (1): Any person who disseminates, openly demonstrates or puts up a writing 
where feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against the Government of Indonesia are 
expressed, with the intent to give publicity to the contents or to enhance the publicity 
thereof, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of four years and six months or 
a maximum fi ne of three hundred f. Section (2): If the offender commits the crime in his 
profession and during the commission of the crime fi ve years have not yet elapsed since 
an earlier conviction of the person on account of a similar crime has become fi nal, he may 
be released from the exercise of said profession.
22 The person who publicly gives expression to feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt 
against one or more groups of the population of Indonesia, shall be punished by a maxi-
mum imprisonment of four years or a maximum fi ne of three hundred f.
 By group in this and in the following article shall be understood each part of the popula-
tion of the Netherlands Indies that distinguishes itself from one or more other parts of 
that population by race, country of origin, religion, origin, descent, nationality or consti-
tutional condition.
23 Any person who disseminates, openly demonstrates or puts up a writing or portrait 
where feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against or among groups of the population 
of the Netherlands Indies are expressed, with the intent to give publicity to the contents 
or to enhance the publicity thereof, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of 
two years and six months or a maximum fi ne of three hundred f.
24 Any person who with deliberate intent in public, orally or in writing, insults an authority 
or a public body set up in the Netherlands Indies, shall be punished by a maximum 
imprisonment of one year and six months or a maximum fi ne of three hundred f.
25 Section (1): Any person who disseminates, openly demonstrates or puts up a writing or 
portrait containing an insult against an authority or public body set up in the Nether-
lands Indies with the intent to give publicity to the insulting content or to enhance the 
publicity thereof, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of four months or a 
maximum fi ne of three hundred f; Section (2): If the offender commits the crime in his 
profession and during the commission of the crime two years have not yet elapsed since 
an earlier conviction of the person on account of a similar crime has become fi nal, he may 
be deprived of said profession.
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tempt for the government. It is moreover not true that the haatzaai-artikelen 
were only applicable to the Netherlands Indies, as claimed by R.H. Siregar 
et al. (2000: 12), for they had also been included as Articles 261 and 262 in 
the Penal Code in the Netherlands in 1881. Moreover, other articles in the 
Penal Code could be used against journalists in the Netherlands Indies as 
well. These included Chapter II: Crimes against the Dignity of Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and Governor-General (Articles 134 and 137); the articles 
about incitement (opruiing) in Chapter V: Crimes Against the Public Order 
(Articles 160 and 161); and Chapter XVI: Defamation (Articles 310, 315, 316, 
317, 320, and 321).26
In practice, the application of the haatzaai-artikelen turned out to be discrimi-
natory, as Dutch and Indonesian (Bumiputera) press were often treated differ-
ently, and the artikelen seemed to be used especially to attack the Indonesian 
nationalist movement.27 Defamatory articles in Dutch newspapers or journals 
were not nearly as often prosecuted as those in Indonesian ones. The plural-
ist system of the administration of justice exacerbated this situation (Maters 
1998: Chapter III-IV). Unfortunately there is no evidence of how often such 
criminal prosecution took place, but a number of cases have been reported. 
The best-known involved Marco Kartodikromo, a former Medan Prijaji jour-
nalist, who started his own newspaper, Doenia Bergerak (World in Motion), in 
1914. This paper was considered the mouthpiece of the Native Indonesian 
Journalists’ Association (Inlandse Journalisten Bond). Kartodikromo wrote an 
attack on the Dutch Advisor on Native Affairs R.A. Rinkes in 1914. On 26 Jan-
uary 1915 the authorities started an investigation on account of the publica-
tion of several anti-Dutch editorials. This led to his incarceration in the same 
year, but after a public outcry he was released after 100 days (Vickers 2005: 
75-76; Wasono 2000). It is unclear what legal basis was used to indict him, but 
the case is representative of the growing level of repression by the authorities.
3.2.6. The Persbreidel Ordonnantie (1931)
The suppression of press freedom worsened when the Press Banning Ordi-
nance (Persbreidel Ordonnantie)28 was introduced in the Netherlands Indies on 
7 September 1931. The draft of this ordinance led to vehement debates in Par-
26 These articles will be further discussed in Chapter V: Press Freedom in Criminal Law.
27 All of the major nationalist leaders were in one way or another involved in the press. 
Soekarno was editor and publisher of the magazine Fikiran Rakjat (People’s Thought); 
Muhammad Hatta was a regular contributor to the magazine Daulat Rakjat (People’s Sov-
ereignty); Amir Syarifudin was a member of the editorial staff of the magazine Banteng 
(Wild Buffalo); Haji Agus Salim was editor in chief of Mestika (Flower).
28 Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1931 No. 394 jo. Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 
1932 No. 44. The original title is ‘Drukwerken, Bescherming van de openbare orde tegen ongew-
enschte periodiek verschijnende drukwerken’ (Printed matters: Protection of public order 
against undesirable periodical printings).
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liament and was seriously criticised by journalists, who had been excluded 
from the drafting process. The enactment of the Press Banning Ordinance can 
be explained by the rise of a political movement that was increasingly critical 
of the Dutch government’s colonial policies. It combined socialist, communist 
and nationalist groups, and arose both in the Netherlands and the Netherlands 
Indies. According to Maters (1998: 204, 220), the Press Banning Ordinance 
was mainly a response to the communist insurgency in East Java of 1926.
Moreover, between 1927 and 1931 the government found that the Penal 
Code proved an insufficient basis for applying the restrictive policies 
deemed necessary. The government wished to push the judiciary out of 
press control and to return it to the realm of administrative policies. To this 
end it developed a license system which could be applied directly (Termor-
shuizen 2011: 156). After the enactment of the Press Banning Ordinance, 
there were two mechanisms to control the press: through the criminal courts 
and through a license system.
Articles 1 and 2 of the Press Banning Ordinance stated that the Governor-
General had the right to ban publications for a maximum of eight days in 
the interest of public order. If he found that the newspaper concerned was 
violating public order, he could ban the publication for a longer period, 
without involvement of the judiciary. Article 2 section (1) and (3) stated:
If the designation referred to previous article does not have the desired effect, the Gov-
ernor-General may, after hearing the Council of the Netherlands Indies, issue a ban on 
printing, publishing and distributing such print works, in the case of a newspaper for a 
maximum of eight days and in the case of other printed periodicals for a maximum of three 
times the period between the appearance of two consecutive issues.
When, after the ban has expired, printing of the banned work is resumed, appearance of 
the same printed materials can be temporarily banned as designated by article 1, as long as 
the designation referred to in article 1 is in force. For a newspaper, the duration of a second 
or third ban can be no more than thirty consecutive days.
One of the newspapers banned on the basis of the Press Banning Ordinance 
was Soeara Oemoem in Surabaya. The ban, by Decree No. 6 of 23 June 1933, 
followed the newspaper’s reports about the mutiny on the ‘De Zeven Provin-
ciën’ [The Seven Provinces] considering them as ‘inciting.’29 This was the out-
come of an investigation process started by Attorney General Verheijen, who 
29 The mutiny broke out on the Dutch warship De Zeven Provinciën, when a group of about 
ten native sailors seized the fi rearms and ammunition on board, and took over the ship. 
Almost all of the native crew members, about 180 men, joined in the mutiny, while of the 
approximately 50 Europeans on board some immediately and enthusiastically joined the 
mutineers, while others hesitated and tried to exercise a restraining infl uence (Bloom 
1975; Western Argus (Kalgoorlie, WA 1916 – 1938), Tuesday 28 February 1933, page 1). 
The case led to a strong call in the Netherlands for stronger government powers in the 
Netherlands Indies.
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had Tjindar Boemi, the author of the Soeara Oemoem articles, arrested. He 
reported to the Governor-General that the investigation showed that Soeara 
Oemoem’s articles were of an inciting nature. After having heard the advice 
of the Council of the Netherlands Indies, the Attorney General suggested 
to the Governor-General to impose a ban on the basis of the Press Banning 
Ordinance. Four days later, the Council of the Netherlands Indies gave the 
same advice to the Governor-General, and on 23 June 1933, the Governor 
General issued the decree (Maters 1998: 239; Swantoro and Atmakusumah 
2002: 197-198).
Between 1933 and 1935, the government banned 18 Indonesian and five 
Dutch newspapers. On Java and Madura, in 1934 alone the government 
banned 26 daily newspapers – out of a total of 30 daily newspapers. On top 
of this, 108 weeklies and 244 monthlies were banned (Maters 1998: 237, 241). 
These bans clearly had an appalling effect on press freedom in the Nether-
lands Indies, far worse than the Penal Code. Any article relating to national-
ist consciousness, struggle, democracy and independence was suspect30 and 
considered a threat for Dutch rule over the Netherlands Indies (Maters 1998: 
238-239). Although the Press Banning Ordinance was primarily aimed at 
controlling Indonesian newspapers, it was also applied to European ones. 
Ironically, this led to a situation where the Indonesian nationalist press 
found itself in the same situation as the extreme right-wing and fiercely 
Dutch nationalist ‘Het Nationale Weekblad’ (The National Weekly), which was 
prohibited from being published for three weeks in 1938.
In 1940 two military regulations were added to the repressive machinery 
already in place: Military Ordinance 14/Dv.0/7A-3 (Verordening van het Mili-
tair Gezag, Javasche Courant 17-5-1940 No. 40 a) and Military Ordinance 66/
Dv.0/VII A-3 (Javasche Courant 26-3-1941 No. 24 a). They prohibited publish-
ing any news or reports concerning military matters which (a) endangered 
public order and security; (b) related to army, navy, air force, state defense, 
and/or other military interests, and which were never to be made public.
Press freedom in the Netherlands Indies was directly influenced by political 
dynamics in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies. The main actors 
were Parliament and the Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands 
and the Governor-General in the Netherlands Indies. The struggle for free-
dom of expression by socialist newspapers in the Netherlands and in the 
Netherlands Indies, as well as the emergence of a vernacular press in the 
Netherlands Indies contributed to an increasing number of press reports 
that were critical about the government. This attitude was also promoted 
30 Press bans in 1933 were applied to silence the ‘non-cooperative movement,’ by banning 
Pemoeda and Gempar as papers of the Partindo (Indonesia Party), Medan Rakjat as paper of 
the Permi (Union of Indonesian Muslims), and Pahlawan Moeda as paper of the HPII 
(Association of Indonesia Moslem Youth) (Maters 1998: 239).
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by the political context of the ‘Ethical Policy’ in the early twentieth century 
discussed above, which led to a ‘modern’ self-consciousness for Indonesians 
as reflected in the press owned by Indonesians.
In summary, throughout the colonial period the government combined 
multiple instruments for restraining press freedom, ranging from preven-
tive to repressive censorship. The Penal Code’s haatzaai-artikelen are often 
considered key to the repression, but in fact the involvement of the judiciary 
made this law not as effective as the government would have wanted. This 
led the Minister of Colonial Affairs to introduce administrative policies for 
more direct forms of control, and ultimately Parliament enacted the Press 
Banning Ordinance in 1931. This marked the end of an age of relative press 
freedom, with the period from 1906 until 1914 as the liberal highlight. After 
1914, growing political consciousness among Indonesians and the emer-
gence of the nationalist movement made the government fearful of the role 
of newspapers in the vernacular language in promoting these ideas among 
larger sections of Indonesian society. The situation for the Dutch language 
press deteriorated as well, but in particular after 1931 the Press Banning 
Ordinance was mainly applied against the Bumiputera press. Administrative 
sanctions provided the effective instrument the colonial administration was 
looking for, not only because they did not involve judicial checks, but also 
because they could be applied against newspapers rather than individual 
journalists or editors. The absence of an appeal or even complaint mecha-
nism made administrative sanctions even more expeditious. At the end of 
Dutch colonial rule, therefore, there was not much left of press freedom in 
the Netherlands Indies.
3.2.7. The Press and the Japanese
On 1 March 1942 Japanese troops landed at three places along the northern 
coast of Java and quickly defeated the Dutch colonial army. This marked the 
start of more than three and a half years of Japanese occupation, lasting until 
after the end of the Second World War on 2 September 1945.
In spite of mixed feelings, in the beginning many Indonesians enthu-
siastically welcomed the Japanese invasion as a liberation from the Dutch, 
waving flags and shouting slogans such as “Japan is our elder brother.” As 
Soekarno said,
I know all about their brutality. I know of Nipponese behavior in occupied territory – but 
okay. I am fully prepared for a few years of this. I must rationally consider what they can do 
for my people. We must be grateful to the Japanese. We can use them… (Adams 1965: 157)
Nevertheless, the situation rapidly deteriorated. During the Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia, many who lived in areas considered strategically 
important were subjected to torture, rape, slavery, arbitrary arrest and exe-
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cution, and other atrocities. An estimated 270,000 Indonesians were deport-
ed as unpaid labourers or romusha to work on Japanese military projects and 
thousands of women ended up in brothels to ‘comfort’ Japanese soldiers.
The Japanese enacted Military Law (Osamu Seiri) 1/ 1942, which applied 
to Java and Madura. This law determined the basic outlines of the govern-
ment system. All the laws and regulations of the Netherlands Indies were 
to remain effective temporarily provided they were not in conflict with Jap-
anese regulations. Similar regulations were also proclaimed for the other 
Netherlands Indies territories (Wignyosoebroto 1994: 183; Han 1998: 421).
In its propaganda campaign for ‘the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ 
on 25 May 2602 (1942), the High Command of the Japanese armed forces in 
Java and Madura promulgated Law 16/1942 on ‘The Control of Organs of 
Publication and Information and the Censorship of Publication and Infor-
mation.’ It introduced a ‘double model’ for press control, providing for both 
preventive and repressive measures, unlike the Dutch who had replaced a 
preventive with a repressive model. Without publication permits newspa-
pers were not allowed to appear (Thoolen 1987: 96; Surjomihardjo et al. 2002: 
175-176). Article 1 of Law 16/1942 stated that “all categories of printed mat-
ter were required to have a publication permit,” while Article 2 “prohibited 
former hostile publications to continue their activities.” Article 3 provided 
that “Publishing printed media which relate to publication and information, 
either daily, weekly, monthly or irregular publication, without a permit is 
prohibited.”
Preventive censorship was introduced by Articles 4, 9 and 10. It stated that 
all printed newspapers should pass through the Japanese Army’s Censor-
ship Department before they could be circulated or distributed. The Censor-
ship Department office was situated in Batavia (Jakarta), with branches in 
cities such as Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. Before being allowed to 
publish, a publisher should get a permit from a censorship official (Domei), 
acquiring a signature (paraf) after inspection. Some newspapers, such as the 
Sedya Tama daily (Yogjakarta) adapted to the new conditions and changed 
their name and function to become mere tools of propaganda (Said 1988: 
48-49).
Law 16/1942 also forced all Dutch and Chinese newspapers to close down. 
The military commander issued some permits for well-established newspa-
pers, but they were required to change their names into Japanese, such as 
Jakarta based newspapers, Asia Raja – with editors Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, 
R. Winarno, A. Tjokroaminoto and B.M. Diah –Kung Yung Pao-Indonesia,31 
31 Indeed, Kung Yung Pao still seems a Chinese name. However, Kung Yung Pao was run by 
Oey Tiang Tjoei, a loyal to the pro-Japan Chinese puppet president Wang Ching Wei, 
based in Japanese-occupied Nanking.
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Kana Monji Shimbun, Pandji Pustaka, Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia and Djawa 
Baroe. Outside Jakarta the same happened to Sinar Matahari (Yogyakarta), 
Sinar Baru (Semarang), Soeara Asia (Surabaya), and newspapers outside Java, 
such as Kita Sumatra Shimbun (Medan), Padang Nippo and Sumatera Shim-
bun (Padang), Palembang Shimbun (Palembang), Lampung Shimbun (Tanjung 
Karang), Borneo Shimbun (Kalimantan) and Selebes Shimbun (Ujung Pandang).
Publishers of newspapers that violated the press rules above could be con-
victed to imprisonment of up to one year. Newspapers violating the censor-
ship mechanism would be brought before the Gunsei Hooin (Court of Justice 
of the Military Government); other offenders had to appear before the Gun-
ritsu Kaigi (Martial Court). However, in practice extra-judicial mechanisms, 
such as arbitrary detention, were used more frequently to suppress the press 
if they were critical of Japanese colonialism.
A clash between the Indonesian nationalist movement and the Japanese mil-
itary seemed inevitable. The Japanese military threatened and arrested any 
Indonesian they did not trust, including journalists. Many journalists were 
suspected of being anti-Japanese and were detained, such as Herusukarto, 
Subekti, Tabrani, Sajuti Melik and S.K. Trimurti. The journalist Kusen died 
in a Japanese prison. In Kalimantan, several journalists were assassinated, 
including Anomputro, M. Homan, H. Babou, A. Atjil and Amir Bondan 
(Said 1988: 50). Unfortunately I have been unable to find the reason for why 
they were killed, and how they were treated in custody.32
During the Japanese occupation, the press system had a rigorously authori-
tarian character and only served the interests and propaganda of the Japa-
nese army. Nonetheless, as argued by Lee (1971: 28), in some respects Indo-
nesian journalists also benefited from the Japanese occupation. Firstly, there 
was the possibility to spread nationalist ideas despite the restrictions of 
Japanese-imposed press censorship, and secondly, they could contribute lin-
guistically to the formation of modern Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia). Jour-
nalists were able to produce comments with nationalist overtones and wrote 
them in a language which gradually became more uniform and modern. 
The war was moreover a useful training period for journalists, preparing 
them for their tasks in the imminent armed struggle for independence and 
the building of a free Republic of Indonesia. Despite the oppressive systems 
under Dutch and Japanese administration, journalists managed to develop 
their skills and could promote a spirit of nationalism and independence 
(Soemanang 1952; Said 1988).
32 I contacted Tribuana Said by email in order to learn more about the assassination of jour-
nalists. He did not remember the specifi c source of the story, but recommended me sev-
eral sources. However, these did not contain any further information either. Personal 
communication with Tribuana Said through email, 30 November 2011.
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3.3. Post-Independence
This part covers the analysis of legislation and policies related to press free-
dom from 1945 until 1957. I have hereby made a sub-division of two shorter 
periods, 1945-1949 and 1950-1957. The first period represents the transition 
from colonialism to independence. The second concerns the first few years 
of independence, when Indonesia was under a parliamentary system after 
the Dutch had finally recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty and given up on 
their colonial war.
3.3.1. 1945-1949
Press freedom during the early years of Indonesian independence was first 
completely suppressed by the British army, which landed in Indonesia in 
1945. Indonesia’s independence was not recognised, and the British troops 
were to control the situation after the Japanese had left and before the Dutch 
returned. Hence, newspapers became a primary target for controlling infor-
mation. Said (1988) notes that the British army stopped the daily Sinar Deli 
and Pewarta Deli in Medan from publishing. A.O. Lubis and the head of the 
printing house of Syarikat Tapanuli, Rachmat, were even detained for three 
days in March 1946. Mimbar Oemoem’s Wahab Siregar was also arrested. 
The printing house of Soeloeh Merdeka was occupied by soldiers. More dras-
tic action was taken in Padang, where a printing house which published 
Oetoesan Soematra was blown up by British soldiers.
Dutch troops joined in the repression after they had landed in February 
1946. Attacks against press offices also occurred in Jakarta (Berita Indonesia). 
Moreover, journalists and editors were regularly detained. B.M. Diah and 
Herawati Diah from the daily Merdeka in Jakarta, as well as several jour-
nalists: Sajuti Melik, Wonohito, P. Wardojo, Sudarso Warsokusumo, Anwar 
Tjokroaminoto, Siauw Giok Tjan, Tabrani and Adam Malik, were all arrest-
ed in the early years after independence without any consideration of a due 
process of law. Thus, it were the British and Dutch armies to first suppress 
press freedom, not the new Indonesian government. This was the context, 
with the press under serious attack by the colonial authorities, in which the 
Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Indonesian Journalists Association or PWI) 
was established on 9 February 1946 in Surakarta (Central Java). PWI’s focus 
was almost entirely on supporting the press in the struggle for indepen-
dence and in enhancing solidarity among journalists.33
33 The fi rst chairman and secretary of PWI were respectively Mr. Sumanang Surjowinoto 
and Sudarjo Tjokrososworo. A short historical overview can be read at the PWI website: 
http://pwi.or.id/index.php/Sejarah/Sekilas-Sejarah-Pers-Nasional.html (retrieved on 
15 June 2012).
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While less repressive than the British and the Dutch, the new Indonesian 
government was concerned about what was being published. It ordered that 
any foreign journalist should submit telegram copies of his reports directly 
to the Military Governor of the Indonesian Republic. Since the Dutch were 
considered foreigners, this included all Dutch journalists. However, accord-
ing to the Indonesian authorities this rule was ‘not part of censorship,’ but 
a way to know what was being published about the Indonesian situation 
abroad (Zweers 2013: 346).
Constitutionally speaking, there was a ‘dualistic’ situation. While the 1945 
Constitution claimed authority over the entire territory of Indonesia, the 
Netherlands opposed this with their own territorial claim and argued that 
their colonial constitution of 1925 (the Indische Staatsregeling) was still valid. 
As one may recall from the previous chapter, the 1945 Constitution stip-
ulated the ‘guarantee’ of freedom of expression under article 28,34 which 
states: “The freedom to associate and to assemble, to express oral or written 
thoughts, etc., shall be prescribed by statute.” However, it was difficult to 
realise this freedom under the conditions of war and territorial dispute in 
these years.
3.3.1.1. Colonial Legacy
The context of the fight for independence made it difficult for the national 
leaders to realise their revolutionary dreams, spirit and ambition to change 
the colonial law. This system was moreover deeply rooted in the Nether-
lands Indies system of administration and its organs, procedures, doctrinal 
principles, and enforcement processes. Therefore, the old colonial legal and 
institutional system could not be removed within a short period of time.35 
According to Lev (1985: 57) and Benda (1966), the new government owed 
a great deal to the colonial precedent, “for even the most shattering revo-
lutions, very rare among new states, cannot wipe out the past”. Similarly, 
Wignyosoebroto (1994: 187-9) said that,
It is impossible to develop national law from zero, because the new configuration still 
needs to be explored. Moreover, educated people who had been trained in the Dutch law 
tradition, would more or less think and act based on this tradition or school of thought, ... 
they preferred to push a type of positive law system like the Netherlands Indies legacy, 
which still existed according to the Constitution’s transitional provision. The founding 
fathers of the State had been trying to propose an alternative law to develop a new legal 
system during the PPKI discussion in 1945, but had not yet reached agreement because the 
first major debate was how to build a governance system or system for leading the country.
34 I added quotation marks to the word ‘guarantee’, because the article did not really pro-
tect freedom of expression. This will be further detailed in the next chapters.
35 This was admitted by Soekarno when he was chairing the PPKI: “The Constitution just 
formulated by PPKI, is considered ‘a rapid constitution’ and a ‘revolutie grondwet’…. Later 
we shall make a more complete and perfect Constitution” (Yamin 1959).
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There are, at least, two reasons that explain why the Netherlands-Indies 
laws were adopted as national laws for Indonesia. First, as mentioned by 
Lev (1985: 69), the failure of the revolution to demystify the colonial heri-
tage accounts in large part for the ease with which the old forms were car-
ried over. Second, retention of the old laws was not a matter of oversight. 
The previous laws were sustained, and their continuation was stipulated 
explicitly in the first Constitution of 194536 and the succeeding two Constitu-
tions of 1949 and 1950. Although no fundamental changes were introduced 
immediately, at least the 194937 and 1950 Constitution contained protective 
human rights. The transitional provision in the Constitution was drafted by 
Soepomo. As he said, this
“…was not merely a matter of convenience… nor was it simply because no one had any 
ideas,” but also because “…the colonial law provided an available and appropriate frame-
work,” and moreover this colonial law “… was a … secular neutrality between conflicting 
religious and social groups” (Lev 2000: 46).
Soepomo’s statement about an ‘available and appropriate framework’ did 
not take into account the implementation of especially those laws that had 
been detrimental to the nationalist movement. As explained in this chapter, 
the colonial system knew many oppressive laws which were contradictory 
to justice and the rule of law. Notorious laws against press freedom, such as 
the Drukpersreglement, many articles of the Penal Code, and the Press Ban-
ning Ordinance (1931) were not repealed. In short, the same laws that had 
been used to oppress numerous nationalist leaders, including journalists 
and publishers, were kept in place without much further consideration.
In 1946, the Penal Code was amended, expanded, and reinforced by Law 
1/1946 on Criminal Law Legislation (Peraturan Hukum Pidana, or KUHP 
36 Article II of Transitional Provision of UUD 1945 stated that, “All regulations in force at 
the time of independence are declared to remain valid unless or until replaced in a man-
ner prescribed by the Constitution.” Then, slightly similar to Article II of UUD 1945, the 
transitional process provision was also stipulated by Presidential Decree (Maklumat Presi-
dent) No. 2 of year 1945 (10 October 1945). The decree stated that, “All regulations in force 
at the time of independence are declared to remain valid as long as they do not contradict 
the Constitution.”
37 Article 192 of the 1949 Federal Constitution, Section 1: “At the moment this Constitution 
becomes valid, the existing regulations by law and administrative provisions, remain in 
force unchanged as the own regulations and provisions of the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia, as long and insofar as they have not been withdrawn, supplemented 
or changed by legislation and administrative provisions based on this Constitution.” Sec-
tion 2: “Maintenance of the existing regulations by law and administrative provisions 
prevails only insofar as these regulations and provisions are not incompatible with the 
provisions of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, of the United Statute, of the Agree-
ment on Transitional Measures or of any other agreement connected with the Transfer of 
Sovereignty, and insofar as they are not in contravention with those provisions of this 
Constitution which require no further legislation or executive measures.”
From the VOC to the End of Guided Democracy: Press Freedom in Legislation 63
or Penal Code).38 It meant that several criminal provisions which could be 
used to attack the press were maintained, including the haatzaai-artikelen.39
3.3.1.2. The First Restrictions against the Press
However, not all anti-press laws were transplanted. Less than a year after 
independence, the government of the Republic of Indonesia enacted an ‘anti-
press law’ to deal with the emergency situation. Law 6/1946 stipulated in 
Articles 8, 9, and 1040 that the State Defense Council (DPN) had the authority 
to restrict and prohibit freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, printing 
or information, and sending news. The latter terms clearly addressed the 
press. Article 24 stated that the DPN had the authority to apply pressure, 
even by using violence, in order to fulfill the implementation of this laws 
and other regulations. Moreover, if the government conducting such action 
would incur expenses, the violators were to recompensate. Obviously, in 
practice Law 6/1946 was effective only in the area controlled by the Repub-
lic (Smith 1969: 117). In the Dutch controlled territory the old laws, such 
as the Drukpersreglement, the Press Banning Ordinance and the Penal Code 
were still in force.
According to Abdulgani (1952: 102), the first effective restriction of the press 
after the declaration of independence was related to the ‘Madiun affair’ in 
September 1948. This concerned a communist uprising against the nation-
alist government. The rebels were, however, not well prepared and were 
quickly defeated by the nationalist army (Kahin 2003: 300). The national-
ist government issued a restriction on the press, targeting specifically those 
papers connected with the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR, the People’s Dem-
ocratic Front) and those affiliated to the communists, such as the Patriot, 
Boeroeh and Soeara Iboe Kota. In turn, the FDR imposed restrictions on Api 
Rakjat, the paper representing its political opponents, especially during the 
power struggle in Madiun.
According to Atmakusumah (2009: 18) the first press restriction based on 
Law 6/1946 was not related to Madiun, but concerned the banning of the 
weekly Revolusioner. The exact date of when this happened is unclear, how-
ever it was between 1946 and 1949. The chief editor Soepeno criticised Soek-
arno’s speeches as “bombastis” (turgid) and Revolusioner was immediately 
banned from dissemination by Wedono Salamoen of the Djawatan Pengawas 
38 Republik Indonesia News No. II, 9, 16 February 1946. The change referred to the Penal 
Code (Article 1).
39 These were adapted from Titel V, Misdrijven tegen de openbare orde (Crimes against Public 
Order) of the Penal Code, which included the haatzaai-artikelen (Articles 154, 155, 156, 157, 
207, and 208). These articles will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
40 Law 6/1946 was enacted on 6 June 1946 by Soekarno (Republic of Indonesia Gazette Year 
II, No. 18-19, p. 189-192). This law was also operationalised by the State Defense Council 
Regulation No. 8, 11, and 16 of 1946 and No. 34 of 1947.
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Keamanan Negara or DPKN (intelligence services under the police corps). 
Another paper prohibited was Soeara Moeda, which was managed by the 
Indonesian Student Association (Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia) in Solo, led by Soe-
listio, Slamet, and Soekarto. Soeara Moeda was accused of being a proponent 
of the ‘autonomous territories’ (Daerah Swapraja) supported by the Dutch. 
Third, the daily Soeara Rakjat in Kediri, led by A. Aziz (who later established 
the Surabaya Post) was banned after reporting the death of communist leader 
Musso. The military governor imposed a ban on the newspaper for several 
days. In September 1948, the government also banned three newspapers in 
Yogya, Revolusioner, Patriot (led by J. Simandjuntak or Yusuf Adjitorop), and 
the daily Soeara Iboekota (led by Wikana). Except for Soeara Moeda these were 
all communist newspapers.
The fact that measures were taken against the press is not surprising, if we 
take into account the chaotic political situation during the first three years 
of independence. Power struggles between Islamic, nationalist and commu-
nist groups were widespread and there was a lack of government stability. 
However, they demonstrate that the revolution did not automatically lead to 
press freedom, despite the 1945 Constitution’s basic point of departure that 
freedom of expression should be protected.
3.3.2. 1950-1957
After the Round Table Conference in 1949, which led to the transfer of sov-
ereignty from the Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia, the latter adopted a 
parliamentary government model. During the parliamentary government 
years, most political parties established their own newspapers, for instance 
Abadi (the modernist Islamic party Masyumi). Merdeka (Soekarno’s national-
ist party PNI), Pedoman (Sjahrir’s Socialist Party PSI) and the Harian Rakjat 
(the communist PKI). Mochtar Lubis (1952: 93) observed that these politi-
cal linkages were reinforced by the weak financial position of Indonesian 
newspapers, which exposed them to external influences. Few newspapers 
were really independent or non-partisan. Nonetheless, Lubis added that 
the Indonesian press was honest in the sense that newspaper staff would 
not take bribes for expressing certain views, and unanimous in their cam-
paign against corruption among government officials and against a slow 
and wasteful bureaucracy.
In the polarised situation, those political parties represented in the govern-
ment used the Press Banning Ordinance of 1931 to silence “over-enthusias-
tic” criticism from the opposition (Feith 1962: 576). This happened for the 
first time when in August 1951 the Masyumi-dominated government, led by 
Prime Minister Sukiman, launched an anti-communist attack on the pretext 
that the communists were conspiring to overthrow the government. Accord-
ing to his speech in Parliament, 15,000 persons had been arrested by the 
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end of October, including a few journalists. In the smaller provincial towns, 
newspapers with a communist, Dutch, or Chinese signature were banned 
(Feith 1962: 323).
After 1951 these anti-press freedom measures continued, with at least 14 
anti-press actions in both 1952 and 1953 (Smith 1969: 152, 178). This led to 
vehement reactions from the opposition and the press and ultimately to the 
revocation of the Press Banning Ordinance by Law 23/1954.41 The govern-
ment then in place considered the Press Banning Ordinance at odds with 
democracy and the rule of law, in particular because it contained no fair 
mechanism for journalists, editors, or media owners to defend their rights 
in a fair judicial process. This, the government argued, violated Article 19 
of the 1950 Provisional Constitution. According to Smith (1969: 181-182, 
186), in 1954 the only action against press freedom consisted of eight cases 
brought to the criminal court.
The revocation of the Press Banning Ordinance led to increasingly vocifer-
ous press attacks on the government (Lee 1971: 51). The leading critical (and 
independent) newspaper was Indonesia Raya, with Mochtar Lubis as its edi-
tor in chief, which ran a series of articles about scandals, feuds, and frauds 
within the various ministries and within several Indonesian diplomatic mis-
sions abroad, without sparing persons of high status and rank – including 
President Soekarno. Mutual accusations and recriminations reached their 
climax in the party press in 1955, when the first general elections for the 
DPR were approaching. Unlike the reporting in Indonesia Raya, few allega-
tions were supported by thorough investigation or reported facts.
On 6 January 1956 the Djawatan Kepolisian Negara Bagian Dinas Pengawasan 
Keselamatan Negara or State Police Security Monitoring Agency (DPKN-
DKN) released a report, denouncing intimidating, false and defamatory 
language in press reporting during 1955.42 It paid attention to the vitriolic 
conflict between Masyumi’s Abadi and PKI’s Harian Rakjat, and the lack of 
ethical standards applied in the party press in general when propagating 
their own ideology and vilifying their opponents. In some cases this led 
to criminal prosecution, but the abolition of the Press Banning Ordinance 
41 State Gazette No. 54-77.
42 DPKN-DKN is a police body. The DKN (Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, or State Police) was 
established on 19 August 1945. This institution employed special agents, named PAM 
(Pengawas Aliran Masyarakat, short for Supervisors of Societal Groups). One of PAM’s 
mandates as stipulated in Police Decree Pol. 68/Staf/PAM, on 22 September 1949, was 
“Monitoring public opinion in the press, radio, and community.” PAM were then 
replaced by the DPKN-DKN (Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara-Djawatan Kepolisian 
Negara or State Police Security Monitoring Agency) on the basis of Police Decree Pol: 
4/2/28/UM, on 13 March 1951. The change was related to the expansion of its mandates, 
especially to secure personal safety of the President and Vice-President as well as other 
high level offi cials.
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seems to have really opened the floodgates. Some Western observers were 
amazed by the lack of governmental control, for example Schumacher, who 
noticed that Indonesian press freedom, “…. would be unthinkable even 
in the countries of the Western world with the greatest press freedom.” 
(Schumacher in Lee 1971: 52).
Although the government could apply the Penal Code in controlling the 
press and freedom of expression, it seemed that this law when it concerned 
press cases had been reduced to relative ‘statutory dormancy’, since the 
revocation of the Press Banning Ordinance in 1954. Smith (1969: 184-185) 
suggests that this had to do with the loss of power of the presidency: “… 
Soekarno was no longer regarded with awe... perhaps the president (Soek-
arno) was not in a strong position. Otherwise, one may wonder if the presi-
dent might not have taken aggressive action against the press that so bra-
zenly bandied the news about the tension between the president’s latest 
wife, Hartini, and the women’s clubs.”
However, this situation was not to last for long. The decline of press free-
dom started when the military intervened, with Army Commander of the 
Military Authority A.H. Naution imposing martial law by Military Ordi-
nance PKM/001/9/1956 on 14 September 1956. Article 1 of this ordinance 
stipulated that,
It is prohibited to print, publish, offer statements, broadcast, post, provoke or have writ-
ings, pictures, or paintings, which contain criticism, insinuations/insults against the 
President and the Vice-President, or against an authority or general assembly, or a public 
servant when acting on the basis of an official mandate; writings which contain hostility, 
hatred, and insulting statements against groups of society; or writings which contain news 
or announcements that provoke chaos in society.
Article 2 provided for a maximum of one-year imprisonment and a fine. In 
fact, this military ordinance was a summary version of the haatzaai-artikelen 
in the Penal Code. The difference was that now the military authorities gave 
themselves the authority to enforce these rules, which meant they could 
arrest anyone on this basis or put him or her into jail without judicial pro-
cess. The military thus usurped the public prosecutor’s position.
It soon became clear that these were serious threats. After his return from 
the International Journalist Conference in Zürich in 1956 Mochtar Lubis was 
interrogated and arrested by the Military Police Corps (Hutagalung 1968: 
14). On 21 December 1956, he was first detained for three days, then confined 
to the Military Prison in Budi Utomo Street for 14 days, and finally put under 
‘house arrest’ for 4,5 years (Lubis 1980: 1). Prior to 1957, many journalists 
were detained for several days or charged for libel or similar offences, but 
Mochtar Lubis was the first editor in the post-1949 history of Indonesia to be 
held without charge for more than a couple of weeks (Smith 1969). However, 
this was only a taste of things to come under martial law (Lee 1971: 52).
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According to Mochtar, he was arrested because of his ‘tajuk rencana’ (edito-
rial opinion) on the ‘Central Sumatra Incident’ (Lubis 1980: 2-3), where he
... drew the conclusion that this incident will surely not be limited to Central Sumatra 
alone, but will have consequences for other regions as well… The (coalition) Cabinet will 
not be able to overcome this, nor will President Soekarno himself, without Bung Hatta, nor 
will Chief of Staff Nasution… if necessary for the greater good, then President Soekarno 
and Chief of Staff Nasution must also be prepared to relinquish their positions.
The arrest letter was drafted by the Military Police Corps Commander of 
‘Detasemen Garnizun III/6’ in his capacity as Military Assistant to the Pros-
ecutor of the Military Court in Jakarta. The letter stated that, “… after hear-
ing and/or reading and/or considering Instruction Letter KMKBDR43 on 
21 December 1956, there are reasonable arguments for saying that Mochtar 
Lubis has violated the KUHP/KUHPT (Penal Code/Military Penal Code),44 
and needs to be temporarily detained and therefore we instruct (Lets/CPM) 
M Jacoub Wahab et al. to arrest and detain the accused on 21 December 1956 
in CPM (Military Police Corps) Det. Gar. III/6” (Lubis 1980: 27-28). Indonesia 
Raya reported the speech of Ministry of Justice, Mr. Mulyatno (2 January 
1957), who stated: “I cannot do anything about the arrest of Indonesia Raya’s 
editorial chief, Mochtar Lubis, and I do not know when he will be released.”
Thus, from now on, under martial law, the military could effectively silence 
the press as they wished, without any controls in place. Combined with the 
above quoted legal provision, which was so broad to be almost meaning-
less, the situation allowed subjective political considerations to determine 
whether journalists and editors should be arrested. Banning newspapers 
became common practice.
3.4. Guided Democracy and The Decline of Press Freedom 
(1957-1965)
I do want the news released not to be objective, 
but to clearly take the side of our Revolution 
and attack the enemies of the Revolution 
(Soekarno, 1962).45
The first years of Guided Democracy were still influenced by the parlia-
mentary system and the Konstituante which had been elected in 1955 and 
continued formulating a new constitution.46 These debates, as well as those 
in parliament, still seemed democratic in nature and allowed for different 
43 Komando Militer Kota Besar Djakarta Raya or Military Commando of Great Jakarta City.
44 Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana/Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana Tentara.
45 Indonesian Observer, December 19, 1962, p. 1.
46 See the previous Chapter.
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ideological convictions to be expressed. Outside parliament, however, the 
situation was different. For the press 1957 was the worst year in the entire 
period of Guided Democracy. In this year, three regulations affecting the 
press were enacted. The first was Military Authority Regulation of Djakarta 
Raya (Peraturan Penguasa Militer Djakarta Raya) 6/1957, promulgated on 13 
March, which merely affirmed military authority in controlling the press.47 
The regulation defended its prohibition on information regarding military 
matters by stating
... that in the current situation there are still news reports, especially reports on matters 
related to the military situation, for the time being newspapers in Djakarta Raya, which 
contents and sources can not be accounted for, so that it will affect security and public order.
This regulation was effectively used to attack journalists. On 20 April 1957, 
the Military Authority of Djakarta Raya instructed to ban two newspapers 
(Pedoman and Bintang Timur) for three days, from 23 April until 25 April 
1957. According to the official statement this ban was promulgated because 
of their report “Banteng Council representatives are arrested in Jakarta,” on 
16 April 1957.48
The Emergency Ordinance (literally State of War and Siege Ordinance, 
Regeling op de Staat van Oorlog en Beleg known as S.O.B) was the next regula-
tion to have a major influence on press freedom. President Soekarno declared 
it applicable on 14 March 1957,49 after the stepping down of the Ali Sastroami-
djojo Cabinet. The Emergency Ordinance permitted the military to respond 
to any act or situation considered as endangering the state. It was a logical 
response to the insurgencies against the Republic in several regions,50 but the 
military used their authority to introduce many political, economic and even 
legal policies that had nothing to do with the insurgencies.
47 Ironically, this regulation was more repressive than the Dutch military regulations of the 
1940s, see Verordening No. 14/Dv.0/7A-3 van het Militair Gezag (Javasche Courant 17-5-
1940 No. 40 a) jo Verordening No. 66/Dv.0/VII A-3 (Javasche Courant 26-3-1941 No. 24 a).
48 “Dua Utusan Dewan Banteng Ditahan di Jakarta.” The Banteng Council was an organisation 
demanding at the national level for “immediate implementation of progressive and radi-
cal improvements in all fi elds, especially in the leadership of the Army and henceforth in 
the leadership of the State” (Kahin 1999: 182-183).
49 This regulation was adopted from the Netherlands Indies regulation, De Regeling op de 
Staat van Oorlog en Beleg (Staatsblad 1939 No. 582, amended by Staatsblad 1948 No. 146 
and Staatsblad 1949 No. 274). In implementing this regulation, the government enacted 
Government Regulation 7/1950 on 16 March 1950. This regulation was repealed by Law 
74/1957 on Determining Dangerous Situations (Penetapan Keadaan Bahaya), on 30 October 
1957.
50 Such insurgencies took place in Aceh, Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Sumatera and West/
Central Java. Best-known were PRRI/Permesta, which tried to gain independence from 
Indonesia, and Darul Islam, which was a fundamentalist Islamic group that fought for 
establishing a religious state in Indonesia.
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These policies included detaining journalists and closing down press com-
panies which dared to publish views that differed from those of the govern-
ment. According to the data collected by Smith (1969: 238, 328), the gov-
ernment took 125 actions against the press in 1957 alone. Soekarno and the 
military commander General A.H. Nasution took the lead in this. On 23 
April 1957, the latter banned Indonesia Raya for three days, after it had pub-
lished an interview with the Commander of the Banteng Council, Lieuten-
ant Colonel Ahmad Husein.51 In fact, Indonesia Raya just quoted from Haluan 
in Padang, 20 April 1957. Chief editor of Keng Po Inyo Beng Goat was also 
threatened, and his office was occupied by the military on 27 May 1957. 
Three other chief editors, Syaaf from Pemandangan, Josef Dick from Marinyo, 
and Hafas from a Dutch language newspaper,52 were also arrested, just as 
Rosihan Anwar from Pedoman (on 13 August 1957).
Not all state institutions sided with the government and the military. Judge 
Abdul Razak Sutan Malelo and his colleagues from the Central Jakarta Court 
bravely acquitted Mochtar Lubis and Kustiniyati Mochtar53 (both of Indonesia 
Raya) from a charge based on a report on the involvement of Roeslan Abdul-
gani (Foreign Affairs Minister) and the Ali Cabinet in a Rp. 1,5 million cor-
ruption case (Lubis 1980: 62-63, 81).
On 13 September 1957, 13 newspapers, Antara, Pia, Ins, Indonesia Raya, Pedo-
man, Harian Rakyat, Bintang Timur, Keng Po, Djiwa Baru, Merdeka, Pemuda, 
Abadi, and Java Bode were banned by the Military Commander of Djakarta 
Raya City. The afflicted newspapers were informed of the ban by telephone. 
During the National Consultative Conference (Lubis 1980: 93-94), which 
was initiated by the Djuanda government as a mechanism for reconciliation 
between central government and district army commanders, the spokes-
man of the Central Army’s Information Office (Penad) Kolonel Pringadi, 
announced that the ban had been lifted..
On 21 September 1957, the military authorities banned Haluan (published 
in Padang) from being disseminated in Jakarta, although the National Con-
sultative Conference in Jakarta had just started. Four days later, Rosihan 
Anwar from Pedoman was brought to court a second time because he had 
allegedly reported some military news on 16 April 1957 from an unoffi-
cial source, which was considered violating KMKBDR 6/1957 of the Mili-
51 Ahmad Husein was a regimental commander in West Sumatera. On 20 December 1956, 
he took charge of the government in Central Sumatera in a bloodless coup. The coup took 
place after a reunion meeting of the Banteng Division, when this meeting had held elec-
tions for the position of chairperson of the Banteng Council.
52 T.D. Hafas was arrested on 6 July 1957.
53 On 12 December 1957, Kustiniati Mochtar was sent to the court, accused of insulting the 
former Resident of Palembang, Abdul Razak. This accusation was based on her writing 
in Indonesia Raya, 21 February 1956. She was detained from October 1957 till January 
1958.
70 Chapter 3
tary Commander of Djakarta Raya.54 He was quickly released however, on 
2 October 1957, once again because of the unwillingness of Judge Abdul 
Razak Sutan Malelo and his colleagues to succumb to the pressure from the 
authorities (Lubis 1980: 96-97, 106). In his legal consideration Judge Malelo 
said that, “… the allegations that Rosihan Anwar violated Regulation No. 6 
of the Military Authorities of Djakarta Raya cannot be proven [..].there is no 
valid reason for applying the mentioned prohibition in Article I and it has 
not been the objective of the maker of this law to create a general prohibition 
on all news reports, or even only on certain elements of them, because each 
rule of prohibition (verbodsbepaling) has its own ratio. The ratio of this rule of 
prohibition can be found in the introduction (considerans) to the regulation, 
i.e. that the ‘content’ and its ‘source’ can interfere with security and public 
order.” The court argued that such prohibition as stated in Article 1 is pun-
ishable in accordance with the law (strafbaar/strafwaardig) if such news can 
indeed harm security and public order.
In September 1957 over 60 cases were examined at the Jakarta District Court 
(Atmakusumah 1992: 69),55 but no matter what the court ruled, dozens of 
journalists were interrogated and sent to military detention. The use of mili-
tary decrees was an effective way to bridle the press in the absence of a 
compliant judiciary, and regular court procedures and extra-judicial mecha-
nisms combined led to an effective breakdown of the rule of law and press 
freedom.
Prosecution of journalists, press banning and extra-judicial detention led to 
concern outside Indonesia. The International Press Institute (IPI, based in 
Vienna) expressed this as follows in its December 1957 report:
In the past year eleven editors have been arrested in Indonesia and seventeen newspapers 
as well as national news agencies have been closed down at one time or another. However, 
no other newsman has been exposed to the treatment shown Lubis. Some observers report 
that the government is embarrassed by his stubborn stand and recently offered to send him 
out of the country on a scholarship. Lubis is reported to have indignantly rejected the offer 
with the reply, “Either set me free or give me a fair trial” (p.11).
However, such international concern had no effect. Press curbing by the 
military continued in 1958, and the government took measures against the 
Chinese language press in Java, summoning 17 of their editors and ban-
ning well-known newspapers as Sin Po and Ken Po (Government Decree 
of 19 April 1958). The official reason was “to prevent misuse of (Chinese) 
scripture for certain purposes which might harm the security of the coun-
try”, ‘misuse’ the government could not monitor for lack of censors who 
54 According to Rosihan Anwar, many press companies and journalists in the capital 
became the victim of press bans and other measures after KMKBDR 6/1957 was issued.
55 Atmakusumah (1992) “Mochtar Lubis dan Indonesia Raya”, in Atmakusumah (ed), 
Mochtar Lubis, Wartawan Jihad. Jakarta: Penerbit Harian Kompas.
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could read Chinese.56 Japanese, Hindi and Russian newspapers were banned 
as well and similar measures were taken in other regions.57 Another step 
towards turning the press into full compliance with the ideas of the gov-
ernment was Government Regulation 34/1958 on the Agency of Informa-
tion Coordination. This agency was to control all news and broadcasting 
channels. Article 6.6 extended such control to ‘perilous’ news from foreign 
newspapers, magazines, books, brochures, and foreign films and other com-
munication channels.
On the surface, press bans started to look increasingly erratic. On 30 May 
1958, Indonesia Raya was banned for an undefined period of time, but was 
allowed to reappear on 26 July 1958. Bans could apply for a short period of 
time, even for a few hours only. While at first this may seem sympathetic 
and allowing for proportionality, bans were utterly unpredictable and thus 
contributed to instilling editors and journalists with terror – the ultimate 
aim being the collapse of an independent press industry (Atmakusumah 
2009: 20).
The military further expanded its authority in controlling the press by 
establishing a system of publication permits (Surat Izin Terbit/SIT) for news-
papers and magazines in Jakarta (Military Authority of Djakarta Raya on 
1 October 1958). In order to prevent publications about ‘sensational’ and 
immoral matters all newspapers and magazines had to register with the 
Authority of Djakarta Raya Military, which could refuse or repeal the pub-
lication permit.58 This was the first license mechanism for newspapers since 
independence in 1945.
During the same period, political developments moved in a negative direc-
tion for press freedom. In early 1959 President Soekarno and his cabinet 
accepted an army proposal on the concrete forms to be given to “Guided 
Democracy” (Feith 1964: 214). After a complicated and ultimately unsuc-
cessful series of moves to persuade the Konstituante, the elected constituent 
assembly, to approve this proposal, President Soekarno finally promulgated 
Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. This brought an end to the constitution-
56 Times, 19 April 1958, p. 4.
57 In Medan, fi ve Chinese language newspapers were closed down, including The Suma-
tera Times, New China Times, Sumatera Bin Poh, Hwa Choa Jit Poh, and the Democratic 
Daily News. Three hundred printers were left jobless. In Makassar, four newspapers 
were banned: Kuo Min-Tang, Chiao Seng Po, the Daily Chronicle and the Daily Tele-
graph (Smith 1969: 245).
58 According to Atmakusumah the new regulation was the reason why Indonesia Raya’s 
Director, Hasyim Mahdan asked Chief Editor, Mochtar Lubis to resign from Indonesia 
Raya. However, other editors refused Mochtar’s resignation. (personal communication 
with Atmakusumah, 28 March 2012). Eventually, the SIT was introduced throughout 
Indonesia on 12 October 1960, based on Peperti (Supreme Martial Authority) 10/1960 
(State gazette No. 116, 1960).
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al debates, re-enacted the 1945 Constitution and disbanded parliament.59 
Guided Democracy had now become the official form of government and 
Soekarno turned it into a mantra to propagate his policies.
In order to control the political situation and overcome the opposition 
against it, the government enacted Government Regulation in Lieu of Law 
(Perpu) 23/Prp/1959 on the Emergency Situation, on 16 December 1959.60 
This regulation gave very broad rights and powers to the Military Emer-
gency Authority for maintaining security and public order, including those 
for restricting publications and printed matters.61 If there was still any press 
freedom left, it had disappeared by now. What remained was a lot of ‘Guid-
ance,’ but very little ‘Democracy.’
3.4.1. National Press Political Manifesto
In 1960, President Soekarno formulated a development programme and 
established the National Planning Council (Dewan Perencanaan Nasional, 
henceforth as NPC), chaired by Muhammad Yamin. Soekarno instructed 
the NPC to draft an Eight Year Plan for National Press Development. The 
result appeared under the heading ‘Penerangan Massa’ (Mass Informa-
tion) as Appendix A to the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara 
(People’s Provisional Consultative Assembly, henceforth as MPRS) Edict 
II/MPRS/1960.62 This became the foundation for the Manipolisasi Pers 
National (Bringing the National Press under the Political Manifesto) during 
Guided Democracy.63 The edict stated that “all the media of mass communi-
cation such as press, radio, films, etc., should be operated in waves, as one 
co-ordinated unit, in a guided, planned and continuous way, thus leading to 
an awareness regarding Indonesian Socialism and the Pancasila (five prin-
ciples).”
59 For a discussion of the constitution, see Chapter 2.
60 This government regulation repealed Law 74/1957 on State of Emergency (State Gazette 
160/1957). This GR in Lieu of Law became a Law through Law 1/1961 about the Deter-
mination of All Emergency Laws and Lieu of Laws Prior to 1 January 1961 Becoming 
Law (State Gazette 1961/3; additional State Gazette 2124).
61 Article 24 jo. 26 of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law 23/Prp/1959.
62 MPRS Edict II/MPRS/1960 was enacted in Bandung on 3 December 1960. The MPRS was 
established by Presidential Decision. 2/1959 (Penetapan Presiden), following a Presidential 
Decree of 1959. The decree mandated that the president himself was to form MPRS in the 
shortest possible time, consisting of members of the House of Representatives and a del-
egation from regions and factions.
63 Manipol (-USDEK) was introduced in 1960. Manipol was the Political Manifesto set forth 
in Soekarno’s August 17, 1959, Independence Day speech, and USDEK was an acronym 
for a collection of symbols: the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democ-
racy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity.
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Critical elements of the plan were providing assistance in printing news 
(item f); creating a press law (item h) with definitions of press functions 
within the Manipol framework in order to further ‘the revolution’ and the 
‘national construction of the country’; defining press rights and obligations; 
defining basic rights in accordance with Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution 
on freedom of expression; and the revision of existing regulations in accor-
dance with the newly defined functions, rights and obligations of the press 
(item i). These ‘socialist press’ measurements would shape the situation of 
press freedom and result in promoting Soekarno’s Guided Democracy.
MPRS Edict II/MPRS/1960 moreover stipulated 12 press ‘functions’: politi-
cal; social; economic; educational and cultural; as an instrument for the 
implementation of overall planning; aiding the completion of ‘the revo-
lution’; criticising and correcting; being a collective instrument based on 
Indonesian socialism; as a barometer; as an indicator; as a controller; and 
assisting in the implementation of the Manipol and especially in the imple-
mentation of the plan for national construction.
The next session of the MPRS resulted in Resolution I/Res/MPRS/1963. 
The appendices to this resolution dealt specifically with the press, and 
demanded:
(a) The implementation, as soon as possible, of MPRS Edict II/MPRS/1960 with regard 
to drawing up a press law that must define the area, functions, tasks and rights of the 
press as an instrument for informing and moving the masses.
(b) The taking of measures within the shortest time with the aim of improving the quality 
of the press in order to make it a real instrument of ‘the revolution’ based on the revolu-
tionary key forces and masses, and imbued with a collective awareness of the objectives 
of ‘the revolution’.
(c) Making an effort within the shortest possible time to ameliorate the system of press 
distribution with regard to quantity (circulation), extensiveness of field (area) and actu-
ality (swiftness of dissemination). Such efforts can be made in the following ways, for 
example: by steadily increasing newsprint production, improving the graphic indus-
try, perfecting the telecommunication apparatus and services, facilitating internal 
and external transportation and distribution, and improving the quality and technical 
aspects of the services of the national news agency.
(d) The provision of aid to the organisation of the national press in their commendable 
efforts to fulfill their functions and tasks as instruments of ‘the revolution’ in both the 
national and international field. Such aid can stimulate the press in achieving integra-
tion with the struggle of the masses and in strengthening solidarity and cooperation 
with the international press and journalist associations.
By looking at the functions attributed to the Manipol press and the mea-
sures advocated by MPRS Edict II/MPRS/1960 and Resolution I/Res/
MPRS/1963, the contours of an authoritarian press system begin to emerge 
(Lee 1971: 116). The press function under Guided Democracy was not to 
inform, to seek the truth, or to be a watchdog for regime activities, but the 
press should advance and promote the policies of the government. Press 
legislation was thus becoming increasingly authoritarian.
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Based on these MPRS edicts, the government would successfully create 
press laws and regulations to promote the Manipol. In practice, “taking mea-
sures within the shortest time with the aim of improving the quality of the 
press in order to make it a real instrument of ‘the revolution’” was inter-
preted predominantly as a license for disciplining any newspaper or journal 
which dared to criticise the government. Manipol and ‘socialist press’ served 
to further legitimise restrictive regulations against the press.
3.4.2. Ten Restrictive Regulations
During Guided Democracy, especially from 1959 until 1965, the most impor-
tant press regulations were produced by the Supreme Martial Authority 
(Penguasa Perang Tertinggi/Peperti). This does not mean that the military 
was somehow unconnected to Soekarno’s leadership. As Mortimer (2006: 
327) wrote, “it is important to bear in mind that this was a period when the 
national press was under great pressure to report only what accorded with 
Soekarno’s view of events.”
The first of these press regulations was Peperti Regulation 3/1960 on the 
Prohibition of Newspapers/Periodicals that are not printed in the Latin or 
Arabic Script of a Regional Language. This regulation was the army’s sec-
ond attempt to eliminate the Chinese press in Indonesia outside of Java.64 
The first one had been Presidential Regulation 10/1959 on the Prohibition 
of Small Business and Retail Trade for Foreigners Outside the Capitals of 
Autonomous Regions Level I and II as well as Residencies. This regulation 
addressed not only Chinese retail traders, but was also used to ban Chi-
nese newspapers and magazines. According to Lee (1971: 118) the basic 
motive for wishing to prohibit Chinese-language newspapers and periodi-
cals was to create a purely Indonesian press. There was also a deep-seated 
mistrust of the contents of Chinese publications due to the lack of censors 
fluent in Chinese, as referred to earlier. Peperti Regulation 3/1960 was the 
military way to ‘purify the press,’ which totally disregarded the minority 
population’s need for news or even communications from the government.
The second and most notorious regulation restricting press freedom dur-
ing this period was Peperti Regulation 10/1960 on publishing permits for 
newspapers and magazines. It was enacted on 12 October 1960, two months 
after the banning of the political parties Masyumi and PSI65 and led to a 
complete subversion of the press to the political aims of the government. 
64 As mentioned earlier Government Decree of 19 April 1958 had already banned the Chi-
nese press in Java.
65 Presidential Letter 3568/HK/1960, issued on the same day, used this regulation as a basis 
to purge the press of ‘enemies of the revolution’ and banned the newspapers Pedoman 
(PSI) and Abadi (Masyumi).
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According to this regulation, newspapers and magazines henceforth had 
to adhere to a number of conditions before receiving a publication permit. 
These conditions were supporting and propagating the Manipol and the 
political programme of the government with the aim of eliminating imperi-
alism and colonialism, liberalism, federalism and separatism; defending the 
independent and active foreign policy of the government and to contribute 
to its implementation; strengthening the belief of the Indonesian people in 
the basic tenets, orientation, programme and leadership of ‘the revolution’; 
supporting all measures in maintaining public order, security and political 
climate; strengthening an awareness of the existence of an Indonesian per-
sonality, for example by banning articles, pictures and drawings having a 
sensational character and therefore antagonistic to good morals; and criticis-
ing, if necessary, the state of affairs and the execution of government policy 
on the condition that this criticism is of a constructive nature and always 
takes the Manipol as a guideline.
In addition to these conditions, newspaper and magazine publishers and 
editors were required to sign a ‘dokumen kesetiaan’ (loyalty document). These 
documents contained 19 points, which mostly overlapped with the require-
ments already stated in the regulation itself.66 Signing the loyalty document 
kept one’s newspaper alive, a refusal meant the end of it.67
The requirement to sign the loyalty document elicited different reponses. 
Rosihan Anwar, the chief editor of Pedoman, signed the agreement. His 
newspaper had actually just been banned, but signing the document meant 
it could be published again. Anwar argued that in the current transitional 
phase towards democracy it was difficult to fully implement press freedom. 
In this situation the main task of the media was to make sure that they could 
at least continue publishing some news. Tasrif from Abadi and Mochtar 
Lubis from Indonesia Raya refused to sign the loyalty document, which 
meant that their newspapers were closed down. Mochtar Lubis denounced 
Rosihan Anwar’s choice as ethically wrong and as ‘kowtowing’ to the gov-
ernment. According to Hill (2010: 61), in 1961 Mochtar even recommended 
the expulsion of his long-term close friend Rosihan Anwar from the Inter-
66 They included the obligation to obey guidance announced by Peperti and other govern-
ment institutions; to support and defend the Manipol and the government programme, as 
well as the Presidential Decree of 5 July of 1959; UUD 1945, the Pancasila, Indonesian 
Socialism, Guided Democracy; Guided Economy; Indonesian National Character; Dignity 
of the Indonesian State; the effort to establish public order, security and political stability; 
and restrictions against press reports of a sensational or a morally degrading nature, 
insulting the head of the state and head of government of foreign countries friendly to the 
Republic of Indonesia, and defending disbanded and prohibited organisations.
67 The so-called loyalty document raised a debate among the members of the International 
Press Institute (IPI) since both Rosihan Anwar and Mochtar Lubis sent letters to the IPI 
explaining their arguments, as mentioned in the IPI reports of January 1961 and Septem-
ber 1966.
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national Press Institute (IPI). Indeed, because of Mochtar’s letter, Rosihan 
Anwar’s IPI membership was temporarily suspended.
The third piece of legislation relevant to press freedom was Peperti Regula-
tion 2/1961 on the Monitoring and Supervision of Private Printing Houses. 
This regulation was based on the same paradigm of controlling the press, 
and aimed to reinforce the ‘Manipolisasi’ of printing houses owned by pri-
vate corporations by submitting them to direct government supervision, 
notably by the Regional Authority for an Emergency Situation (Article 1). 
The latter’s members included the army, the information department, the 
police, and the public prosecutor. The regulation stated that the private 
printing houses that printed the major part of the Indonesian newspapers 
and magazines should be used for the dissemination of Manipol and as a 
means to put an end to sentiments of imperialism, colonialism, liberalism, 
federalism and separatism. The authorities could employ preventive and 
repressive control to ensure the printing houses obeyed the purpose of the 
political manifesto (Article 4). This regulation also provided sanctions in the 
form of imprisonment of one year and fines if the printing houses refused to 
implement the Manipol ideology (Article 6).
In order to control the National News Agency, Antara, Soekarno promul-
gated Presidential Decision 307/1962 on the Establishment of the Institute of 
the National News Agency Antara (24 September 1962). This was the fourth 
regulation targeting press freedom. It was issued to resolve an internal 
conflict within Antara that started in September 1961, between an anti-PKI 
group chaired by Zein Effendi against a pro-PKI group led by Djawoto.68 
The decision assigned Peperti to run Antara. (Said 1988: 126-127)., President 
Soekarno merged Persbiro Indonesia (PIA) into Antara on 13 December 
1962. The President also closed down two other news agencies: the Asian 
Press Board (APB) and the Indonesian National Press and Publicity Service 
(INPS). According to Atmakusumah, the ultimate aim of this presidential 
decision was to control the flow of information and opinion in the media.69
Inseparable from the martial law framework was the fifth anti-press reg-
ulation, Presidential Regulation 4/1963 on the Securing of Printed Papers 
which Disturb Public Order, Especially Bulletins, Newspapers, Magazines, 
and Regular Publications. This law resembled the pre-censorship system 
during the colonial period, when publishers had to submit copies of the 
printed materials to the authorities. As found in Article 2 section (1),
Within 48 hours of the printing being concluded, the printer shall submit a copy of the 
printed material [...] to the High Public Prosecutor, carrying the signature of the printer.
68 Djawoto was the former chair of the PWI.
69 Personal communication with Atmakusumah Asraatmadja through email, 11 September 
2014.
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This legislation gave the public prosecutor the authority to control and curb 
publishers. If the latter provided services to critical newspapers, they could 
be prosecuted. Most restrictive for the press was Article 6 of this regulation, 
which stated that prohibited printed material could be confiscated by pros-
ecutor, police and other state institutions, which were to maintain public 
order. Hence, the military was also allowed to control the press. Although 
the state of emergency was lifted on 1 May 1963, and Government Regula-
tion in Lieu of Law 23/Prp/1959 was therefore no longer applicable, the 
government imposed an even more oppressive system by introducing the 
Anti-Subversion Law 11/PNPS/1963. This change of emergency regime 
required a new military press control regulation, i.e. Presidential Regulation 
4/1963.
Sixth, a fortnight after lifting the state of emergency, on 15 May 1963, the 
president passed Presidential Decree 6/1963 on Stipulations regarding the 
Promotion of the Press, which replaced Peperti Regulation 10/1960. This 
was henceforth the most important press regulation enacted after 1959, pro-
moting a ‘guided press’ under civil rather than martial law. Article 1 and 2
stated that all guidance of the press would be entrusted to the minister of 
information, assisted by the chief of staff of the armed forces, the command-
ers of the army, navy, air force, the head of the police force, and by the attor-
ney general, all acting in their capacity as ministers of the Cabinet. Article 
3 stipulated that in giving guidance to the press, the minister of informa-
tion was required to: (a) promote the function of the press in the climate 
of Guided Democracy; (b) act as a liaison between the leadership of ‘the 
revolution’ and the press organisations with regard to problems of the press 
under Guided Democracy; (c) lend his ear to voices of public opinion or to 
proposals from the side of representatives of the press, all within the context 
of the general press policy of the leadership of ‘the revolution’; (d) forward 
his views to the leadership concerning the policy of promoting the press; 
and (e) draw up directives concerning the implementation of this press poli-
cy within the context of Guided Democracy. Article 4 stated that in fulfilling 
his task the minister of information was accountable only to the president as 
the ‘great leader of the revolution.’
Article 6 of the Presidential Decree also stated that a publication permit was 
needed for the publication of newspapers and magazines, in accordance 
with conditions laid down by the minister of information. Article 8 stipu-
lated that Indonesian publishing companies should fulfill several obliga-
tions, such as: (a) to support, defend and disseminate Pancasila and Manipol; 
(b) to publish invariably constructive articles and commentaries about the 
situation and implementation of government policy, using the Manipol for 
guidance, and (c) to pay attention to the conditions of public order and to 
existing government regulations.
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The regulation also provided for sanctions. As stipulated by Article 9, a sanc-
tion against the violation of any obligation following from this law would be 
imposed in the form of a revocation of the publication permit. Article 10 stat-
ed that the firm, or its leadership, which printed newspapers and magazines 
without a printing permit was liable to a maximum penalty of a one-year 
imprisonment or a maximum fine of Rp. 50,000. In addition, Articles 11 and 
12 stated that the stapling and printing machines could be confiscated and/
or destroyed, as well as the stocks of newspapers and magazines concerned.
Presidential Decree 6/1963 thus emphasised non-military control of the 
press, but its spirit and content were quite similar to Peperti Regulation 
10/1960. In fact, by enacting such regulation as part of the post-emergen-
cy situation, the government revealed its intention to make the restriction 
of press freedom permanent and to move Indonesia further towards an 
authoritarian state.
However, despite the fully-fledged framework to control the press already in 
place, press control regulations continued to appear, aiming to turn the press 
even more into an ideological agent for the government. A good example is 
the regulation enacted on 19 December 1964, a week after the official banning 
of the Body for the Support/Diffusion of Soekarnoism (BPS).70 This presiden-
tial decree in the form of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/KOTI 
Regulation D/450/64 on the Publishing of the Writings of the Great Leader 
of the Revolution without Interpretation put the press under the obligation 
to publish Soekarno’s ideas without any further questions or comments, and 
in particular sections from the book Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the Flag 
of the Revolution). The implementation of this regulation led to the require-
ment for all newspapers and magazines to include a column under the head-
ing ‘The Teachings of the Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno.’ In this 
way, Soekarno claimed the commitment of the press to the ‘revolutionary 
struggle’. Soekarno said in front of the Antara (National News Authority) 
staff in Jakarta (14 October 1962) that “many journalists argue that the press 
is capable of spreading all sorts of thinking, even if this contradicts the spirit 
of the revolution.” On another occasion, Soekarno complained, “[Journalists] 
argued that this is a press democracy. I don’t want to see Antara become such 
an institution. Therefore, Antara should become a tool of ‘the revolution’ that 
is capable of refusing all counter-revolutionary thoughts” (Indonesian Observ-
er, 15 October 1962, p. 1, in Smith 1983: 12). He repeated a similar statement 
when he inaugurated the Monitor Agency of Antara News in the presidential 
palace on 18 December 1962: “Objective reporting during a time of revolu-
tion is impossible. [...] I don’t want the news to be objective, but I want it to 
70 The Badan Pendukung Soekarnoisme or BPS was an institution to create solidarity among 
journalists against the communist press, journalism politics and the communist infl uence 
in the press association. Since Soekarno was close to the communist party elite he dis-
agreed to be supported by BPS and in the end decided to disband the organisation.
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be committed to our revolution and to become an instrument to fight against 
the enemies of the revolution” (Indonesian Observer, 19 December 1962, p.1, in 
Smith 1983: 12). By demanding such a ‘revolutionary press,’ Soekarno arbi-
trarily threatened journalists, especially those who criticised him, his admin-
istration, or his leadership.
Ministerial Decision 17/SK/M/65 and 27/SK/M/65 were a sequel to the 
disbanding of the BPS. They banned all newspapers associated with the 
BPS after a longstanding conflict between pro- and anti-communist press. 
The latter had long pushed for such a measure; the PKI newspaper Harian 
Rakjat for instance published the anti-BPS article “Clear the Press and the 
Ideas of the BPS and the Counter-Revolution” (“Bersihkan Pers dan Ide-Ide 
BPS dan Kontra Revolusi”) (Harian Rakjat, 17 February 1965, XV, 4024). Previ-
ously, the leftist writers organisation Lekra had also pushed for a press ban 
against BPS newspapers (Harian Rakjat, 10 January 1965, XIV, 3980). Minister 
of Information, Major General Achmadi responded by revoking the printing 
permit (Surat Ijin Cetak) of 21 newspapers and magazines associated with 
the BPS (Harian Rakjat’s headline, “21 Koran BPS di Djakarta dan Medan Dit-
jabut Idjin Terbitnya,” on 25 February 1965, XV, 4024).71 How grim the situa-
tion was, is clearly demonstrated by Soekarno’s speech in Istora Senayan, 
Jakarta, at the occasion of PWI’s anniversary:
I dissolved the BPS… my order to dissolve the BPS was surely with reason. I received 
information, secret information, that the CIA drove the BPS … Well, after getting such 
information and after looking at its practice, the BPS is anti-Nasakom, so then I dissolved 
the BPS. I said firmly, any newspapers, any organisation, any tool that becomes part of the 
BPS cohorts, dissolve it! I repeat, I am not plintat-plintut (a ‘weather cock’). The thing that 
must be dissolved is whatever is related to the BPS cohorts (Soekarno 1965: 30).
BPS journalists and editors were detained and prosecuted, although the 
public prosecutor soon released them due to lack of evidence regarding the 
involvement of the CIA and the intention to attack Soekarno. In 1966 many 
BPS newspapers were re-established (Said and Moeljatno 1983: 109-110).
71 Under Ministerial Decision No. 17/SK/M/65 (24 February 1965), 21 publications were 
prohibited, including Jakarta-based: Berita Indonesia (News of Indonesia), Berita Indonesia 
Sport and Film, Merdeka (Independent), Indonesian Observer, Warta Berita (News Journal), 
Revolusioner, Garuda (Eagle), Semesta (Universe), Karyawan (Labour), Gelora Minggu (Sun-
day Surf); Suluh Minggu (Sunday Torch); Medan-based: Mimbar Umum (Public Platform); 
Waspada (Vigilant); Tjerdas Baru (New Intelligence); Bintang Indonesia (Star of Indonesia); 
Mimbar Taruna (Youth Platform); Suluh Masa (Torch of the Masses); Resopim (Presidential 
speech on 17 August 1961); Genta Revolusi (Revolution Bells); Duta Minggu (Sunday 
Envoy); and Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia). On account of the same regulation, several 
newspapers and weeklies were also prohibited, including Jakarta-based: Mingguan Film 
(Film Weekly); Medan-based: Pembangunan (Development); Waspada Teruna (the youth 
edition of Waspada); Mingguan Film (Film Weekly); Siaran Minggu (Sunday Transmis-
sion); Sjarahan Minggu (Sunday Lecture); Padang-based: Aman Makmur (Securely Pros-
perous); and Semarang-based: Pos Minggu (Sunday Post).
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The next anti-press measure was Ministerial Decision 29/SK/65 about the 
Basic Norms for Press Enterprises within the Context of the Promotion of 
the Indonesian Press (issued on 26 March 1965 by the minister of informa-
tion). Its aim was reorganising press enterprises along new lines based on 
the idea of a closer relationship between these enterprises on the one side 
and political parties, ‘functional groups’ and mass organisations on the oth-
er. The basis for this reorganisation could be found in the Introduction of 
Presidential Decree 6/1963.
The first chapter of Ministerial Decision 29/SK/65 prescribed the ideologi-
cal basis of the press, as well as its tasks and duties. The Indonesian press as 
a tool of ‘the revolution’ had to reflect and defend the ideals of ‘the revolu-
tion’ unconditionally. According to this decision, the press ought to sup-
port the idea of Pancasila as the basis of the state and Manipol as the gen-
eral orientation of state policy. The press must strengthen national unity by 
being of a progressive nature and should subscribe to the so-called Nasakom 
(Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunism [Nationalism, Religion, Communism]) as 
an ideology. It furthermore had to function as an instrument for disseminat-
ing the teachings of President Soekarno as the ‘great leader of the revolu-
tion’, as well as the ‘message of the people’s suffering’ (Ampera or Amanat 
Penderitaan Rakyat).
The second chapter was about the management of press enterprises. It stat-
ed that newspapers and periodicals should only be managed by those who 
supported the basic tenets and objectives of ‘the revolution,’ and possessed 
the required technical and journalistic capabilities. Journalists who had 
been involved in a rebellion against the republic or in counter-revolutionary 
activities were excluded. The remaining ‘patriotic’ and Manipol journalists 
needed the official support from a political party, functional group or mass 
organisation, or the ‘Single Five Pillars’ (Pantja Tunggal).72 Journalists further-
more needed a written recommendation and approval of their biographies 
from the police before they could be forwarded to the minister of informa-
tion, together with an application for a publication permit. Such recommen-
dations were also needed for the managerial staff and editorial personnel 
of newspapers. The newspaper’s management needed a recommendation 
from the Serikat Perusahaan Suratkabar (Federation of Newspaper Enterprises 
or SPS), and from the Press Division of the Organisasi Perusahaan Sejenis, Pers 
(Organisation of Similar Enterprises or OPS, Pers). Junior journalists had to 
obtain a recommendation from the PWI.
72 The Pantja Tunggal (Single Five Pillars) was an institution formed to promote the Manipol 
ideology. Actually it started in March 1964 by the Tjatur Tunggal (Single Four Pillars): four 
institutions at three levels of regional government – provincial, regency and city), com-
prised of the provincial governor (or regent or mayor), army commander, police chief 
and public prosecutor. The fi fth pillar was the ‘national front leader’.
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The third chapter dealt with financial management and determined that 
the national press should be fully financed by Indonesian capital. The fifth 
chapter, on accountability, held the important clause that political parties, 
functional groups or mass organisations and Pantja Tunggal were respon-
sible for publications from the newspapers and magazines whose editorial 
boards they had officially supported and recommended. The sixth chapter 
contained sanctions, in the form of a temporary suspension or definite clos-
ing-down of a newspaper or magazine. This could happen if a newspaper 
or magazine was found to no longer reflect an aliran (school of thought) of 
a particular constituency as stated in the publication permit, either because 
it aired other opinions or because this aliran had been prohibited; when it 
introduced ideological deviations that damaged and/or were in contradic-
tion with the teachings of the president; when it undermined the authority 
of the government and the president; when it disturbed public order and 
security; when it harmed the cooperative principle of Nasakom; and when 
it harmed the development of the national press by transgressing the limits 
of its publication permit. Existing newspapers and periodicals were given 
three months for applying for a new publication permit in accordance with 
the stipulations of this decision as from the date of its enactment (Chapter 7).
While it seemed that Ministerial Decision 29/SK/65 had exhaustively 
supressed any remaining press freedom and brought newspapers and mag-
azines under full control of the state, both practically and ideologically, a 
tenth and final restriction was added to this regulatory framework. It con-
sisted of Ministerial Decisions 51, 52 and 53/SK/M/65, which dealt with 
respectively government and other official publications, and newspapers 
and periodicals in scripts other than Latin, Arabic or a regional language, 
and the circulation of these. The aim of these regulations was to also bring 
these specific categories under the ideological wings of Guided Democracy 
and infuse them with its stipulations and phraseology.
In defence of this complete suppression of press freedom, Soekarno told 
Cindy Adams (Adams 1965: 279):
In Guided Democracy the key ingredient is leadership […]. Revolution needs leadership. 
Without it, there is panic and fear. It is because we are still in an economic revolution that I 
shall not allow destructive criticism of my leadership nor do I permit freedom of the press.
It is clear that Guided Democracy had produced a myriad of regulations 
that not only suppressed press freedom, but befitted a state on its way to 
becoming totalitarian. Not only was press freedom systematically subvert-
ed by all these rules and regulations from various state institutions, the 
press was moreover forced to actively support the propaganda of the state. 
Press publications were increasingly forced to promote Soekarno’s Mani-
pol/USDEK and other policies, at the risk of being banned if they would 
not cooperate.
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Guided Democracy thus became the worst period for press freedom after 
Indonesia became independent in 1945. Indonesia’s identity in Soekarno’s 
USDEK was merely ‘Soekarno’s identity,’ not that of the nation nor of a con-
stitutional democracy as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution. The creation 
of this myriad of suppressive legislation clearly violated the principles of 
justice and the protection of substantive liberties underpinning the rule of 
law. Soekarno’s Guided Democracy introduced law as guidance (‘rule by 
law’), but at the same time he imposed an ideological perspective that tend-
ed towards ‘rule by men.’ The law was not used to protect freedom of the 
press, but adversely, to conceal and mistify the abuse of power. Paraphras-
ing Tamanaha (2006: 219), Soekarno considered law as an “empty vessel that 
can be applied to achieve any end.”
3.5. Conclusion
As shown in this chapter, press freedom in the territories now known as 
Indonesia has known highs and lows over the centuries. Limitations on 
press freedom were introduced long before Indonesia became an indepen-
dent state, with the VOC already keeping strict controls on the printed press 
in their Javanese territories. The Dutch government, which took over after 
the VOC collapsed, continued to do so. The enactment of the Drukpersregle-
ment in 1856 enabled the Netherlands-Indies’ government to exert excessive 
control over the press, an opportunity it immediately and enthusiastically 
deployed. The Drukpersreglement introduced a pre-censorship system, which 
imposed the rule that printing houses and newspaper owners had to submit 
their newspapers to the authorities for approval prior to publication.
However, not all colonial policies were equally detrimental to press freedom. 
The ‘Ethical Policy’ that was implemented at the start of the twentieth cen-
tury not only included education, improving irrigation in agriculture and 
transmigration, but also introduced more freedom for the press. This became 
most evident in the revision of the Drukpersreglement in 1906. Although it did 
not lift all press control, this revision allowed for the development of a ver-
nacular and Bumiputera press under Governor-General Van Heutz.
Press freedom declined in 1914 with the introduction of the Netherlands 
Indies Penal Code, which included several so-called ‘hatred sowing’ articles. 
These were often applied in a discriminatory way, targeting the Bumiputera 
rather than the Dutch language press. This development shows that from 
1914 onwards criminal law became more dominant than administrative 
law and repressive control more prevalent than preventive control. A real 
low was reached when in 1931, during the final period of conservatism, 
the Netherlands Indies’ government enacted the Press Banning Ordinance. 
Both the Penal Code and the Press Banning Ordinance provided for severely 
repressive criminal sanctions in order to control press.
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The arrival of Japanese troops replacing the Dutch authorities in 1942 first 
meant few changes to the repressive system in place, as the Japanese mili-
tary administration continued to apply the preventive and repressive law 
introduced by their predecessors. Later, the system of press control became 
rigorously authoritarian in character and was only used to serve the Japa-
nese army and Japanese propaganda in the occupied territory.
Indonesia’s independence in 1945 was followed by three years of conflict 
and chaos, between Indonesians and Dutch, but also among Indonesians 
themselves. In the territory controlled by the republic, the first press ban 
was effected in 1948 after the ‘Madiun affair’, and was directed against the 
communist press. To this end, the government applied Law 6/1946, which it 
had enacted barely eight months after independence.
Much changed after the Netherlands recognised Indonesia’s independence 
in late 1949. Four years later the more open political atmosphere resulted in 
the revocation of the Press Banning Ordinance of 1931. This ushered in what 
Schumacher called the period of “greatest press freedom in Indonesia,” and 
newspapers used it to the full. As most newspapers were closely allied to 
particular ideologies and political parties, the press became extremely par-
tisan in nature and published many accusations and recriminations, series 
about scandals, feuds, and frauds – often without much fact-checking. How-
ever, this period was not to last for very long. The introduction of martial 
law in 1956 allowed the army to arrest and detain journalists and editors, 
without judicial process. The ample space left open to interpretation caused 
by the law gave broad discretionary powers to the military and no guaran-
tees for press freedom.
Atmakusumah has argued that, from the time the first newspapers in the 
Netherlands Indies were published in the mid-eighteenth century to the 
present, “there has not been a single period of considerable length with-
out government pressure and suppression of the press.”73 This goes against 
Gazali’s argument that perhaps the period 1950-1957 was an exception 
(Gazali 2004: 4). However, this chapter confirms Atmakusumah’s point of 
view. Only the brief period between 1954 and 1956 deserves praise from 
a press freedom perspective, but as we have seen, Military Ordinance 
PKM/001/9/1956 put an end to this.
Press freedom declined drastically after 1957. Under Soekarno’s Guided 
Democracy, journalists, editors, and publishers were submitted to all kinds 
of anti-press freedom actions. Part of it was a mere ‘ideological’ effort, with 
Soekarno calling for a ‘revolutionary’ press; part of it consisted of legal mea-
sures. After the return to the 1945 Constitution through the Presidential 
73 Atmakusumah, personal communication, on 30 March 2010 in Leiden, cf. Basori 2001.
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Decree of 5 July 1959 and the renewal of the state of emergency, the govern-
ment intensified its anti-press freedom policies by military (Peperti), presi-
dential and ministerial legislation. These served to impose Soekarno’s Mani-
pol policy, specifically the ‘national press political manifesto.’ This meant that 
the press had to promote ‘the revolution’ and the struggle for developing the 
nation. The regime introduced various mechanisms to create a ‘guided press’ 
through the control of ideology, organisation, personnel, and circulation of 
publications. This allowed Soekarno to arbitrarily act against journalists who 
criticised him, his administration or leadership. The press freedom situation 
reminisced of communist China, where the press was controlled in a similar 
way by the communist political party (Chu 1983).
Opposition against the concept of a ‘guided press’ proved ineffective. Mil-
itary legislation using administrative controls was applied to easily close 
down papers opposing Soekarno. At the same time, journalists and editors 
were silenced by being sent to jail without judiciary process, although the 
Penal Code actually enabled the government to prosecute them. Twenty-
nine papers were closed down for their support of an anti-communist (as 
opponents argued, anti-Soekarno) bloc, in February and March 1965. Alter-
natively, in the backlash that followed the political chaos of 1 October 1965, 
46 of Indonesia’s 163 remaining newspapers were banned indefinitely 
because of their presumed association with or sympathy for the PKI or its 
allies. The year of 1965 thus became the worst year for press freedom in 
Indonesia (Hill 1995: 34).
In theoretical terms, the Indonesian press situation during Soekarno’s Guid-
ed Democracy resembled an authoritarian system, rather than the Soviet one 
that has sometimes been suggested as its primary model (Siebert, Peterson 
and Schramm 1956, see the first Chapter for this typology). In an authoritar-
ian system the government has absolute power and control over the press, 
over its ownership, content, license, and the use of mass media. Soekarno’s 
regime was characterised precisely by such authoritarianism. Since the idea 
of trias politica was weakly developed, Soekarno’s administration forced the 
judiciary and the legistative to bow to the executive power. The military 
played a key role in producing the law, interrogating and detaining journal-
ists, and banning particular papers and magazines. Put bluntly, from 1957 
until the end of Guided Democracy in 1965, press freedom languished until 
it ceased to exist altogether.
The restrictions or limitations were formulated into laws, but these laws 
substantively violated the fundamental principles of press freedom. Albeit 
restrictions to protect security and public order are justified by law, military 
installment for regulating the press as shown in this chapter illustrate that 
there were unclear borders as to what extent such restrictions are necessary 
in a democratic society. However, this chapter shows that those military 
laws, S.O.B. and also their implementation were applied beyond the inter-
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ests of justice and the development of a constitutional democracy as stipu-
lated under the constitution. The involvement of the military in regulating 
the press and the extra-judicial detention are strong evidence to confirm that 
press freedom was severely curtailed during the parliamentary years and 
Soekarno’s Guided Democracy.
This period demonstrates how a lack of democracy, ideology and contradic-
tory lower legislation undermined the Constitution and the legal system 
more generally. Law was simply practiced as a tool to legitimise suppressing 
voices critical of Soekarno.

4.1. Introduction
The demise of Guided Democracy was dramatic in all respects and the situ-
ation of press freedom was no exception. During the backlash that followed 
the aborted coup of 30 September 1965, 46 of Indonesia’s 163 remaining 
newspapers were banned indefinitely because of their presumed associa-
tion with, or sympathy for, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its 
allies. Left-wing journalists were expelled from the Indonesian Journalists 
Association (PWI) and the national news agency Antara. Thirty percent of 
all editorial staff was dismissed. As Hill (1995: 34-35) put it, “the arrests and 
killing of communist and sympathizing journalists in 1965-66, carried out 
against a background of large-scale massacres in the country side, cast a 
very long shadow over the press for a subsequent decade.”
Initially, the unstable and chaotic political situation led to strong attacks 
on the press, but when the New Order took form the situation gradually 
changed. This chapter starts where the previous chapter stopped. It describes 
and analyses from a rule of law perspective how press freedom has been 
shaped and implemented during the periods of the New Order and Refor-
masi, looking at legislation and key cases (i.e. cases which drew much atten-
tion).
4.2. From Hope of Restoration of the Rule of Law to Repression
Press freedom in Indonesia is the freedom to express and enforce 
truth and justice, not freedom in a liberalist sense.
(MPRS Decree XXXII/MPRS/1966, 5 July 1966)
During and immediately after the attempted coup of 30 September, the 
media had an important role in informing the public on how to understand 
what was happening or had happened. The press and radio also played a 
significant role in military propaganda, and the military immediately acted 
to make sure that they could control the flow of information. In the eve-
ning of 1 October 1965, Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, the army 
commander in Jakarta, released instruction letter 01/Drt/10/1965, which 
ordered the closure of all publications without special permits. Only the two 
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army papers Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata were allowed to appear.1 
The letter also instructed the police commander of VII/Jaya (Jakarta) to 
seize all printing houses, except for those of Berita Yudha’s and Angkatan 
Bersendjata’s.2
Although the prohibition on publishing newspapers only lasted for five 
days, it is likely to have shaped public opinion. By monopolising the news, 
the military could use it for political framing. The control of Radio Repub-
lik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Radio, henceforth RRI) played at least 
as important a role. The influence of RRI must have been clear to all sides 
in the coup and counter-coup of 1965. Untung’s first public action was to 
announce through RRI that the Council of Generals’ attempt to overthrow 
the President had been foiled. Then, after the military had occupied the RRI 
Jakarta studios, Soeharto broadcast that he had assumed personal command 
over the army, which helped legitimise his rise to power in 1965 (Sen and 
Hill, 2007: 82-83).
Soeharto’s counter-coup operation attacked communist party members, 
those sympathising with them, and those suspected of such sympathies 
and their friends and relatives at various levels of society. The communist 
party and other leftist groups were quickly and easily exterminated by the 
military and the militias associated with them. This was the start of an offi-
cial ‘depoliticisation’ of the country, with the military in a supreme posi-
tion (Crouch 1979: 576; Crouch 2007). Soeharto’s position as military com-
mander received political legitimation by Soekarno providing him a license 
to restore order (by the so-called Supersemar [Instruction Letter of 11 March 
1966]) and by the unanimous authorisation of the same purpose by the Pro-
1 Berita Yudha was established on 9 February 1965, chaired by brigadier general Ibnusub-
roto. Angkatan Bersendjata was founded on 15 March 1965. Both papers were established 
after most BPS’ newspapers were banned in early 1965 (see the previous chapter).
2 The measure was not 100 percent effective, as PKI’s Harian Rakjat still published an issue 
on 2 October 1965. According to Peter Dale Scott (1985), this indicates that the CIA and 
the military were involved in the publication of this issue. Anderson and McVey (1971) 
have also questioned the authenticity of the 2 October issue of Harian Rakjat and argued 
that it was possibly a “falsifi cation by the army.” As they wrote (1971; 1978), “Why did 
the PKI show no support for the Gestapu coup while it was in progress, then rashly edi-
torialized in support of Gestapu after it had been crushed? Why did the PKI, whose edi-
torial gave support to Gestapu, fail to mobilize its followers to act on Gestapu’s behalf? 
Why did Suharto, by then in control of Jakarta, close down all newspapers except this 
one, and one other left-leaning newspaper which also served his propaganda ends?” The 
United Kingdom Embassy document (Southeast Asia Department, Indonesia, D.H. 
1015/218, 10 October 1965) in Jakarta also expressed wonder about such a strange publi-
cation at that time (Adam 2000). By contrast, Salim Said argued that at that time it was 
usual that papers were printed a few days before the actual date of publication. The issue 
of Harian Rakyat dated 2 October 1965 would therefore have been printed a few days 
before the ban, and may even have appeared prior to this date (Salim Said, personal com-
munication, Leiden, 5 December 2011).
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visional People’s Consultative Assembly’s (henceforth MPRS) Decree IX/
MPRS/1966 of 21 June 1966.
The change in the political situation gave new hope to detainees, including 
outspoken anti-Soekarno journalists such as Mochtar Lubis, who believed 
that their release was imminent. Lubis was indeed released (into ‘town 
arrest’) on 17 May 1966, with the obligation to report every Monday to the 
attorney-general’s department (Lubis 1980: 477; Hill 2010: 85-86).
In 1966 two important press regulations were enacted. The first was MPRS 
Decree XXXII/MPRS/1966 on Press Supervision, enacted on 5 July 1966. 
Article 2 of this decree states that press freedom is closely related to the 
responsibility towards God almighty; the people’s interest and state secu-
rity; the sustainability and the achievement of ‘the revolution’; morality 
and decency; and the nation’s character. It also stipulated that press free-
dom in Indonesia is the freedom to express and enforce truth and justice, 
but not freedom in a liberalist sense (no clarification about this term was 
offered). Most important was Article 3, which stated that the main objective 
of the decree was to reinforce press responsibility in promoting and empha-
sising the Pancasila and in rejecting communism, Marxism, and Leninism. 
The decree contained a provision almost literally taken from Peperti 3/1960 
on the Prohibition of Newspapers/Periodicals in a Regional Language not 
printed in the Latin or Arabic Script; Article 4 of the MPRS Decree stated 
that the government would allow only one press publication in a non-Latin 
script. The contents of the decree were clearly influenced by the military and 
its anti-communist stance.
The second regulation was Press Law 11/1966, signed by Soekarno on 12 
December 1966. Although at the time the press was under strict control of 
the military, several of the law’s provisions were remarkably favourable to 
press freedom:
Article 4: No censorship or banning shall be applied to the National Press.
Article 5(1): Freedom of the press is guaranteed in accordance with the fundamental rights 
of citizens.
Article 8(2): No publication permit is needed.
The one exception to this rule concerned communism, Article 11 stating that
Press publications on the basis of Communism/Marxism-Leninism, contradicting the Pan-
casila, are prohibited.3
3 Elucidation of Article 11 Law 11 of 1966.
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As a sanction for the violation of this article, according to its elucidation, the 
government could decide to ban the publication. Second, Article 20(1a) of 
the law stipulated that,
In the transitional period, the requirement for obtaining a Publication Permit (SIT) is still 
valid, until the revocation of the law by the Government and Parliament.4
The legal implication of this provision was that the government could still 
apply old anti-press regulations from Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (see 
Chapter 3). For instance, a publisher still had to obtain two permits: a ‘publi-
cation permit’ (Surat Ijin Terbit/SIT)5 and a ‘permit to print’ (Surat Ijin Cetak/
SIC).6 A newspaper publication without both permits would be seized and 
destroyed. The government granted many of these dual permits to papers 
supporting its policies, such as Harian Kami and Mahasiswa Indonesia, both 
associated with the militant students whose anti-PKI and anti-Soekarno 
posture was evident (Hill 1995: 35).
So in spite of the promise of the introduction of more liberating legislation, 
not much improved in practice. The press had to support the government’s 
position, or at least they had to be “a good partner in accelerating develop-
ment” (Hill 1995: 36). If the press took an opposing view, either the jour-
nalist, the editor or the publisher involved would be jailed, as would often 
happen during the late 1960s and 1970s. The legal framework in place still 
made it easy to discipline the press to conform to the government’s policies.
Although Soekarno was still formally president, the military under Soehar-
to controlled the government. Soeharto’s position was further legitimised 
by MPRS Decree IX/MPRS/1966, of 21 June 1966. One day later Soekarno 
delivered a speech before the MPRS (entitled “Nawaksara”) to account for 
his acts, but the MPRS refused to approve. In Decree 5/MPRS/1966, dated 
5 July 1966 the MPRS seemed to aim for the replacement of Soekarno as 
4 Dalam masa Peralihan keharusan mendapatkan Surat Izin Terbit (SIT) masih berlaku sampai ada 
keputusan pencabutannya oleh Pemerintah dan DPR (GR).
5 During Guided Democracy, at fi rst a publication permit for the press had to be obtained 
from the military authorities (Peperti Regulation 10/1960). This military regulation was 
annulled by Presidential Decree 6/1963 on Stipulations regarding the Promotion of the 
Press; after the annulment the minister of information held the authority to provide a 
publication permit.
6 This prevention mechanism found its basis in Peperti Regulation 2/1961 on the Monitor-
ing and Supervision of Private Printing Houses and in Presidential Regulation 4/1963 on 
the Securing of Printed Papers which Disturb Public Order, Especially Bulletins, News-
papers, Magazines, and Regular Publications. They were implemented by the Regional 
Authority for Emergency Situations and formed a reminder of the pre-censorship system 
of the colonial period, when publishers were to submit copies to the authorities prior to 
publication (see Chapter 2).
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president.7 Although Soekarno still signed the Press Law on 12 December 
1966, it was clearly Soeharto’s political product.
The legitimacy conferred upon Soeharto by the MPRS, the dominant role 
of the military in controlling society, and the continued disciplining of the 
press combined formed the platform for Soeharto’s ascent to power in 1966. 
On 12 March 1967 the MPRS deposed of Soekarno as president through 
Decree XXXIII/MPRS/1967, thus paving the way for Soeharto to start tak-
ing over the leadership of the country in a more formal and legitimate way. 
Article 3 of the decree stipulated that “Soekarno was prohibited to engage 
in political activities until the next general elections.” The article was quite 
controversial, as it indicated that there was no freedom of political expres-
sion, not even for the former president and founder of the nation Soekarno. 
If the latter’s fundamental rights were legally constrained by the MPRS, it 
would be even easier to deny them to common people.
4.3. ‘Press Responsibility’ and ‘Pancasila Press’
The 1966 Press Law was amended by Law 4/1967, on 6 May 1967. The 
amendment repealed Presidential Regulation 4/1963 on the Securing of 
Printed Papers Disturbing Public Order, in response to a PWI campaign 
against press control.8 Yet, this only removed the authority of the supreme 
prosecutor to prosecute press reporting, but initially left intact the power of 
the military authority to examine press violations and impose sanctions on 
the basis of Peperti Regulation 10/1960 on the Publication Permit for News-
papers and Magazines.9 Even if the latter was soon replaced by another reg-
ulation on the publication permit, which took this power out of the hands of 
the military (see below), the publication permit remained a powerful instru-
ment of press control.
To the prohibition of promoting communism/Marxism in Indonesia’s press, 
the amended press law added the requirement of ‘press responsibility, based 
on God almighty, the people’s interest and state security’, and the sustain-
ability and achievement of ‘the revolution.’ The press was no longer ‘an acti-
vator of the masses,’ but ‘an activator of national development’; no longer 
a ‘guardian of the revolution,’ but a ‘guardian of the Pancasila ideology’; 
and no longer a ‘Pancasila Socialist Press,’ but simply a ‘Pancasila Press’ (Hill 
1995: 62).
7 It was promulgated on the same day as the MPRS Edict on Press Supervision mentioned 
above. This would later be signed into the Press Law.
8 See the PWI Report on its 13th Congress in Banjarmasin, 17-21 June 1968.
9 Peperti (Supreme Martial Authority) Regulation 2/1961 on Monitoring and Supervision 
of Private Printing. According to this regulation, the Peperti authority (military) had the 
power of preventive and repressive monitoring of printing materials.
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During the government of the so-called first and second Ampera Cabinets, 
B.M. Diah as a senior journalist and one of the founders of the PWI served as 
the minister of information (1967-1968).10 Diah actually felt unhappy about 
his appointment in the complex situation following the events of 1965, rais-
ing the ire of Soekarno by running programmes assigned by Soeharto. These 
were to promote ‘press responsibility’. Diah was also to lead (ex-officio) the 
new organisation of the Press Council (Dewan Pers).
The Press Council, an organisation specifically set up to control the press, 
was established on 8 July 1967 by Government Regulation 5/1967.11 Its main 
function was to assist the government in guiding the establishment and 
development of the national press. To this end the council was to: 1. assist 
the government in preparing the rules and regulations of the press as well 
as monitoring their implementation; 2. act as a liaison between the govern-
ment and press organisations in resolving problems concerning the relation-
ship between the press and government; and 3. assist the government in 
conducting supervision of journalists and journalist organisations (Art. 2). 
Although it was officially an autonomous state organ in the Department of 
Information, the Press Council’s composition put it under firm control of 
the government: the minister of information and the general director of the 
Department of Information were its chair and vice-chair (Art. 5). Thus, the 
Department of Information became the central actor in shaping press free-
dom during the early years of the New Order.
The Press Council became an effective political instrument to transmit the 
idea of ‘press responsibility’ under the Soeharto regime and could struc-
turally discipline newspapers, journalists, and associations by using opera-
tional regulations, permits, and ‘government-press liaisons’ as leverage (Hill 
2010; Wiratraman 2011). After Soekarno was ousted from the presidency, the 
press according to Minister B.M. Diah seemed “untrustworthy and uncon-
trollable” (Kakiailatu 1997: 231) and on 24 October 1967 his department 
warned several and the next day banned eight newspapers by withdrawing 
their publication permits.12
On the other hand, the minister of information allowed the reappearance 
of several critical newspapers that had been banned by Soekarno. Indonesia 
Raya obtained a publication permit and the essential permit to print (SIC) 
from the Jakarta commander of the all-powerful command for the restoration 
of security and order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban 
10 Diah was appointed minister of information by Presidential Decree 171/1967.
11 The proposal was recommended by the minister of information, 14 April 1967, 69/SM/67 
on Government Regulation Draft on the Press Council.
12 The newspapers concerned were Andjangsana Pusat, Andjangsana Djaja, Populer, Dharma 
Bakti, Indodjaja, Tamsja, Warta Minggu and Djakarta Minggu.
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or Kopkamtib), on 10 August 1968.13 This gave much hope to journalists that 
press freedom was on its way to being restored. In an interview on 13 Janu-
ary 1981, Mochtar told Hill (2010: 89):
I gave full support to Soeharto’s government… I accepted the statements of intent of these 
people for our nation so I supported them because they [said] they wanted to correct all the 
mistakes, the fatal mistakes under Soekarno. They wanted to develop democracy in Indo-
nesia … build welfare for the people, … social justice and political justice.
Hill shows how Mochtar truly believed that the Soeharto government was 
willing to establish a fairly liberal political system, free from leftist agita-
tion and Soekarno. Given his stature as a very critical journalist, his posi-
tive attitude towards the new regime influenced many journalists to adopt 
a similar view. However, one should take into account that many newspa-
pers and magazines had been banned in 1965-1966, and that the few which 
remained were inclined to be more obedient to the New Order. Indeed, very 
few papers published critical news reports (Hill 2010: 89). Those which were 
brave enough to be critical first focused on the rising corruption. A nota-
ble target was General Ibnu Sutowo, who became minister for oil and gas 
in February 1966, and in 1967 president director of state oil company Per-
tamina. From the start he became the culprit of student demonstrations on 
account of corruption and mismanagement. He ran Pertamina without gov-
ernment control and accountability, mainly because the company proved a 
major revenue generator for the army and the regime. Mochtar’s Indonesia 
Raya exposed Ibnu Sutowo’s opulent lifestyle, especially in 1969 at the occa-
sion of his daughter’s wedding. In a way Ibnu Sutowo became the central 
target of Mochtar’s moral crusade, as Soekarno had been targeted before 
1966 (Hill 2010: 100-101).
Indonesia Raya was not immediately subjected to censorship, but pro-army 
papers, such as Angkatan Bersenjata and Merdeka, defended Ibnu Sutowo and 
accused Mochtar of a conflict of interest as chief editor of Indonesia Raya and 
his involvement in consultancy firm Indoconsult.14 This made other news-
13 Mochtar Lubis as chief editor and director of Indonesia Raya Corporation sent two appli-
cation letters to the minister, on 31 May 1966 and on 11 February 1967. He received his 
publication permit only on 24 July 1968 (Minister of Information Decree 0632/SK/DIR/
PDLN/SIT/1968). Indonesia Raya was offi cially fi rst republished on 30 October 1968.
14 One of newspapers which made a claim about Mochtar’s confl ict of interests, Merdeka, 
stated that Indonesia Raya had received ‘foreign’ funding to attack Pertamina and destroy 
Ibnu Sutowo, because his ‘tough’ oil policies were limiting foreign oil company profi ts. 
B.M. Diah, chief editor of Merdeka stated that Mochtar had attacked Pertamina because 
they had rejected a project proposal made by Indoconsult (Hill 2010: 102).
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papers more hesitant to stand up for Mochtar Lubis.15 Yet, in August 1970 
Soeharto declared that if papers like Indonesia Raya and Nusantara remained 
a nuisance, they would be dealt with firmly (Rosihan Anwar in Hill 2010: 
103). Eight months later, in April 1971, Nusantara’s chief editor T.D. Hafas 
was charged with disseminating hatred against President Soeharto and his 
assistants, and sentenced to one year in prison (2 September 1971). Hafas 
was accused by the public prosecutor of having printed a series of news 
items, articles and cartoons in 1970 and early 1971 with the intention of 
disseminating feelings of enmity, hatred and contempt towards the presi-
dent of the republic and his assistants. The accusation centred on the words 
“tidak becus” (a vulgar expression meaning ‘not capable’), used by Hafas 
when describing the performance of Minister of Information Budiarjo, and 
his comment that Soeharto’s ‘development’ cabinet was “amateurish” (Lee 
1974: 30-31).
As a result of these events the press soon became less outspoken. From the 
start, issues that were considered out of bounds, such as political prisoners 
and the recent massacres, could not be properly researched by newspapers, 
including Indonesia Raya. Soon, ‘critical’ newspapers did not cover the news 
significantly differently from the ‘moderate’ press or even the New Order 
militant press (Abdurrahman Saleh, p. 47, in LBH, 1976).
The one year imprisonment sentence for T.D. Hafas in 1971 demonstrates 
how the Soeharto regime started to use the colonial legal legacy, in this case 
the haatzaai-artikelen from the Penal Code, to restrict press freedom.16 Jour-
nalists and other press workers now found themselves between the Press 
Law on one side and the Penal Code on the other, both of them with their 
own apparatus of repression involved. In short, there were two types of 
press control: first, the Penal Code mechanism (carried out by the police 
and public prosecutor), and second, the administrative mechanism of the 
publication permit or SIT (from the minister of information) and the permit 
to print or SIC (from the Kopkamtib).
15 Hill wrote that although the issue of a confl ict of interests was not clear-cut, this still had 
a moderating effect on a number of dailies, such as Kompas, Pedoman and the student 
press which had initially backed Mochtar’s Indonesia Raya. The issue was also used by 
B.M. Diah to attack Mochtar Lubis after Indonesia Raya had published an article about 
B.M. Diah’s involvement in a sex scandal. Later on, Diah was unable to prove his allega-
tions during an ensuing series of court cases, in which Mochtar and Diah sued one anoth-
er for defamation (Hill 2010: 101-102).
16 Hafas as editor in chief of Nusantara was accused of disseminating hatred against Soe-
harto and his assistants. This case was inseparable from the case of corruption in Per-
tamina, about which Soeharto gave a statement in August 1970 saying that if Indonesia 
Raya and Nusantara continued to make trouble against him, these papers would be dealt 
with fi rmly (Hill 2000: 103). The role of mass media in criticising corruption and its rela-
tion to politics and the military are discussed in detail in Crouch (2007: 293-299).
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One of the key elements of the New Order press policy was a strict con-
trol on publication permits. As mentioned above, this was taken out of the 
hands of the military. On the basis of Article 20(1)a of the Press Law,17 the 
minister of information enacted Regulation 03/PER/MENPEN/1969 on 
the Institution of Publication Permits in the Transitional Period for General 
Press Publications. This regulation replaced Peperti Regulation 10/1960 and 
reformulated in detail the mechanism for providing publication permits. It 
defined ‘the transitional period’ as the time frame from 30 September 1966 
until the next general elections for the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) in 1971.18
In fact, this regulation was in clear contravention with another provision of 
the Press Law, i.e. Article 8. The latter stipulated that “every citizen has the 
right to publish papers…,” and section (2) clearly added that, “in exercising 
such a right [a citizen] does not need a publication permit letter.” Regulation 
03/PER/MENPEN/1969 thus violated the legal principle that a regulation 
of a lower level may not go against a regulation of a higher level. However, 
it was never submitted to judicial review.
In practice, the mechanism for obtaining permits was quite complicated, 
and state officials intervened in the process. Permits to publish had to be 
applied for with the minister of information (Art. 2). The applicant was 
obliged to abide by a legally permitted company structure as prescribed by 
a regional police commander (Komando Daerah Angkatan Kepolisian or KOM-
DAK); he needed recommendation letters from the regional and national 
level PWI; as well as recommendation letters from the regional and national 
Newspaper Publishers Association (SPS) (Article 2 (d, e, and f). Each com-
pany was only allowed to publish a maximum of three newspapers (Art. 
4). The publication permit would be repealed if a publication of a news-
paper concerned contravened Article 11 of Law 11/1966, which prohibited 
any publication involving: (a) communist/Marxist – Leninist thoughts; (2) 
pornography; (3) cruelty or sadism; and (4) content contravening Pancasila, 
such as the contravention of religious values, moral dignity, and social jus-
tice involving moral responsibility for securing the coming generation. The 
repeal of a publication permit meant automatically that the newspaper con-
cerned could no longer be published, printed or disseminated.
The PWI also played a role in legitimising New Order’s control of press 
associations. Through Ministerial Decree 02/PER/MENPEN/1969, the 
Department of Information limited the number of journalist associations 
and in the end only recognised one single journalist organisation (the PWI). 
According to Article 3 of the Press Law, “Indonesian journalists are obliged 
17 Article 20(1)a. During the transitional period the obligation to obtain a publication permit 
was still in force, until the government and DPR(GR) decided to revoke it.
18 Point 4 of the General Consideration of Ministerial Regulation 03/PER/MENPEN/1969.
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to become members of a journalist association which is recognised by the 
government.” This was an effective tool for the New Order strategy to dis-
cipline and control journalists and their associations. That the restrictions 
on establishing a journalist organisation and the obligation for journalists to 
join the PWI violated Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which guarantees 
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to unite, was of 
little concern to the government. It shows how the New Order regime pur-
posively disregarded fundamental requirements of the rule of law.
In summary, the hope for press freedom at the beginning of Soeharto’s New 
Order regime in 1966 was soon thwarted by bans and suppressive legisla-
tion. The Press Law and its amendments were designed to support coun-
ter-coup measures and/or to fight communism, but in practice they were 
used against any critic of the regime. The key terms from the dominant dis-
course became ‘press responsibility’ and ‘Pancasila press.’ The regime also 
applied unlawful administrative regulations to force the press to obtain a 
publication permit, with the minister of information at the centre of control. 
If deemed useful to counter transgression of the New Order rules, like in 
the case of T.S. Hafas, the regime turned to criminal prosecution. ‘Self-reg-
ulation’ by a single journalist association in combination with co-optation 
became the final building-blocks of the systematic undermining of press 
freedom under the New Order.
In short, there was not much of a ‘honeymoon relation’ between the press 
and the government even in the early years of New Order. It rather showed 
how the press switched the ‘crocodile pit’ for the ‘tiger cage.’
4.4. A ‘Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State’ and the Press
Press freedom is the crown of the New Order.19
(Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo, minister of information, 1978-1983)
Press bans continued to be imposed in the 1970s. Prior to the general elec-
tions of 1971 Harian Kami and Duta Masyarakat were banned for not hav-
ing respected the so-called ‘week of calm’ (minggu tenang) when political 
campaigns were to be halted. Another example is the revocation of Sinar 
Harapan’s permit to print (SIC) by the Kopkamtib in January 1973 for alleg-
edly leaking details of the 1973-74 national budget proposal (RAPBN) (Hill 
1995: 38). This example also shows how the military had certainly not lost its 
power over the press, even after the authority to issue and revoke a publica-
tion permit had been moved to the minister of information.
19 “Kebebasan pers adalah mahkota Orde Baru.” This statement is a quotation from Kakiailatu 
(1997: 224).
Press Freedom from the Early New Order to the SBY Administration 97
The first implementing decree with regard to the permit to print was KEP 
063/PK/IC/VIII/1973 of the Special Task Force, Command for the Restora-
tion of Security and Order of Djakarta Raya and Surroundings (Laksus Pan-
gkopkamtibda Jaya dan Sekitarnya). The decree provided the permit to print to 
a number of publications, including Indonesia Raya. The permit given on 1 
August 1973 to Mochtar Lubis included the obligation to submit ten printed 
copies of every publication of Indonesia Raya to the Mass Media Task Force 
Unit of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order in Jakarta 
(Satgas Mass Media Laksus Pangkopkamtibda Jaya).20
Military control over the press reflected the power of the armed forces gen-
erally during the early period of the New Order. The military held strategic 
positions in the state bureaucracy, with the Indonesian state becoming more 
and more centralised and authoritarian in character through the exclusion of 
political parties from effective participation in the decision-making process 
and the appropriation of the state by its officials. This character was inex-
tricably intertwined with the regime’s economic policy, which stimulated 
industrialisation and economic growth, and allowed the elites to increas-
ingly appropriate large parts of the benefits which were the result of the 
economic development of the time (Robison 1986: 105). The regime justified 
its authoritarian control through the need for rapid economic development 
and to preserve a fragile social ‘harmony’ during the complex transition to 
modernity (Gosh 1996: 36-37). Thus, the Indonesian New Order defined 
itself as a modernising, developmentalist state, and actually made little pre-
tences of being a democracy. The resulting bureaucratic capitalism sustained 
a military bureaucratic state and provided officeholders of that state with 
patronage for themselves, their families, and the political factions to which 
they owed their authority (Robison 1978: 37).
This political configuration contributes to the explanation of the political 
riots in 1974 known as the Malari (Fifteen January Riots) and the ensuing 
oppression of the press. When Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visited 
Jakarta on 14-17 January 1974, pro-democracy students used the occasion 
to voice their protests against the New Order’s economic policy and in par-
ticular against the extractive and manufacturing investments sponsored 
by Japanese, American and expatriate Chinese capital. The protests led to 
a violent response by the regime.21 Students were molested and arrested 
by the military, and serious measures were taken against journalists and 
20 This decision was signed by Colonel L.S.M. Panggabean, S.H. Actually the permit to 
print was given fi ve years later, after a publication permit was given by minister of infor-
mation on 24 July 1968, through its decision 0632/SK/DIR/PDLN/SIT/1968.
21 During the Malari riots, at least 11 people were killed, 775 people were arrested, 807 cars 
and 175 motorcycles were burned, and 144 buildings were destroyed. These riots have 
been analysed from different perspectives, including as a protest against Soeharto’s per-
sonal assistants, or as internal friction among military offi cials (General Soemitro against 
General Ali Moertopo) (Adam 2003).
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newspapers. At least 470 people were arrested, including Indonesia Raya’s 
Enggak Bahau’din (who was detained for nearly 11 months) and Mochtar 
Lubis (detained for two and a half months). Several printing and publi-
cation permits were withdrawn because they had reported on the Malari 
events, including Indonesia Raya, Nusantara,22 Abadi, Harian Kami, The Jakarta 
Times, Pedoman (Jakarta); Mingguan Wenang, Pemuda Indonesia, Ekspres, Suluh 
Berita (Surabaya) and Indonesia Pos (Ujung Pandang). Only a few of these 
were eventually allowed to re-appear under a different name, such as Pelita 
(replacing the Islamic Abadi) and The Indonesian Times (replacing the English-
language The Jakarta Times) (Hill 1995: 37).
It was clear that the government held these newspapers responsible for the 
Malari demonstrations. Indonesia Raya may serve as an example. Its editorial 
of 14 January 1974, written by Mochtar Lubis with the title “A Welcome to 
Tanaka,”23 analysed Japan’s role in Southeast Asia, with critical attention for 
the impact of Japanese business in Indonesia. On 15 January, Indonesia Raya’s 
headline carried news about student detentions, and its editorial asked the 
authorities not to accuse students of the riots following their demonstra-
tions. Such headlines and editorials continued for four days (15-18 January 
1974).24 Later on, in its revocations of their publication and printing permits, 
the government accused the press of inciting the public to riot. At that time, 
only Indonesia Raya had been openly critical of the Indonesian government’s 
foreign policy.
Indonesia Raya’s permit to print (SIC) was thus withdrawn within six months 
of receiving the permit (on 1 August 1973). The Commander of Security and 
Order in Jakarta, through Decree KEP-007-PK/I/1974, repealed it on 21 Jan-
uary 1974, considering that:
… (a) Indonesia Raya has breached the spirit and core of the norms stipulated in MPR 
Decree IV/MPR/1973 and Law 11/1966; (b) Indonesia Raya has published news which 
can degrade the authority of and trust in the national leadership; (c) Indonesia Raya is con-
sidered to have provoked people, which has led to chaos on 15 and 16 January 1974 and 
which could cause conflict among leaders.
22 Nusantara was the fi rst newspaper banned in the context of the Malari riots. Its permit to 
print was withdrawn on 16 January 1974 by the Kopkamtibda, together with the banning 
of three radio stations: Suara Neggala, Radio Arief Rahman Hakim, and Suara Radio Kebe-
basan (Haryanto 1995: 190).
23 “Selamat Datang Tanaka-san” (Welcome, Tanaka-san), Indonesia Raya, 14 January 1974.
24 “Harus Diselesaikan dengan Bijaksana” [This needs to be resolved wisely], Indonesia 
Raya, Editorial Column on 15 January 1974; “Pengalaman dengan Jepang selalu Pahit” 
[The experience with Japan has always been bitter], Indonesia Raya, Editorial Column on 
16 January 1974; “Jangan Pamer kekayaan” [Never show your riches], Indonesia Raya, 
Editorial Column on 17 January 1974; “Kita Lihat Pelaksanaannya Nanti” [We’ll see the 
implementation later on], Indonesia Raya, Editorial Column on 18 January 1974. Although 
Indonesia Raya still published about the Malari riots on 19 January 1974, its editorials were 
quiet by then. Further details about Indonesia Raya’s role in the Malari riots can be found 
in Haryanto (1995).
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Indonesia Raya’s publication permit was also withdrawn, by Decree 20/SK/
Dirjen-PG/K/1974, on 22 January 1974. Its considerations were more elabo-
rate:
a. It is necessary to take action against Indonesia Raya by withdrawing its permit to print 
(SIT) 0632/SK/DirPP/SIT/1968, 24 July 1968-10632/Per/Per/SK/DirPP/SIT/1971, on 
18 June 1971, which was given to Indonesia Raya Corporation, Bonang 17 Jakarta.
b. The publication permit’s withdrawal is based on the following considerations:
(e) Indonesia Raya daily has breached the spirit and core of the norms stipulated in MPR 
Decree IV/MPR/1973 and Law 11/1966;
(f) Indonesia Raya daily has written things which: 1. in principle lead to attempts to 
weaken the foundations of national life, by fuelling issues such as foreign capital, 
corruption, failing dual function of government officials, high-level battles, and 
Kopkamtib personal assistant problems; 2. damage public confidence in the national 
leadership; 3. provoke sensitivities without giving precise and positive solutions, 
which may lead to inciting people to rise up and take actions which are liable to 
cause disruption to public order and state security; 4. create a situation that leads to 
acts of treason;
(g) Although the Kopkamtib has given warnings to all media in Bandung since 5 August, 
[…] nevertheless, the reports and writings of certain newspapers have actually dis-
regarded such warnings.
(h) The permit to print was withdrawn by Laksus Pangkopkamtibda on 21 January 1974.
c. The acts of Indonesia Raya daily have been contradicting and violating the function and 
responsibility of the press, as stipulated in MPR Decree IV/MPR/1973, the Press Law, 
the Journalist Code of Ethics and Ministry of Information Regulation 03/1969, Chapter 
III, article 7d.
d. The withdrawal of Indonesia Raya’s publication permit does not violate press freedom, 
but precisely serves to implement press freedom in a concrete way in response to the 
Pancasila democratic order, with a healthy press as dreamed of by the Indonesian peo-
ple as formulated under MPR Decree IV/MPR/1973, i.e. a “free and responsible press.”
Although more elaborate, these legal considerations are so vague as to 
give no criteria at all for determining what is allowed and what is not. The 
two decrees clearly demonstrate that the repeal of Indonesia Raya’s permits 
was not only decided without involvement of the judiciary, but also that 
the military authority and the minister of information applied a procedure 
that would not even come slightly near a fair trial. Haryanto (1995: 218) 
has observed that the decision was taken without first consulting the Press 
Council. This consultation was actually a legal obligation at that time (GR 
5/1967 Article 2(2) and (4) and Article 3(2).25 In any case, on 22 January 1974 
Indonesia Raya published its last issue.
25 The relevant articles state that the Press Council’s task is to act as a connecting institution 
(Badan Penghubung) between the government and press organisations in resolving prob-
lems in their relation, and give advice to the government in helping and protecting the 
press. Article 3(2) moreover states that the Press Council has the authority to offer advice 
on institutional policies and acts regarding press companies and their journalists which 
violate the Press Law or other press regulations.
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Three months later, on 9 April 1974, the Council for Political and Security 
Stabilisation (Dewan Stabilisasi Politik dan Keamanan) decided to repeal the 
publication permit (SIT) of daily Pedoman and weekly Ekspres. As quoted by 
Tempo, the Minister of Information Mashuri said that:
Such a decision was issued in order to complete the resolution to close down several news-
papers and magazines as a consequence of the Malari riots…. Now, 12 publications are 
closed down, 417 workers and journalists in Jakarta and 85 workers in regional offices 
were dismissed.26
The 1974 bans make clear how the government used the publication permit 
and the permit to print for limiting press freedom. Yet, the government went 
further, by also targeting journalists considered as ‘offensive’. These were 
‘blacklisted’ by the authorities. When eight journalist who had formerly 
worked for Pedoman and Indonesia Raya attempted to join the daily Cahaya 
Kita, the director-general of Press and Printing of the ministry of informa-
tion announced that all journalists who had been working with banned 
papers were required to obtain permission, in the form of a ‘clearance letter’ 
from the directorate-general, before they could be reemployed by another 
newspaper (Hill 1995: 38). This added another instrument to the extra-legal 
repertoire of the government to control the press.
There was little organised resistance to such measures. The PWI hardly 
responded to the repressive turn of government policy and was absent alto-
gether when it came to advocating for journalists or newspapers. By the end 
of March 1974, the Ethical Council of the PWI had only pointed at a common 
statement of the PWI and the Department of Information of 18 June 1973, 
which stipulated that “the difficulties which currently besiege the Indone-
sian press need not mean that they disturb or even harm the development 
of national press quality and sweep aside the responsibility in guiding the 
nation’s and the young generation’s morals.”27 Such a statement completely 
disregarded the painful realities for the press and the freedom of expression.
The Malari riots badly embarrassed and annoyed Soeharto. The events made 
him more careful in choosing his aides and in developing policies to sus-
tain his power and position in a more systematic way, including curbing the 
press. This further entrenched the politics of ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ 
and its combination of military involvement in politics and the Ministry of 
Information’s role as an executive body for disciplining the press. The press 
had to do without the protection of a fair judicial process mechanism in 
facing government and military intervention through ‘administrative’ mea-
sures without a proper legal basis.
26 “Yang Eksit dan Yang Terbit” [Who exits and who publishes], Tempo, 20 April 1974.
27 “Yang Eksit dan Yang Terbit” [Who exits and who publishes], Tempo, 20 April 1974.
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4.5. Discourse and Streamlining Organisations as Sources of 
Control
One way of disciplining the press under the New Order was framing the 
proper relation between ‘democracy’ and the press through a particular dis-
course (Kitley in Lloyd and Smith 2001: 262-263; Mundayat 2005). In par-
ticular Soeharto’s speeches were an important source of information in this 
regard. A good example is his speech of 26 March 1975:
In a democratic society as we wish to develop, there is no doubt whatsoever among us, 
about the right to have a different opinion, including having a different opinion than the 
government. Nevertheless, such a difference of opinion must grow from the pure desire 
to improve oneself, and therefore needs to be accompanied with a better result, while the 
effort to realise a different opinion as mentioned before should be done in a democratic 
manner, based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.28
Two years later, Soeharto started to emphasise ‘national stability’ as an 
important issue:
The press should avoid any writing which incites or irritates people and shakes national 
stability.29
It was the government which defined whether press reporting supported 
the regime’s interests. There was a clear prohibition on exposing the gov-
ernment or government policies in a negative way, especially when they 
concerned the regime’s economic policy and its bureaucratic capitalist net-
work. However, there was a grey area where concepts as ‘democracy’ and 
‘national stability’ were arbitrarily interpreted by the regime, just as ‘Pan-
casila press’ or ‘responsible press’ under Guided Democracy as described 
in Chapter 3. No special institution turned these concepts into clear legal 
standards, and hence a large degree of legal uncertainty remained.
Another way of disciplining the press was the further streamlining of press 
organisations. In 1975 the minister of information promulgated Decree 47/
KEP/MENPEN/1975 to recognise only a single organisation for journalists 
(PWI) and publishers (SPS). These organisations could be easily controlled 
by the Soeharto regime, a policy it used in many other fields as well (Hill 
1995).
28 “Pers Pembawa Panji-Panji Demokrasi” [Press as Carrier of the Banner of Democracy], 
Opening remarks for Indonesia’s chief editors’ meeting in Jakarta, 26 March 1975.
29 “Hindari Pemberitaan yang Membakar dan Menghasut Rakyat” [Avoid News that Heats up 
and Incites People] Soeharto’s speech for Indonesia’s editorial chief and PWI in Jakarta, 9 
February 1977.
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In January 1978, new press banning measures, following student protests 
against the government’s development policies and their involvement of 
foreign investors, ethnic-Chinese investors and government officials, once 
again showed the tight limits on press freedom. The Kopkamtib arrested 
223 students, disbanded all university student councils, and banned seven 
student newspapers and seven prominent newspapers in Jakarta (Kom-
pas, Merdeka, Sinar Harapan, Pelita, Pos Sore, Indonesia Times and Sinar Pagi). 
Almost similar to 1974, they were accused of provoking people directly or 
indirectly to engage in activities which threatened national security and 
public order. Before they could reapply for a permit, the directors of these 
newspapers had to send a written statement to the president, the minister 
of information, and the Kopkamtib commander, in which they promised to 
henceforth obey the “norms of a free and responsible press.”
President Soeharto responded directly to what had happened during his 
visit to Surakarta for the opening ceremony of the National Press Monu-
ment Building, on 9 February 1978:
Until the end of January 1978, an almost uncontrollable evolution of press freedom endan-
gered national stability. And if there would have been an opportunity for further growth, 
this would have created a dangerous situation for the state and the safety of the people. For 
the greater interest, and in order to remove this dangerous situation for the state, the gov-
ernment was forced by the situation to temporarily bridle several newspapers.30
For students, Minister of Education Daoed Joesoef developed a policy of 
depoliticisation through a special body, the Normalisation of Campus 
Life/Student Affairs Coordination Body (NKK/BKK).31 Undoubtedly, this 
affected the student press. Several student papers were banned in 1979 
and 1980, and on 31 May 1980 the ministers of education and information 
established the National Supervisory Team for the University Student Press 
(Tim Pembina Pers Kampus Mahasiswa Tingkat Nasional) through joint Decree 
0166/P/1980. The supervisory team included officials from both depart-
ments and appointed university lecturers. Its tasks were supervising the 
student press as a tool of education, which as a subsystem of the university 
should be part of the university government system, and the student press 
should be ‘assisted’ by the government in its efforts. The supervisory team 
could apply pressure to the student press, by the requirement for the latter 
to hold a sort of permit, the STT (Surat Tanda Terdaftar or Letter of Registra-
tion) (Supriyanto 1998: 80-84).32
30 PWI adalah Kekuatan Perjuangan [PWI is a Power in the Struggle], Soeharto’s speech dur-
ing the opening ceremony of the National Press Monument Building, in Surakarta, 9 Feb-
ruary 1978.
31 NKK/BKK, ‘Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan,’ was based 
on Ministry of Education Decree 0156/U/1978 and 037/U/1979.
32 The STT was based on Minister of Information Regulation 01/Per/Menpen/1975.
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This ‘depoliticisation’ through press bans and disbanding student councils, 
which obviously contravened Article 28 of UUD 1945, was the hallmark of 
the New Order. The hypocrisy of the regime in this matter can be illustrated 
by the following quotes from one of Soeharto’s speeches:
Fundamental postulates for the press are: improving responsible freedom to maintain 
dynamic national stability, strengthening national unity and continuity of development. 
Those should be developed on the basis of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.33
And in the same speech:
One of the important elements of democratic life is the improvement of freedom of opin-
ion. And the press is one of the channels to freely express one’s opinion.34
The period from 1970-1978 was the worst for press freedom during Soe-
harto’s regime, in the sense that there was no court involvement in press 
banning at all and that the military authorities were heavily involved. In 
this respect the situation was basically the same as under Soekarno during 
the period in which martial law applied and the military were in charge of 
supervising the press (from 1957 to 1965). Rule of law was a far cry from 
Soeharto’s bureaucratic-authoritarianism during these years.
4.6. ‘Responsible Freedom’ According to the New Order
I am happy, because based on my current observations,
the principle of responsible freedom is more 
entrenched in our press society
(Soeharto, 1981)35
There are two sources that illuminate the earth. 
The first one is the sun and the second is the press….
(Soeharto 1984)36
In the early 1980s, the press was closely controlled by the state. Not only did 
the Department of Information and the military exercise full control over 
press publications, but the Soeharto regime also successfully supervised jour-
33 PWI adalah Kekuatan Perjuangan, Soeharto’s speech during the opening ceremony of the 
National Press Monument Building, in Surakarta, 9 February 1978.
34 Asas Kebebasan yang Bertanggungjawab Harus disadari Pers Sendiri [The Principle of 
Responsible Freedom Needs to be Acknowledged by the Press], Soeharto’s speech to 
Indonesia’s editorial chief and the PWI in the State Palace, Jakarta, 11 September 1981.
35 Asas Kebebasan yang Bertanggungjawab Harus disadari Pers Sendiri, Soeharto’s speech to 
Indonesia’s editorial chief and tge PWI in the State Palace, Jakarta, 11 September 1981.
36 “Ada dua sumber yang menerangi bumi ini. Pertama matahari dan kedua pers….” Soeharto’s 
speech at the opening session for the Conference of the Ministers of Information of Non-
Aligned Countries (COMINAC), Jakarta, 26th-30th January 1984.
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nalists through the PWI and press owners through the SPS. The next step was 
to further internalise control of the press itself. To this end Soeharto addressed 
the PWI’s national congress in 1981, which had the theme “Strengthening 
Positive Interaction between Government, Press and Society.”37 Soeharto’s 
speech emphasised the normative concept for the press known as ‘a respon-
sible press.’
Like its predecessors ‘democracy’ and ‘national stability,’ the concept of a 
‘responsible press’ was fairly vague. Four years before addressing the PWI 
congress, on 7 February 1977, Soeharto had already introduced the idea of 
a ‘responsible press,’ saying that “The press itself should be responsible to 
measure whether news or a problem needs to be publicly known, and how 
to expose it. In this regard, [the press should] exercise ultimate responsi-
bility and carefully estimate this.” It never became much clearer than this. 
‘Development’ also remained a central but equally vague concept, as can be 
illustrated by the following quote of a 1982 Soeharto speech: “In our great 
activities of national development, the press has a respectable position to 
light an enlightening torch of explanation, so that society can really under-
stand the direction and purpose of our development.”38
In practice, press responsibility and national stability led to strict control of 
the press, for instance when Tempo’s publication permit (SIT) was repealed 
on 12 April 1982. The reason was simply that Tempo had posted a news 
report and a photo about the unrest accompanying the general elections in 
Banteng Square in Jakarta, which the Minister of Information Decree 76/
Kep/Menpen/1982 considered as ‘disturbing national stability.’ In order to 
regain its publication permit, Tempo should obey the Press Council’s direc-
tions, which held that (1) Tempo should be responsible in securing national 
stability, safety, order and public interest, and not make matters worse and 
create tension in society; (2) Tempo should exercise self-restraint and priori-
tise the public interest rather than individual and Tempo’s interests; (3) Tempo 
should always protect the good reputation and authority of the government 
and the national leader; (4) Tempo should obey the law and rules of the Press 
Council, the Journalist Code of Ethics, and other regulations stipulated by 
the government to promote a free and responsible press; (5) Tempo should 
apply ‘introspection,’ ‘correction,’ and internal improvements for stabilising 
a free and responsible press.
37 Pers Jadilan Pelopor Pemerataan Pembangunan [The Press Must Become a Protagonist of 
Even Development], Soeharto’s speech at the PWI National Working Conference, Banjar-
masin, 9 February 1981.
38 Pers Mendapat Kehormatan untuk Menyalakan Obor Penerangan Pembangunan, [The Press 
Gets Respect for Lighting the Torch for Explaining Development], presidential speech at 
the inauguration of the Press Council Building, Jakarta, 1 March 1982.
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From this case, it is quite hard to find the connection between ‘development’ 
as stipulated by Soeharto and the requirement for Tempo to fulfil these five 
requirements. Of the guidelines prescribed to Tempo ‘securing national sta-
bility, safety, order and public interest, and not make matters worse and cre-
ate tension in society’ and ‘always protect the good reputation and author-
ity of the government and the national leader’ are especially problematic. 
These issues have been addressed by the international press community, 
for instance at the Talloires conference in France in 1981.39 The conference 
observed that governments, in developed and developing countries alike, 
frequently constrain or otherwise discourage the reporting of information 
they consider detrimental or embarrassing, and that governments usually 
invoke the national interest to justify these constraints. By contrast, the Tal-
loires participants held that the people’s interests, and therefore the interests 
of the nation, are better served by free and open reporting. From robust pub-
lic debate grows better understanding of the issues facing a nation and its 
peoples; and out of understanding grow better chances for solutions. They 
also reaffirmed that censorship and other forms of arbitrary control of infor-
mation and opinion should be eliminated; the people’s right to news and 
information should not be abridged; access by journalists to diverse sources 
of news and opinion, official or unofficial, should be without restriction; 
members of the press should enjoy the full protection of national and inter-
national law; and also journalists should be free to form organisations to 
protect their professional interests.
In 1982, in order to promote a ‘responsible press,’ the Indonesian legisla-
tor promulgated Law 21/1982. This new law amended Law 11/1966,40 and 
became the cornerstone of Indonesian press regulation during the 1980s and 
1990s. It followed MPR Decree IV/MPR/1978, which described the differ-
ences between the Press Law put into place in 1966 and the objectives the 
New Order regime now sought to realise. While in 1966 the National Press 
was obliged to ‘struggle for honesty and justice upon the basis of press free-
dom,’ the objective now was ‘responsible press freedom.’ The obligation to 
be a ‘channel for constructive and revolutionary progressive public opinion’ 
was replaced by a ‘positive interaction between the government, press and 
society,’41 aimed at ‘broadening communication and community participa-
tion and implementing constructive control by society’ (Article 1(6)).
39 The conference adopted a declaration, namely ‘the Declaration of Talloires.’ This declara-
tion was adopted by leaders of independent news organisations from 21 nations at the 
Voices of Freedom Conference in Talloires, France, May 15-17, 1981. It contained a state-
ment of principles to which a free world media ought to subscribe, and on which it will 
never compromise. The conference was attended by 63 delegates from 21 countries.
40 This law was passed on 20 September 1982.
41 The terms ‘positive interaction between the government, press and society’ were used 
earlier as PWI’s theme of the National Working Conference, Banjarmasin, 9 February 
1981.
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Article 5 stipulated that the National Press has the following duties and obli-
gations:
(a) Preserving and socialising the Pancasila as stipulated in the Preamble of the 1945 Con-
stitution [..];
(b) Fighting for the Implementation of the Message of the People’s Suffering based on Pan-
casila Democracy;
(c) Fighting for truth and justice on the basis of a responsible press freedom;
(d) Stimulating the spirit of serving the people’s struggle, strengthening national unity, 
broadening the feeling of responsibility and national discipline, helping to raise the 
intelligence of the people’s living and stimulating the people’s participation in develop-
ment;
(e) Fighting for the realisation of a new international order in the field of information and 
communication on the basis of the national interest and the belief in one’s own strength 
in building regional and international co-operation, especially in the field of the press.
This article thus changed Soekarno’s revolutionary press into a ‘free and 
responsible press.’ This term was always ‘connected’ to the Pancasila as the 
state ideology, even if the meaning of this connection was never made clear.
The 1982 Press Law knew five general restrictive articles, revolving around 
a new permit that replaced the publication permit and the permit to print. 
This new permit was the ‘Press Publication Permit’ (Surat Izin Usaha Pener-
bitan Pers or SIUPP, Article 5(1)). Second, each printing house had to be a 
member of a state-recognised printing organisation (Article 29); third, print-
ing houses were not allowed to print newspapers without a SIUPP; fourth, 
press companies were required to adjust the form, governance and struc-
ture of their corporations as determined by the law and register with the 
government and the Press Council; and fifth, non-compliance with these 
provisions could be punished by the sanctions stipulated by Article 19(2). 
According to this provision, publishing news without a SIUPP could lead to 
imprisonment for a maximum of three months and/or a fine of as much as 
Rp. 10 million. All political parties in parliament agreed upon the necessity 
of the SIUPP, and considered it as an improvement on the previous situation 
(Simorangkir 1986: 76-101).
The military was thus no longer involved in controlling the press and the 
minister of information became the single authority to perform this task. 
Two years later, the minister of information published an implementing reg-
ulation of the 1982 Press Law, 1/PER/MENPEN/1984.42 It was made opera-
tional by Minister of Information’s Decree 214A/KEP/MENPEN/1984 on 
the Procedure and Conditions for obtaining a SIUPP. These regulations 
42 Ministerial Regulation 01/PER/MENPEN/1984 on SIUPP was enacted on 31 October 
1984.
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allowed the minister to ban any paper without allowing recourse to the judi-
ciary or another forum to defend itself.43
Hence, albeit there was no longer any military involvement in processing 
press permits, the SIUPP turned out to be ‘old wine in a new bottle.’ The 
first paper banned after the adoption of the 1982 Press Law was Sinar Hara-
pan in 1986, when it reported that the government planned to abolish 44 
import monopolies before the government had officially announced its plan 
(Lubis 1993: 277).44 This exposed the way in which the elites drew profits 
from the New Order business climate. It was unclear from the decision what 
the basis for the ban was and the case was not taken to court. Sinar Harapan 
reappeared in 2001, after a 15-year close down.45
The second case was the weekly magazine Prioritas, whose SIUPP was 
withdrawn in 1987 because it had reported on issues considered too sensi-
tive. In response, Prioritas’s chief editor Surya Paloh wrote an open letter to 
parliament and the People’s Consultative Assembly (DPR and MPR) to ask 
for the annulment of the 1984 Regulation. Paloh also approached Supreme 
Court Chairman Ali Said to check whether he might bring Minister of Infor-
mation Regulation 1/PER/MENPEN/1984 before the Supreme Court for 
review, but he was told that he should address the district court first. As he 
supposed this was not going to bring any relief, Paloh did not file a claim 
before the district court. Instead he directly asked the Supreme Court for the 
nullification of the minister of information’s decision to withdraw Priori-
tas’ SIUPP. The Supreme Court apparently agreed to consider the issue, but 
stalled until the March 1993 session of the MPR, when a new president and 
vice- president were appointed. Eventually, in June 1993 the Supreme Court 
rejected Surya Paloh’s request to challenge the regulation on SIUPP.46 The 
reason was that there was no appropriate procedure for review. Although 
the court decided to dismiss the Prioritas case, this decision brought an 
important change by stipulating rules of procedure for judicial review of 
regulations below the level of an act of parliament so that in the future such 
43 The minister of information at that time was Harmoko, who would serve until the end of 
the New Order and became quite notorious. Ironically, Harmoko had a background is the 
press world, as the founder of Jakarta’s big-selling down-market newspaper, Pos Kota. He 
had been a journalist and editor since 1960, working with papers as Merdeka and Angka-
tan Bersenjata.
44 About two weeks after Sinar Harapan’s banning, the government announced the abolition 
of 165 import monopolies, none of them controlled by the Soeharto family. Interestingly, 
Soeharto’s son Bambang Trihatmodjo and his brother in law Sudwikatmono expressed 
their interest in buying Sinar Harapan.
45 “Koran Sinar Harapan Kembali Terbit” [Newspaper Sinar Harapan is Published Again], 
Liputan6.com, 3 July 2001, http://news.liputan6.com/read/15825/koran-sinar-harapan-
kembali-terbit (accessed on 13 January 2013).
46 Supreme Court Regulation 1/1993.
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cases could effectively be addressed by the Supreme Court (Pompe 2005: 
144-146).47
There were also complaints about the procedure for acquiring a SIUPP. Mon-
itor’s chief editor Arswendo once remarked that getting a SIUPP in a ‘formal 
way’ was a complicated matter, implicitly commenting on the fact that if 
one had a close relationship with Minister Harmoko, it was much easier. 
Such a relation could be constructed, according to Arswendo, by delivering 
a certain sum of money to the minister: “If the ‘deal’ had been agreed upon, 
administrative trivial matters could be easily arranged thereafter. That is the 
shrewdness of Harmoko, even if dealing with a friend, all administrative 
requirements must be fulfilled” (Tempo, 13 January 2003).
In the early 1990s, Soeharto promoted a policy of ‘openness’ (keterbukaan) 
that permitted wider public debates in parliament and the press, and 
restored some hope of a more independent judiciary (Bedner 2001: 6-7; 
Crouch 2010: 18-19). This ‘openness,’ the Indonesian equivalent of the Soviet 
Union’s Glasnost, intended to create a dynamic and developing society. In 
the name of ‘openness,’ controls on the press became more relaxed, demon-
strations became possible, student activism started to flourish, NGOs grew 
in number and influence, and criticism of the government became both 
more frequent and more trenchant. The establishment of Komnas HAM (the 
National Human Rights Commission) in 1993 was part of this policy. How-
ever, the policy of ‘openness’ was abruptly ended by one of the most notori-
ous crackdowns on press freedom in Indonesian history.
It concerned the banning of two prominent weeklies: Tempo, Editor and the 
daily Detik, whose SIUPP were withdrawn by Minister of Information Har-
moko.48 The Director General of Press and Printed Media Guidance Sub-
rata explained in an official announcement that the three papers had been 
warned on a number of occasions, but had failed to heed these warnings. 
In addition, he argued, there had been a ‘discrepancy’ between what was 
allowed by the SIUPP and the contents of the publications concerned.49
Before the ban was announced, Minister of Information and Press Coun-
cil Chairman Harmoko conducted a meeting at 9 a.m. in the Press Council 
office.50 Jakob Oetama, the chief editor of Kompas and present in his capacity 
as a Press Council member, later testified before the administrative court 
47 Paloh brought his case on 16 November 1992. It will be further elaborated in Chapter 7.
48 The ban was based on Minister of Information Decree 123/KEP/Menpen/1994 (21 June 
1994).
49 AFP News Service (Antara), “Government Cancels Tempo, Editor and Detik Printing and 
Publishing Licenses,” 21 June 1994.
50 The participants included Jakob Oetama from Kompas, Director General of Press and 
Graphics Guidance Drs. Subrata, and Handjojo Nitimihardjo from Antara.
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that the Press Council had not found the newspapers concerned to be in 
contravention of the limitations of a free and responsible press and had cer-
tainly not recommended banning them. Nonetheless, Subrata announced 
the ban at 16 p.m. It seemed that the Press Council meeting was an empty 
formality and that the decision to ban these papers had long been taken.
Tempo’s editorial staff was uncertain about the reason for the withdrawal. 
According to the minister’s decree, several Tempo editions “had not reflected 
a healthy, free and responsible press” and the decision was taken to super-
vise and develop a national press in accordance with the 1945 Constitution 
and the Pancasila, as well as to promote ‘national stability.’ In short, the 
reasons were utterly vague. Albeit Tempo won a legal case against the min-
ister in Jakarta’s Administrative Court, both in first instance and on appeal, 
officially the reasons for the ban remained a mystery.51
Unofficially, several high ranking government officials referred to news 
reports related to the purchase of used marine ships from Germany, con-
troversial within the government itself, as the immediate cause.52 Tempo 
had already published a cover story on the contested purchase on 7 June 
1994.53 The following week Tempo reported that the costs of these 39 ships 
had increased 62-fold.54 The press community in Jakarta also believed that 
this was the main reason for the bans.55 However, the absence of any official 
reasons made it difficult to address the ban on substantive grounds. With-
out mentioning particular newspapers or magazines, Soeharto stated from 
a navy ship in Teluk Banten that strict measures should be taken against a 
whistle-blowing press.
The ban on Tempo, Detik and Editor did not directly lead to public silence and 
‘national stability.’ On the contrary, it was followed by numerous protests 
in nearly every part of the country (Dhakidae 1994: 54). During protests in 
Jakarta 53 people were arrested, including well-known performer and poet 
W.S. Rendra. The situation also led to international outrage. In response, 
Soeharto simply redefined the concept of openness: “Openness does not 
mean unlimited freedom, or even worse, the freedom to be hostile, pitting 
one party against another and unconstitutionally imposing one’s ideas.”56
51 See Chapter 7 for this case.
52 “Jerman Punya Kapal, Tempo Ketiban Bredel” [Germany Holds Ships, Tempo is Banned], 
Tempo, 13 October 1998. This case is discussed further in Chapter 7.
53 “Dihadang Ombak dan Biaya Besar” [Intercepted by Waves and High Cost], Tempo, 7 June 
1994.
54 “Jerman Punya Kapal, Tempo Ketiban Bredel” [Germany Holds Ships, Tempo is Banned], 
Tempo, 13 October 1998.
55 “Jerman Punya Kapal, Tempo Ketiban Bredel” [Germany Holds Ships, Tempo is Banned], 
Tempo, 13 October 1998.
56 “The Limits of Openness: Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor,” Human Rights 
Watch, 1 September 1994.
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Underground journalist associations57 and individual journalists through-
out the country established a larger network, namely AJI, the Independent 
Journalists Alliance.58 Its main objectives were realising public rights to 
information, opposing press restraints and rejecting a single organisation 
for journalists. As only the PWI was recognised by the government, AJI had 
to operate underground.
The government immediately moved to suppress the AJI. It indicted AJI 
activists Ahmad Taufik, Eko Maryadi and Danang Kukuh Wardoyo, who 
were condemned to three years in prison each (Danang received a lighter 
sentence of 20 months imprisonment). In October 1996, Andi Syahputra, 
who printed news on behalf of the AJI, was also imprisoned for 18 months. 
To this end, the prosecutor used Minister of Information’s Decree 47/Kep/
Menpen/1975, which provided for a single journalist organisation.
During the same period, in 1996, Indonesia was shaken by the killing of 
journalist Fuad Muhammad Syafruddin, also known as Udin, in Bantul, 
Yogyakarta. Udin had worked for ten years for the regional newspaper 
Bernas. He had written a number of articles in July 1996 about corruption 
in Bantul regency, involving illicit land deals and the election of officials.59 
During the night of 12 August 1996, his house was visited by a number of 
unknown people. Then, on 13 August 1996, two men (later on identified as 
Hatta Sunanto, a Bantul parliament member, and Suwandi, a broker) came 
to the Bernas office. After work, Udin went home, and was tortured and 
stabbed Udin in front of his own house. He died after three days in coma 
at the hospital in Yogyakarta. The police refused to look at a connection 
between the killing and his critical articles, and instead focused on an extra-
marital affair Udin was allegedly having, arguing that he had been killed 
by a jealous husband. This version remained the dominant story, but led 
nowhere and no one was ever brought to trial for the killing.60
The Udin case became symbolic of the anti-press attitude of the Soeharto 
regime, which by now banned and censored both foreign and national pub-
lications at will and condoned severe beatings of journalists reporting on 
demonstrations against the repression of political opposition. This situation 
also drew attention at the international level. In 1997 UNESCO produced a 
57 Independent Journalists Forum (FOWI) Bandung, Yogyakarta Journalist Discussion 
Forum (FDWY), Surabaya Press Club (SPC) and Independent Journalists Solidarity (SJI) 
Jakarta.
58 Through the so-called Sirnagalih Declaration, on 7 August 1994.
59 “The Death of a Journalist,” Inside Indonesia, 52: October-December 1997.
60 In 1997 Amnesty International called on the Indonesian government to re-open the inves-
tigation into the death of Udin and for the investigation to be thorough and impartial. AJI 
Yogyakarta also released a petition for investigation into the death of Udin and to stop 
violence against journalists (“AJI Yogyakarta: Buka Kembali Kasus Pembunuhan Udin,” 
Voice of Human Rights, 16 August 2010).
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resolution about violence against journalists, referring specifically to Indo-
nesia. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a US-based organisation 
for press freedom, put Soeharto among “The 10 Worst Offenders or Enemies 
of the Press of 1997.”61 Although Soeharto seemed to pay little attention, the 
international support contributed to mounting criticism in Indonesia itself, 
which was to come to a head after the onset of the financial crisis in 1997.
In short, the closing years of the Soeharto regime saw an ever-tightening 
press and information control. The regime ignored international pressure to 
respect press freedom, clinging to its conception of the role of the press as 
the guardian of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and to its interpre-
tation of ‘responsible press freedom.’ The discourse of ‘Pancasila press’ and 
‘responsible press’ was ambiguous and liable to different interpretations,62 
which created continuous uncertainty and enabled the government to dis-
cipline the media at will as part of its strategy in establishing ‘political sta-
bility.’ This discourse was articulated through laws, the absence of judicial 
control and violence against journalists, all of them underlining the authori-
tarian nature of the regime.
4.7. Reformasi
After Soeharto stepped down on 21 May 1998, there was a tremendous push 
to liberalise the country and to reform all aspects of social and political life. 
This led to many new laws, including on human rights, and the ratifying 
of almost all international human rights law instruments.63 Press freedom 
was high on the list of the reform movement. AJI immediately seized the 
initiative through its call to the government to reform the media, in its press 
release on 23 May 1998. The demands for media reform included, first, 
removal of a single professional organisation for journalists and publish-
ers; second, permit providers that contravene the press freedom principles 
and rights of the people should be dissolved, and the SIUPP and broadcast-
ing license should be abolished. These demands pushed the government 
and parliament to review the Press Law (21/1982), Minister of Information 
Regulation 01/Per/Menpen/1984 (on the SIUPP), Minister of Information 
Decree 47/Kep/Menpen/1975 (on the PWI and SPS Organisation).64
61 CPJ (1997) Enemies of the Press of 1997, http://cpj.org/reports/1997/05/enemies97.
php#more (accessed on 4 March 2011).
62 Cf. McCargo (2003: 77-99), who has argued that ‘Pancasila press’ was an ‘enigmatic dis-
course.’
63 Law 5/1998 on the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Law 29/1999 on the Racial Discrimination Convention, Law 
11/ 2005 on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Convention, and Law 12/2005 on 
the Civil and Political Rights Convention.
64 AJI press release about media reform, 23 May 1998.
112 Chapter 4
The government swiftly responded to the public concerns. On 5 June 1998 
Yunus Yosfiah, the new minister of information, annulled Ministerial Decree 
1/1984 on the SIUPP65 and 47/Kep/Menpen/1975 and 184/1978, both 
about the regulation of journalists.66 On 26 October 1998, President Habi-
bie enacted Law 9/1998 on Freedom of Expression. According to Article 1, 
freedom of expression means the right of citizens to express their thoughts 
orally, in writing, or by other means, freely and responsibly in accordance 
with existing legislation. Article 3 stipulated that this freedom should take 
into account:
(a) the principle of balancing between rights and duties; (b) the principle of deliberation 
and consensus; (c) the principle of legal certainty and justice; (d) the principle of propor-
tionality; and (e) the benefit principle.
These principles are not further explained in the law, except for proportion-
ality, which is defined as “that any activity must be in line with its context 
and purpose, whether conducted by citizens or the government’s institu-
tions and apparatus, based on individual ethics, social ethics, and insti-
tutional ethics.” While not against freedom of expression, this is a rather 
flexible definition which can potentially be abused by the authorities. The 
absence of a further definition of the other principles is even more of a prob-
lem. For instance, the principle of deliberation and consensus can easily be 
interpreted as demanding the application of these mechanisms before pub-
lication is even allowed.
According to Article 4, the aims of regulating freedom of expression are:
(a) realising a responsible freedom as a fulfilment of human rights in accordance with the 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; (b) realising consistent and continuous legal protec-
tion in guaranteeing freedom of expression; (c) realising a conducive climate for improving 
participation and creativity of all citizens as rights and responsible fulfilment in democrat-
ic life; (d) establishing social responsibility in society, the nation and the state’s life, without 
ignoring individual and group interests.
The problem with this article is obviously that it does not fully distance itself 
from the New Order legacy. Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the idea of 
‘social responsibility’ still feature prominently and carry with them strong 
connotations of the practice that had developed during the thirty years of 
the Soeharto regime.
The law also contained articles explicitly limiting freedom of expression. 
Article 10(3) required a three-day notice to the police for activities such as 
demonstration or strikes, long marches, and/or other activities using public 
facilities. If unreported, the authorities held the power to halt such activi-
65 By Minister of Information Regulation 01/PER/MENPEN/1998 on SIUPP.
66 By Minister of Information Regulation 02/PER/MENPEN/1998 on Journalists.
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ties (Article 15). This provision was problematic in threatening spontaneous 
actions to call policy makers to account or to protest against unfair deci-
sions. Labour strikes, for instance, for protesting against a managerial deci-
sion can seldom be postponed three days, because they would come too late 
to influence the negotiation process. Likewise, journalists need to be able 
to stage an immediate protest if they are not allowed to cover a particular 
event. If this is not possible, it probably means the loss of a resource person 
or even the news itself.
In practice, in the case of labour strikes, the ‘mechanism to report’ to the 
police effectively became a ‘permit’ to conduct strikes. Strikes without such 
a ‘permit’ were easily dissolved by being labelled illegal, with leaders being 
arrested and punished. These rules about the freedom to express one’s opin-
ion remain controversial in their implementation, and such mechanism has 
been maintained until the present.
More generally, and despite many advances, 1999 was a problematic year for 
human rights in Indonesia. It was marked by gross human rights violations, 
most notably the crimes against humanity committed in East Timor before, 
during and after the referendum for independence, as well as the so-called 
‘Banyuwangi murders’.67 These cases caused the international community, 
including the United Nations, to increase pressure on the Indonesian gov-
ernment, but the weakness of many state institutions in combination with 
the conflict about secessionist movements made it difficult for the govern-
ment to respond. In short, the process of democratisation during this early 
phase of political transition was messy and fragile. Nevertheless, important 
steps were taken, with the first free national elections since 1955 (on 7 June 
1999), in which a large number of parties participated – and with a press 
reporting freely and critically without being harassed by the authorities.
Government and parliament also enacted two important laws on human 
rights and press freedom, on the same day (23 September 1999): the Human 
Rights Law 9/1999 and Press Law 40/1999. Much attention was paid to 
them, both domestically and at the international level. They were passed to 
show Indonesia’s commitment to reform itself into a democracy under the 
rule of law.68
67 The ‘Banyuwangi murders’ concerned the killing of persons who were suspected as 
Dukun Santet (persons using black magic). There were at least 117 people killed, 80 of 
them followers of the Islamic mass organisation Nahdlatul Ulama. The case was sus-
pected to be connected to an intelligence operation in Banyuwangi, involving military 
agents and local offi cials.
68 The drafting process was organised by the minister of information and involved legal 
academics, journalist associations and media practitioners. The draft was delivered to 
parliament on 7 July 1999 (President Instruction, R. 33/PU/VII/1999), and was formally 
approved by parliament on 13 September 1999 (Parliament/DPR Decree 8/
DPR-RI/I/1999-2000).
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Human Rights Law 9/1999 was passed prior to the Constitutional Amend-
ment on Human Rights in 2000 and presents a detailed legal framework for 
human rights protection in Indonesia. Of importance for the press was that 
it clearly defined press freedom as a human rights issue. Article 23(2) of the 
law explicitly guarantees freedom of expression and especially freedom of 
the press:
Everyone is free to have, impart, and disseminate his opinion according to his conscience, 
either orally or in writing through print or electronic media while taking into account reli-
gious values, morals, public order, public interest, and the unity of the nation.
The legal framework for press freedom was elaborated in the new Press 
Law. It provided much better protection of journalists and others working 
for the press than the previous law (Law 21/1982), even if it also carried 
several weaknesses. According to Atmakusumah (2007: xxxiv) the 1999 
Press Law was passed in the context of a continued battle between those still 
clinging to the ‘old’ New Order paradigm and those supporting the liberal 
paradigm which flourished by Reformasi’s euphoria. This explains why the 
Press Law in the end became more restrictive than what had initially been 
suggested by the Reformasi supporters.
Yet, press freedom was clearly promoted by three important changes com-
pared to the previous situation: (1) censorship was abolished; (2) press 
banning was no longer allowed; and (3) the press permit (SIUPP) could 
no longer be revoked. As we have seen, these issues had been extremely 
oppressive in practice before. In the wordings of Article 4 of the 1999 Press 
Law:
(1) Press freedom is guaranteed as a fundamental citizen’s right;
(2) No censorship, banning or broadcast prohibition can be imposed on the national press;69
(3) In order to guarantee press freedom, the national press has the right to seek, acquire, 
and disseminate ideas and information;
(4) In accounting their reporting before the law, a journalist has the right to refuse (hak 
tolak).
Interestingly, any violation of these provisions, including by officials, are 
considered a crime, and punishable by up to two years of imprisonment or 
a fine of up to Rp. 500,000,000.
Equally important provisions are Articles 7(1) and 8, which provide protec-
tion of the freedom for journalists to join journalist associations. Article 9(1) 
protects the rights of Indonesian citizens to establish press companies and 
69 Article 1(6) said “the national press is the press which has been established by Indonesian 
press corporations. This defi nition includes the local and regional press as long as they 
are owned by an Indonesian corporation.”
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Article 13c determines the same for news agencies. Both articles provide a 
legal underpinning for Minister of Information Regulations 1 and 2 of 1998.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the 1999 Press Law also contains a 
number of unnecessary or potentially harmful provisions. As pointed out 
earlier by the AJI, Article 15 is unclear about the institutional status, posi-
tion and competence of the Press Council, in particular in dealing with com-
plaints about the press. The role of the Press Council can be read as a mere 
public relations and press facilitating institution, rather than a press freedom 
defender and monitoring institution for law enforcement (Jamaludin 2009: 
28-31). Nevertheless, according to Margiyono, a coordinator of the legal 
division in the AJI, the Press Council from the start claimed ‘effectiveness 
for its decisions,’ and the power to decide on complaints or claims against 
the press.70 Yet, again according to Margiyono, the enforceability of Press 
Council decisions has remained problematic.71 Another way for the Press 
Council to exert influence has been opened up by Supreme Court Circu-
lar Letter 13/2008, which puts courts under the obligation to invite a Press 
Council member as an expert witness in press cases.
A second weakness of the 1999 Press Law is its inclusion of codes of eth-
ics, codes of publication, codes of conducts, and codes of enterprises and 
law enforcement. A code of ethics should be separate from the law, for it is 
a form of self-regulation, usually formulated as an agreement by a profes-
sional association. A violation of a code of ethics should be examined by 
the professional association itself, and not by the court. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the inclusion of the code of ethics into the 1999 Press Law, 
instead of having been promulgated by the journalist association itself, has 
led to confusion. When there is a case, the first legal institution to consider 
to what extent a journalist has violated the press code of ethics should be the 
Press Council and/or the journalist association itself.
A third problem concerns the definition of the right to reply (Article 1(11) 
juncto article 5(2)), which is much broader in scope than a simple right to 
reply to statements violating one’s legal rights. Moreover, the refusal of 
media to serve such a reply carries a fine of up to Rp. 500 million. However, 
this does not refer to an obligation to publish a reply. If the reply would 
affect third parties, contains unethical references, makes unclear statements, 
or bears no clear relation to the news report it is supposed to respond to, 
an editor may refuse it. The publication of the reply ultimately depends on 
the decision of the editor, without any outside interference (Asraatmadja, 
2007c).
70 Margiyono, personal communication, 9 March 2011.
71 See Chapter 6 for an elaborate discussion.
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The purpose of a right to reply is to provide an individual with an opportu-
nity to respond to and correct inaccurate facts or statements which infringe 
his or her legal rights, such as privacy rights. NGOs concerned with free-
dom of expression have therefore suggested that a right of reply should 
be voluntary rather than prescribed by law, and at least should conform 
to certain conditions: (1) the reply should only be available to respond to 
statements which violate a legal right of the person involved and not serve 
to comment on opinions which the reader or viewer does not like; (2) the 
way in which it is published should be of the same prominence as the origi-
nal article or broadcast; (3) the reply should be proportionate in length to 
the original article or broadcast; (4) it should be restricted to addressing the 
contested statements in the original text; and (5) it should not be taken as an 
opportunity to introduce new issues or to comment on other correct facts 
(ARTICLE 19, 2004: 10-11). The Indonesian Press Law is clearly far removed 
from this standard.
Fourth, many journalists, associations, and lawyers have urged for an 
amendment of the Press Law to make it unequivocally clear that the Press 
Law is a lex specialis to the Penal Code. Now the police, public prosecutor 
and (lower) courts often apply the Penal Code rather than the Press Law.72 
Bagir Manan, chairman of the Press Council from 2010 to 2013, has argued 
that the Press Law is ‘supreme’ when it concerns cases involving the press 
(lex suprema), meaning that other laws are only supplementary to it.73 In fact, 
the addition of the term lex specialis should be unnecessary, because lawyers, 
including law enforcers, should understand that the Press Law simply is 
one. Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Supreme Court has 
confirmed this time and again in its case law. Unfortunately, it seems that an 
additional article may be needed to convince all involved.
In summary, despite the limitations of the 1999 Press Law, its introduction 
also meant an important step ahead, and we may conclude that in the early 
post-Soeharto years several important legislative steps were taken to sup-
port freedom of expression and press freedom.
4.8. Turning Point of Press Freedom, From Abdurahman Wahid to 
Megawati
After the abolition of the SIUPP as a requirement for establishing media, 
the number of newspapers and magazines increased exponentially. Within 
72 The statement is from Abdul Mutholib, director of the Makassar Legal Aid Bureau, 1 Feb-
ruary 2010; Amir Syamsuddin (lawyer of seven media against Raymond Teddy), inter-
view, Jakarta, 15 June 2010; Andi Siahaan, TV contributor in Pematang Siantar, 10 July 
2010. Yemris Foutuna, Jakarta Post’s journalist, Kupang, 20 July 2010.
73 Bagir Manan (the Press Council chairman), interview, Leiden, 26 March 2010.
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a few months after Soeharto stepped down, 1,200 new dailies, magazines, or 
tabloids were started. However, as Atmakusumah remarked,
When I was chairing the Press Council in 2000-2003, about half or 600 of the 1,200 printed 
media were quickly closed down during one and half years only. In this regard, I have 
seen that citizens are already critical and smart in choosing media, they can differentiate 
between media which are more or less informative and educative. This forms a public pun-
ishment for untrue and unprofessional media…74
Press freedom steadily became more respected, especially during the Abdu-
rahman Wahid (‘Gus Dur’) presidency. A major step he took was to abolish 
the cornerstone of New Order press repression, the Department of Infor-
mation. Of course, this policy elicited protests of thousands of staff of the 
Department of Information, as well as former Minister of Information, 
Yunus Yosfiah, who had a vehement debate with Abdurahman Wahid Dur 
in the State Palace. Nevertheless, Abdurahman Wahid stuck to his decision, 
which he had long considered:75
Already too long have the common people been suffering at the hands of the government, 
so I am trying to correct this situation, including restructuring, promoting efficiency, and 
dissolving the Department of Information. Information is the business of society, and it is 
inappropriate when the government intervenes. The existence of the Department of Infor-
mation will only provoke the common people to oppose the government if it always forces 
to regulate the exchange of information.76
For the AJI, as an independent journalists movement, the dissolution of the 
Department of Information in 1999 went beyond what they had proposed 
the year before in their press release on media reform in Jakarta, on 24 May 
1998. A new phase of press freedom started. In 2002, the Press Freedom Index 
ranked Indonesia 57th, much higher than its neighbouring countries, such 
as Thailand (65th), Malaysia (110th) and the Philippines (89th). The Abdu-
rahman Wahid administration showed an unprecedented commitment to 
human rights and democracy, and its strengthening of press freedom was a 
logical but courageous step in this context, with immediate results.77
The situation changed however when Wahid was impeached in 2001 for 
allegations of corruption and Megawati Soekarnoputri, his vice-presi-
dent replaced him. During her leadership, Megawati often criticised the 
press for being ‘njomplang’ (unbalanced), ‘njlimet’ (complex), and ‘ruwet’ 
74 Atmakusumah, personal communication, 30 March 2010, Leiden.
75 “Gus Dur-Yunus Yosfi ah Bersitegang” [Tension Arises between Gus Dur-Yunus Yosfi ah], 
Republika, 29 October 1999. Also see: Hidayat, 2007, p. 63.
76 “Membredel Sang Raja Bredel” [Silencing the Silencing King]. http://majalah.tempointer-
aktif.com/id/arsip/1999/11/01/MD/mbm. 19991101.MD97591.id.html, Tempo Online, 
1 November 1999 (accessed on 10 March 2011).
77 Gus Dur received awards of numerous organisations and universities because of his 
commitment to promoting human rights and democracy. This included the Tasrif Award 
on Press Freedom which he was awarded by the AJI on 11 August 2006.
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(complicated),78 and, later on, ‘un-nationalistic’, or ‘un-patriotic.’79 These 
statements addressed the newspapers in general, but most notably Rakyat 
Merdeka, which heavily criticised the policies of Megawati leading to higher 
fuel prices.
More generally, the way in which Megawati approached the media led 
to increasing tension. She tended to perceive the media as a ‘problem’ for 
her leadership, instead of developing a policy to deal with them. Thus, she 
refused to talk to the press about several issues that at the time were a cause 
for public concern, including the fuel price. Neither had she appointed a 
spokesperson for communicating with the press or the public. And to crit-
ics she would respond that it all concerned a ‘public misunderstanding,’ 
without any further clarification.80 According to Arismunandar (Kompas, 
23/1/2003), Megawati’s responses to criticism were often disproportional, 
and she took them personally, instead of seeing them as criticism of her poli-
cies as the head of government. Moreover, her political communication with 
the general public was inadequate, which caused serious problems for her 
presidency. Yet, despite the deteriorating relationship between Megawati 
and the media, during her presidency no bans or institutional pressure were 
imposed on the press.81
During the Megawati administration, one important piece of legislation relat-
ed to the press was enacted, providing an important addition to the Press Law. 
This was the Broadcasting Law (Law 32/2002).82 It addressed some issues 
relevant to press freedom, in particular preventing a monopoly of ownership 
and supporting healthy competition in broadcasting matters (Article 5(g)).83 
This article is connected to Article 41, which states: “Broadcasting institutions 
can engage in co-operation to broadcast together as long as this does not turn 
into an information or opinion making monopoly.” However, there is no fur-
ther elucidation of this article, or a specific sanction if it is violated.
78 ‘Njomplang,’ ‘njlimet’ and ‘ruwet’ were terms used during her speech before the PDI-P 
(Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle) in Jakarta, 21 January 2003 (Kompas, 22 Janu-
ary 2003).
79 ‘Un-nationalistic’ and ‘un-patriotic’ were used during a meeting between Megawati and 
the Press Council in 2001, soon after she had become president (Press Council 2003, 
“Answering Questions from Commission I of Parliament in Public Hearing Session: 
Press Council Explanation,” Jakarta, 30 January 2003).
80 During 2002-2003, the government policies on R&D (Release & Discharge) for debtors, 
the divestment of stock shares of Indosat Incorporation, and also the most controversial 
policy regarding fuel prices, electricity prices and the telephone tariff were not preceded 
by any adequate communication.
81 This opinion is also based on the Press Council explanation during the Public Hearing 
Session in Parliament, Jakarta, 30 January 2003.
82 The Broadcasting Law (Law 32/2002 replacing Law 24/1997) was enacted on 28 Decem-
ber 2002.
83 This article is related to Law 5/1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolies and Unhealthy 
Competition Law.
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The agency which is responsible for supervision and enforcement is the 
Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia or KPI). 
The KPI consists of a central office in Jakarta and branch offices at the pro-
vincial level. It has the authority to: (a) determine broadcasting programme 
standards; (b) formulate regulations and determine the guidelines for 
broadcasting behaviour; (c) monitor the implementation of broadcasting 
regulations, guidelines, and programme standards; (d) impose sanctions for 
violating broadcasting regulation, guidelines, and programme standards; 
(e) build co-ordination and/or co-operate with the government, broadcast-
ing institutions, and society. The KPI did not exercise its authority to ban 
a broadcasting station under the Megawati presidency, but as will be dis-
cussed later, it did under her successor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
Yet, threats against press freedom started to resurface during the Megawati 
administration, most notably two cases in 2003. The first concerned Rakyat 
Merdeka, whose chief editor Karim Paputungan was sentenced to five months 
with ten months probation by the South Jakarta District Court for defamation, 
violating Article 310 after having insulted Chairman of Parliament Akbar 
Tandjung. Tandjung was being investigated for embezzling Rp. 40 billion 
(USD 4.7 million) in state funds and the report concerned showed Tanjung 
shirtless, crippled, sweating and looking sad with a banner reading “Akbar to 
be finished soon. Golkar shedding tears of blood” (Paputungan 2011).84
In another legal case against Rakyat Merdeka editor Supratman was sen-
tenced by the South Jakarta District Court to six months imprisonment and 
a 12-month suspension because of insulting Megawati. Supratman was 
proven to have violated Article 137(1) of the Penal Code, which prohib-
its insulting the president and vice-president. The Chair of the Council of 
Judges, Zoeber Djajadi, stated that “anyone who is sane must be annoyed 
or offended” by the wordings used in the headlines to a number of articles. 
This court case was accompanied by threats of ultra-nationalist pro-Mega-
wati groups to kill Rakyat Merdeka’s journalists.85
Another threat to press freedom came from altogether seven civil and crimi-
nal lawsuits against Tempo, initiated by business tycoon Tommy Winata after 
Tempo had published an article questioning his involvement in a market fire in 
the Jakarta district of Tanah Abang. The Central Jakarta District Court ordered 
Tempo to pay Rp. 500 million in damages to Tommy for ‘material losses’ and 
84 Paputungan lodged an appeal with the Jakarta High Court, but I have not been able to 
fi nd any information about the subsequent proceedings and their outcome.
85 “Redaktur Eksekutif Rakyat Merdeka Divonis Enam Bulan” [Executive Editor of Rakyat 
Merdeka Sentenced to Six Months], Tempo Interaktif, Senin, 27 October 2003. This case will 
be further elaborated in the next chapter.
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‘forfeiture of future profit.’86 In the criminal case public prosecutor Bastian 
Hutabarat used article XIV(2) of Law 1/1946 juncto Article 55 (1)-1e of the 
Penal Code to indict chief editor Bambang Harymurti to nine years impris-
onment. Tempo was accused of ‘libel’ and of intentionally creating ‘a chaotic 
situation in society.’ On 16 September 2004 the Central Jakarta District Court 
sentenced Bambang to one year imprisonment, a verdict confirmed by the 
Jakarta High Court on 14 April 2005. However, the Supreme Court over-
turned the latter decision on 9 February 2006 on the basis of the precedence 
the Press Law takes over the Penal Code. The court added that since press 
freedom is a conditio sine qua non in a democratic state based on the rule of law, 
cases against it should be treated with utmost circumspection.87
Although Tempo won this case, it appears that in legal practice there are serious 
threats to press freedom. Tempo and its employees, for instance, faced at least 
nine lawsuits, none of them brought under the 1999 Press Law. There is no 
doubt that such legal harassment influences journalists and editors. To this we 
can add the use of violence against journalists and media, and the lack of seri-
ousness of the police in protecting journalists. The attack by Tommy Winata’s 
thugs on the Tempo office on 17 May 2004 presents a clear example.88 Unlike 
her predecessor, President Megawati took no steps to improve this situation.
In short, during Megawati’s presidency press freedom was reduced in the 
way in which prosecutors and lower courts applied the law as well as by 
the use of violence against the press. The state offered insufficient protection 
against such violence and Megawati herself had a problematic relation with 
the media. Her lack of responsiveness in addressing attacks on the press can 
be interpreted as violating press freedom by omission, while her consenting 
to prosecution of Rakyat Merdeka staff she went beyond mere omission.
4.9. Surplus Freedom of the Press? The Press under the SBY 
Administration
Before reformation, press freedom was jeopardised, 
or deficient.  But now after reformation, press freedom 
is working well, there is  even a surplus of it….
 (SUSIBY, 3 June 2010)89
86 “Court Orders Tempo to Pay Rp. 500 million to Tommy Winata,” LKBN Antara, 18 March 
2004.
87 This case will be further discussed in Chapter 5.
88 “Penyerangan Kantor MBM Tempo” [Attack on MBM Tempo Offi ce], Tempo Interaktif, 17 
May 2004.
89 “SBY: Kebebasan Pers Harus Disertai dengan Tanggung Jawab” [SBY: Press Freedom Must Be 
Accompanied By Responsibility], Detik News, 3 June 2010.
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Parliamentary elections were held on on 5 April 2004 and for the first time 
in Indonesian history they were followed by direct presidential elections. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, better known as SBY, gained more than 60 per-
cent of the vote, defeating Megawati Soekarnoputri.
At the start of SBY’s presidency, many NGOs expected him to show more 
respect for human rights, including press freedom, than his predecessor. 
However, by the end of 2004 he had already disappointed many, and Indo-
nesia dropped even further in the international press freedom ranking.90 By 
the end of 2004 the two most important human rights issues for the gov-
ernment concerned the addressing of the tsunami tragedy in Aceh and the 
investigation – or rather the lack of it – of the Munir case.91 Munir was poi-
soned while travelling from Jakarta to Amsterdam on 7 September, and his 
death became a major issue in the media. As it quickly became clear that the 
Indonesian intelligence service had been involved in the killing, the murder 
on Munir became something of a test case for SBY’s stance regarding the 
protection of human rights and human rights defenders (including journal-
ists) in Indonesia. The fact that the culprits of the Munir killing have never 
been punished certainly contributed to the eventual disappointment of the 
human rights movement with SBY.
In 2005, Indonesia seemed to be doing better with regard to press freedom, 
when it moved from position 117 to 103 in the JPC press freedom index. 
However, the database of LBH Pers (the Press Legal Aid Institute) demon-
strates that state pressure on the press had actually increased, including 
attacks on the press by government officials, police and military person-
nel (Tim LBH Pers 2009: 103). The number of violent attacks by thugs had 
increased even more quickly than those by state security officials, though 
the former were sometimes organised by state officials.92 For instance, the 
Palopo Pos office was brutally attacked and destroyed by thugs sent by the 
district head of Palopo (South Sulawesi) on 19 January 2005. Palopo Pos chief 
editor Mukhramal Azis was severely beaten and a journalist, Jusriadi, was 
strangled. According to Mukhramal, the reason for the attack was Palopo 
Pos reporting about the severance pay for 35 former district parliament 
members of in total Rp. 1,05 billion, which had angered the district head.93 
Similar cases happened in Medan, where a TV journalist was beaten, on 16 
90 The IPJ’s Press Freedom Index ranked Indonesia at 110th in 2003 and at 117th in 2004.
91 Munir was a public interest lawyer of YLBHI, and the founder of well-known human 
rights NGOs KontraS, Imparsial, and Voice of Human Rights. He was extremely coura-
geous and the only one openly accusing the military and intelligence of kidnapping stu-
dents and activists during the years 1997 and 1998 – which ultimately led to him being 
murdered.
92 The term ‘thugs’ (preman) in this context comes quite close in meaning to ‘gangster’ in the 
sense of organised crime.
93 Interview with Mukhramal Azis, Makassar, 3 February 2010.
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April 2005, and in Bogor, where Radar Bogor journalist Ahmad Junaedi was 
tortured by unknown persons in July 2005.
This formed only part of a wider lack of interest from the government in 
human rights protection and civil society groups were questioning the 
seriousness of the government in promoting and protecting human rights. 
Human rights NGO Elsam gave its 2005 Human Rights Enforcement Report 
the title “Ekspektasi Yang Sirna” [Expectations that Disappeared].
President SBY denied the allegations and expressed his satisfaction about 
the level of press freedom. As he said during his ‘End of the Year Speech,’
We should also be grateful that democratic life in the country is developing. People are 
more accustomed to different opinions. The number and quality of criticism in society s is 
steadily increasing, with sustained press freedom.94
It was not only the written press that came to face the more repressive poli-
cies regarding press freedom. As already mentioned, in 2007 the KPI for the 
first time used its authority to ban Radio Era Baru FM in Batam. This station 
had been broadcasting since 2005, but in 2007 came under pressure to halt 
its activities.95 The KPI and the minister of communication and information 
asked Radio Era Baru to stop broadcasting without providing any clear rea-
son, in the end by having the Frequency Monitor Section in Batam release a 
final letter imposing a broadcasting ban on account of broadcasting in Chi-
nese, on 21 October 2008. The radio station took the case to the administra-
tive court, but lost in first instance and on appeal.96 However, the Supreme 
Court overturned this decision and quashed the banning decision on 5 Octo-
ber 2010. This ended a three-year legal battle between Radio Era Baru, and 
the KPI and minister of communication and information. Radio Era Baru 
thus regained its license and can now freely broadcast in Indonesia.97
94 ‘End of Year Speech’ in Cipanas Palace, 31 December 2005.
95 The pressure to close down Radio Era Baru originally came from the Chinese government. 
It was the KPI which decided to use the broadcasting language as the offi cial reason to 
close down the station as a way to hide the true reasons. Raymond Tan and Gatot Supri-
yanto (director of Radio Era Baru) said that Chinese offi cials visited the KPI in 2007, ask-
ing the government to shut down Radio Era Baru, because it had been airing criticism of 
Beijing’s human rights conditions, including news of the suppression of Tibetans, 
Uyghurs, and Falun Gong practitioners. Letters to this extent were sent to the ministers 
of foreign and domestic affairs, the department of espionage, the department of commu-
nication and information and the KPI. Tan held evidence about the letters from the Chi-
nese Embassy and news of Chinese officials visiting the KPI, as well as the letter of 
8 March from the KPI, asking the station to halt its activities (personal communication of 
Raymond Tan and Gatot Supriyanto in Jakarta, 22 September 2010). See also Chapter 7 
for more details.
96 Administrative Court judgment 166/G/2008/PTUN-JKT.
97 This case is discussed further in Chapter 7.
Press Freedom from the Early New Order to the SBY Administration 123
Press freedom came further under threat after the killing of Herlyanto, a 
journalist of Delta Pos, a daily in Probolingo (East Java). On 29 April 2006 
Herlyanto was found dead, his body covered with wounds. The motive 
behind this killing related to his report on the corruption of local officials.98 
In September of the same year, the killer was arrested and testified that the 
killing had been ordered by the head of a project, who had marked up the 
government budget concerned. This was the first time since the end of the 
New Order and the killing of Bernas journalist Udin in Bantul that a journal-
ist was actually murdered.
Criminal cases against the press on the basis of the Penal Code instead of the 
Press Law occurred as well, such as those against Rakyat Merdeka Online and 
Playboy Magazine. Chief Editor of Rakyat Merdeka Online, Teguh Santosa was 
indicted for violating Article 156a of the Penal Code, on defamation against 
religion. The case concerned the covering of the story of the cartoons con-
sidered as humiliating Islam’s Prophet Muhammad published in the Jylland-
Posten in Denmark. Fortunately, the South Jakarta Court judges dismissed 
the case. The suit against Playboy Magazine’s Chief Editor Erwin Arnada did 
not end as well. He was prosecuted under Article 282(3) of the Penal Code, 
on crimes against decency, with Playboy Magazine being considered as por-
nography. The Supreme Court sentenced Erwin to two years imprisonment 
(Decision 972K/Pid/2008), but eventually the Supreme Court reviewed its 
own decision.99
Using legal suits against press freedom in Indonesia started to become a 
trend during this period, not only under the Penal Code but there was also a 
rise in civil lawsuits against several media and journalists for extraordinary 
amounts of damages. The case of Radio Era Baru is a good example, as the 
station not only lost its license, but also saw its director prosecuted under 
the Telecommunication Law for imprisonment for up to six years.100 The 
98 The AJI investigation concluded that the killing was related to news involving numerous 
village authorities (“AJI Malang Yakin Herlyanto Tewas Akibat Pemberitaan” [AJI Malang Is 
Certain That Herlyanto Was Killed as a Consequence of Reporting], Gatra, 8 October 
2006).
99 Erwin Arnada, through his lawyer, Todung Mulya Lubis, requested a review (peninjauan 
kembali) of this Supreme Court decision (“Pimred Playboy Ajukan PK Dan Penangguhan 
Eksekusi” [The Chief Editor of Playboy Requests Review and Suspension of his Sentence], 
Primair Online, 6 September 2010). Then, the Supreme Court’s review ended up in favour of 
Erwin’s position, and he was released on 24 June 2011 (“Mantan Pemimpin Redaksi Play-
boy Dibebaskan,” Tempo.co.id, 24 June 2011). The cases are further discussed in Chapter 5.
100 This indictment was based on the Letter of Radio Frequency Monitoring Agency (Balm-
on) Batam – Directorate General Post and Telecommunication, Ministry of Communica-
tion and Information Technology number 65/IIc/b.II.BTM/II/2011. According to the 
aforementioned letter the criminal case fi les were considered complete (P21) by the pub-
lic prosecutor (“Criminalization of Director of Radio Era Baru Continues”: Press Release 
of Era Baru, 17 February 2011, signed by Rachmat Pudiyanto (general manager)). The 
case is elaborated further in Chapter 7.
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other cases in 2007 included a civil suit by Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper 
(RAPP), which filed a claim for damages against Tempo Newspaper and a 
criminal prosecution in the same case against journalist Bersihar Lubis. Both 
concerned defamation.
The most notorious judgment against the press was the Supreme Court’s 
3215K/Pdt/2001, adjudicated on 28 August 2007 in the case of Soeharto v 
Time. Judges German Hoediarto, H. Muhammad Taufiq, and Bahauddin 
Qaudry overturned the judgments by the first instance and the appellate 
court and awarded damages to the plaintiff for defamation to the fantastic 
amount of one quintillion rupiah, on the basis of tort, without any compre-
hensible legal reasoning. The case drew international attention and further 
harmed the already tainted image of the Indonesian judiciary. The judgment 
totally disregarded the Press Law, which Article 18 stipulates a maximum 
fine of Rp. 500 million.101
However, 2007 also saw an important milestone in favour of press freedom. 
First, the Constitutional Court decided that haatzaai artikelen 154 and 155 of 
the Penal Code were contradictory to the constitution and were hence no 
longer legally binding (Number 6/PUU-V/2007, 17 July 2007). More than 
90 years since the enactment of the Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch-
Indië in 1914, this Constitutional Court decision did away with an important 
symbolic marker of suppression against freedom of expression and press 
freedom in Indonesia.
However, the situation of press freedom grew progressively worse in 2008, 
with several new criminal and civil lawsuits against the press, such as 
Munarman (coordinator of Islamic Defender Front/FPI) v Tempo, and the 
criminal prosecution of journalist Upi Asmaradhana,102 of Tempo’s journal-
ist/editor, Irvansyah and Sunudyantoro, and of Kwee Meng Luan and Khoe 
Seng-Seng who were convicted because of their letters to the editor.103 More-
over, two important pieces of legislation related to the press were enacted. 
The first one, Law 11/ 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions 
(EIT), is the most controversial.104 Its articles 27 and 28 allow for a criminal 
suit against journalists for defamation. Article 27(3) determines that
Any person who knowingly and without authority distributes and/or transmits and/or 
causes to be accessible Electronic Information and/or Electronic Records with contents of 
insult and/or defamation.105
101 This case will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
102 Upi Asmaradhana, a freelance journalist in Makassar, South Sulawesi, was acquitted of a 
defamation charge.
103 These cases will be elaborated in the next chapters.
104 This law was approved by the House of Representatives on 21 April 2008.
105 The phrasing of the article is not in line with the basic rules of Indonesian grammar.
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while Article 45(1) states that
Any person who satisfies the elements as intended by article 27 section (1), section (2), sec-
tion (3), or section (4) shall be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding 6 (six) years and/
or a fine not exceeding Rp. 1.000.000.000 (one billion rupiah).
Because the sentence can be more than five years imprisonment, journalists 
can be taken into custody immediately when accused of violating Article 
27(3) and therefore this provision can be used to harass journalists or citi-
zens without judicial intervention.
Such fears of arbitrary use of the EIT Law led a number of NGOs and indi-
viduals106 to challenge Article 27(3) before the Constitutional Court. Accord-
ing to the applicants, this article is contradictory to the following articles of 
the Constitution: Article 1(2),107 Article 1(3),108 Article 27(1),109 Article 28,110 
Article 28C(1) and (2),111 Article 28D(1),112 Article 28E(2) and (3),113 Article 
28F,114 and Article 28G(1).115 Article 27(3) of the EIT Law notably violated 
the rule of law requirement that a provision must be clear, easily under-
stood, and fairly enforced. However, their claim was rejected by the Consti-
tutional Court. In their Decision No. 2/PUU-VII/2009, dated 5 May 2009, 
the judges argued that the EIT Law is important to secure and protect free-
106 The Indonesian Association of Legal Aid and Human Rights (PBHI), the Alliance of Inde-
pendent Journalists Indonesia (AJI), the Legal Aid Centre for the Press (LBH Pers) Edy 
Cahyono, Nenda Inasa Fadhilah, and Amrie Hakim.
107 Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is implemented according to this constitu-
tion.
108 The State of Indonesia shall be a state based on the rule of law.
109 All citizens shall be equal before the law and the government and shall be required to 
respect the law and the government, with no exceptions.
110 The freedom to associate and to assemble, to express written and oral opinions, etc., shall 
be regulated by law.
111 (1) Each person shall have the right to develop him/herself through the fulfi llment of 
his/her basic needs, the right to get education and to benefi t from science and technolo-
gy, arts, and culture, for the purpose of improving the quality of his/her life and for the 
welfare of the human race; (2) Every person shall have the right to improve him/herself 
through collective struggle for his/her rights to develop his/her society, nation and state.
112 Every person shall have the right of recognition, guarantees, protection and certainty 
before a just law, and of equal treatment before the law.
113 (2) Every person shall have the right to the freedom to believe his/her faith, and express 
his/her views and thoughts, in accordance with his/her conscience; (3) Every person 
shall have the right to the freedom to associate, to assemble and to express opinions.
114 Every person shall have the right to communicate and to obtain information for the pur-
pose of the development of his/her self and social environment, and shall have the right 
to seek, obtain, posses, store, process, and convey information by employing all available 
types of channels.
115 Every person shall have the right to protection of him/her, family, honour, dignity, and 
property, and shall have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the 
threat of fear to do or not do something that is a human right.
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dom of expression, and to give legal certainty, because it not only addresses 
the press or journalism but also ordinary people.116
In practice, it soon appeared that the EIT Law does effectively threaten free-
dom of expression. Most notorious in this regard is the case of Prita Mulyas-
ari, an Indonesian woman arrested on 13 May 2009 for allegedly circulating 
online defamatory statements against Alam Sutera Omni International Hos-
pital in Serpong, Tangerang (Banten). Prita had been a patient at the Omni 
International Hospital, and had asked her doctor for her medical record. 
When the doctor refused, Prita complained about this via e-mail to a num-
ber of friends, as well as about the fact that she had been misdiagnosed as 
suffering from dengue fever whereas in August 2008 further medical exami-
nation proved that she had mumps. She accused the doctors of unprofes-
sional conduct and warned her friends against visiting this hospital. The 
e-mail was circulated through various mailing groups and eventually came 
to the attention of the Omni Hospital. The hospital filed a complaint with 
the police and Prita was sued for defamation. When this became known it 
caused a public outrage and a media frenzy, in particular when Prita was 
taken into custody three weeks ahead of her trial.117
The prosecution indicted Prita for defamation of doctors Hengky Gosal and 
Grace Hilza Yarlen Nela, in an email sent to twenty people that described 
the two as unprofessional and impolite. She was indicted by three articles 
– Article 45(1) jo. 27(3) of the EIT Law, Article 310(2) and 311(1) of the Penal 
Code –, all of them concerning defamation and insult. The prosecutor 
demanded a sentence of six months in jail, but the judges at the Tangerang 
District Court rejected the indictment for unclarity. However, this judgment 
was quashed in cassation and the Supreme Court convicted Prita to six 
months in jail with one month probation.118
At the same time, the Omni Hospital brought a civil suit against Prita, and 
she was found guilty of defamation and ordered to pay Rp. 204 million to the 
hospital by the Tangerang District Court on the basis of tort, Civil Code Arti-
116 This case will be further discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 5 will further discuss EIT provi-
sions that may endanger press freedom.
117 The case led to public outrage, with tens of thousands joining a Prita support page on 
Facebook.and other social media. That the case invited such huge public sympathy was 
at least in part because it exposed the injustice and corruption within the country’s judi-
cial system. Many took part in the action ‘Coin for Prita,’ and altogether an amount of 
Rp. 317,639,105 was raised (“Coin for Prita Sums up to 317 Million Rupiahs,” Kompas, 
17 December 2009, http://english.kompas.com/ read/2009/12/17/14380167/Coin.for.
Prita.Sums.up.to.317.Million.Rupiahs, accessed on 15 January 2010).
118 This case was registered as 1269/PID.B/2009/PN.TNG. At the time of writing, this case 
is under review (peninjauan kembali) by the Supreme Court (“Tolak Status Terpidana, Pri-
ta Ajukan PK” [Refusing the Status of a Convict, Prita Requests Review], Detik.com, 
01/08/2011). This case will be further discussed in the next chapter.
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cle 1365.119 This judgment was upheld by the Banten High Court,120 which 
forced Prita to appeal to the Supreme Court (Wiratraman 2010). Here she 
finally received justice, when judges Harifin A Tumpa, Rehngena Purba and 
Hatta Ali quashed the appellate judgment, arguing that such a case could 
never be qualified as defamation.121
The Prita case made clear that the EIT Law not only threatens journalists, 
but also ordinary citizens expressing opinions on the internet. According to 
Press Council member Agus Sudibyo (2009), “the EIT Law is strange. Other 
countries really wish to regulate cyber crime, but in Indonesia the purpose 
of this law is merely restricting the freedom to information and criminalis-
ing citizens.”122 Yet, it is clear that online media have most to fear from the 
EIT Law.
The year 2008 also witnessed the promulgation of other laws introducing 
new criminal sanctions for the press: the General Election Law 10/2008, the 
Presidential Election Law 42/2008 and the Pornography Law 44/2008. Arti-
cle 99(1) of the General Election Law listed the following sanctions:123
(a) a written warning; (b) temporary suspension of a problematic programme; (c) reducing 
time and duration of election campaign news, broadcasting, and advertisements; (d) fines; 
(e) termination of activities regarding election campaign news, broadcasting, and adver-
tisement for a certain period; (f) revoking the broadcasting license or publication permit.
Those sanctions were to be regulated further by the Electoral Commission 
(Article 100). The Presidential Election Law held similar provisions and its 
Article 47(5) added that
Printed papers and broadcasting agencies as stipulated under section (1) during the period 
of non-campaigning,124 are prohibited to broadcast news, track records of candidates, or 
other forms promoting the interest of a campaign which are beneficial or detrimental to 
the candidates.
This provision is followed by the threat of heavy punishment, including the 
revocation of the broadcasting license and SIUPP (Article 57(1)). In short, 
these laws seriously endanger press freedom and have raised much con-
119 Tangerang District Court Decision 300/Pdt.G/2008/PN.TNG, 11 May 2009.
120 Banten High Court Decision 71/PDT/2009/PT.BTN, 8 September 2009.
121 Supreme Court Decision 300 K/Pdt/2010. The criminal case was decided by a different 
panel of judges.
122 “Kebebasan Berpendapat Janganlah Direduksi” [Never Reduce Freedom of Opinion], Kompas, 
4 June 2009, kompas.com/read/xml /2009/06/04/03091447/kebebasan.berpendapat. 
janganlah.direduksi [accessed on 5 January 2010].
123 They refer to Article 98(2), which refers to Articles 93, 94 and 95, all of them concerning 
media campaign advertisement.
124 This is a period of three days immediately before the elections when campaigning is no 
longer allowed (Article 40(2)2).
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troversy, for one thing because there was hardly any public participation in 
their formulation (Hendrayana 2009). The only positive thing we can say 
about these provisions is that they have never been applied.
This is different for the third law threatening press freedom introduced in 
2008. Article 1.1. of the Pornography Law defines pornography as
any pictures, drawings, illustrations, photographs, writings, voices, sounds, moving pic-
tures, animation, cartoons, conversation, bodily movements, or any other form of mes-
sage through the media of communication and/or demonstrations in public, which depict 
lewdness or sexual exploitation which violates the moral norms of society.
This definition is highly moralistic without setting any clear standard or 
method for evaluating what ‘lewdness’ is, in particular because it is so dif-
ficult to establish what ‘the moral norms of society’ are in a normatively plu-
ralistic country as Indonesia. In Bali for instance, some common daily activi-
ties based on tradition could very well be categorised as pornography on 
the basis of this law.125 Such unclear standards lend themselves to arbitrary 
interpretation by state or non-state actors and can be easily used for putting 
pressure on particular social groups (Wiratraman 2009). The sanctions of the 
law are moreover extremely serious. As defined in Article 29:
Anyone who produces, makes, reproduces, duplicates, disseminates, broadcasts, imports, 
exports, offers, sells, leases, and provides pornography as stipulated in Article 4 Section 1 
shall be punished with imprisonment of no less than 6 months and exceeding twelve years 
and/or a fine of at least Rp. 250,000,000 (two hundred and fifty million rupiahs) and a 
maximum of Rp. 6,000,000,000 (six billion rupiahs).
The danger is evident from the conviction mentioned earlier of Erwin Arna-
da (chief editor of Playboy Indonesia), who was convicted for crimes against 
decency on the basis of Penal Code Article 282(3). In 2007 the Press Coun-
cil explicitly stated that Playboy Indonesia was not a pornographic magazine 
according to the Press Law, but this could not prevent his conviction.126 The 
far greater leeway the Pornography Law offers is therefore quite dangerous.
125 A respected Hindu high priest, Ida Pedanda Gede Ketut Sebali Tianyar Arimbawa 
offered such an argument, reminding that sexual organs were important parts of the reli-
gion’s sacred iconography. Lingga and Yoni, the three-dimensional images of a phal-
lus and a vagina, are the sacred symbols of divine creation and sustenance, fertility and 
creativity. The full breast of Kali or Durga is also the symbolic representation of their 
motherly compassion in nurturing the universe. Sexual organs and nudity are often the 
primary characteristic of sacred objects of worships. “Balinese culture and belief had 
never considered sexual organs, nudity and sensuality as fi lthy, morally reprehensible 
and offensive things,” scholar I Ketut Sumarta said.
126 “Dewan Pers: Playboy Indonesia Tak Porno” [Press Council: Playboy Indonesia is not Porn], 
Kompas, 9 October 2010.
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Yet, there also was a positive development for press freedom in 2008. This 
concerned the enactment of the Public Information Disclosure Law (PIDL) 
14/2008, which guarantees access to public information as mandated by 
Article 28F of the constitution. According to its general elucidation, the PIDL 
is important as a legal basis for,
(1) the right for everyone to access information; (2) the duty for public agencies to provide 
information quickly, on time, at low/proportional cost, and in a simple way; (3) that excep-
tions are strict and limited; (4) the duty for public agencies to improve documentation and 
information service systems.
The law thus allows the public, including the press, to be better informed 
and to better participate in decision-making processes and their implemen-
tation. For journalists, the PIDL provides a new ‘weapon’ besides the Press 
Law to force public officials to disclose information. A government official 
can no longer say that a document is secret if it has been categorised as a 
public document, which can only be done in exceptional cases. Yet, in prac-
tice, the application of the law has been difficult for several reasons. First, 
the regional government has been reluctant to set up a minimum opera-
tional standard for delivering public information; second, the old paradigm 
that information ‘belongs’ to officials is still strong at that level; and third, 
many officials know little about the PIDL and have no idea how to deal with 
journalists in giving public information.127 This had already been predicted 
when the PIDL was formulated and in the debates in parliament very little 
attention was paid to the pervasiveness of the ‘old paradigm’ and the new 
law.128
4.10. Physical Attacks on the Press
Journalists in Indonesia like living in an inhuman jungle!
(Ahmadi, journalist from Harian Aceh newspapers, 2010)
As discussed in the previous section, in 2008 it seemed to become a trend to 
use the court for attacking the press, and as a result some journalists, editors 
and media owners became more preoccupied with defending themselves in 
court than with focusing on providing information to the public. Moreover, 
the judges or other judicial enforcers did not apply the Press Law as a legal 
127 These views were expressed in interviews by journalists and public interest lawyers: 
Anton Muhajir (AJI Bali and Sloka Institute, Denpasar), interview in Denpasar, 27 July 
2010; Paul Sinlaeloe (anti-corruption division staff of PIAR, NTT), interview in Kupang, 
22 July 2010; and Rika Yoez (coordinator of AJI Medan), interview in Medan, 28 June 
2010.
128 Personal communication of Ignatius Haryanto (director of the LSPP/Institute for Press 
and Development Studies, Jakarta), during a discussion on the right to information, 
Demos Jakarta, 8 January 2010.
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source to resolve disputes. Albeit the Supreme Court released an important 
letter on 30 December 2008129 that mentioned the Press Council as an appro-
priate institution to decide on press cases in the court, the court is still con-
sidered as a threat. The relation between the press and the judiciary system 
is discussed in the next part of this dissertation. This sub-chapter discusses 
another type of attacks on the press: physical violence against journalists, 
media owners and press offices.
Unfortunately, press freedom is not only influenced by law and its appli-
cation. Violence against journalists has taken place under all Indonesia’s 
regimes and journalists have been assaulted by all kinds of actors, both from 
the state and from society. Such violence ranges from damaging or destroy-
ing cameras or other equipment to torture or even murder.
The first Indonesian journalist to be killed in the period post-Soeharto was 
Sander Thoenes, on 21 September 1999. Sander went to Dili, East Timor, on a 
reporting mission. That same day, he was brutally murdered by two officers 
of the Indonesian army, Major Jakob Djoko Sarosa and Lieutenant Camillo 
Dos Santos on Becora Road in Dili.130 According to the Committee for Pro-
tecting Journalists (CPJ), Thoenes was the first foreign reporter killed in East 
Timor since 1975, when six Australia-based reporters were killed during the 
Indonesian military invasion of East Timor.131
Yet, the main change after the end of the New Order was that violence no 
longer came from the state apparatus in the first place, but rather from thugs 
and similar ‘social groups.’ The drama is that such violence has almost with-
out exception remained with impunity, while state officials have hardly 
made any effort to protect the press.
During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration, Delta Pos journal-
ist Herlyanto was killed in Probolingo, on 29 April 2006, in relation to his 
report on local corruption. Unfortunately, his case received little attention. 
This was different for Radar Bali’s journalist Anak Agung Narendra Gede 
Prabangsa, who was found dead on 16 February 2009. He was killed in rela-
tion to his reporting on a corruption case in Bangli’s education district office. 
129 Supreme Court Circular Letter No. 14/Bua.6/Hs/SP/XII/2008 on Asking Information 
from Expert Witnesses. This letter supports press freedom, because it emphasises the 
nature of the Press Law as a lex specialis.
130 After a thorough investigation by the Serious Crimes Unit of the United Nations, it 
became clear that Sander had been murdered in cold blood. He was executed lying on the 
ground, after he had fallen off the back of a taxi motorbike he was riding to visit the Bec-
ora district, where he was going to gather some quotes of people in the street (“Sander 
Thoenes: Freelancer,” Committee for Protecting Journalists, http://cpj.org/killed/1999/
sander-thoenes.php, accessed on 16 January 2014; “Documentary revisits murder of FT 
journalist in East Timor,” Financial Times, 30 October 2013, written by John Aglionby).
131 Ibid. “Sander Thoenes: Freelancer.”
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Initially, it was difficult to get a serious investigation started, because the 
intellectual perpetrator of the killing, I Nyoman Susrama, was a member 
of the district parliament and brother of Bangli’s district head. However, 
concerted action from journalist associations, NGOs, political parties, media 
and wider solidarity networks pushed the police to seriously investigate the 
case and in the end Susrama was convicted to life imprisonment, while five 
accomplices received sentences of eight to twenty years in jail.132 The atten-
tion for this case moreover resulted in a wider campaign to protect journal-
ists.
Nonetheless, during 2009-2010 assaults on and killing of journalists con-
tinued. Cases that drew much attention were the torture of Harian Aceh’s 
journalist Ahmadi on Simeulue Island, Aceh (18 May 2010),133 and Ardian-
syah Matrais in Merauke, Papua (30 July 2010),134 and the killing of Rid-
wan Salamun in Tual, Maluku (21 August 2010).135 “Being a journalist in 
Indonesia is like living in an inhuman jungle!” Ahmadi stated after he was 
beaten up by military officers on Simeulue Island, because of his reports 
about illegal logging by the military. All of his equipment was destroyed as 
well.136 Other cases of violence during 2009-2010 were the security guard 
attack against Imam Abdurrahman (Megaswara TV, Bogor, 2 January 2010), 
the violence against Miftahuddin Halim (Radar Bali journalist, 15 January 
2010) by Paul Handoko and his gang, the brutal attack on Nurul Iman and 
Zabur (Tribun Batam, 11 February 2010) in Sekupang port, the mob attack on 
the Siantar office after a publication on local politics (25 May 2010), and oth-
er physical attacks in various places. In Jakarta, Tempo Magazine was intimi-
dated through a Molotov cocktail thrown at its office on 7 July 2010 after it 
reported about suspect bank accounts owned by police officers.137 An even 
132 In September 2010, the Supreme Court confi rmed the judgments of the district and the 
high court. Nyoman Susrama was sentenced to life; I Nyoman Wiradnyana, I Komang 
Gede, and I Komang Gede Wardana to twenty years; and I Dewa Gede Mulya Antara 
and I Wayan Suecita to eight years. The Supreme Court council consisted of Artidjo Alko-
star, Imam Harjadi and Zaharuddin Utama.
133 Former military intelligence officer Faizal Amin was convicted of grievous assault 
against Ahmadi. The Iskandar Muda Military Court in Banda Aceh sentenced him to ten 
months in jail.
134 Matrais, a reporter for the local broadcaster Merauke TV, had been covering plans for a 
large agribusiness development in Merauke. In the week before his death, he had 
received threatening text messages similar to those sent to at least three other local jour-
nalists. “To cowardly journalists, never play with fi re if you don’t want to be burned. If 
you still want to make a living on this land, don’t do weird things. We have data on all of 
you and be prepared for death” (“Ardiansyah Matra’is, Merauke TV,” CPJ, 2010, http://
www.cpj.org/killed/2010/ardiansyah-matrais.php, accessed on 21 March 2011).
135 Ridwan Salamun, 28, a correspondent for Sun TV, was fi lming violent clashes between 
local villagers in the southeastern Tual area of the Maluku Islands when he was stabbed 
repeatedly.
136 Interview with Ahmadi, 5 July 2010.
137 “Rekening Gendut Perwira Polisi” [Fat Account for Retired Police Offi cers], Tempo Maga-
zine, 28 June – 4 July 2010.
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worse attack happened on 31 March 2013 when the Palopo Pos office in South 
Sulawesi was burnt down by a mob because of a report about a particular 
candidate in the local elections.138
Two important points can be made about these cases. First, corruption and 
natural resource exploitation at the local level can be dangerous topics for 
critical reporting, as indicated by the cases of Ahmadi in Aceh and Ardian-
syah Matrais in Papua. This is particularly the case when they write about 
the connections between local business elites and government officials. Sec-
ond, the actual violence is performed by non-state actors rather than state 
officials, whether thugs (preman) or ordinary civilians. This differs from the 
New Order, when state institutions were often directly involved in such vio-
lence.
The surge of violence against the press at the regional level cannot be consid-
ered separately from the political context of decentralisation. Political gang-
sters and vigilantes have been major beneficiaries of the decentralisation 
reforms. The greater autonomy and power of regional governments have 
turned paramilitary groups and ‘political gangsters’ into valuable political 
capital and influential power brokers in their own right (Hadiz 2003). The 
proliferation of paramilitary and vigilante groups since 1998 represents a 
manifestation of the decentralisation of violence as a political, social and 
economic strategy, leading to a loss of state control (Wilson 2006). This has 
changed the political culture in which the press operates. The role of the 
state in shaping and influencing press freedom is still large, but the pat-
tern has changed from an interaction between state and society, to struggles 
within society (Romano 2003).
Another fundamental issue for press freedom is impunity. Most cases 
involving violence against journalists or editors fail to bring justice, either 
because there is no prosecution at all or because of an inappropriate punish-
ment. In the cases of Udin (1996), Herliyanto (2006), Prabangsa (2006), Sala-
mun (2010) and Matrais (2010), the strong structural connection between 
political and business elites at the regional level made prosecution difficult 
or even ruled it out altogether. One of the worst is the case of Jakarta Globe 
journalist Banjir Ambarita, who was stabbed in the chest and stomach by 
two assailants on a motorbike on 3 March 2011. The unidentified attackers 
sped off. The attack was related to his report linking police to a prisoner sex 
abuse scandal.139 The case remains unclear and so far no judicial prosecution 
has followed. Violence against journalists combined with weak law enforce-
ment has thus become a major terror for the press.
138 “Palopo Pos Dibakar Massa dengan Tabung Gas dan Bom Molotov” [Palopo Pos Burned Down 
by Gas Stove and Molotov Bomb], News Detik.Com, 31 March 2013.
139 “Wartawan Ditusuk di Jayapura” [Journalist Stabbed in Jayapura], Viva News, 3 March 2011.
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However, impunity is not merely caused by factors external to the press. It 
seems that sometimes media owners or even journalist associations suggest 
to the police and the public prosecutor to drop a case in order not to damage 
relations. A good example is a case involving an official from national oil 
company Pertamina in Lombok. Head of the Ampenan branch office Sadi-
kun Syahroni threatened four local journalists from the Lombok Post, Suara 
NTB, NTB Post and Radio Global by a gun and sickle at an interview about 
fuel scarcity in West Nusa Tenggara, in Ampenan, 18 July 2007. The case was 
reported to the police, but no prosecution followed, apparently because the 
PWI had lobbied the journalists involved to drop the case. In the end they 
did not dare bring the case to justice, because they were lacking sufficient 
protective support from the editor and media owner.140
A similar thing happened in the case of the Adam Malik Hospital in Medan, 
after an incident on 7 February 2010. The doctor (with a navy background) 
locked the door when five TV journalists were trying to get an interview on 
malpractice. The security guard and other paramedical personnel intimidat-
ed them, although there was no physical assault. The matter was reported 
to the police, but under pressure from the media owner ended by an agree-
ment not to further press charges. Other journalists and representatives of 
journalist associations later privately expressed their anger about this ‘win-
win solution,’ which they considered as undermining law and press free-
dom.141
Even more disturbing were two cases in East Java in 2012, where it was the 
Press Council to forge an agreement instead of pressing for criminal pros-
ecution. The first incident, on 25 May 2012, concerned the attempt of several 
internet and TV journalists to make a report about a fire at the Indospring 
corporation in Gresik. They were stopped in their activities by corporation 
manager Paulina Pradini, who ordered security guards to take away their 
camera, tape recorder and other equipment. The security guards not only 
took the equipment, but also destroyed it. Gresik’s journalist community 
reported the case to the police, which started an investigation. The case was 
subsequently accepted by the public prosecutor, who took it to the Gresik 
District Court. Surprisingly, the Press Council then interfered by starting 
a mediation process, eventually reaching an agreement with the journal-
ists. The corporation subsequently tried to discontinue the criminal case. 
However, the court stated that such agreement could not stop criminal 
legal proceedings before the court and it sentenced Pradini to one-month 
140 Personal communication and interview (Mataram, 24 June 2010) with two journalists 
(anonymous).
141 Personal communication with a journalist (anonymous), Medan, 29 June 2010.
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imprisonment. Ironically, the journalists involved in the case expressed their 
appreciation for the conviction.142
A similar case occurred after an incident on 15 December 2012. Head of 
Pamekasan’s Religious District Office Normaluddin threathened to kill 
journalist Sukma Firdaus after her reporting about a corruption scandal at 
Normaluddin’s office.143 This led to many protests and upon a complaint 
filed by journalists the police started an investigation, finally leading to a 
prosecution before the Pamekasan District Court. However, on 11 March 
2013, still during the trial, the Press Council held a meeting in Surabaya with 
the parties involved in order to settle and discontinue the criminal case. The 
meeting resulted in three points of agreement, one of them being that “par-
ties agreed to resolve the case by apologising to one another and the legal 
case is considered closed.” For Sukma this agreement was hard to accept, 
but in the end she complied with the policy of her employer.144 In my opin-
ion, to prioritise a mediation process over a criminal case leads to a form of 
impunity which fails to send a clear message to those threatening or using 
violence against journalists.
This problem of impunity has received very little attention from the post-
Soeharto governments, but compared to the case of Udin it also failed to 
grasp the attention of the international community. This may be caused 
by the general impression that Indonesia is now a fairly well functioning 
democracy. Under Soeharto, violence against journalists was considered 
part of the authoritarian repertoire to silence the press, whereas at present 
it is something more ‘localised’ and ‘privatised.’ The tendency of the SBY 
administration to blame the press, calling it ‘unprofessional,’ ‘excessive’ or 
‘partisan’ may also lead to institutionalising an anti-press discourse. This 
may well lead to underestimation of the seriousness of the acts of violence 
against the press which remain unpunished – by the public, the state and 
perhaps even by the press itself.
142 “Kekerasan Wartawan Gresik, HRD Indospring Divonis Satu Bulan” [Violence against Gresik 
Journalists, HRD Indospring Convicted to One Month], Gresik.co, 9 November 2012.
143 “Diancam Dibunuh, Wartawan Madura Unjuk Rasa” [Under Threat of Being Killed Madu-
rese Journalists Stage a Demonstration], Tempo, 20 December 2012, http://www.tempo.
co/read/news/2012/12/20/058449447/Diancam-Dibunuh-Wartawan-Madura-Unjuk-
Rasa (accessed on 14 March 2013).
144 Sukma said, “[...] in my heart, I would like the case to be brought before the court. An 
agreement could be necessary after the court has given its judgment fi rst. Since I am 
working at a press company, of course I have to obey the company policy, otherwise if I 
disagree with this policy, it would surely infl uence my career as a journalist. Hence, I do 
not have any choice. To me, discontinuation of the legal process is an injustice for a jour-
nalist. Nonetheless, this case may provide a learning process for the violator, since he has 
admitted his fault and promised not to repeat his act to put a journalist under pressure 
[...]” (Sukma Firdaus, interview, 2 April 2013).
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In addition to this overview of attacks against journalists, it is useful to con-
sider the views of international organisations, especially Reporters Without 
Borders (RSF), about press freedom in Indonesia. RSF recorded a decrease 
in press freedom in Indonesia in 2008 with the country dropping from 100th 
position in 2007 to 111th in 2008. In 2010, RSF ranked Indonesia 117th, the 
lowest position since 2004, but Indonesia has since continued to slide down 
even further, to 146th place in 2011-2012. Indicators used by RSF to compile 
their index include violence and abuse against journalists, the state’s role in 
combating impunity for those responsible for violence and abuse, censor-
ship and self-censorship, media control (regarding questions of ownership), 
media legislation, pressure from the administration and the judiciary, pres-
sure from business, and freedom on the internet and of new media.
The increasing number of killings of journalists in 2010 contributed to the 
drop in ranking, in particular because they were not followed by further 
judicial prosecution to bring the culprits to justice. Physical assaults contin-
ued as well, as can be seen from the following table, based on data from the 
AJI:
Table 1: Cases of violence against journalists: 2008-2012145146
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Intimidation 18 1 6 10 15
Eviction and obstruction of access 9 3 7 8 5
Censorship146 3 2 3 3 1
Physical assault 21 18 16 17 18
Prosecution and legal suit 6 7 6 2 2
Demonstration 1 3 2 2 2
Hostage 1 2 - 1 2
Killing - 1 3 1 -
Mysterious deaths - - 1 - -
Attack of a press office - - 4 2 2
145 This table is adapted from the AJI annual reports.
146 This is a policy or regulation which prohibits journalist from reporting. For instance, the 
East Jakarta government released a circular letter (Surat Edaran) to schools and teachers 
for not accepting journalists whose identity is unclear, or who have not obtained a recom-
mendation from government offi cials or the regional parliament.
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Indonesia did slightly better in 2013 (139th position), but this does not seem 
to be caused by changes in government policy.147 The next table offers a dis-
heartening view of the safety of journalists.
Table 2: Journalists killed in Indonesia: 1996-2012148149150151
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147 ‘Press Freedom Index,’ Reporters Without Borders, 2011-2012 and 2013, http://en.rsf.org/,
148 This data is gathered from various sources. The baseline is made by the Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ), added are the two columns listing the perpetrator and the ensu-
ing judicial process.
149 In court, Dwi Sumaji Iwik who previously confessed to killing eventually withdrew his 
confession. He claimed that he had been forced to confess by police offi cer Edy Wuryanto 
in order to protect the interests of the Bantul District Head Sri Roso Sudarmo (Marajo 
2007).
150 Sayuti’s death was a result of his reporting on local corruption (Andi Tonra Mahie), but 
local police said the cause was a traffi c accident (“Muhammad Sayuti Bochari,” CPJ, June 
11, 1997, https://cpj.org/killed/1997/muhammad-sayuti-bochari.php, accessed on 19 
January 2014).
151 CPJ reported that Naimullah was killed for his reporting on police links to illegal logging 
activities in the area. The police failed to investigate the case, according to local sources, 
and some journalists suggested that the police may have been involved in the murder 
(“Naimullah,” CPJ, https://cpj.org/killed/1997/naimullah.php, accessed on 19 January 
2014).
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152 Kogoya was killed when unknown gunmen fi red on a small passenger plane landing at 
Mulia Airport, Papua. Kogoya had travelled to Mulia to report on elections in Jayapura, 
Papua’s capital, for the Papua Pos Nabire and the Pasifi k Pos Dail (“Hunt Begins for Gun-
men Who Machine-Gunned Plane in Papua,” Jakarta Globe, 9 April 2012).
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4.11. Conclusion
From the start of the New Order until the present, there have been lower 
and higher levels of press freedom in Indonesia in a direct relation with 
the character of the political regime – from authoritarian to more demo-
cratic and from centralised to decentralised government. Unfortunately, the 
post-Soeharto era has in the end not fully delivered on its liberal promises 
regarding press freedom.
The authoritarian Soeharto regime often used legal forms to pressurise the 
press. The law was used for banning media and the criminal prosecution of 
journalists and editors. Military rules applied during the emergency situa-
tion in the early New Order years, and subverted human rights principles 
and press legislation. The law was also designed to create a hegemonic dis-
course through its use of central concepts such as ‘development press,’ ‘Pan-
casila press’ and ‘social responsibility press.’ In this respect the New Order 
recalled Soekarno’s press policies. These discourses were to serve the inter-
ests of the regime and led to much hypocrisy.
The introduction of the SIUPP (publication and printing permit) in 1982 
meant a serious administrative threat to press freedom and endangered 
critical reporting by the media, especially about the government. During 
the New Order, legislation was used to subvert higher legislation in restrict-
ing the press, meaning that the government could impose sanctions without 
using the court system. Yet, by banning Tempo, Detik and Editor in 1994 the 
government somehow went too far, in the sense that this became a ‘step-
ping stone’ for journalists and the public at large to start seriously question-
ing government policies regarding press freedom. It led to establishing the 
AJI as an alternative journalist association, and thus to building solidarity 
outside the control of the government. This likely helped pave the way for 
the call for democratisation that swept over Indonesia after the start of the 
economic crisis in 1997 and eventually led to the ousting of Soeharto.
In the early post-Soeharto years press freedom was at a peak. Under Presi-
dent Habibie, in September 1999, a new Press Law was enacted, which abol-
ished the SIUPP and contained important guarantees for press freedom. The 
peak of press freedom fell during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. 
He dissolved the Department of Information, which had been the corner-
stone of New Order repression of the press. Under Wahid no journalist 
ended up in jail. According to Wahid “…Information is society’s business, 
which means it is inappropriate for the government to intervene.” In his 
wordings and policies Wahid subscribed to the principle that democracy 
requires well-informed citizens. Their capacity to produce intelligent agree-
ments by democratic means can be nurtured only when they enjoy equal 
and open access to diverse sources of opinion (cf. Keane 1991: 176).
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Unfortunately, this situation of full freedom started to change after Mega-
wati took office as president, and regularly confronted the press by accusa-
tions that its reports were ‘un-nationalist,’ ‘un-patriotic,’ ‘njomplang’ (unbal-
anced), ‘njlimet’ (complex), and ‘ruwet’ (complicated). Under Megawati 
prosecution of journalists and editors started again, including at her own 
initiative when she felt her reputation was tarnished by cartoons.
Under the SBY presidency the situation has further deteriorated. First, new 
legislation started to undermine the 1999 Press Law, such as the Pornogra-
phy Law, the Electronic Information and Transactions Law, the General Elec-
tion Law, and the Presidential Election Law. At the same time the number 
of criminal and civil lawsuits against journalists, editors and media owners 
has continued to rise. Criminal law enforcement under the Penal Code has 
become common again, despite the fact that the Press Law should take pri-
ority. Both criminal and civil lawsuits have put financial stress on the press. 
On top of this, there has been an increase in violent attacks against journal-
ists and media offices, usually by privately hired thugs and societal groups. 
Those committing such acts usually avoid any sanction, which adds to the 
general feeling of impunity for human rights violations. All of this disturbs 
the processes of democratisation and rule of law formation. When we com-
pare the current situation to the New Order, violence against journalists has 
become more ‘localised’ and ‘privatised’ – usually benefiting elites at the 
district level rather than the national government. This change is closely 
related to the decentralisation process. As argued by Heryanto and Had-
iz (2005: 261): “freedom of the press continues to be challenged, not by an 
authoritarian state, but by a variety of vested business interests or by the 
exercise of societal political violence.” One may add that exposing issues 
of corruption and natural resource exploitation by regional elites are most 
likely to lead to violence against the press.
Despite these serious drawbacks, there is still much more press freedom 
now than under the New Order. There is a constitution which has been 
amended to clearly guarantee freedom of expression. This freedom is also 
sustained by the Human Rights Law of 1999 and the Press Law of the same 
year. New restrictive or even suppressive laws have been enacted, but they 
are not specifically targeted at the media. Under the New Order the limits of 
press freedom were moreover never clearly defined and Soeharto’s speeches 
played an important role in their interpretation, whereas today the Press 
Council and the court articulate the rules.
There are also significant institutional changes that have sustained press 
freedom. While direct influence of the military on the press through its 
involvement in licensing was abolished in 1982, similar control was exer-
cised by the Department of Information thereafter. Post-Soeharto there is no 
military influence and the Department of Information was dissolved during 
the early ‘reformation.’ Although it was re-established under the SBY presi-
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dency as the Department of Information and Communication, and the KPI 
became the licensing and monitoring organ for broadcasting media, these 
bodies lack the power and influence of their predecessor. Measures against 
the press now at least involve the judiciary and are no longer purely admin-
istrative in nature. And finally, under Soeharto press organisations, printing 
houses and the Press Council were co-opted by the regime. Today there is no 
longer such co-optation, certainly not at the national level.
The next three chapters will focus on the legal means of limiting press free-
dom, considering in depth how viz. criminal, civil and administrative law 
have been used in court cases involving the press and to what extent the 
courts have supported press freedom.
5.1. Introduction
In the Indonesian history of freedom of expression, the criminal courts have 
been used by all kinds of political regimes to suppress opposition against or 
criticism on authority. After 1918 the Penal Code for the Netherlands Indies 
(Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch-Indië) proved an effective tool to 
this purpose, originally for the colonial government to prosecute Indone-
sian nationalist leaders and press, but after independence for the Indonesian 
government to silence dissenting voices in a similar way. In post-Soeharto 
Indonesia the government has no longer been the dominant actor in crimi-
nalising the press, but businesses and certain civil society organisations 
have been able to use the criminal law to instigate prosecutions against jour-
nalists and editors.
This chapter examines from a legal point of view – but taking into account 
the socio-political context – the relation between press freedom and the 
criminal court process. It looks at how the Penal Code and criminal provi-
sions in other laws have been interpreted and applied, and whether this has 
contributed to promoting press freedom or the opposite. Understanding the 
socio-political context helps us to explain why prosecutors and courts have 
remained within the boundaries of the rule of law, or transgressed them. In 
the end the chapter draws a few conclusions regarding the importance and 
need for criminal law provisions to regulate press freedom.
Cases have been selected on the basis of their importance for specific crimi-
nal law provisions such as those on defamation, insult, or secrecy. Regarding 
a few provisions only a single case turned out to be available, which some-
times has to do with the relative unimportance of such a provision, but this 
may also be due to the unavailability of sources. Nonetheless, altogether the 
chapter offers a fairly comprehensive overview.
5.2. A Few General Notes on Press Criminal Law
Probably the most notorious provisions used in silencing the press have 
been the so-called haatzaai-artikelen (hatred sowing articles), which were 
first introduced by the colonial regime, but continued to apply after inde-
pendence. As explained in the previous chapter, the most despised of the 
5 Press Freedom and Criminal Law
142 Chapter 5
haatzaai-artikelen have now been declared in violation of the Constitution 
(Constitutional Court decision 6/PUU-V/2007), but some variations still 
apply, as well as many other criminal law provisions threatening the free-
dom of the press. This includes several other articles in the Penal Code, as 
well as provisions in more recently enacted special laws such as the General 
Election Law, the Pornography Law, and the Electronic Information and 
Transaction Law. The following two tables offer an historical overview of 
the relevant legislation:
Table 3: Criminal Law Provision against the Press in Indonesia (Within the Press 
Law)1234
Issue in Criminal Law Law (Art./s) Sanction
(imprisonment) 
National Press Duties Art. 2, 3, and 19 of Law 
11/19662 
1 year
Art 19(1) (Point 17) of Law 
21/19823 
4 years and/or 40 million 
rupiah
Press without Permit 
(SIUPP) 
Art. 13 (5) (Point 17) of Law 
21/19824




Art. 9 (2) and 12 jo. 18 (3) of 
Law 40/1999
100 million rupiah 
(criminal fines)
Violating Public Decency 
(kesopanan /kesusilaan)
Art. 5 (1), 13, and 18 of Law 
40/1999
500 million rupiah 
(criminal fines)
1 Laws 11/1966, Law 4/1967, Law 21/1982 and Law 40/1999.
2 No longer valid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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Specific issues Law (Art./s) Sanction
(imprisonment)
Haatzaai-artikelen 
(hatred sowing or 
hate speech – 
menabur kebencian or 
ungkapan kebencian)
Against government 
and state symbols 





Art. 156-157 of the 
Penal Code
2.5-4 years
Cyber media Art. 28 (2) of the EIT 
Law
6 years and/or fine 
of 1 billion rupiah
Opprobrium or 




Against President or 
Vice President
Art. 134, 136 bis and 
137 of the Penal Code
6 years
Against the King or 
heads of friendly 
countries
Art. 142 5 years
Against representa-
tives of foreign 
countries
Art. 143 and 144 of 





Art. 207, 208 and 209 




Art. 310, 311, 315, and 
316 of the Penal Code
9-16 months
Against dead person Art. 320-321 of 
thePenal Code
4 months 
Cyber defamation Art. 27 (3) and 28 (1) 
of the EIT Law
6 years and/or fine 




Art. 171 of the Penal 
Code6
2-10 years





Art. 160 and 161 of 





Art. 282 and 533 of 
the Penal Code 
2 months-2 years 
and 8 months
Art. 27 (1) of the EIT 
Law 
6 years and/or fine 
of 1 billion rupiah
Art. 4 (1) jo. 29 of the 
Pornography Law 
6 months-12 years, 
and/or 250 million-
6 billion rupiah
Crimes against state 
security (including 
official secrecy)
Art. 112, 113, 114 and 





(a) (b) Art. 483, 484, and 
485
(c) 1 years and 4 
months
5 Art. 154-155 of the Penal Code have been repealed by Constitutional Court judgment 6/
PUU-V/2007.
6 Art. 171 of the Penal Code was repealed by Art. XIV and XV of Law 1/1946 (Penal Code).
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These tables show that the majority of criminal provisions can be found out-
side the Press Law, and that many of them contain severe sanctions.
No wonder that there has been an ongoing debate about whether the Press 
Law is in fact a special law which prevails over the other criminal provi-
sions when it concerns press cases. This debate finds its origin in the legal 
doctrine lex specialis derogat legi generali. In Indonesia this doctrine is now 
often interpreted meaning that a law governing a specific subject matter (lex 
specialis) overrides a law which governs general matters (lex generalis).
This matter was brought into clear relief by the case of Upi Asmaradhana in 
2008. The case started with public remarks made by South Sulawesi police 
chief Sisno, who asked the public to report press ‘violations’ to the police, 
which would then be prosecuted on the basis of the Penal Code or other 
criminal law provisions, rather than on the basis of the Press Law. After 
organising a protest against this policy journalist Upi was prosecuted for 
defamation at the Makassar District Court. He was acquitted, but his case 
led to a public debate about the extent to which the press law is a lex specialis 
vis-à-vis other laws.
There are basically two perspectives on this matter. On one side are those 
who argue that the Press Law is not a lex specialis, for the following reasons. 
First, the Press Law does not mention that it is one. Second, it does not spe-
cifically refer within which field of law it would be a special law (criminal, 
civil, constitutional or administrative law) and it holds no reference to pro-
cedure within any of these fields. Third, the content of the Press Law and 
its Elucidation confirm that it is not a lex specialis: Articles 13.b, 16, as well 
as the Elucidation to Articles 4.2, 8, 9, 11, 12, and finally the last paragraph 
of the General Elucidation all refer to ‘existing legislation’ which continues 
to be valid.7 The fourth reason is that the Supreme Court has never stated 
that the Press Law is a lex specialis.8 And fifth, the Press Law does not only 
regulate ‘journalist activities’, but also regulates foreign press corporations, 
advertisements, and social welfare (Sukardi 2007: 177-186).
7 For instance, the Elucidation of Article 12 of Law 40/1999, stipulates that “as long as 
related to criminal responsibilities, this refers to existing legislation.” Likewise, the fi nal 
paragraph of the General Elucidation of Law 40/1999 stipulates that “…in order to avoid 
overlapping regulation, this law does not regulate provisions which have already been 
formulated by other legislation.” These two reasons were mentioned by Sisno when he 
talked during Working Meeting among Governors, Mayors and District Heads of South 
Sulawesi on 19 May 2008. “UU Pers bukan Lex Specialis” [The Press Law is Not a Lex Spe-
cialis], Kompas, 24 March 2009. The statement of ‘existing legislation’ was added by Parlia-
ment (Aryani et al. 2007: 77).
8 According to former Supreme Court Chairman Bagir Manan, the Supreme Court consid-
ers the Press Law as a supreme law (‘lex suprema’), to be applied in press cases instead of 
other legislation. However, the meaning of this concept is not entirely clear (Interview, 
Leiden, 26 March 2010).
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On the other side, those who support the Press Law as lex specialis bring for-
ward several arguments as well. First, there is no need for the Press Law to 
be referred to explicitly as lex specialis, because the process and background 
of the law making process already put beyond doubt that it is one, as it aims 
specifically to clarify the boundaries of journalist activities (Batubara, 2007; 
Pandjaitan and Siregar, 2004). Second, the law contains special mechanisms 
to deal with potential transgressions of these boundaries, such as the right 
to respond (hak jawab) and the right to correct (hak koreksi). Only if a journal-
ist moves out of this realm, for instance by extorting a company he or she 
should be prosecuted on the basis of the Penal Code. Third, the Press Law 
has been a response to the systematic oppression of the press by previous 
authoritarian regimes and its fundamental aim is to improve the quality of 
democracy, as an operational law of article 28 of UUD 1945. Going back to 
the Penal Code to resolve issues of press freedom is therefore not only con-
trary to the spirit of law reform, but also a-historic.
These lines of argument both suffer from a misinterpretation of the principle 
of lex specialis derogat legi generali. This principle is generally accepted as a 
technique of interpretation in solving legal cases when dealing with two 
or more conflicting norms in a particular case, meaning that a specific rule 
should be prioritised over a more general one. This means that the relation-
ship between the lex specialis principle and other norms of interpretation 
or conflict resolution cannot be determined in a general way. That a spe-
cial rule holds priority over a general one is justified by the fact that such 
a special rule, being more concrete, takes better account of the particular 
features of the context in which it is to be applied than a more general one. 
The rationale of lex specialis dates back to Hugo Grotius (1653), who wrote 
that “Inter eas pactiones quae supradictis qualitatibus pares sunt ut praeferatur 
quod magis est peculiare, & ad rem propius accedit: nam solent specialia efficaciora 
esse generalibus.”9
The original idea about a lex specialis refers to a ‘rule’ or a ‘provision,’ not 
to a ‘law.’ The principle does not entail that a special law automatically 
overrides all general law, or that a special rule overrides all general rules, 
because the application of a special rule should be in accordance with the 
principles and aims formulated by general law or rules. The application of 
a special rule can only follow if it produces a more equitable result. For this 
reason, the present research considers about each individual rule whether 
it has an equivalent that deals specifically with such issues for the press. 
9 H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, libri tres (1653) Liber II, Caput XVI, § XXIX. ‘Among those 
treaties, which, in the above named respects, are equal, the preference is given to such as 
are more particular, and approach nearer to the point in question. For where particulars 
are stated, the case is clearer, and requires fewer exceptions than general rules do.’ (Trans. 
A. C. Campbell, 1814, available at http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm, retrieved 
on 5 June 2011).
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The question on the relation between the Penal Code and the Press Law in 
Indonesia should therefore be determined by the equivalence between rules 
in the Press Law and rules in the Penal Code to be applied to cases concern-
ing the press.
Another issue is the question which mechanism should take precedence 
in addressing press cases. The Press Law contains a special mechanism 
for dealing with such cases, consisting of the ‘right to reply,’ a complaint 
through the Press Council, mediation, and court procedure as a last resort. 
A growing number of people have brought press cases to the Press Council: 
between (April) 2000 and 2009, the Press Council has roughly seen a four-
fold increase in the number of complaints in relation to press publication 
matters (see table below, www.dewanpers.org, accessed on 8 April 2011).
Table 5: Complaints in relation to press publication matters 2000-2009
Year 2000-2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Complaints
Total 427 101 153 127 207 319 424 442 2200
If we look at the minutes of parliament, we further find that the legislator 
clearly intended to formulate special characteristics of the law in order to 
promote and protect press freedom. There were several debates on lex specia-
lis, and even if they departed from an incorrect interpretation of this concept 
they put beyond doubt that the legislative intent was to strengthen the role 
of the press in order to bolster democratisation processes in post authoritar-
ian Indonesia.10 Therefore, it should be clear that even if not based on the lex 
specialis argument the Press Law’s mechanism for dealing with complaints 
against the press should take precedence over other mechanisms.
Before dealing with cases concerning this issue, the next sections will first 
provide an overview of the role of specific criminal provisions in cases 
against the press.
10 See: Rapat Kerja Kedua Pembahasan DIM RUU Pers/The 2nd Meeting for Discussing of the 
List of Problem on Press Law Draft (27 August 1999), The Short Report of the Meeting 
between Commission I of DPR and Minister of Information (Aryani 2007: 322; 351; 353; 359; 
362; 406; 518; 523). For instance, the Minister of Information stated that “…. If we return to 
the Penal Code, it means our friends as journalists may be potentially sent to jail for 1-4 
months, then I ask you to consider the issue of justice in this regard” (Aryani 2007: 359).
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5.3. The Haatzaai-Artikelen
In 1914 the haatzaai-artikelen were introduced through the new Penal Code 
for the Netherlands Indies for the Dutch part of the population. According 
to R. Soesilo (1976)11 the Dutch took these articles from Article 124a of British
Indian Penal Code, but in fact similar articles had long been part of the 
Dutch Penal Code in the Netherlands (Maters 1998: 98). On 1 January 1918 
(Han 1961: 5), Articles 66a and b became Articles 154, 155, 156, and 157 of 
the Netherlands Indies Penal Code, when the former code was included in 
the new one.
The main purpose of the haatzaai-artikelen was to restrict opposition and 
criticism against the government, and they were indeed primarily applied 
to attack Indonesian nationalists writing in newspapers, such as Soekarno 
(Fikiran Rakjat), Muhammad Hatta (Daulat Rakjat), Amir Syarifuddin (Ban-
teng) and Haji Agus Salim (Neratja).12 Soekarno was indicted on the basis 
of the haatzaai-artikelen in 1930 in the Bandung District Court, and attacked 
them vehemently during his trial,13 but left them in place after he became 
President in 1945.
Articles 154 and 156a of the Penal Code are directly linked to the press; 
on the other hand, Articles 155 and 157 of the Penal Code are not directly 
related.14
11 Later often quoted, see a.o. Sukardi 1989: 59 and Surjomihardjo et al. 2002: 339.
12 As written by Kahfi  (1996: 7). Ironically, Neratja had originally been funded by the Dutch 
administration, before Salim became editor in chief in 1916-1920.
13 See: Ir. Soekarno’s (1989) speech, entitled “Indonesia Menggugat: Pidato Pembelaan Bung 
Karno di Depan Pengadilan Kolonial Bandung, 1930” [Indonesia Indicts: The Defence Speech 
of ‘Bung Karno’ begore the Colonial Court in Bandung, 1930]. Although the haatzaai-
artikelen have been applied to attack the nationalist movement and the press, these arti-
cles were never repealed until the Constitutional Court decided to quash Articles 154 and 
155 of the Penal Code (No. 6/PUU-V/2007). Nevertheless, Articles 156 and 157 are still 
valid and these can constitute possible threats for the press.
14 Article 155 stipulates: “(1) Any person who disseminates, openly demonstrates or puts 
up a writing where feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against the Government of 
Indonesia are expressed, with intent to give publicity to the contents or to chance the 
publicity thereof, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of four years and six 
months or a maximum fi ne of three hundred rupiah; (2) If the offender commits the crime 
in his profession and during the commission of the crime fi ve years have not yet elapsed 
since an earlier conviction on account of a similar crime has become fi nal, he may be 
released from the exercise of said profession.” Article 157 states that: “Any person who 
disseminates, openly demonstrates or puts up a writing or portrait where feelings of hos-
tility, hatred or contempt against or among groups of the population of Indonesia are 
expressed, with intent to give publicity to the contents or to enhance the publicity there-
of, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of two years and six months or a 
maximum fi ne of three hundred rupiah.”
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Article 154 stipulated,
The person who publicly gives expression to feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt 
against the government of Indonesia, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of 
seven years or a maximum fine of three hundred rupiah.
Article 156 states:
The person who publicly gives expression to feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt 
against one or more groups of the population of Indonesia, shall be punished by a maxi-
mum imprisonment of four years or a maximum fine of three hundred rupiah.
By group in this and in the following article shall be understood each part of the popula-
tion of Indonesia that distinguishes itself from one or more other parts of that population 
by race, country of origin, religion, origin, descent, nationality or constitutional condition.
The next sections will discuss two cases before and one after 1998 which 
were based on these articles. The following table provides a summary over-
view of them:
Table 6: Press Cases on Hate Speech and Hatred Sowing Issues15
The case Indictment Court Decision
Rules Sanction District Court High Court Supreme Court
















7 years & 
fine
Sentenced to 
3 years in jail 
(except 
Danang, 18 
months in jail) 
Sentenced to 
















7 years & 
fine
Sentenced 
for 2.5 years 

















15 Unknown in the table is defi ned as may be appealed to the High or Supreme Court, but 
there is no further information, or also I have not been able to fi nd any information about 
a High or Supreme Court decision.
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5.3.1. Haatzaai Cases Prior to 1998
In 1951, chief editor of Terompet Masyarakat, Goei Po An in Surabaya was 
convicted of violating Article 154 of the Penal Code. In its decision the Sura-
baya District Court argued that the newspaper had spread “feelings of hos-
tility, hatred or contempt against the government of Indonesia,” by writing 
that “the government acts as if it is blinded (by rage or craze)” (…Pemer-
intah seakan-akan mata gelap). The reason for such critique was the deten-
tion of numerous public figures in Jakarta. The District Court’s decision 
was upheld by both the High Court (1953) and the Supreme Court (1955) 
(Soeprapto in Soesilo 1989: 132-133). It is clear from these judgments that the 
limits of tolerance had not shifted far from those in the colonial days.
The next case occurred some 44 years later, under the Soeharto regime. On 
16 March 1995, three AJI activists (Independent Journalists Association), 
Ahmad Taufik, Eko Maryadi, and Danang Kukuh Wardoyo were arrested 
during an AJI meeting in Hotel Wisata, Jakarta. They were charged on the 
basis of Art. 154 juncto 55 (1) of the Penal Code, because they had published 
a magazine called Independen that allegedly had “insulted the govern-
ment” on several occasions. The most offensive article concerned Indepen-
den’s exposure of the business involvement of relatives of the Minister of 
Information Harmoko, as well as the latter’s role in revoking publication 
licenses. On top of that, Independen had speculated about the succession of 
President Soeharto. In spite of the difficulty to bring these acts of publish-
ing under Article 154, the Central Jakarta District Court sentenced Ahmad 
Taufik and Eko Maryadi to almost three years and Danang Kukuh Wardoyo 
to 18 months. These sentences were later confirmed on appeal and cassation.
Ahmad Taufik remembered the case as follows during an interview in 1997:
I saw our legal system was not independent. Judges were under pressure when they gave 
this decision. After I was released, I met the public prosecutor and he asked me whether 
Harmoko’s stocks in several newspapers had been disputed in the court (?). I said that this 
had not been discussed at all. It should have been in order to prove whether Harmoko had 
stocks in those newspapers […]. In my thought […], I imagined that substantial matters 
would be discussed (during court session), but it was not […] the substance of the problem 
was only discussed as a procedural matter.16
Likewise, Andi Syahputra was arrested by the police in Cipulir, Jakarta 
Selatan, on 27 October 1996, because of his involvement in publishing Suara 
Independen on behalf of MIPPA (Masyarakat Indonesia Peminat Pers Alterna-
tif / Alternative Press Interest Indonesian Society), an organisation based in 
Australia. The prosecutor indicted Andi Syahputra for four years imprison-
ment for showing hostility towards the President. According to the indict-
16 “Saya Terlambat Masuk Penjara: Wawancara Ahmad Taufi k” [I Went to Prison Too Late: Inter-
view with Achmad Taufi k], Tempo, Edisi 22/02 – 30/Jul/97.
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ment, the accused had ordered the printing of 5000 copies of Suara Indepen-
den, containing an article called, “Soeharto Dalam Proses Jadi Raja Telanjang” 
(Soeharto on the Way to Becoming a Naked King).17
According to one of his lawyers, Irianto Subiakto,18 the indictment contained 
an error in persona, because Syahputra’s position was only that of a printer. 
Even, the title of the writing actually was taken from foreign scholar Takashi 
Shiraishi who wrote that “Soeharto in the process of becoming a King of 
the Nude”. Syahputra did such printing because it provided him with an 
income. There was no indication that Syahputra intended to defame Soehar-
to. The person who was in fact legally responsible in this case was MIPPA, 
because as stated by Benyamin Kurnia (the chair of MIPPA), through his 
letter to Syahputra’s lawyer, he claimed responsibility for the publication of 
Suara Independen.
The panel of judges at the South Jakarta District Court – chaired by Mar-
sel Buchari –, decided that Andi Syahputra as the printer of the alternative 
magazine Suara Independen (Voice of Independence) was guilty. He was 
sentenced to two years and six months in prison for distributing material 
hostile to Soeharto.19 Eventually, he was released earlier than the period of 
his sentence following the fall of Soeharto.
Looking at the use of the haatzaai-artikelen in these cases shows the prosecu-
tor’s intention to merely silence the press by sentencing journalists and edi-
tors, similar to the Netherlands Indies’ government’s intention to silence the 
nationalists prior to independence.
5.3.2. Haatzaai Cases Post-Soeharto: Rakyat Merdeka Online (2006)
Despite the spirit of reform and euphoria of freedom in Indonesia after the 
fall of Soeharto, the haatzaai-artikelen were used again in the case against 
Rakyat Merdeka Online’s Teguh Santoso. It became something of a cause célè-
bre because it drew international attention, especially in many Muslim coun-
tries.
The case concerned a repost by Rakyat Merdeka Online of one of the cartoons 
of the Prophet Muhammad published originally by the Jyllands-Posten in 
Denmark. Taken from this daily’s website, the cartoon showed the Prophet 
17 “Kasus “Suara Independen”: Jaksa Tetap Menuntut Terdakwa Empat Tahun Penjara” [The Case 
of “Suara Independen”: Public Prosecutor Still Demands Four Years of Prison for the 
Suspect”, Kompas, 5 April 1997.
18 Interview, in Jakarta, 20 October 2012.
19 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), http://www.cpj.org/attacks97/asia/indonesia.
html (retrieved on 20 October 2012).
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Muhammad with red eyes, beard and dishevelled moustache, wearing a 
bomb turban igniting fire wicks carrying the Arabic text Laa illaha Illalah 
Muhammadarasulullah. Ironically, when Rakyat Merdeka Online had pub-
lished this cartoon for the first time, in October 2005, nothing had happened, 
but this time it caused an uproar and Teguh Santoso, chief editor of Rakyat 
Merdeka Online was prosecuted before the South Jakarta District Court, on 
the basis of Article 156a of the Penal Code.
In his plea (with the title “Saya Hanya Jurnalis Biasa, Bukan Penista Agama” / I 
am an ordinary journalist, not a religion hater),20 Teguh Santoso pointed out 
that before publishing it, Rakyat Merdeka Online had actually modified the 
cartoon in order to reduce the vulgar aspects of the original. Moreover, it 
belonged to a story about the controversy the cartoon had raised, under the 
heading “Nabi Muhammad Dihina, Indonesia Lancarkan Protes” (the Prophet 
Muhammad Has Been Insulted, Indonesia Protests). After many complaints 
about the posting, Rakyat Merdeka Online explained that it had not intended 
to insult anyone (“Kami Tak Bermaksud Ikut Menghina” / We Did Not Intend 
to Insult Anyone), on 2 February 2006.
Nevertheless, about 200 members of the Muslim fundamentalist vigilante 
FPI (the Front of Defenders of Islam) gathered at the Rakyat Merdeka office, 
while on their way to the Danish Embassy. After the editors had provided 
an explanation to the FPI’s leaders, the FPI expressed its understanding and 
just asked the editors to delete the posting and apologise to the public. This 
agreement was published on the Rakyat Merdeka website.21 As stated above, 
the editors had in fact already done this.
Moreover, Rakyat Merdeka itself asked the AJI (Independent Journalists Alli-
ance) to examine whether or not it had breached the ethical code for jour-
nalists. After a hearing, the Ethics Assembly of AJI, consisting of Abdullah 
Alamudi, Atmakusumah Asraatmaja, and Stanley, decided that there had 
been no violation of either ethics or methods of journalism, as laid down in 
the 2006 Code of Journalist Ethics.
Islamic fundamentalist leaders Habib Rizieq from the FPI (Islamic Defender 
Front) and Abu Bakar Baasyir from MMI (Indonesian Mujahiddin Assem-
bly) also agreed to drop the case and accepted that Rakyat Merdeka Online 
had not intended to insult the Prophet Muhammad. One may therefore 
imagine the widespread surprise when the public prosecutor decided to 
bring a case against Teguh Santosa before the South Jakarta District Court. 
20 The plea was delivered by Teguh Santosa during the second court session, 6 September 
2006, in the South Jakarta District Court.
21 “Redaksi dan FPI Sepakat Akhiri Kontroversi” [Editorial Board and FPI Agree to End the 
Controversy], 3 February 2006, 11:12 am.
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However, before the judges examined the main case, they passed an inter-
locutory verdict in which they considered the prosecutor’s indictment 
“unacceptable” and returned the case to the prosecutor.22 This final case 
based on the haatzaai-artikelen thus ended in an ‘anti-climax.’
Nonetheless, from the perspective of press freedom the case is quite dis-
turbing. Rakyat Merdeka Online was intimidated by a vigilante, without the 
police doing anything to prevent this or without this group taking recourse 
to a legal mechanism. This fact is even cast into sharper relief by the AJI’s 
Ethic’s Assembly that there had been no infringement of the code of ethics 
for journalists. On top of this, the public prosecutor’s actions indicate that 
law enforcement institutions show little understanding of the 1999 Press 
Law mechanism.
5.3.3. The End of the Haatzaai-Artikelen?
There is an interesting contradiction between the notoriety of the haatzaai-
artikelen on the one hand and the scant use that has been made of them. The 
different regimes ruling Indonesia have generally preferred to use other 
laws to silence the press, such as military regulations, licenses, censorship, 
etc. Still, this notoriety can be understood if we consider the fundamental 
injustice contained in them. This was finally legally acknowledged, when in 
its decision 6/PUU-V/2007, on July 17, 2007, the Constitutional Court 
declared that Articles 154 and 155 of the Indonesian Penal Code were con-
tradictory to the Constitution and therefore were no longer legally binding.
For AJI, the annulment of Articles 154 and 155 meant a restoration of civil 
liberties and press freedom.23 ‘Sowing hatred’ against the government is 
no longer an issue, because there is no longer a legal basis for prosecution. 
Nonetheless, some government officials have difficulties to adjust to the new 
conditions, as for instance Cabinet Secretary Dipo Alam when he argued 
that television channels Metro TV, TV One and the daily Media Indonesia were 
sowing hatred against the government, while “to criticize the government 
is allowed, but not to sow hatred!”24 Usman Kasong, Director of News-
room, Media Indonesia, rebutted that, saying “Media Indonesia has reported as 
required by proper standards of journalism, […] if we are accused of sowing 
hatred, then we should open a public assessment. Perhaps the public doesn’t 
22 I have so far been unable to fi nd the complete reason why the District Court’s decision 
found this ‘unacceptable.’
23 AJI: Press Release, 19 July 2007 in Jakarta.
24 “Dipo Alam Kecewa Metro TV, TV One, & Media Indonesia” [Dipo Alam is Disappointed 
with Metro TV, TV One & Media Indonesia], Detiknews.com, 22 February 2011.
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like it, and then perhaps they will not read it.”25 It seems that there is still a 
danger that the haatzaai-artikelen will be ‘excavated from their grave.’
A more serious matter is that Articles 156 and 157 on hate speech are still 
valid. As elaborated in the previous section, Rakyat Merdeka Online was sen-
tenced on the basis of Article 156. Moreover, the scope of hate speech under 
the Penal Code has been reinforced by special rules under the Electronic 
Information and Transaction Law (EIT Law) of 2008 when it concerns online 
media. As Article 28(2) of the EIT Law determines:
It is prohibited that any person knowingly and without any right disseminates informa-
tion that is intended to evoke feelings of hatred or hostility against an individual and/or 
particular groups based on ethnicity, religion, race and intergroup.
The wordings of this article are similar to those in Article 156, which speaks 
of ‘[…] expression to feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against one 
or more groups’. For press freedom, these two articles provide a double-
barrelled gun for anyone to attack the press, either printed or electronic.
5.4. Opprobrium or Insult (penghinaan/pencemaran nama baik)
Other notorious articles against press freedom under the Penal Code are 
those concerning opprobrium. They range from insults against the President 
and Vice President, to insults against foreign officials, public institutions, 
individuals, and even deceased persons. The maximum sanctions vary from 
four months to six years in jail.
This table shows the cases on opprobrium I was able to track down:
25 “Media Indonesia: Kami Tidak Pernah Menyebarkan Kebencian” [Media Indonesia: We Never 
Spread Insults], Detiknews.com, 22 February 2011.
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Lie on Cyber 
Defamation / 
2009
Article 27 (3) 
of the EIT 
Law30
6 years in jail 
and 1 billion 
rupiah
- - -
26 Tempo Mingguan 20/XXVII 14 February 1999.
27 The East Jakarta District Court Decision No. 1591/Pid.B/2008/PN.Jkt.Tim.
28 The Jakarta Higher Court Decision No. 324/PID/2009/PT.DKI.
29 The Cassation to the Supreme Court, No. 1951 K/PID/2010. The KontraS (The Commis-
sion for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) also paid attention by sending a letter 
asking the Supreme Court to correct the Higher Court Decision No. 324/PID/2009/
PT.DKI. See: KontraS Letter on 2 May 2011, signed by Sri Suparyati.
30 The case was unclearly processed, and it remained questionable whether it would be 
followed up or not into further judicial process. Iwan was investigated by the Cyber 
Crime section of Metro Jaya’s Regional Police. “Beberapa Kasus Ekspresi di Dunia Maya 
vs UU ITE dan KUHP”, ICT Watch, 22 October 2009 [http://ictwatch.com/internet-
sehat/2009/10/22/beberapa-kasus-ekspresi-di-dunia-maya-vs-uu-ite-dan-kuhp/]
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5.4.1. Against the President and Vice President
Insults against the President and Vice President are dealt with in Articles 
134, 136bis, and 137.31 These articles reflect the Dutch colonial legacy of strict 
control and silencing opposition and were only slightly adjusted after inde-
pendence.
Article 134 stipulates,
Deliberate insult against the person of the President shall be punished by a maximum 
imprisonment of six years or a maximum fine of three hundred rupiah.
Article 136bis stipulates,
Deliberate insult in article 134 also includes acts as described in article 135, if these have 
been committed in the absence of the insulted person, either in public or not in public but 
in the presence of more than four persons, or only in the presence of a third party who is 
present without a clear will thereto and who takes offence, by acts as well as by words or 
in writing.
And article 137 stipulates,
(1) Any person who disseminates, demonstrates openly or puts up a writing or portrait 
containing an insult against the President or Vice President with the intent to make the 
contents public or enhance the publicity thereof shall be punished by a maximum impris-
onment of one year and four months. Or a maximum fine of three hundred rupiah; (2) If 
the offender commits the crime in his profession and during the commission of the crime 
two years have not yet elapsed since an earlier conviction on account of a similar crime has 
become final, he may be deprived of the exercise of said profession.
These articles were used in two cases: Soeharto v. Pop Magazine (Rey Hanintyo) 
in 1974 and the case of Megawati v. Rakyat Merdeka (Supratman) in 2003.
5.4.1.1. Soeharto v. Pop Magazine (1974)
POP (abbreviation of Peragaan, Olahraga, Perfilman/Style, Sport and Film) 
magazine’s 17th edition of October 1974 contained a five page story about 
Soeharto’s genealogy, with the headline, “Teka-teki Sekitar Garis Keturunan 
Soeharto, Kulo Sampun Trimah Dados Tiyang Dusun” (Puzzles about Soehar-
to’s descent, I have been admitted as a village person). The story claimed 
that, differently from O.G. Roeder’s biography (1969), Soeharto was the son 
of the aristocratic R.L. Prawirowiyono. The author of the article, POP maga-
zine’s reporter Rey Hanityo, later told in Tempo that Soeharto would actually 
accept this as new information.32
31 Of course at that time it concerned the King or the Queen.
32 “Misteri Anak Desa Kemusuk”, Tempo Online, 4 February 2008.
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However, Soeharto immediately rejected the account and reconfirmed 
the Roeder version that his father was the poor peasant Kertosudiro from 
Kemusuk, a small village near Yogyakarta, calling the article “not only det-
rimental for me personally, but also for my family and descendants”.33 POP 
magazine’s printing permit (SIC) and publishing permit (SIT) were repealed 
and Rey was arrested and taken to jail. In the case that followed at the Cen-
tral Jakarta District Court, the public prosecutor argued that Rey had insult-
ed the President, breaching Articles 134 juncto 136bis of the Penal Code, and 
– subsidiary – Article XIV section 2 of Law No. 1 of 1946 juncto article XV of 
Law No. 11 of 1966.34
During the court hearing Rey mainly relied on the argument that he “did 
it with good intentions”. On judge’s Chabib question whether he checked 
the truth of these facts with the person involved Rey answered that he had 
not yet done this because it was “difficult to check this with the President 
personally”. He admitted that from a journalist perspective this had been 
improper indeed. However, when the judge asked whether it had also been 
improper to publish on the President’s genealogy in this way Rey’s lawyer 
Yap Tjiam Hien replied with the question “with whom actually should a 
journalist check the truth of any piece of news?”. He emphasised that there 
would be no obligation to directly verify with the person concerned and that 
it depended on the journalist what source to select.
Rey added that he had already prepared an erratum to be published in the 
next edition of POP, but that his arrest and the banning of POP had made 
this impossible.35 Moreover, the Department of Information immediately 
published an “Explanation by President Soeharto about his descent (“Ket-
erangan Presiden Soeharto tentang Silsilah Keluarga”). On top of this, still dur-
ing the same year Suryo Hadi published a book rendering Soeharto’s ver-
sion of the matter.36
The matter of verification of news under Indonesia’s legal framework was 
intensively discussed during the court hearing, focusing on the question 
whether Rey had violated the journalistic code of ethics. In the end the judg-
es decided to disregard the fact that Rey had tried to check the facts and 
produce an erratum, sentencing him to two years imprisonment.37 The fact 
that Rey was already in detention and that POP magazine had been banned 
33 “Apakah Maksud Menghina”, Tempo, 25 January 1975; “Misteri Anak Desa Kemusuk”, 
Tempo Online, 4 February 2008.
34 The court assembly was chaired by Chabib Sarbini SH, with the members Abdullah SH 
and Hargadi SH. The prosecution was represented by Gatot Hendarto SH. Rey; the 
accused was defended by two lawyers, Tjiam Joie Khiam SH and Drs. Sumadji.
35 This procedure was provided for in the journalist code of ethics.
36 The title was Genealogy of Soeharto as a Peasant’s Son: An Explanation from President Soeharto 
himself. (“Silsilah Presiden Soeharto Anak Petani: Penjelasan dari Presiden Soeharto Sendiri”).
37 Tempo Mingguan 20/XXVII 14 February 1999.
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already meant that in fact the prosecution had already drawn its own con-
clusions before the court had passed its verdict. Hence the court process 
cannot be separated from the situation of press suppression that had been 
in place for some time and became particularly critical after the Malari riots. 
The court was under severe influence from the executive, which was active 
in co-opting the judiciary during this period (Pompe 2005: 112-129).
5.4.1.2. Megawati vs. Rakyat Merdeka (2003)
As already discussed, the demise of Soeharto led to legal and institutional 
changes that greatly contributed to press freedom. Nevertheless, the Mega-
wati government decided to use the Penal Code articles on opprobrium, 
which had remained in place, to take action against Rakyat Merdeka. This 
daily reacted to Megawati’s policies of raising the fuel price with head-
lines such as “Mega’s mouth smells of gasoline”,38 “Mega is more cruel than 
Sumanto”,39 “Mega is a Usurer”40 and “Mega is of the same standard as a Dis-
trict Mayor”.41 Unsurprisingly, Megawati was upset and criticised the press 
for being “tidak seimbang” (unbalanced), “ruwet” (complicated), “tidak adil” 
(unfair) and “tidak patriotis” (unpatriotic).42
The Minister of Manpower Jacob Nuwawea, publicly warned Rakyat Merde-
ka that if it “insisted to insult PDI-P leaders, it would face thousands of PDI-
P supporters.”43 Ultra-nationalist, pro-Megawati masses threatened journal-
ists, editors and others working for Rakyat Merdeka.
In February 2003 Rakyat Merdeka was summoned by the police after PDI-P 
filed a complaint and the case was proceeded to court by the public prosecu-
tor – in spite of the fact that the titles referred to above reflected the content 
of the articles and were hence in line with the Press Law and the Press Code 
of Ethics. Chief editor Supratman was prosecuted before the South Jakarta 
District Court on the basis of Articles 134 juncto 65 (1) of the Penal Code, and 
a subsidiary charge on the basis of Article 137 (1) juncto 65 (1). There had 
been no previous complaint to the Press Council.
38 “Mulut Mega Bau Solar,” Rakyat Merdeka, 6 January 2003.
39 “Mega Lebih Kejam dari Sumanto,” Rakyat Merdeka, 8 January 2003. Sumanto is suppos-
edly a cannibal.
40 “Mega Lintah Darat,” Rakyat Merdeka, 30 January 2003.
41 “Mega Sekelas Bupati,” Rakyat Merdeka, 4 February 2003.
42 See: PWI (2003) “Pers Bebas: Demokrasi, Anarki atau Tirani?”, Tafsir ke-5 Sikap Dasar 
PWI-Reformasi; Suara Pembaruan, 22 January 2003; and Ali, Novel (2003) “Pers, Mega-
wati, Dulu dan Sekarang,” in Suara Merdeka, 3 Februari 2003.
43 “Jacob threatens media, students not to criticize PDI-P,” The Jakarta Post, 23 February 
2003, and “Police summon editor over article allegedly insulting Megawati: lawyer,” 
Agence France-Presse, 19 February 2003.
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During the court session, the chair of the panel of judges, Zoeber Djajadi, 
stated that the headlines involved were clearly an attack on the President’s 
dignity and that anyone sane would be annoyed or offended by them.44 While 
it had not been proven that Supratman deliberately insulted the President, he 
had disseminated writings which insulted the President and was therefore 
sentenced to six months imprisonment on a probation period of 12 months.
Two important points should be noted about this judgment. First, it held that 
a particular headline is sufficient to determine the guilt of the defendant, 
regardless of whether the content is true or not. Second, Supratman was sen-
tenced on the basis of an ‘insult against Megawati’s dignity’, which intro-
duces a new and unclear standard. Unfortunately the case was not appealed, 
so no clarification on this issue has been provided by a higher court.
These cases illustrate that, while seldom applied, the provision of insulting 
the President can easily be misused to silence criticism against the govern-
ment. Neither judgment has provided a clear standard on what is to be con-
sidered opprobrium, while bringing the case to the criminal court without 
first considering the Press Law mechanism denied the intention of the leg-
islator to provide a special mechanism to try to settle such cases first. The 
only difference between the Pos Magazine and Rakyat Merdeka cases seems to 
be the political context: Soeharto had taken control of the courts to a large 
extent, but under Megawati they had a fair degree of autonomy. However, 
the degree of hooligan-like protests in the latter case showed that not every-
thing had become better.
5.4.2. Against the King or Heads of Friendly Countries and Representatives 
of Foreign Countries
There are three articles in the Penal Code, Articles 142, 143, and 144,45 regard-
ing insulting Kings or heads of friendly countries and representatives of for-
44 “Redaktur Eksekutif Rakyat Merdeka Divonis Enam Bulan”, Tempo Interaktif, 27 October 
2003.
45 Article 142 stipulates: “Deliberate insult against a ruling king or another head of a friend-
ly state shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of fi ve years or a maximum fi ne 
of three hundred Rupiahs.” Article 143 stipulates: “Intentional insult against a represen-
tative of a foreign power to the Indonesian Government in his capacity, shall be punished 
by a maximum imprisonment of fi ve years or a maximum fi ne of three hundred rupiah.” 
Article 144 stipulates: “Section 1, Any person who disseminates, openly demonstrates or 
puts up a writing or portrait containing an insult against a ruling king or another head of 
a friendly state or against a representative of a foreign power to Indonesian Government 
in his capacity, with the intent to make the insulting content public or to enhance the pub-
licity thereof, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of nine months or a maxi-
mum fi ne of three hundred rupiah; Section 2, If the offender commits the crime in his 
profession and during the commission of the crime, two years have not yet elapsed since 
an earlier conviction on account of a similar crime has become fi nal, he may be deprived 
of the exercise of said profession.”
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eign countries. Although those articles could be applied to attack journalists, 
they are similar in wording to the equivalent articles discussed in the previ-
ous subsection, and I will therefore not further discuss them here.
5.4.3. Against State Institutions (Public Institutions)
The articles concerning insulting state institutions (207, 208 and 209 Penal 
Code) have a legal construction similar to the haatzaai-artikelen and are like-
wise open to flexible interpretation. The main difference is that they carry a 
lower penalty.
Article 207,
Any person who with deliberate intent in public, orally, or in writing, insults an authority 
or a public body set up in Indonesia, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of 
one year and six months or a maximum fine of three hundred rupiah.
Article 208 states,
Section 1.
Any person who disseminates, openly demonstrates or puts up a writing or portrait con-
taining an insult against an authority or public body set up in Indonesia with the intent to 
give publicity to the insulting content or to enhance the publicity thereof, shall be punished 
by a maximum imprisonment of four months or a maximum fine of three hundred rupiah.
Section 2.
If the offender commits the crime in his profession and during the commission of the crime 
two years have not yet elapsed since an earlier conviction of the person on account of a 
similar crime has become final, he may be deprived of said profession.
Article 209 stipulates,
Section 1
By a maximum imprisonment of two years and eight months or a maximum fine of three 
hundred rupiah shall be punished:
1st any person who gives a gift or makes a promise to an official with intent to move him to 
commit or omit something in his service contrary to his duty;
2nd any person who gives a gift to an official following or in pursuance of what this official 
has committed or omitted in his service in contravention of his study.
Section 2
Deprivation of the rights mentioned in article 35 nos. 1- 4 may be pronounced.
This section looks at the only two cases based on these articles I have found 
so far: those against Sriwijaya Post’s editor Mohammad Soleh Thamrin 
(1991) and Koran Tempo’s journalist Bersihar Lubis (2007).
5.4.3.1. Sriwijaya Post (1991)
This case took place in South Sumatera after Sriwijaya Post, a Palembang 
based newspaper, reported about corruption with the title “Eight Corrupt 
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Sub-District Heads Fired” (Dipecat 8 Camat Korupsi) on 4 April 1991. One of 
the Sub-District Heads involved – Marchan Mukti – filed a complaint with 
the police against Sriwijaya Post’s chief editor Muhammad Soleh Thamrin. 
The basis for this complaint was that a month before the report appeared the 
complainant had been appointed as the chair of the Financial Audit Agen-
cy in Palembang District and that prior to having been reassigned to this 
new position, he had been audited by the Functional Monitor Institution of 
Palembang, which confirmed that he had a ‘clean status.’46
That the complaint led to an actual prosecution took Chief Editor Thamrin 
by surprise, because Sriwijaya Post had immediately conceded its fault and 
corrected the news four times, as required by the journalistic code of ethics. 
Thamrin argued that the case should rather be taken to the Honorary Coun-
cil of the Indonesian Journalists’ Association (PWI). However, Marchan 
insisted on pressing criminal charges, officially supported by the governor.47
At the trial, public prosecutor Muchtar Arifin said that the news had been 
gathered by Sriwijaya Post’s journalist Abadi Tumenggung from official 
sources within the South Sumatra Government, but without first checking 
the facts and seeking the opinion of those involved. The sub-district heads 
had been reassigned, not fired, and there was no relation with corruption.48 
The defendant denied none of these points, which was the reason his news-
paper had apologised to Marchan Mukti and provided a rectification. Still, 
according to the prosecutor, this would amount to a violation of Articles 207, 
208 (1) and 310 (2) of the Penal Code.
However, the council of judges acquitted Thamrin from all charges. First, 
they argued, there was a case of error in persona – not Thamrin as chief edi-
tor should have been prosecuted, but the journalist who wrote the report. 
Likewise, the defendant could not be held accountable for a crime he knew 
nothing of when it was committed, the judges referring to the Penal Code 
that stipulated ‘individual or personal accountability’. Hence, nothing was 
said about the main issue, the court leaving open the possibility of prosecut-
ing the journalist who wrote the report.49
In fact the decision was problematic from the perspective of accountability. 
The Press Law of 1982 – valid at the time – introduced the concept of ‘water-
fall accountability’ (Art. 15), meaning that the owner of a newspaper can 
transfer responsibility for publications to the chief editor, who can further 
46 “Disidang setelah Disensor,” Tempo, 8 August 1992.
47 “Disidang setelah Disensor,” Tempo, 8 August 1992.
48 “Disidang setelah Disensor,” Tempo, 8 August 1992.
49 In another case against the Sriwijaya Post in (1999), the same court did apply ‘waterfall 
accountability’ as stipulated in the 1982 Press Law. This case will be further discussed in 
the next chapter.
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delegate this to the other members of the editorial team or to the reporter. 
The judges did not consider this matter in the case at hand, but relied entire-
ly on the Penal Code instead of looking at the internal accountability regime 
of the Sriwijaya Post.50
The Sriwijaya Post case drew much attention at the time because it was a 
way of intimidating the press rather than seeking to clarify legal bound-
aries. The case was sent to court more than one year after the news had 
been published and it was not the only way in which the local government 
sought to control the Sriwijaya Post. For instance, the office of the newspaper 
had been visited by staff members of the South Sumatra Government, to 
check whether any other news that might be damaging for the government 
was going to be released in the following days. The matter also drew pub-
lic attention because the governor’s staff became involved in directly influ-
encing the press. In the end, Governor Ramli Hasan publicly apologised 
about the issue. However, Thamrin and many others were not satisfied and 
called the Governor, Interior Minister and Minister of Information to fur-
ther account for this.51 This case was well known as “sensor gaya Palembang” 
(Palembang style censorship), and this reminds us of the practice during the 
colonial regime when any publication had to get the permission and signa-
ture from the Dutch government.
From a legal point of view, the court did not make a clearer standard for 
defining ‘insult’. However, the court decided an interesting legal position 
to refuse the application of ‘individual’ responsibility as stipulated under 
the Penal Code. Although, judges did not clearly refer to the Press Law, the 
court considered a special mechanism as showed by Sriwijaya Post in accom-
modating the ‘right to correction’ and ‘right to reply.’
5.4.3.2. Bersihar Lubis’ Column: “The Story of the Stupid Interrogators” (2007)
Not only reporters can be charged with insulting officials, but authors of 
newspaper columns as well. This became apparent when in 2007 Bersihar 
Lubis was prosecuted for his column “The Story of the Stupid Interroga-
tors”, published by Tempo Interaktif on 17 March 2007. In this column Lubis 
addressed the bans on historical books for middle and high schools and 
referred to the former prohibition of Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s novels by 
the Attorney General in 1981. These were published by Hasta Mitra, owned 
by Joesoef Ishak and Lubis quoted Ishak who said about his interrogation 
50 Decision of Palembang District Court, No. 222/Pid/B/1992/PN/PLG, 5 November 
1992). The council of judges consisted of Mulkan Lutfi, Yahya Wijaya, and Chaidir 
Anwar.
51 “Disidang setelah Disensor,” Tempo, 8 August 1992.
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by the public prosecutors: “I was tortured by the idiocy of the interrogators, 
but they in turn were tortured by their bosses who were even more stupid.”52
This quotation was considered as insulting a state institution, i.e. the Attor-
ney General’s Office (AGO, Kejaksaan Agung) and Lubis was put on trial for 
this alleged offence. Articles 207, 316 juncto 310 of the Penal Code formed 
the basis for this charge.53 The public prosecutor did not use the Press Law 
of 1999, because the case addressed Bersihar Lubis in person, not the Tem-
po Corporation (Tempo Interaktif, 28 November 2007). This in itself was a 
strange decision, since the principle of press responsibility as laid down in 
the Press Law puts the accountability for publications with the chief edi-
tor, not with the reporter or the author of a column. An opinion or article is 
moreover normally edited or discussed first by the internal editorial team.
In his defence, Lubis stated that what he had written was not a crime, but 
rather an expression covered by the freedom of opinion as guaranteed by 
article 28 of UUD 1945, and as a part of democratic life in Indonesia. Because 
of its nature it was an effort to support public interest, and therefore allowed 
by Article 310 section (3) of the Penal Code.54 The logic of this argument not-
withstanding, the Depok District Court under presiding judge Suwidya 
agreed with the public prosecutor that Lubis in his capacity as an opinion 
writer should be held accountable for the content of his work and that the 
word “dungu” (stupid) could not be considered other than as an insult. He 
was therefore sentenced to a prison sentence of one month with a proba-
tion of three months. On appeal Lubis repeated his earlier arguments and 
pointed out that the word “dungu” was not his, but Joesoef Ishak’s.55 None-
theless, the West Java High Court upheld the argument by the District Court 
and imposed the same sentence.56
These judgments drew strong reactions from legal aid and journalist asso-
ciations, which considered them as violations of the freedom of expression, 
52 The two novels concerned were Bumi Manusia (The Earth of Mankind) and Anak Semua 
Bangsa (Child of All Nations). The statement was made when celebrating Indonesia’s Lit-
erature Day in Paris, October 2004.
53 The indictment also applied Article 316, about opprobrium directed to a person or indi-
vidual. This article is discussed in the next sub-chapter.
54 “Perkara Penulisan Opini: Jaksa Sanggah Pembelaan Bersihar,” Tempo Interaktif, 28 
November 2007.
55 “Kasus Artikel di Koran: Bersihar Lubis Ajukan Banding,” Gatra, 20 February 2008, 
http://www.gatra.com/artikel.php?pil=23&id=112386 (retrieved on 9 June 2011).
56 Hendrayana, personal communication, on 19 June 2012. He said that Lubis did not give 
the Letter of Attorney to the LBH Pers, especially for making cassation to the Supreme 
Court.
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press freedom, and human rights generally.57 Irfan Fahmi al-Kindy, a lawyer 
from the human rights NGO PBHI,58 said that “the court process in pros-
ecuting Lubis was too forced. What Lubis had written was actually as cri-
tique of how the public prosecutor functions. If the public prosecutor wants 
to complain about the insulting issue, he should use the ‘right to reply’ 
against such writing.”59 Press Legal Aid executive director, Hendrayana 
said his organisation would ask for a constitutional review of the Criminal 
Code articles concerned, including Article 207, which violated the freedom 
of the press. The Alliance of Independent Journalists Head Heru Hendrat-
moko said his organisation would support Lubis in a request for constitu-
tional review. He said, “The articles are no longer relevant for a democratic 
country like Indonesia.”60
In this manner the case was taken from the usual track to the Supreme Court 
and instead became the reason for a general suit about the constitutional-
ity of Articles 207 and 306 of the Penal Code, brought by Bersihar Lubis, 
together with Risang Bima Wijaya. Unsurprisingly, the Constitutional Court 
refused the case by stipulating that such articles are of a general nature, and 
not only for press cases. Hence, they are not contradicting the Constitution.61
The two cases of Sriwijaya Post and Bersihar Lubis demonstrate how Penal 
Code Article 207 concerning insults against an authority or a public body in 
Indonesia may lead to restrictions on press freedom. First, by not recognis-
ing the general principle of press accountability as laid down in the Press 
Laws, the article may put any press worker, either editor or journalist, in 
trouble, because they may all be prosecuted individually. Second, the case 
shows that the Press Law mechanisms to deal with insults and the like, such 
as the use of the right to reply and other correction mechanisms are over-
looked by judges in criminal cases and do not lead to protection of press 
freedom against criminal liability. Even if a case is not successful, the crimi-
nalisation in itself is already a serious problem for the press. This problem 
is exacerbated by the absence of clear criteria on criminal liability regard-
ing insults. While in Sriwijaya Post the judge may have had good reasons to 
dismiss the case, the judgments in Bersihar Lubis seem if not plain wrong at 
least badly reasoned. It has therefore been a strategic error that Lubis and 
his defenders decided to turn the case into one for the Constitutional Court 
57 PBHI (Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia/Association 
for Legal Aid and Human Rights), AJI (Independent Journalists Alliance), and LBH Pers 
(Press Legal Aid) were not only complaining of the judge’s decision, but also appealing a 
judicial review to the Constitutional Court to repeal article 207 of Penal Code.
58 Association for Legal Aid and Human Rights.
59 “Bersihar Lubis Diadili Karena Menulis Opini,” Koran Tempo, 21 November 2007.
60 “Indonesia: Journalists To Seek Judicial Reviews On Defamation,” Jakarta Post, 23 Febru-
ary 2008.
61 Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-VI/2008, on 15 August 2008.
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instead of simply addressing the Supreme Court, which could have pro-
vided the clarity required.
As a result of all of this, Article 207 of the Penal Code presently constitutes 
a threat to press freedom, which will not be lifted until a new case will be 
decided differently.
5.4.4. Against Person/Public
Both during and after the New Order, legal cases of opprobrium against 
an individual have occurred most frequently. This might be related to the 
very wide scope of these Penal Code articles in potentially criminalising the 
press. The articles concerned are the following:62
Article 310
Section 1: The person who intentionally harms someone’s honour or reputation by charg-
ing him with a certain fact, with the obvious intent to give publicity thereof, shall, being 
guilty of slander, be punished by a maximum imprisonment of nine months or a maximum 
fine of three hundred rupiah.
Section 2: If this takes place by means of writings or portraits disseminating, openly dem-
onstrated or put up, the principal shall, being guilty of libel, be punished by a maximum 
imprisonment of one year and four months or a maximum fine of three hundred rupiah.
Section 3: Neither slander nor libel shall exist as far as the principal obviously has acted in 
the general interest or for a necessary defence.
Article 311
Section 1
Any person who commits the crime of slander or libel in case proof of the truth of the 
charged fact is permitted, shall, if he does not produce said proof and the charge has been 
made against his better judgment, being guilty of calumny, be punished by a maximum 
imprisonment of four years.
Section 2
Deprivation of rights mentioned in article 35 first to thirdly may be pronounced.
62 Although such a case has never happened, one may potentially be prosecuted for insult-
ing a dead person, as stipulated under Article 320 (1) of the Penal Code: Any person who 
in respect of a deceased person commits an act that if the person were still alive, would 
have been characterised as libel or slander, shall be punished by a maximum imprison-
ment of four months and two weeks or a maximum fi ne of three hundred rupiah; Section 
2: This crime shall not be prosecuted other than upon complaint by either one of the 
blood relatives or persons allied by marriage to the deceased in the straight line or side 
line to the second degree, or by the spouse; Section 3: If by virtue of matriarchal institu-
tions the paternal authority is exercised by another than the father, the crime may also be 
prosecuted upon complaint by this person.
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Article 315
A defamation committed with deliberate intent which does not bear the character of slan-
der or libel, against a person either in public orally or in writing, or in his presence orally or 
by deed, or by a writing delivered or handed over, shall as simple defamation, be punished 
by a maximum imprisonment of four months and two weeks or a maximum fine of three 
hundred rupiah.
Article 316
The punishment laid down in the foregoing articles of this chapter may be enhanced with 
one third, if the defamation is committed against an official during or on the subject of the 
legal exercise of his office.
These articles can be applied in relation to one another. Insulting a person 
or the public can include any kind of insulting (slander, libel, defamation), 
either orally, written, or pictures and the press has not been excluded from 
their scope.63 In other words, they provide a very wide and flexible ‘legal 
trap’ for anyone expressing his or her opinion and indeed they have given 
rise to many prosecutions.
5.4.4.1. Warta Republik (1998) and Gatra (1998)
In November 1998 Warta Republik published an article under the follow-
ing headline: “Triangle love involving two generals: Try Sutrisno and Edi 
Sudrajat compete to date widow”.64 The news was based on rumours only 
and the newspaper had not taken any effort to obtain confirmation or denial 
from either Try Sutrisno or Edi Sudrajat prior to publication. No wonder 
that Chief Editor of Warta Republik, Husein Majelis soon found himself in 
court to face charges of defamation after complaints by the two generals 
mentioned above.
The Jakarta District Court argued that he had indeed violated Article 310 of 
the Penal Code, since all three of its elements were in place: first, the deed 
had been carried out intentionally and in public, second, the article accused 
persons without providing adequate evidence, and third, such news 
degraded the reputation of the two generals concerned. Majelis was given a 
punishment on probation and did not appeal the decision.
63 These articles are also closely related to Article 317 (1) of the Penal Code, which stipu-
lates: “Any person who with deliberate intent submits or causes to submit a false charge 
or information in writing against a certain person to the authorities, whereby the honor 
or reputation of said person is harmed, shall, being guilty of calumnious charge, be pun-
ished by a maximum imprisonment of four years.” Nevertheless, Article 317 (1) is dis-
cussed in the next section, especially dealing with the ‘false news’ issue.
64 “Cinta Segitiga Dua Orang Jenderal: Try Sutrisno dan Edi Sudrajat Berebut Janda,” Warta 
Republik, November 2008.
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Actually, the correction or reply mechanisms had not been used by either 
Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudrajat, through which the case should have been 
resolved. So, once again we see how the court bypassed the official mecha-
nism and thus contributed to the decrease of press security against viola-
tions of its independence. In this particular case there is no reason why a 
correction or a reply would not have sufficed.
Another case in the same year concerned the widely read Gatra magazine, 
which in Edition No. 48, 17 October 1998 carried a report under the fol-
lowing headline: “Prohibited Drugs, Tommy’s name has been mentioned”.65 
Tommy Soeharto – the Tommy referred to in the headline – then filed a com-
plaint with the police which led to a prosecution of the editor of Gatra before 
the Jakarta District Court.
The Jakarta District Court rejected all the charges against Gatra. The judg-
es found that Gatra’s reporting had been up to the professional standard. 
The defendant could indeed demonstrate that he had accurately referred to 
sources and cross-checked with various informants. In following this path 
of reasoning the judges digressed considerably from the course discussed 
in the previous cases about insulting the state or officials. Thus, the judges 
affirmed the supremacy of the Press Law criteria to protect professional 
journalism. That this was not always the case after Reformasi will become 
clear from the following sections, which will demonstrate how the Penal 
Code’s opprobrium articles have continued to be used to attack the press.
5.4.4.2. Risang Bima Wijaya (2002)
The case of Risang Bima Wijaya started with the publication of a sex harass-
ment scandal with the title “Newspaper Boss Sentenced”, on 24 May 
2002.66 It concerned Soemadi Martono Wonohito, the executive director of 
Kedaulatan Rakyat newspaper, who had been reported to the police because 
he would have sexually harassed his employee Sri Wahyuni. Two other 
employees had been witness to the harassment. On the basis of the police 
file of the case – of which he held a copy – Radar Yogja journalist Risang Bima 
Wijaya, did an interview with Sri Wahyuni. After having worked on the case 
for 20 days Risang published his findings in Radar Yogja.
However, in October 2002 the police decided to drop the case due to lack 
of evidence. Soemadi then reported Sri Wahyuni, her lawyer and Risang 
to the police for slander, based on Articles 310 (2) juncto 64 (1) of the Penal 
65 “Obat Terlarang, Nama Tomy pun Disebut,” Gatra, No. 48, 17 October 1998.
66 “Bos Koran Dipidanakan,” Radar Yogja, 27 May 2002.
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Code.67 Even if working for the press himself, Soemadi did not use the ‘right 
to reply’ to counter Risang’s report. Risang moreover received a text mes-
sage from his boss (the general manager of Radar Semarang) that he had been 
fired as general manager of Radar Yogja and that he should return to Sura-
baya.
One and a half years later, in April 2004, Risang was then formally sum-
moned by the Yogyakarta Police and subsequently prosecuted before the 
Yogyakarta District Court. On 22 December 2004 he was eventually sen-
tenced to nine months in jail, without probation. The judgment was based 
on three legal arguments brought forward by the public prosecutor: the 
accused had written and published a number of reports which accused 
Soemadi of sexual harassment; the reason for this had been to draw public 
attention and finally, the reports together seriously harmed Soemadi’s repu-
tation.
Several weaknesses are immediately visible in this reasoning. First, the 
judges provided no clarification on the nature and the boundaries of the 
‘insult,’ giving no guidance whatsoever for future cases and failing to clarify 
why this particular case was insulting in the first place. The main problem, 
however, is that they did not make a link with the proper standards for 
reporting: can you insult someone by publishing something that is true? 
This relates to the next issue at stake: the professional standards in place. 
The judges clearly denied applying the Press Law and the standards it con-
tains – all of which had been followed by Risang. There had been no ethical 
examination by the Indonesian Journalists Association or the Press Council, 
Soemadi had never used the ‘right to reply’ and no attempt had been made 
at dispute resolution through the Press Law mechanism. In short, the judges 
simply ignored the availability of the Press Law.
As we have seen so far, this has happened in many cases in the first instance. 
However, it was unacceptable for Risang, and therefore he made an appeal 
to the High Court and cassation to the Supreme Court. Neither appeal nor 
cassation were accepted by the court. The Supreme Court, in its judgment 
No. 1374K/Pid/2005 on 13 January 2006, decided to strengthen the High 
Court Decision No. 21/Pid/2005/PTY.68 The sentence was only lowered on 
67 Article 64 section (1) of Penal Code is related to the ‘conjunction of punishable acts’: “If 
among more acts, even though each in itself forms a crime or misdemeanour, there is 
such a relationship that they must be considered as one continued act, only one the heavi-
est penal provision shall be imposed.”
68 The decision was received by Risang on 3 May 2007.
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appeal to six months in jail. Risang’s appeal for review of the cassation judg-
ment because new evidence (novum) would have been found, was refused.69
According to the Supreme Court’s decision at the review level, the rea-
sons for pleading were unjustified since judex facti and judex juris had been 
legally applied correctly and there was no evidence of the “obvious mis-
take and failure” in such judgment (see: Supreme Court Decision No.14 PK/
Pid/2008, 24 June 2009). In this regard, all arguments on the use of press law 
as a special mechanism and also previous jurisprudence decisions at the 
Supreme Court level had been rejected by the judges.70
This is actually one of the few decisions in which the Supreme Court 
digressed from its fairly consistent course to uphold the Press Law mech-
anisms. The Risang case therefore stands out as a depressing example of 
the failure of the Indonesian legal system to uphold press freedom. I will 
later return to the question whether this concerns a single – even if terrible – 
error, or whether it points to a major flaw in legal reasoning and its origins 
in such cases, and hence legal uncertainty in Indonesia’s press law system 
more generally.
5.4.4.3. Winny and Aseng (2006)
The cases of Kwee Meng Luang (or Winny) and Khoe Seng-Seng (or Aseng) 
were unique, since they were neither journalists nor editors. The reason to 
discuss their ordeal is because it started with a letter to the editor (Surat 
Pembaca). Letters to the editor fall under the responsibility of the editors, 
because they select which letters will be published. Letters to the editor are 
quite important from a general press point of view in that they provide a 
platform for information sharing and engagement of newspapers with their 
readers.
Winny and Aseng had bought real estate property from Duta Pertiwi Cor-
poration in Mangga Dua (Central Jakarta) and in their letter complained, 
because they had found out that they had acquired a lease hold (Hak Guna 
Bangunan) on top of a management right (Hak Pengelolaan) instead of a full 
69 The novum concerned a clarifi cation by the former member of the Press Council, R.H. 
Siregar as an expert witness in the Sleman District Court, 8 July 2004, which states that 
the relevant articles in the Penal Code cannot be applied against journalists. He also said 
that the transcript of the court session was inaccurate, unclear and incomplete. The court 
somehow concluded that Siregar agreed to prosecute Risang Bima Wijaya by using the 
Penal Code, a conclusion it adopted from the public prosecutor.
70 The Supreme Court judges at review level were Dr H. Abdurrahman, SH, MH (chair); 
H.M. Zaharuddin Utama, SH, MM, and Prof Dr Mieke Komar, SH, MCL (members).
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lease right.71 They claimed that they had been deceived by Duta Pertiwi 
Corporation because this developer had never informed them about the true 
status of the property,72 and made this public in a number of letters to the 
editor in Suara Pembaruan, Kompas and Warta Kota.73 Together with 17 other 
buyers they also reported Duta Pertiwi to the police for having committed 
fraud (Article 378 of the Penal Code), but the police decided to stop the 
investigation for lack of evidence of a crime.
Duta Pertiwi, however, retaliated by reporting Aseng to the police for slan-
der and this case did lead to a prosecution in the North Jakarta District 
Court for violating Articles 311 (1) and 310 (2). The defendants were assisted 
by the Press Legal Aid Institution (LBH Pers), which concentrated its plea on 
the original fraud case and the need to consider this case in the context of 
the Press Law. Expert witness Leo Batubara confirmed that this case should 
be resolved by the mechanism stipulated in the Press Law, i.e. the ‘right 
to reply’ mechanism. However, judges Robinson Tarigan, Heras Sihombing 
and Firdaus decided differently and followed the prosecutor’s indictment, 
sentencing Winny and Aseng for slander to six months in jail and one year 
probation. They refused to grant Winny and Aseng the protection of the 
Press Law, which would only concern the accountability of the editor, not of 
citizens writing to them.
On appeal to the Jakarta High Court, a similar decision followed, which 
made the plaintiffs appeal to the Supreme Court, through cassation applica-
tion No. 1951 K/Pid/2010. Again, the judges, consisting of Moegihardjo as 
chair of the panel, Salman Luhtan and Surya Jaya as members, refused the 
appeal (31 May 2011) and sentenced the plaintiffs to one year probation.74 
The case is now pending for a review in the Supreme Court.75
It will be clear that this case compromises press freedom. Not only does it 
limit public space in promoting civil society participation, it also denies the 
fact that the editor in chief holds ultimate responsibility for what appears 
in his newspaper and that the mechanism to prevent transgressions of pro-
71 HGB is a property status, entitled to construct, to own buildings or other structures over 
the land. HPL is also a property status, only granted to government institutions and state 
(national/local)-owned companies for developing public facilities.
72 “Khoe Seng Seng Dinyatakan Bersalah,” Tempo, 15 July 2009.
73 Kompas (26 September 2006), “Duta Pertiwi Bohong” (Duta Pertiwi Lies) and Suara Pem-
baruan (21 November 2006), “Jeritan Pemilik Kios ITC Mangga Dua” (ITC Mangga Dua Stall 
Owner’s Plight).
74 “Kasasi Ditolak, Penulis Surat Pembaca Tetap Divonis 1 Tahun Percobaan,” Detik News, 2 
March 2012, http://news.detik.com/read/2012/03/02/201520/1856856/10/ (retrieved 
on 12 October 2012).
75 “Kalah di Kasasi, Terpidana Kasus Surat Pembaca Ajukan PK,” Detik News, 29 May 2012, 
http://news.detik.com/read/2012/05/29/174527/1927712/10/ (retrieved on 12 Octo-
ber 2012).
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priety should be drawn from the Press Law instead of the Penal Code. It is 
therefore clear that the application of the general articles on slander seri-
ously compromises press freedom. During the Soeharto years the articles 
concerning individual slander were not needed by the regime, which could 
simply punish and ban newspapers without judicial processes. A case in 
point is Matahari magazine, which on 25 June 1979 saw its publication per-
mit (SIT) revoked after publishing two articles considered as damaging to 
government allies.76 While this is no longer possible, we see that the use of 
the Penal Code in a majority of cases has had a detrimental effect as well.
5.4.5. Iwan Piliang vs. Alvin Lie on Cyber Defamation (2008)
Since 2008, Indonesia has a new law on Electronic Information and Transac-
tion (EIT), Law No. 11 of 2008. Initially the Press Council did not pay any 
attention, but after its enactment the council realised that the law actually 
held criminal provisions on defamation and hate speech. As Press Council 
member Bambang Harymurti later put it, “the Press Council felt cheated”.77 
The EIT’s most controversial provision concerned defamation in cyber 
space, which is threatened by six years of imprisonment (Art. 27(3) jo. Art. 
45). This means that direct detention is allowed during the pre-trial phase. 
From a press freedom perspective the main problem is that the article does 
not exclude journalists from its scope.
Article 27 section (3):
It is prohibited that any person who knowingly and without authority distributes and/or 
transmits and/or causes to be accessible Electronic Information and/or Electronic Records 
with contents of affronts reputation and/or defamation.
Article 45 section (1):
Any person who satisfies the elements as intended by article 27 section (1), section (2), sec-
tion (3), or section (4) shall be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding 6 (six) years and/
or a fine not exceeding Rp. 1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah).
Another controversial Article is 28(2) in combination with Art. 45(2)
Article 28 section (2):
Any person who knowingly and without authority distributes information which is 
intended to create hate feelings or individual and/or particular society group hostility 
based on ethnicity, religion, race and groups.
Article 45 section (2):
76 “Cukong Sumber Malapetaka” (Financier as Catastrophe Sources) (16 May 1979), and 
“Bangkrutnya Teknokrat ala Mafi a Berkeley” (The Collapse of Berkeley Mafi a’s Technocrat) 
(17 June 1979). According to the decree, both articles have been considered as breaching 
decency boundaries, containing an insult and libel against state offi cials, as stipulated in 
Article 310 of the Penal Code. In fact, neither Article 310 nor those implicated in the 
report were state offi cials.
77 “Dewan Pers Ajukan Judicial Review UU ITE,” Kompas, 25 April 2008.
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Any person who satisfies the elements as intended by article 28 section (1) and section (2) 
shall be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding six years and/or a fine not exceeding 
Rp. 1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah).
In fact Article 28(2) looks very much like the haatzaai-artikelen that had been 
invalidated by the Constitutional Court and it is unsurprising that soon 
after their enactment these provisions became the target of a suit for con-
stitutional review of this law by a coalition of civil society groups including 
the Press Council. Yet, the case ended in disappointment and disbelief. The 
Constitutional Court argued that Article 27 (3) of the EIT Law is a lawful 
limitation of the freedom of expression. According to the court the law is 
important to protect citizens against any threats against their individual and 
family dignity.78 Hence, the articles of EIT have continued to be enforceable.
That this has jeopardised freedom of expression generally but also the free-
dom of the press has been proven in several cases that have happened since. 
One concerned Prita Mulyasari’s case that was discussed in the previous 
chapter, but the other – earlier – suit brought on this basis concerned a jour-
nalist. Narliswandi (Iwan) Pilliang, a journalist and blogger was denounced 
on the basis of the EIT Law by MP Alvin Lie, after a publication on the lat-
ter’s business interests.79 The article alleged that the coal mining company PT 
Adaro Energy bribed the National Mandate Party (PAN) through its legisla-
tor Alvin Lie to influence the proposal in the House of Representatives to 
investigate PT Adaro’s involvement in transfer pricing when selling coal to 
Singapore-based Coaltrade Services International Pte. Ltd. This company, 
whose shares are owned by Adaro shareholders, received coal at a price of 
US$32 per ton, when coal prices stood at an average of US$95 per ton at that 
time.80 The police also summoned Agus Hamonangan, the moderator of the 
mailing list, for questioning.
There is no further information about whether the case continued to the 
court process or not. The only fact that is known is that an investigation has 
been carried out by the Cyber Crime section of Greater Jakarta’s Regional 
Police. However, it illustrates how presently the EIT Law is held to be appli-
cable to online-media journalists. The case was directly taken to the police, 
without any prior recourse to a ‘right to reply’ or a complaint to the Press 
Council as stipulated in the Press Law.
78 Court Decision Number 2/PUU-VII/2009, 5 May 2009.
79 “Hoyak Tabuik Adaro dan Soekanto” published in the Kompas Readers Forum’s mailing 
list. Hoyak Tabuik is a ceremonial tradition in West Sumatera, usually done for rejecting 
bad things in society. Adaro is a coal mining company, and Soekanto is the owner of 
Asian Agri Corporation.
80 New media law “threatens press freedom,” Jakarta Post, Monday, September 2008.
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5.4.6. Conclusion
The Penal Code carries more provisions about defamation than about any 
other issue restricting press freedom. Most of them are still in force, while 
the enactment of the EIT has further added to the repertoire available to 
silence journalists or the press. As shown by the cases above, the application 
of these articles has indeed led to such situations, in particular because of 
the arbitrary interpretation of some of the articles concerned, without the 
judgments concerned providing clear and consistent guidelines for their 
future use. Unfortunately this includes those by the Constitutional and the 
Supreme Court.
The sometimes abusive application of defamation articles by the Indone-
sian police, prosecutors and courts has been addressed by several interna-
tional organisations. Internationally, there is a tendency to consider all use 
of criminal law regarding defamation against the press as a violation of the 
freedom of expression. The United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have been lobbying for this 
purpose. Thus, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has called for the aboli-
tion of all laws that provide criminal penalties for the defamation of public 
figures or which penalise defamation of the state or state organs. The UN, 
OSCE and Organisation of American States (OAS) Special Mandates have 
gone even further, by stating that:
Criminal defamation is not a justifiable restriction on freedom of expression; all criminal 
defamation laws should be abolished and replaced, where necessary, with appropriate 
civil defamation laws.81
ARTICLE 19, a London based NGO for freedom of expression, has suggest-
ed that because all criminal defamation laws breach the guarantee of free-
dom of expression but are unlikely to be repealed in the near future, interim 
measures should be taken to attenuate their impact until they are abolished. 
Indonesia’s record on this issue certainly supports such a stance.
81 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression: Joint Declaration, by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Represen-
tative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expres-
sion, 2002.
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5.5. Spreading False News
Although not always acknowledged as such, spreading false news is a criti-
cal issue for press freedom. Three criminal law provisions relate to this issue: 
Art. XIV and XV of Law 1/194682, and Art. 317 of the Penal Code.
Article XIV of Law No. 1 of 1946 stipulates:
Section 1: Whoever, by publishing false news or notifications, by deliberately publishing 
sensation among the people, is punishable by maximum ten years of imprisonment.
Section 2: Whoever circulates news or issues a notification which can lead to sensation 
among the people, whereas he can assume that such news or notification are false, is pun-
ishable by maximum three years of imprisonment.
Article XV of Law No. 1 of 1946 stipulates:
Whoever circulates unclear news or excessive or incomplete news, while he understood, or 
it would at least be predictable that such news would or could cause sensation among the 
people, is punishable by maximum two years of imprisonment.
Article 317 of Penal Code stipulated,
(5) Any person who with deliberate intent submits or causes to submit a false charge or 
information in writing against a certain person to the authorities, whereby the honour 
or reputation of said person is harmed, shall, being guilty of calumnious charge, be 
punished by a maximum imprisonment of four years.
(6) Deprivation of the rights mentioned in article 35 first to third may be pronounced.
I managed to find four cases related to these articles, two during the New 
Order and two after Reformasi.
82 Law 1/1946 on Rules of Criminal Law was enacted on 26 February 1946. This law was a 
legal basis for adopting the Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch Indië (WvS.NI) into 
the Indonesian legal system. Law 73/1958 made this Penal Code applicable to the full 
territory of Indonesia.
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Table 8: Summary: Press Cases on Spreading False News8384
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5.5.1. Sinar Pagi (1980-1982)85
… membawa masalah ini ke Pengadilan dalam keadaan keblinger
dan tidak ubahnya seperti menembak nyamuk dengan meriam.86
This case was highly controversial because it concerned an indictment of 
the press for reporting on corruption, “Bupati Tangerang Lalap Uang Rakyat 
28 Juta” (Tangerang Mayor Ate (=corrupted) People’s Fund of 28 Million), 
83 “Buntut Berita Lemak Babi,” Tempo, 1 September 1990.
84 The Makassar District Court passed judgment on 14 September 2009, but then the prose-
cutor appealed for cassation to the Supreme Court on 25 September 2009. “Jaksa Ajukan 
Kasasi Melawan Upi: Pengajuan Kasasi Telah Diajukan Jaksa ke Mahkamah Agung pada 
Jumat siang,” Viva News, 26 September 2009.
85 The details of this case have been taken from Hamzah et al. (1987: 97-140; 152-251).
86 The plea delivered by S.A.S. during the court session in Tangerang District Court, 8 Sep-
tember 1981 stated that: “… bringing this case into the court is excessive, like shooting a 
mosquito by a cannon.”
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published on 23 July 1980.87 It addressed S.A.S, the vice-editor of the daily 
Sinar Pagi,88 on the basis of six articles: (1) Art. XIV (1) jo. (2) of Law 1/1946 
(false news or notifications); (2) Art. XV of Law 1/1946 (unclear, excessive 
and incomplete news); (3) Art. 310 (1) and (2) jo. Art. 311 (1) jo. Art. 316 of the 
Penal Code (opprobrium or insulting of individual); (4) Art. 207 of the Penal 
Code (insulting of state institution); (5) Art. 208 of the Penal Code (insulting 
of state institution); (6) Art. 19 of Law 11/ 1966. The case started in 1981 and 
continued until 1982.
The news item consisted of a report about a number of people from Setu vil-
lage (Serpong, Tangerang) who submitted a complaint to the national parlia-
ment on 22 July 1980. They were accompanied by their lawyer, from MKGR 
Tangerang (the Mutual Assistance Families Society, an NGO closely related 
to the Golkar Party). The complaint concerned the embezzlement of a com-
pensation fund of 28 million rupiah for acquisition of the complainants’ land 
funds by the Mayor of Tangerang (H. Muhammad Syukur). The report just 
contained a description of the event and the complaints concerned, without 
further interpretation. The article was published on the first and third page 
of Sinar Pagi, one day after the complaint had been lodged.
In court S.A.S.’s main defence was that Sinar Pagi had merely reported 
what others had said in parliament.89 He also claimed that the indictment 
was biased, as it stated that the Setu people had no rights to receive any 
compensation, and that the criminal court could not decide this matter, as it 
concerned a moot point of civil law in which the court held no jurisdiction. 
S.A.S added that:
It is difficult to imagine that if someone doesn’t like how he or she is being mentioned in 
the news he or she just reports this to the prosecutor, who then takes the case to court, as 
has been done by H. Muhammad Syukur. If this happens all the time, one can imagine how 
courts throughout Indonesia would be seeing a lot of editors prosecuted […] and if such 
situation would become normal, it would threaten a healthy press development.
87 The complete title was “Dilapor ke DPR: Bupati Tangerang Lalap Uang Rakyat Rp. 28 
Juta” [Reported to Parliament: Tangerang Mayor Ate (=corrupted) People’s Fund 28 Mil-
lion], Harian Umum Sinar Pagi, 23 July 1980, No. 2299 Year X.
88 The acronym S.A.S. is used in Hamzah et al.’s book. (see: Hamzah, A, et al. (1987) Delik-
Delik Pers di Indonesia. Jakarta: Media Sarana Pers).
89 Before the case actually started there was a dispute about the court’s jurisdiction. Sinar 
Pagi’s lawyer argued that based on Art. 252 (2) of the HIR (Herzien Indonesisch Reglement), 
jurisdiction was determined by either the locus delictie principle or the domicile of the 
accused. In both cases this was Jakarta and not Tangerang, and hence within the jurisdic-
tion of the Jakarta District Court. This argument was rejected in an interlocutory verdict, 
however, which stated that in 1972-1973 the Supreme Court had decided in three cases 
that an exception could be made to Art. 252 (1) HIR when the witnesses involved lived 
suffi ciently close to the district court concerned.
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The judgment held that the public prosecutor had failed to prove that the 
news item had been false, unclear, excessive or incomplete. The court spe-
cifically argued that the title of the article, “Tangerang Mayor Ate (=cor-
rupted) People’s Fund [of] 28 Million [rupiah]” was not misleading, because 
this had not been effectively proven. Neither had the prosecutor proven any 
intention on the part of the defendant to incite people, which could create 
chaos – in fact the article addressed the mayor, not society. The elements of 
‘excessive’ and ‘incomplete’ were also unproven, because they could not 
be separated from ‘causing turmoil in society’. Hence, the indictment on 
‘spreading false news’ fell through. The court’s arguments thus offered a 
clear interpretation of the relations between the title, the body of content, 
and the facts of the case in light of the criminal provisions involved.
Yet, the court sentenced S.A.S to six months with a one-year probation for 
violating Art. 207 of the Penal Code, by insulting or defaming an authority 
or a public body set up in Indonesia.90 This judgment was upheld on appeal 
by the High Court of West Java.91 S.A.S. then appealed for cassation to the 
Supreme Court, on 16 July 1984, but I have not been able to trace the out-
come of the procedure.
The Sinar Pagi case took place while the government was preparing a revi-
sion of the Press Law. During this period the government kept an extreme-
ly tight watch on the press and strongly urged journalists to subscribe to 
the ‘responsible press’ discourse. Traces of this discourse can be seen in 
the judgment of the Tangerang District Court, which stipulated that press 
freedom meant a ‘responsible’ press: (1) responsible to the government; (2) 
responsible to the press itself; (3) responsible to society.92 As explained in the 
previous chapter the ‘responsible press’ discourse in practice led to many 
contradictions. Yet, the case of Sinar Pagi stands out favourably compared to 
Tempo’s case in the same year, after Tempo was banned by Minister of Infor-
mation’s Decree Letter No. 76/Kep/Menpen/1982. The decree repealed 
Tempo’s publishing permit (SIT) on 12 April 1982.
It seems likely that in the Sinar Pagi case the court felt under pressure from 
the government to sentence S.A.S. While the judges provided clear argu-
ments to refuse the more serious allegations, they still upheld the indictment 
on the basis of Art. 207, but without much evidence and without providing 
many arguments for this decision. In fact it seemed clearly contradictory to 
the earlier assessment that there had been no case of ‘spreading false news’.
90 Tangerang District Court Decision No. 36/Pid/PN/TNG1981.K., on 22 April 1982. The 
panel of judges consisted of Bremi (chair), Rahadjeng Endah and Pardoman Sidabutar.
91 The judges’ panel was chaired by M.S. Hadi Imam and member, W.J. Winardi and Siti 
Kamari Soebari. This verdict was taken on 28 May 1984. See: The Higher Court of West 
Java Decision No. 174/1982/Pid/PTB.
92 Tangerang District Court Decision No. 36/Pid/PN/TNG1981.K., on 22 April 1982.
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5.5.2. Berita Buana (1989)
On 14 October 1988, business newspaper Berita Buana published a conten-
tious article with the title “Much food produced evidently contains pork 
fat”.93 The article warned consumers to be more careful in consuming sus-
pected food items and demanded that the government be stricter in this 
matter.94 The article was based on a news item in Canopy magazine, pub-
lished by the Agriculture Faculty of Brawijaya University, which referred to 
a list of 63 food items containing suspected ingredients. The original report 
underlying the Canopy coverage, was based on research by Dr. Tri Susanto, 
which listed only 34 food items as suspect, not 63.
As consumption of pork is a highly sensitive matter for most Muslims in 
Indonesia, the article led to some public debate and the sales of some of the 
suspected food products dropped drastically. For these reasons the public 
prosecutor brought a case against the author of the article, H. Abdul Wahid, 
a journalist and editor of Berita Buana,95 accusing him of publishing false 
news or notifications which could cause public unrest. During the court ses-
sion Wahid admitted that he should have used the word “diragukan” (doubt-
ful) rather than “ternyata” (evidently).
The case took an interesting turn when the issue of responsibility accord-
ing to Art. 15 (1) of the 1982 Press Law arose. According to this provision, 
the “chairperson [of newspapers] is responsible for all publications either 
internally or externally.” Some argued this to mean that not Wahid should 
have been prosecuted but the chairman of Berita Buana, H. Wibowo. Accord-
ing to Oemar Seno Adji, acting as press expert for ‘a de charge’ witness, 
“[…] in the past, criminal law principles did not allow successive and fictive 
accountability. Now, this (in the court session) would introduce successive 
and fictive responsibility. This is against criminal law principles.”96 Similarly, 
the defendant’s lawyer, T.M. Abdullah, said that, “[…] the process of court is 
illogical, or even hypocritical […]. As a commander, the chief editor should 
not be ‘washing his hands’. This is a shame for journalists, it will create 
much legal uncertainty for them.” Wahid added that he was “interrogated 
because of the writing, but the chairman just kept his silence. Please speak 
up, Press Council, Minister of Information, Parliament, Ministry of Justice. 
Why have they kept their silence as well?”
However, the public prosecutor said that Wahid had been careless, without 
having first consulted with his boss before delivering his draft to be printed. 
93 ‘Banyak Makanan yang Dihasilkan, ternyata Mengandung Lemak Babi’.
94 “Buntut Berita Lemak Babi,” Tempo, 1 September 1990.
95 “Buntut Berita Lemak Babi,” Tempo, 1 September 1990.
96 Successive responsibility means it can be represented, and fi ctive responsibility means a 
representative will take responsibility.
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Neither did the council of judges go along with this line of argument. Judge 
Sulaiman held that “it is not the court’s authority to review the law. The 
court has only considered that Wahid is accountable because he received 
such authority from the chief editor/chairman. In the court session, it has 
been proven that he has written this article.” Wahid was then sentenced to 
one year of imprisonment.
I would like to make two comments on this case. First, the ‘spreading of 
false news’ was indeed legally proven, but the punishment was far too 
heavy for a journalist who had only been attempting to deliver information 
to the public without seeking his own interest. He made a mistake and rec-
ognised he did so. Therefore, it would have been far better not to treat this 
case as a criminal case, but as a case to be resolved through a special mecha-
nism or perhaps the civil court. The prosecution against this journalist was 
also excessive, because those reporting the case to the police could also have 
asked Berita Buana to publish their complaint in the newspaper.
Second, indeed H. Wibowo, as the chief editor of Berita Buana, should have 
been held accountable, regardless of whether or not his journalist had con-
firmed with him whether the news report should have been published. Art. 
15 (1) is eminently clear on this matter. The court should therefore have 
relieved the journalist in this case from any criminal liability.
5.5.3. Tomy Winata v. Tempo (2003)
Investigative journalism is one of the most sensitive tasks of the press, espe-
cially when it deals with political elites or business mafia. It is likely to lead 
to all sorts of resistance, including legal cases. Indonesia’s flagship of critical 
journalism, Tempo magazine, has several times been confronted with the lat-
ter, one of them being a suit following the report with the title “Ada Tomy di 
Tenabang?” (Is Tomy present in Tenabang?).97
The article discussed the role of business tycoon Tomy Winata regarding a 
fire that destroyed the Tanah Abang market in central Jakarta. Before the fire 
broke out, Winata had proposed to the Jakarta government to renovate this 
market, for a total sum of 53 billion rupiah. As the fire somehow paved the 
way for the renovation, it was clearly to Winata’s advantage and Tempo’s 
investigation indeed suggested his involvement in arson. Winata vehement-
ly denied this charge, with support from the director of the Tanah Abang 
market, and on 10 March 2003 filed a complaint with the police against 
Tempo’s Chief Editor Bambang Harymurti, reporter Ahmad Taufik, and lan-
guage editor Teuku Iskandar Ali.
97 Tempo Magazine, Edition No. 01/XXXII/3-9 March 2003.
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The case was then processed by the police and taken to court by the public 
prosecutor, with the first court session taking place on 15 September 2003. 
The indictment consisted of two allegations: first, ‘spreading false news’ 
(Art. XIV (1) and (2) of Law 1/1946 juncto Art. 55 (1) of the Penal Code98), 
and second, ‘slander or defamation’ (Art. 311 (1) and 310 section (1) of the 
Penal Code juncto Art. 55 (1) of the Penal Code). The prosecutor’s indict-
ment argued that the report by Tempo had provoked people by “publishing 
false news and causing confusion among people,” especially among the vic-
tims who, after the news had spread, had gone to Winata’s office and house 
to protest. Winata himself gave testimony of having been intimidated by 
telephone, which in turn led employees of Winata’s Artha Graha Group to 
engage in demonstrations at the Tempo headquarters, which were accom-
panied by vandalism. The public prosecutor also argued that Tempo had 
insulted Winata by referring to him as a “pemulung besar” (big scavenger) 
and that the report was false.
The judges in Central Jakarta District Court acquitted Ahmad Taufik and 
Teuku Iskandar Ali, because their positions as journalist and language edi-
tor relieved them from accountability on this matter. This is in line with the 
Elucidation to the Press Law Art. 12, which puts responsibility over news 
reports with the chief editor. However, the judges found that the indict-
ment on defamation and false news were ‘proven’ during the court session, 
which was contentious because Bambang Harymurti refused to disclose the 
sources underlying the report. The panel of judges left the Press Law aside, 
because – in their own words – “the Press Law regulates neither defama-
tion nor false news”. They also pointed out that according to its Transitional 
Rules and Elucidation, the Press Law did not override Law 1/1946 or the 
Penal Code. Hence, Harymurti was punishable under these laws as he was 
unable or unwilling to provide any evidence before the court that Tomy 
Winata was ‘a big scavenger’ and that he had actually proposed a renova-
tion project of Tanah Abang market three months prior to the fire.
The court thus swept aside Harymurti’s defence, which under the title 
“Wartawan Menggugat” (A Journalist’s Claim) had emphasised the special 
position of the press, as mandated by the law. “Should a journalist who 
practices his profession as mandated by law, and who publishes his works 
according to journalistic norms enshrined in law, be seen as a criminal?”, 
Harymurti had asked. He had pointed out the overriding importance of the 
Press Law, especially referring to Art. 4(1) (“Freedom of the press is guaran-
teed as a basic human right of citizens”), Art. 4(3) (“… in order to guarantee 
freedom of the press, the national press has a right to explore, discover and 
disseminate ideas and information”), and Art. 8 (“In practicing his profes-
98 Article 55 section (1) 1 of the Penal Code is part of ‘participation in punishable acts’: “As 
principals of a punishable act shall be punished, those who perpetrate, cause others to 
perpetrate, or take a direct part in the execution of the act.”
180 Chapter 5
sion a journalist has protection of the law”). In the light of these provisions, 
as argued by Harymurti, the prosecutor’s indictment had to be rejected.
He furthermore appealed to the double standards applied by the pub-
lic prosecutor, who had asked the court to release the leader of the dem-
onstrations at the Tempo office, David Tjoe, from all charges (No. P-139/
JKTPS/03/2003). This was somewhat remarkable, given that David Tjoe 
had admitted to this fact as well as to ‘represent’ Tomy Winata and had 
also assaulted Bambang Harymurti at the Metropolitan Central Jakarta 
Police Station, an event that had been witnessed by many police officers 
who had done nothing to prevent such violence. Now the same public pros-
ecution council charged Harymurti as a criminal who must be sentenced to 
two years imprisonment, with an order for immediate detention. “Isn’t this 
extraordinarily unjust?”, Bambang had asked in court (Harymurti 2004).
After Chairman Suripto of the Central Jakarta District Court had read the 
decision to sentence Bambang Harymurti to one year imprisonment (see: 
Court Decision No. 1426/Pid.B/2003/PN.Jkt.Pst, 16 September 2004), Bam-
bang described this as an ‘extraordinary blow’ for press freedom. The deci-
sion would scare other editors in chief from publishing reports on conten-
tious issues, and therefore he would continue to fight the case to the end by 
bringing it to the Supreme Court, expecting it to develop to the same kind 
of precedent in Indonesia as Sullivan versus New York Times in the United 
States.99
The Press Council shared Harymurti’s fears for Indonesian press freedom. 
As stated by its Chairman Ichlasul Amal:
the judges’ decision was similar to those taken under the New Order Soeharto, when the 
law enforcer always tried to find the press at fault. Critical papers were banned and jour-
nalists were taken to jail […]. Before reformation, the power was exerted by the executive. 
Now, in the name of the ‘supremacy of the law’, the power has shifted to the law enforcers, 
police, prosecutors, and judges. The problem is, especially with judges, that they have not 
understood the meaning of reformation. To me, the Tempo verdict has tarnished reforma-
tion and democracy.100
Initially Harymurti was unsuccessful, as the Jakarta High Court rejected 
his appeal. However, in the end his perseverance paid off, for the Supreme 
Court overturned the lower courts’ judgments. On 9 February 2006, also 
known as Press Day, the Supreme Court acquitted him (No. 1608 K/
PID/2005). The ruling stated that, “there have been mistakes in the applica-
tion of the law by the District Court and the High Court in examining this 
99 “Bambang Harymurti Divonis Satu Tahun Penjara,” Liputan 6 SCTV, 17 September 2004, 
http://berita.liputan6.com/read/86184/bambang_harymurti_divonis_satu_tahun_
penjara [retrieved on 1 July 2011].
100 “Ichlasul Amal: Keputusan Hakim Mencederai Demokrasi,” Tempo, 20 September 2004.
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press case. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that such cases must not 
merely be viewed from the perspective of the Penal Code, as the offence by 
the accused was related to Press Law.”
The judges’ panel, chaired by Supreme Court Chairman Bagir Manan and 
with members Djoko Sarwoko and Harifin Tumpa, argued that the Press 
Law is a lex specialis and in such cases overrides the Penal Code. The special 
mechanism for dealing with offences as regulated in the Press Law holds 
priority over a criminal procedure. Sarwoko later clarified in an interview 
that the Press Law does not provide for criminal law as such, but that the 
press as the fourth pillar of democracy should be protected. The court also 
considered the roles of journalists and the linguistic aspects of the case, i.e. 
the headline “Ada Tomy di Tenabang” and the phrase “a big scavenger.”101
Alhough Tomy Winata complained about the term “big scavenger”, the 
court did not discuss this term and its meaning in detail. Given the story’s 
context, the term “big scavenger” was quite applicable to Winata’s role in 
the whole story of the Tanah Abang fire. As Tempo had carefully checked the 
facts of the case, their report was actually in accordance with the Press Code 
of Ethics regarding carefulness, balance or proportionality, and applying the 
presumption of innocence.
The decision thus restored the rights, dignity, and position of Bambang 
Harymurti, with the state paying for the cost of the cases. Harymurti himself 
recognised the decision as ‘a special gift’ for press freedom in Indonesia.102 
Yet, as we have seen, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case is not just 
another step in the development of full legal protection of press freedom in 
Indonesia as guaranteed by the judiciary. There have been inconsistencies in 
the line of Supreme Court decisions, notably in the Risang Bima Wijaya case, 
which also concerned Art. 310 of the Penal Code.103 In this case the Supreme 
Court failed to refer to its own judgment in Tomy Winata v. Tempo and to 
provide any arguments as to the difference between the two. This clearly 
continues to lead to legal uncertainty in the development of press freedom.
101 “MA Menangkan Bambang Harymurti,” Tempo, 29 February 2006, http://www.tempo.
co/read/news/2006/02/09/05573708/MA-Menangkan-Bambang-Harymurti (retrieved 
on 2 June 2012).
102 “Bambang Harymurti: Ini Kado Istimewa untuk Pers,” Tempo, 9 February 2006.
103 As previously discussed in this Chapter, the decision was made by the Supreme Court, 
the panel of which was chaired by Artidjo Alkostar, SH, LLM. Decision No. 1374 K/
Pid/2005, on 13 January 2006, refused Risang’s cassation, and strengthened the Yogya-
karta Higher Court decision (No. 21/Pid/2005/PTY), which sentenced Risang to six 
months in prison due to the offence as stipulated in Article 310 section (2) of the Penal 
Code juncto Article 64 section (1) of the Penal Code.
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5.5.4. Upi Asmaradhana (2008)
This case concerned Jupriadi Asmaradhana, better known as Upi, a free-
lance TV journalist in Makassar. Upi had been actively promoting press 
freedom through AJI (the Independent Journalists Alliance) Makassar. On 
behalf of the KJTKP (Journalist Coalition to Refuse Press Criminalisation), 
he coordinated a campaign against Sisno Adiwinoto, the head of the South 
Sulawesi Police (Polda), after the latter had publicly announced that “...if the 
press insults someone, I ask that person to report directly to the police with-
out using the right to reply (or Press Law mechanism).”104 Sisno thus denied 
the priority of the 1999 Press Law’s special mechanism in dealing with com-
plaints against the press. The campaign sought the support from the Press 
Council, the National Police Commission, and other institutions, but also 
organised a demonstration demanding that Sisno repeal his statement.
In order to explain his statement, Sisno had already sent a response to the 
Harian Fajar newspaper (4 June 2008, p. 4, 19 May 2008 and 30 May 2008). 
However, this had not stopped journalists from considering Sisno’s state-
ment as causing confusion and endangering them.
Sisno considered the actions coordinated by Upi as defamation and started 
a suit against several mass media, demanding ten billion rupiah in dam-
ages. He soon dropped this case, however, to concentrate on a criminal case 
against Upi, against whom he lodged a formal complaint. On 18 September 
2008, the police sent a warrant to Upi, accusing him of violating Art. 317 (1),105 
Art. 311 (1) and Art. 160 of the Penal Code. It contained the main grounds 
Sisno used to support his case. First, the protests by KJTKP Makassar were 
instigated by Upi and based on a false allegation: Sisno argued that he had 
never intended to deny the status of the Press Law as a lex specialis and this 
statement harmed his reputation. Second, the letters sent to the Press Coun-
cil and National Police Commission had caused damage to his reputation 
and/or dignity, and he claimed to have suffered material losses due to the 
protests. Third, because the actions organised by Upi were not part of his 
activities as a journalist, he was not protected by the Press Law and could be 
held responsible individually.
The public prosecutor adopted these arguments and brought the case to 
trial, but the court dismissed all the charges. The judges argued that the let-
ter sent by Upi on behalf KJTKPM resulted from an interpretation by South 
Sulawesi journalists and could therefore not be seen as unrelated to press 
104 Sisno gave the same statement twice: fi rst during a workshop of the governor and district 
heads of South Sulawesi (19 May 2008) and second at a ‘Jamboree’ of Local Press in South 
Sulawesi (30 May 2008).
105 Article 317 section (1) of Penal Code and its case are further elaborated in the next sub-
chapter.
Press Freedom and Criminal Law 183
freedom. Second, although Sisno had already sent a response to the Har-
ian Fajar newspaper, this had not been sufficient to change the journalist’s 
perception and understanding of Sisno’s statement. Third, there was a case 
of miscommunication, and the ‘intention’ to disseminate false information, 
as stipulated under Article 317 (1) of the Penal Code could not be addressed 
to Upi, because Upi and KJTKPM had not offended Sisno’s dignity with 
false information. Fourth, the complaint letter addressed the appropriate 
institutions and therefore could not be considered as defamation. Hence, the 
judges argued that the element of ‘false complaint and information to the 
ruler’ could not be proven,106 and that Upi had neither engaged in ‘defama-
tion’ nor in ‘insulting a ruler or public institution.’
Makassar District Court judges, Parlas Nababan, Mustari and Kemal Tam-
pubolon, thus contributed to the line of thought of the Press Law as lex spe-
cialis. The judges also confirmed that the manner in which Upi and KJTKP 
Makassar had conducted their protest had been reasonable and therefore 
remained within the limits of the law.
Since journalist and press associations have been monitoring the court ses-
sions and campaigning closely, these have to some extent influenced court 
decisions. Outside and even in the courts, journalists and their alliances at 
national and international level have had a favourable influence on the judi-
cial process with regards to press freedom. A type of solidarity movement 
also played a role in the judicial process when Susrama and his gang were 
brought before the law for killing Radar Bali’s journalist Prabangsa in 2009. 
As believed by local journalists, without a strong solidarity movement and 
large-scale campaigns, law enforcement might fail to provide justice.
An important aspect of the Upi Asmaradhana case was that it was close-
ly followed by international networks concerned with press freedom and 
widely covered by national and international newspapers, and other media. 
It thus became a widely recognised monument for promoting press freedom 
in Indonesia.
5.6. Violating Public Decency: Selera Hakim107
In Indonesia public decency is a contested issue, especially when it concerns 
the press. This contestation is partly caused by the differences in social and 
cultural settings within the country itself. A media accusation of someone 
being called a prostitute could lead to controversies in Aceh’s syariat law 
context, but not in other regions. Hence, journalists in Aceh have to be more 
careful in showing pictures, illustrations or writing texts in order not to 
106 No. 197/Pid.B/2009/PN.Mks (14 September 2009).
107 The Selera Hakim decision can be translated as the ‘Judges’ Taste’ decision.
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offend conservative Muslims, with ‘Islamic values’ in Aceh seemingly hav-
ing become a standard for measuring appropriateness of press reporting.108 
As a result, the same provisions concerning press freedom operate differ-
ently in these different contexts and the way in which they influence jour-
nalists’ practices and professional self-perception (Romano 2003: 164).
The 1999 Press Law addresses the issue of public decency in Art. 5(1) juncto 
Art. 18(2):
The national press has the obligation to respect religious norms and public decency as well 
as the presumption of innocence in its news and opinions.
The press corporation that violates the provision in Article 5 section (1) […] can be charged 
with a maximum fine of 500 million rupiah.
Until the present, no case has been brought before a court in relation to this 
article.
In addition to the Press Law, the Penal Code contains the following provi-
sions on public decency:
Article 282:
(1) Any person who either disseminates, openly demonstrates or circulates a writing of 
which he knows the content or a portrait or object known to him to be offensive to 
decency, or produces, imports, conveys in transit, exports or has in store, either openly 
or by dissemination of a writing, unrequestedly offers or indicates that said writing, 
portrait or object is procurable, in order that it be disseminated, openly demonstrat-
ed or put up, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of one year and four 
months, or a maximum fine of three thousands rupiah.
(2) Any person who disseminates, openly demonstrates or puts up a writing, a portrait or 
an object offensive to decency, or produces, imports, conveys in transit, exports or has 
in store, either openly or by dissemination of a writing unrequestedly offers or indi-
cates that said writing, portrait or object is procurable, in order that it be disseminated, 
openly demonstrated or put up if he has serious reasons for suspecting that the writing, 
portrait, or an object is offensive to decency, shall be punished by a maximum imprison-
ment of nine months or a maximum fine of three thousand rupiah.
(3) If the offender makes an occupation or a habit of the commission of the crime described 
in the first paragraph, a maximum imprisonment of two years and eight months or a 
maximum fine of five thousands rupiah may be imposed.
Article 533,
By a maximum light imprisonment of two months or a maximum fine of two hundred 
rupiah shall be punished:
(1) any person who at or alongside a place destined for public traffic openly demonstrates 
or puts up either a writing, of which the legible title, cover or the content is appropriate 
to stimulate the sensuality of the youth, or a portrait or an article appropriate to stimu-
late the sensuality of the youth;
108 Syaifuddin Bantasyam, interview, Aceh, 5 July 2010. I add quotation marks to his state-
ment, in order to indicate that ‘Islamic values’ in this context should be interpreted as 
values supported by the dominant Acehnese conservative establishment.
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(2)  any person who at or alongside a place destined for public traffic openly announces the 
contents of a writing which is appropriate to stimulate the sensuality of the youth;
(3) any person who openly or unrequestedly offers, either openly or by disseminating a 
writing unrequestedly shows where a writing, a portrait or an article appropriate to 
stimulate the sensuality of the youth is available;
(4) any person who offers, hands over permanently or temporarily, delivers or shows such 
writings, such portraits or such article to a minor under the age of seventeen years;
(5) any person who announces the contents of such writing in the presence of a minor 
under the age of seventeen years.
The most difficult issue in relation to these articles is how to ‘measure’ 
whether or not a news item has transgressed the limits of public decency. 
The absence of clear standards inevitably leads to uncertainty and subjective 
interpretations by judges, policy makers, government officials, journalists 
and media workers. In the Netherlands, this led the government in 1979 
to request the Advisory Commission on the Decency Law (advies commissie 
zedelijkheidswetgeving) to explore whether it would be necessary to change 
the Penal Code (including Article 240, the equivalent of Article 282 of Indo-
nesia’s Penal Code). Although the commission could offer no solution for 
the problem of definition, they advised against dropping the ‘decency arti-
cle’, instead recommending for the judiciary to determine such a definition 
by precedent (Seno Adji 1990: 49-50).109
In Indonesia, the General Prosecutor, in the Circular Letter concerning Mon-
itoring of Publications Violating Decency dated 22 February 1952, stipulated 
that “a definition of decency must be based on a general objective concept 
(algemeen objectief begrip), not on a person’s sense of offence after having read 
or seen any writing or picture, or on a sense of subjective feeling of decency 
(subjektief eerbaarheidsgevoel).” However, this guideline has not been trans-
lated into a series of precedents that has provided a more objective interpre-
tation.
During the Soeharto regime, the Department of Information controlled the 
press in matters concerning public decency by means of warning letters. 
A well-known case for instance concerned Jakarta-Jakarta magazine, which 
received such a warning from the Department of Information after publish-
ing a picture of a female that the Department categorised as pornography 
and as such, violated Article 282 of the Penal Code.110 The magazine had 
already received three previous warning letters, but no ban followed.111
109 The advice has been followed and this practice has continued until the present, see for 
instance http://www.wetboek-online.nl/wet/Sr/240.html.
110 Department of Information’s warning letter, No. 167, 17 September 1989. The letter was 
sent to the magazine on 18 October 1989 (Sadono 1993: 84-85).
111 These letters were sent in response to three editions, No. 145 (20 April 1989), No. 152 (2 
June 1989) and No. 157 (6 July 1989) (Sadono 1993: 85).
186 Chapter 5
In fact, against what one might expect, there have been few press cases con-
cerning public decency. I only found the following three:
Table 9: Press Cases on Public Decency
The case Indictment Court Decision
Rules Sanction District 
Court
High Court Supreme 
Court
Varia Baru 
(Kadis Purba) / 
1971 
Art. 282 (1) 
of the Penal 
Code
1 year and 
4 months 
Sentenced 









Art. 282 (1) 
of the Penal 
Code












Art. 282 (1), 
(2), and (3) 
of the Penal 
Code








but after a 
judicial review 
7 months later, 
the defendant 
was acquitted. 
5.6.1. Varia Baru (1971)
Varia Baru was a three-monthly Jakarta magazine that mostly published 
gossip about Indonesian and foreign celebrities, but also serials and short 
stories. The case concerned one serial (“Ranjang-Ranjang yang Dingin” (The 
Cold Beds)) and one short story (“Penyelewengan Seorang Kekasih” (A Lover’s 
Affair)) in edition No. 37/4, October 1971, which led to the revocation of 
Varia Baru’s SIT (Publishing Permit) by the Department of Information.112 The 
legal basis for the decision was Ministry of Information Decree No. 52/Kep/
Menpen/1968 on The Prohibition of Newspaper Publications which Con-
travene Pancasila by using Pornography and other Misuses Dangerous to 
Supervising Pancasila Morality.113
112 Ministry of Information Decree No. 35/SK/Dirdjend-PG/1971.
113 Keputusan Menteri Penerangan Republik Indonesia No.52/Kep/Menpen/1968 tentang 
“Larangan terbit bagi penerbitan berita suratkabar, jang bertentangan dengan Pantjasila 
menggunakan tjara-tjara pornograts dan lain-lain penjelewengan jang membahajakan 
pembinaan achlak Pantjasila.”
Press Freedom and Criminal Law 187
Prior to this administrative sanction, the vice-chair of Varia Baru Kadis Pur-
ba had been prosecuted for violating public decency and on 25 August 1971 
he had been sentenced to six months with two years on probation by the 
Central Jakarta District Court on the basis of Art. 282 (1) of the Penal Code. 
One of the judges argued that, “.. in order to eradicate pornography, punish-
ment of an individual is ineffective, it is better if its SIT is also repealed.”114
As far as I can judge from the sources, the judgment did little to define the 
legal term of ‘pornography’ or determine the legal limitations to decency. 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any further information on this 
case.
5.6.2. Matra Magazine (1999)
The next case in this category only arose after the fall of the New Order 
when Chief Editor Nano Riantiarno of Matra Magazine was prosecuted for 
publishing the covers of Edition 155, June 1999 and Edition 156, July 1999 
that portrayed film stars Inneke Koesherawati and Sarah Azhari in ways 
some considered as pornographic. On 8 June 2000, Nano was convicted by 
the South Jakarta District Court to five months with eight months on proba-
tion, on the basis of Art. 282(1) of the Penal Code, significantly less than the 
16 months imprisonment the public prosecutor had demanded.
The case had been controversial from the start, because other magazines, 
such as Top, Pop, Liberty, and Desah had published women’s pictures many 
considered far more explicit than those in Matra. The prosecutor, Y.W. Mere, 
denied any imbalance here, saying that it was only a matter of time – the 
Matra case had just been processed more quickly by the police and the pub-
lic prosecutor.115
What was actually the issue? On the cover the first contested edition ran 
the headline: “A Reportage: Celebrities’ Nude Photos”, across a picture of 
Inneke Koesherawaty taken from the side, on which she appeared nude, 
but covered most of her breast, arms and hands. The second cover told the 
readers: “Sex: Plant Support for Doughtiness”, and showed Sarah Azhari 
in sitting position, with her legs and hands crossed, equally suggesting that 
she was nude.
Nano argued that these positions and style aimed at exploring beauty.116 Sup-
porting him, press expert Atmakusumah Asraatmadja argued that Matra’s 
cover could be categorised as art rather than pornography, as it did not 
114 “Menindak Porno,” Tempo, 16 October 1971.
115 “Delik Asusila: Mengadili Pornografi ?” Tempo, 18 October 1999.
116 “Vonis Porno untuk Majalah Matra,” Tempo, 12 June 2000.
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show any “sensitive and vital body parts”, or articulated them in a vulgar 
manner.117 However, prosecutor Y.W. Mere held on to his view that, “..such 
covers were not included as works of art. They are merely famous wom-
en with a sexy style […]. Then, what makes this art? For the prosecutor, 
these pictures go against the public feeling of decency.”118 In its judgment 
the court basically agreed with this view. Decency concerns morality, and 
is related to sexuality. Both photos suggested that the models concerned 
were nude, and therefore these photos were related to sex, hence morality. 
Because Matra magazine’s readership consists of a wide audience, without 
age limitation, Nano was sentenced for violating morality by spreading pic-
tures of which he knew that they violated public morals. In its judgment, 
the court put little argumentation to determine the nature of pornography.
In an interview, one of the judges – T.H.D Pardede – added that such maga-
zine covers were considered as a porn form, and it breached the law (Article 
282 section (1) of Penal Code).119 Both Matra’s lawyer Todung Mulya Lubis 
and media expert Ade Armando complained that the decision had produced 
no clarity at all regarding the definition of pornography or the limitations on 
public decency.
The Matra case shows how easily ‘selera hakim’ or subjective ‘judicial taste’ 
can become decisive in such issues.120 It also demonstrates how the limita-
tions regarding public decency had not necessarily been widened after the 
end of the Soeharto era.121 Atmakusumah, at the time chairperson of the Press 
Council, argued that the public view as to what constituted pornography 
was excessive. He added that, “media are held to contain pornography if 
they show genitals or sexual intercourse. But, if the intercourse serves edu-
cational purposes, this can not be categorised as pornography.”122 In addition, 
the standards for indicating pornography limitations always change from 
time to time. For instance, the word ‘kissing’ was considered as porn during 
the 1940s, but this is no longer considered as pornography at present.
117 “Delik Asusila: Mengadili Pornografi ?” Tempo, 18 October 1999.
118 “Delik Asusila: Mengadili Pornografi ?” Tempo, 18 October 1999.
119 “Vonis Porno untuk Majalah Matra,” Tempo, 12 June 2000.
120 Cf. Pompe, S. (1999). “Between Crime and Custom: Extra-Marital Sex in Modern Indone-
sian Law.” In Lindsey, T. (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society (pp. 111-121). Sydney: The Fed-
eration Press.
121 In Tempo (2000), this case was said to be the fi rst prosecution case against a chief editor on 
the basis of Article 282 of the Penal Code in the Indonesian press history. Actually, it was 
not the fi rst time, because Varia Baru’s Kadis Purba was earlier than Nano’s case.
122 “Bila Bukan Porno, Apa Namanya?” Media Watch & Consumer Center Online, 11 October 
2000.
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Indeed, it is hard to define what ‘the public’ thinks about pornography. Also 
it is not easy to understand what the purpose of the restrictions is. Hence, 
an exploration of the question in which circumstances a restriction of por-
nography is necessary, would be useful, to create clarity for journalists and 
editors.
5.6.3. Playboy Magazine (2006)
After the Matra case the next lawsuit concerned a scandal that became 
known far beyond Indonesia itself. It concerned the publication of the 
Indonesian version of Playboy, which on 7 April 2006 led to an attack on 
the magazine’s office in Jakarta by the radical fundamentalist group Islam-
ic Defender Front (FPI). The FPI held speeches outside of the building, 
harassed employees, and eventually invaded and destroyed the office. Next 
to their non-legal strategy the FPI reported Playboy to the police as publish-
ing pornography.
The police had done little to nothing to prevent the FPI’s violence against 
the magazine’s property and employees, or to take any action later on, but 
it seemed eager to follow up on the FPI’s complaint against Playboy. Chief 
Editor Erwin Arnada and models Kartika Oktavina Gunawan and Andhara 
Early became subject to investigation on 29 June 2006. Meanwhile, Play-
boy’s headquarters were moved to Bali to prevent further attacks and in July 
2006 Playboy published its second and third editions. This was followed by 
renewed complaints from the FPI and police investigations of models Fla 
Priscilla and Julie Estelle.
Eventually the public prosecutor only charged Chief Editor Erwin with vio-
lating Article 282 sections (1), (2) and (3) of the Penal Code, before the South 
Jakarta District Court. The primary indictment for this case was that Playboy 
depicted sexual photos or pictures which violated published decency and 
could be viewed by many readers.
However, on 5 April 2007 the panel of judges dismissed the suit since it held 
that the case should be heard under the Press Law instead of the Penal Code 
(2362/Pid.B/2006/PN.JakSel).123 This judgment was confirmed on appeal by 
the Jakarta High Court (255/Pid/2007/PT.DKI) on 22 October 2007.
Normally speaking this would have meant the end of the case, because 
acquittals (vrijspraak) and a ‘dismissal of proceedings’ (ontslag van rechtsver-
volging) cannot be subjected to cassation according to Art. 67 jo. 244 of the 
123 This decision was appreciated by AJI, through its press release No. 012/AJI-Adv/Siaran 
Pers/IV/2007 (5 April 2007), especially because the decision confi rmed the press law as 
the legal basis to solve this press confl ict.
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Criminal Code of Procedure (KUHAP). However, there is a law that allows 
for the proposal of appeal based on the Letter of the Ministry of Justice No. 
M.14-PW.07.03 of 1983 on Additional Guidelines to KUHAP Implementa-
tion. The annex to this letter, Number 19, stipulates that,
(i) ‘acquitted decisions’ cannot be appealed against;
(ii) nevertheless, depending on the situation and conditions, for the sake of 
law, truth, and justice, the ‘acquitted decision’ can be turned into a cas-
sation.
This letter is clearly in violation with the law, but the Supreme Court itself 
follows this guideline instead of the law. When the public prosecutor sent 
an appeal for cassation to the Supreme Court on 18 February 2008, this court 
decided to follow the ministerial guideline and examine the case. It then 
overturned the decisions of the lower courts, arguing that the High Court 
had been incorrect assuming that the Press Law serves as a lex specialis vis-à-
vis the Penal Code, because the Press Law holds no provisions on decency.
Law No. 40 of 1999 on the press does not regulate ‘the offence of disseminating writings, 
pictures, or objects which are known to violate decency’, or ‘anyone who intends to dis-
seminate, show or post these writings, pictures, or objects publicly.’
The court thus disregarded its own line of precedents, which – as we have 
seen – had consistently upheld the prevalence of the Press Law mechanism 
over the Penal Code. Regardless of whether this case is related to decency 
which could lead to sexual arousal, Playboy magazine remains a press prod-
uct and it has an editorial board which is responsible for publishing its con-
tents. For those reasons, the Press Law should prevail in this case as well.
Second, the judges held that the High Court should have taken into account 
Art. 27 (1) of Law 14/1970 on the Judiciary, which stipulates that judges 
should pay attention to ‘wisdom and values of society’, especially Islamic 
and traditional ones.
This proved to be only the prequel to an outrageous judgment (no. 972 K/
Pid/2008), passed on 29 July 2009.124 The Supreme Court adopted all argu-
ments of the public prosecutor without any objection to indictment, and 
convicted Erwin on the basis of Art. 282 to two years of imprisonment, as 
well as ordered his immediate arrest.
The judgment was followed by a whole array of events. Erwin refused to 
obey the summons by the public prosecutor, who then ordered his arrest 
on 7 October 2010 (Letter no. 160/0.1.14/Euh.2/10/2010) and put him into 
prison. This was clearly long after the passing of the judgment and in spite 
124 The Supreme Court’s panel of judges was chaired by Mansyur Kartayasa and the mem-
bers were Abbas Said and Imam Harjadi.
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of the protests by the FPI. Less than a month after the Supreme Court ruling, 
the latter had made a press statement in which they had called for the execu-
tion of the judgment, to put Erwin on the DPO (List of Wanted Persons), and 
asked the Minister of Law and Human Rights to annul Erwin’s passport to 
prevent him from leaving the country.125 The organisation had also called on 
its members to arrest Erwin and bring him to the prosecutor.
On the other hand, press organisations – the Independent Journalists Alli-
ance (AJI), the Indonesian Journalist Forum (FJI)126 and the Indonesian Jour-
nalists Association (PWI) – took action on behalf of Erwin. Nezar Patria of 
the AJI attacked the ruling: “The press organisation regrets to hear that the 
Supreme Court has applied the Penal Code instead of the Press Law. The 
judge should have applied the Press Law because Playboy magazine is a 
press product”.127 The Press Council made a similar statement concerning the 
failure of the Supreme Court to apply the Press Law128 and sent a letter to the 
President for support.
On top of this, three NGOs sent an amicus curiae (friends of the court) letter 
to the Supreme Court, requesting a review of its decision on Erwin Arnada.129 
Erwin himself applied for a review (Peninjauan Kembali) on 12 October 2010, 
and seven months later the Supreme Court passed judgment. The judges 
were in favour of Erwin and ordered his immediate release.130 The panel of 
judges, chaired by Supreme Court Chairman Harifin Andi Tumpa, made an 
unequivocal statement that should for once and for all settle the controversy 
about the relation between the Press Law and the Penal Code:
The prosecutor’s indictment is dismissed, because the prosecutor was inaccurate in mak-
ing his indictment as it did not apply Press Law, which prevails.
125 Press statement on the Playboy case, signed by Al Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab and 
KH. Sabhri Lubis, Head and General Secretary of the Central Leadership Board of the 
Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Jakarta, 25 August 2010.
126 See: Position Statement of the Indonesian Journalist Forum on the Press Criminalisation 
of Erwin Arnada, Bandung, 12 October 2010.
127 “Organisasi Pers Sesalkan Pidana Pemimpin Playboy,” Tempo, 28 August 2010.
128 Press Council Statement No. 07/P-DP/IV/2006. The Press Council also pointed out that 
there had been no violation of Press Regulation 8/Peraturan-DP/X/2008 on Guidelines 
regarding the Dissemination of Printed Adult Media. Such media cannot be sold to chil-
dren under 21, at schools or in religious places. The cover should moreover be covered 
and it should say “21+”. In case of violations, complaints can be fi led with the Press 
Council.
129 “Delik Kesusilaan dan Kemerdekaan Pers dalam Perkara Majalah Playboy di Indonesia: 
Amicus Curiae” was submitted by the Indonesian Media Defense Litigation Network 
(IMDLN), Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) and Institute of Policy Research 
and Advocacy (ELSAM) (2011).
130 “Erwin Arnada Bebas Hari Ini,” Kompas, 24 June 2011; “Indonesia: Court acquits Playboy 
editor Erwin Arnada,” BBC News, 23 June 2011.
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Hence, although the Press Law does not include norms on decency, there is 
no legal basis for the argument that cases regarding decency can therefore 
be tried under another statute. The Supreme Court’s judicial review deci-
sion has put beyond doubt that all press cases should be resolved under the 
Press Law.
In drawing a conclusion on decency-related matters in this section, it is obvi-
ous that decency and a restriction of pornography present a considerable 
conflict between competing values. There are at least three perspectives on 
the restriction of pornography: a liberal, a legal moralist, and a feminist per-
spective. Bakan wrote,
… all appear to agree that, in certain circumstances, restrictions on pornography are jus-
tified, but they vehemently disagree as to why and in what circumstances such restric-
tions are justified. Liberals argue that restricting pornography means curtailing freedom of 
expression and the right to individual liberty, and that such restrictions are only justified 
where the exercise of these rights and freedoms can be shown to cause harm to individuals. 
Legal moralists, on the other hand, argue that restrictions on pornography are necessary 
even where no harm to individuals can be shown. Pornography, they claim, is immoral, 
and the law must protect society from breaches of its moral standards. Feminists are not 
concerned with the moral or immoral nature of pornography, but with the harm that por-
nography causes to individual women. In this sense the feminist position is consistent with 
the liberal theory, although there is a reluctance on the part of many liberals to recognize 
this (Bakan, 1985: 1).
Considering Bakan’s description of the different views on a restriction of 
pornography, the illustrated cases above seem closer to a ‘legal moralist per-
spective,’ rather than a liberal or feminist one. With the ‘legal moralist per-
spective’ having become a dominant perspective in approaching decency 
matters in the press, several cases have been brought to the court or entered 
a judicial process to examine the issue at stake. Interestingly, although the 
court argued closer to the ‘legal moralist perspective,’ the decision did not 
articulate clearly what was meant with the term ‘harm to another individu-
al.’ Hence, criminalisation of decency issues in the press seems too excessive 
and creates injustices for press freedom.
The Press Code of Ethics (2006) also formulated a special article on pub-
lic decency. Article 4 states that, “An Indonesian journalist is prohibited to 
publish something fake, slander, sadistic, and/or obscene.” This article is 
formally elucidated by the Press Council as “point d: Obscenity means the 
depiction of erotic behaviour by means of photos, images, voices, graphics 
or writing which is solely intended to arouse lust.” Such definition provides 
no guarantee of press protection, since it can be interpreted widely. How-
ever, since this relates to the press, the Press Council has the authority to 
review and assess whether a particular news item is considered as obscene 
or not. The Press Council is in this regard expected to define clearer stan-
dards for decency than the judicial decisions.
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5.7. Conclusion: The Decriminalisation of the Press?
Karya jurnalistik tak layak dipidanakan!131
(Atmakusumah Asraatmadja)
This chapter has focused on press freedom in the light of criminal law. Indo-
nesia’s legal system has many criminal provisions that can be used against 
the press, some in the Penal Code, others in special statutes. Several of them 
have indeed been used to ‘discipline’ newspapers, including legislation on 
hate speech (haatzaai-artikelen), opprobrium or insult, spreading false news, 
and violating public decency. The way in which they have been applied 
shows that in many cases prosecutors and judges have shown little consid-
eration for the importance of press freedom.
Judges have seldom produced arguments that consider whether a criminal 
sanction is commensurate to the seriousness of the violation in the light of 
the importance of press freedom for the goals of a democratic society. Many 
judges have even disregarded the availability of a new statute, the Press 
Law of 1999, to prevent such one-sided reasoning and continued to apply 
the traditional criminal law provisions in such cases. In the end however, 
one should admit that there is also a positive development: the Supreme 
Court has in the large majority of cases upheld the primacy of the Press Law 
and clearly stated that cases concerning the press should refer to this stat-
ute. If judges feel bound to this fairly unequivocal line of precedents, much 
future problems should be prevented.
Under Soeharto criminal law was not the preferred mechanism to keep the 
press in line, but if needed it was used effectively, as we have seen in the case 
of Pop Magazine’s Rey Hanintyo (1974), AJI activists in 1995 (Ahmad Tau-
fik, Eko Maryadi, and Danang K.W.) and Suara Independen’s Andi Syahputra 
(1996). After Soeharto had stepped down the relative importance of criminal 
law in cases against the press seems to have increased rather than subsided, 
especially in those involving state officials and after Megawati took office 
in 2002, as illustrated by cases such as those of Rakyat Merdeka’s Supratman 
(2003), Bersihar Lubis’ column (2007), and Metro TV’s Upi Asmaradhana 
(2008).
Altogether, however, the situation has improved, which should come as no 
surprise given the nature of the authoritarian New Order vis-à-vis the Refor-
mation Era. The enactment of the Press Law has been central here. Not only 
does it prohibit the application of press banning, censorship and permits, 
it also provides more clarity about the role of the Press Council. Although 
many judges have had difficulty in understanding this, many judgments 
131 “Journalistic work is unworthy to be criminalised!” This statement was strictly spoken 
when I met Atmakusumah Asraatmadja for fi rst time in Leiden on 8 May 2009.
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– and in particular those of the Supreme Court – have shown an increased 
understanding of the new legal constellation. The Supreme Court has not 
only stimulated this development by its case law, but also by disseminating 
a Circular Letter to the courts in which they are summoned to involve a rep-
resentative from the Press Council as an expert witness in cases involving 
the press (Supreme Court Circular Letter 13/2008).
Nonetheless, criminal cases have continued to impact negatively on press 
freedom. Even if the outcome is not a conviction, a criminal trial in itself is 
already detrimental for journalism. Therefore, Susanto et al. (2010: 232) have 
argued that the Press Law should be amended to put beyond any doubt that 
it prevails over any criminal procedure. To this end, to Article 5 of the Press 
Law should be added that “No press crime can be held to exist before the 
‘right to reply’ and mediation by the Press Council have been tried.”
However, Susanto’s next suggestion is to allow for a criminal prosecution 
after the ‘right to reply’ and mediation by the Press Council have failed 
to satisfied the aggrieved party. This research argues that the application 
of criminalisation itself against journalists due to inaccuracy, unreliability, 
defamation, insulting, and so on, must not be allowed. The Press Council 
has sufficient power to punish a newspaper failing to live up to the Press 
Code of Ethics and is better positioned than the judiciary to do this. We have 
seen that the application of criminal law is always merely aimed at attacking 
journalists or the press, and it affects not only press freedom, but also fails 
to reflect the rule of law, democratisation and human rights. Hence, criminal 
provisions in press cases are no longer relevant.
Another opinion is offered by Syamsuddin in his dissertation (2008). Basi-
cally he argues that criminal law should not be applicable to the press if its 
reporting is done in the ‘public interest’. Moreover, the concept of ‘public 
interest’ in the Penal Code should be interpreted differently in cases con-
cerning the press. First, public interest in press activities must be interpreted 
as the people’s interest instead of state interest, group interest, an organisa-
tion’s interest or national interest. Second, public interest includes knowl-
edge about activities and/or public instruments and facilities that have 
‘public use’ or ‘public purpose,’ including central and local government’s 
procurement and operational activities for the benefit and utility of society 
either directly or indirectly. Third, since press activities are related to the 
right of citizens to access news information, news for people’s interest is 
news that has to fulfil honesty, objectivity, truth, impartiality, balance, qual-
ity and affordability requirements (Syamsuddin 2008: 301-304).
However, it is quite difficult to see how such an argument helps to provide 
press freedom protection on the basis of the interpretation of public interest. 
In practice, this Chapter shows that such criteria could lead to arbitrariness 
by the ruler, since an open flexible interpretation is detrimental for the press. 
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In other words, this chapter argues that, based on socio-legal observations, 
criminal provisions for press legal cases always have a negative impact on 
press freedom.
The core of the matter is whether criminal provisions can be tolerated at 
all if one wishes to take press freedom in Indonesia seriously. At present, 
a criminal law approach is still taught in law schools, which emphasises 
the importance of the Penal Code and other criminal provision for control-
ling the press – well-known as delik-delik pers (persdelicten or press crimes). . 
Such an approach misjudges the fact that the application of criminal law to 
the press cannot be separated from its political context. For this to change, 
the discussion among legal scholars in Indonesia should be broadened from 
doctrinal interpretation of the current criminal law to a full picture of press 
freedom and press control
This political context has changed dramatically over the years, while many 
of the criminal law provisions have remained the same. Originally, the Penal 
Code was a legal instrument for the colonial government to silence the 
nationalist opposition, while after Independence it has been used to support 
a new type of authoritarian regime. Such repression has continued to some 
extent during the post-Soeharto era and has thereby continued to threaten 
press freedom.
The criminal laws and cases discussed in this Chapter show that we are not 
merely discussing unjust law enforcement, but that there is a problem of 
substantive law. Criminal provisions provide a legal framework to suppress 
the press in spite of the constitutional guarantee of press freedom. Even 
though the Supreme Court in particular has stood up for press freedom on 
most occasions, criminal law has continued to be used to harass journalists, 
editors and publishers.
Therefore, this Chapter argues that criminal provisions are detrimental to 
press freedom in Indonesia. It has simply been too easy to misuse them and 
this will continue to be the case even if amendments or interpretations as 
discussed above will be implemented.
First, this historical overview has taught us that neither authoritarian nor 
post-authoritarian regimes have used criminal provisions with due regard 
for press freedom. This was quite evident during the Soeharto years, but since 
then cases such as Megawati versus Rakyat Merdeka (2003), Tomy Winata ver-
sus Tempo (2003), and Bersihar Lubis’ column (2007) have demonstrated how 
the government has continued to put media under pressure or even silence 
them. Apparently, the authoritarian regime’s assumption that the government 
is infallible has continued to hold sway and the government feels entitled 
to punish anyone who questions the state’s ideology or challenges policies. 
Thus, it seems that in this respect actually not so much has changed.
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Second, the words ‘written’ (tertulis) or ‘writing’ (tulisan) in the Penal Code, 
such as an article “Any person who with deliberate intent submits or causes 
to submit a false charge or information in writing against a certain person to 
the authorities, …” can be interpreted as a legal basis by the public and/or 
applied by the authorities to attack the press.
While the role of the state in reducing press freedom has diminished, private 
parties start to cause more harm (cf. Romano 2003: 174) – even if the pattern 
is slightly different. Interference with press freedom by vigilantes (such as in 
the case of Tomy Winata against Tempo, or the FPI’s attack on Playboy maga-
zine) have shown where this may lead to, with the state refusing to take 
action to protect the press. Press freedom needs a liberal environment but it 
also needs protection. The liberal perspective as its genesis is based on the 
notion that individuals should be free to publish in the news or mass media 
whatever they like without interference from government, other persons or 
groups (McQuail 1987; Lichtenberg 1987: 353). The facts show that the gov-
ernment could not prevent vigilantes to attack the press, which leads to the 
conclusion that it is therefore not a liberal one.
Third, it has become clear that in Indonesia a precedent is insufficient to pre-
vent criminal law prosecutions being regarded as unlawful, as the Supreme 
Court has time and again argued that press cases should be resolved on the 
basis of the Press Law, instead of the Penal Code. Notably in its judgment 
No. 1608 K/PID/2005, the Supreme Court made perfectly clear the follow-
ing three important points:
• The lower courts have been mistaken in applying the Penal Code, since 
the facts of the case showed that the accused had carried out its activities 
within the framework of the Press Law (point 82).
• With due regard to the philosophical foundation underpinning the Press 
Law that the national press is the fourth pillar in a democratic state, 
judges should contribute to developing case law in order to support 
the legal protection of press workers, and consider the Press Law as a 
lex specialis. The Press Law is not sufficiently able to protect press free-
dom, especially on the issue of ‘press crimes’ because of the absence of 
criminal provisions in Press Law, but these are enforced under the Penal 
Code. The press also stressed the importance of law instruments and the 
press code of ethics to ensure press freedom and to prevent the misuse 
of press freedom (point 83).
• Criminalising (the press) goes against press freedom and hence the rules 
under the Press Law should be prioritised over other rules (point 84).
Although the Supreme Court still allows for the possibility of applying 
the Penal Code, it is clear that it should be used with the utmost restraint 
and only as a complement to the Press Law. Of particular importance is the 
Supreme Court’s opinion that “strengthening press freedom” should be cen-
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tral and that punishment in principle goes against it. In short, this decision 
was a clear message from the highest judicial institution to avoid the use of 
the Penal Code for prosecuting journalists, editors or publishers, but it has 
not been heeded by the public prosecutors and the lower courts.
A fourth reason, which has only been touched upon in this chapter, con-
cerns the current international development of changing criminal provisions 
against the press into private law. In line with this development, Atmaku-
sumah Asraatmadja, a press expert and former chair of the Press Council, 
has stated that more than 50 countries have diverted the issue of malicious 
wording, insults, and defamation, from criminal law to private law. Several 
countries have even repealed the rules of defamation and insult because 
these were deemed insufficiently objective and therefore difficult to prove.132 
In his words:
…for the professional press, which for decades has been dreaming of press freedom from 
the threats of the political regime, 35 articles of Penal Code can be used against the press 
and journalists [...] which seems excessive. Moreover, those (criminal) articles can send 
journalists into jail for seven years. Whereas, ideally, in democratic states that guarantee 
press freedom, products of journalistic work shall never lead to journalists being sent to 
jail, but instead sentenced by a fine only. (Asraatmaja 2002: vii-viii)
International bodies such as the UN and the OSCE have also recognised the 
threat to press freedom posed by criminal defamation laws in particular and 
have recommended that they should be abolished. For example, the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly has called for the abolition of all laws that provide 
criminal penalties for the defamation of public figures or which penalise 
defamation of the state or state organs. The UN, OSCE and OAS Special 
Mandates have gone even further, stating that:
Criminal defamation is not a justifiable restriction on freedom of expression; all criminal 
defamation laws should be abolished and replaced, where necessary, with appropriate 
civil defamation laws.133
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) has expressed its concern sev-
eral times over the misuse of criminal defamation laws in concrete cases, 
recommending a thorough reform in countries as wide-ranging as Azerbai-
jan, Norway and Cameroon.134 In its General Comment No. 34, the HRC 
stipulates in paragraph 47, “State parties should consider the decriminal-
132 Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, personal communication, on 30 March 2010 in Leiden. 
Also Atmakusumah’s statement as quoted by Constitutional Court Decision No. 50/
PUU-VI/2008, page 8.
133 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression: Joint Declaration 
(2002), retrieved from http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.
asp?artID=87&lID=1 (4 June 2012).
134 Article 19, Criminal Defamation, retrieved from http://www.article19.org/pages/en/
criminal-defamation.html (4 June 2012).
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ization of defamation and, in any case, the application of the criminal law 
should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and imprisonment 
is never an appropriate penalty.”135 In addition, the Concluding Observation 
of the HRC on the Initial Report of Indonesia in 2013 stipulates under para-
graph 27, “The Committee is concerned at the application of the defamation 
provisions of the Criminal Code and Law No. 11 of 2008 on information and 
electronic transactions to stifle legitimate criticism of State officials (art. 19). 
The State party should consider revising its defamation law and, in particu-
lar, the Law on information and electronic transactions, to ensure that they 
are in compliance with article 19 of the Covenant.”136
Press freedom support organisations such as ARTICLE 19 similarly argue 
that all criminal defamation laws breach the guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion. However, in recognition of the fact that many countries do have crimi-
nal defamation laws which are unlikely to be repealed in the very near 
future, it has suggested interim measures to attenuate their impact until 
they are abolished.137
In response to such international developments, the Indonesian government 
seems to have actually started to reconsider the application of the Penal 
Code against the press. The Head of BPHN (National Law Development 
Agency, Ministry of Law and Human Rights), Prof. Dr. Ahmad M Ramli, for 
example, said that, “…. Therefore it is unnecessary to criminalise journal-
istic works.”138 He also stated, “… the threats against the press do not only 
consist of criminalisation, but also the massive private lawsuits against the 
135 General Comment No. 34 of Human Rights Committee on Article 19: Freedoms of opin-
ion and expression (102nd session, Geneva, 11-29 July 2011), (CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 Sep-
tember 2011).
136 Concluding Observation of Human Rights Committee on the Initial Report of Indonesia 
(21 August 2013) / CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1
137 (i) No-one should be convicted for criminal defamation unless the party claiming to be 
defamed proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the presence of all the elements of the 
offence, as set out below; (ii) The offence of criminal defamation shall not be made out 
unless it has been proven that the impugned statements are false, that they were made 
with actual knowledge of falsity, or recklessness as to whether or not they were false, and 
that they were made with a specifi c intention to cause harm to the party claiming to be 
defamed; (iii) Public authorities, including the police and public prosecutors, should take 
no part in the initiation or prosecution of criminal defamation cases, regardless of the 
status of the party claiming to have been defamed, even if he or she is a senior public 
offi cial; (iv) Prison sentences, suspended prison sentences, suspension of the right to 
express oneself through any particular form of media, or to practice journalism or any 
other profession, excessive fi nes and other harsh criminal penalties should never be 
available as a sanction for breach of defamation laws, no matter how egregious or blatant 
the defamatory statement.
138 “….Demikian juga tidak boleh ada kriminalisasi terhadap karya jurnalistik”, Ramly’s statement 
BPHN: Hukum Pers Masih Banyak Kelemahan, 20 May 2010, http://www.suarakarya-
online.com/news.html?id=253521 (accessed on 3 June 2012).
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press … there are no limits as to how much compensation must be paid by 
the press, and this can lead to threatening press freedom.”139
Thus, there is a glimmer of hope. The application of criminal provisions in 
cases concerning the press – and in particular those leading to the imprison-
ment of journalists – goes against building a more democratic public sphere. 
The cases in this chapter have made clear that they are merely used to pro-
tect the interests of the rulers and the elites associated with them. The only 
solution seems to be to decriminalise press cases, which is in line with inter-
national legal developments. In fact the enactment of the 1999 Press Law 
should have been sufficient to achieve this, but given the current attitude of 
the government, public prosecutors as well as many judges, it would be bet-
ter to abolish all criminal law provisions regarding the press.
139 “Gugatan Perdata Ancaman Kebebasan Pers”, Antara News, 20 May 2010, http://www.
antaranews.com/berita/187658/gugatan-perdata-ancaman-kebebasan-pers (retrieved 
on 5 May 2013).

6.1. Introduction
Just as criminal prosecutions, civil law suits pose a threat to press freedom. 
Many cases against the press have been brought to the civil court, mostly 
asking the court for damage compensation and/or rehabilitation because 
of news reports. Clearly, everyone ought to have the right to defend her- or 
himself against detrimental news, but – as we will see – this mechanism is 
open to abuse and has sometimes been deployed to attempt silencing critics 
by threatening them with serious material losses or even bankruptcy.
The use of private law to sue journalists or media owners reflects the ten-
sion between private and public law in the contestation between privacy, 
dignity, reputation and personality versus the public right to information. 
Although this is not stipulated explicitly in the Press Law (40/1999), the 
civil court mechanism is applicable as the last resort when the mediation 
process through the Press Council has failed. The civil court should also 
take into account the Press Law in determining the balance between private 
rights on the one hand and press freedom as a public interest on the other. 
This chapter will discuss to what extent the Indonesian civil courts have 
managed to strike such a balance on the basis of a legal analysis of civil 
court decisions, starting with cases under the New Order until approximate-
ly 2010. This analysis will be preceded by a brief discussion about the limits 
that can be imposed on press freedom within a private law context, and by 
an introduction into the main private law rules relevant to press freedom.
6.2. Private Law, Public Interest and Press Freedom
In providing accurate information to the public, the press serves the public 
interest. Journalists have to be professional in reporting news, in particular 
when it may be harmful to the interests of private persons. Press freedom 
does not provide a blanket protection, but only protects if it strikes a proper 
‘balance’ between private interests and the public interest in acquiring infor-
mation.
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Syamsuddin has argued that 
there are three criteria to help understand the term ‘public interest.’ First, pub-
lic interest as related to press activities must be interpreted as ‘the people’s
6 Press Freedom and Private Law
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interest,’ not a state interest, a group interest, an organisation’s interest, or 
the national interest. Second, public interest refers to activities and/or public 
instruments and facilities that have a ‘public use’ and/or ‘public purpose,’ 
including procurement and operational activities that provide benefits to 
society by the central, regional and local government. Third, public interest 
refers to the right of the people to access information, but only information 
fulfilling the following criteria: honesty, objectivity, truth, impartiality, bal-
ance, quality and affordability (Syamsuddin 2008: 301-304).
If we view the development of democracy as a public interest, then the rela-
tion with press freedom is evident, as accurate information is indispensable 
for the well functioning of a democracy. The disclosure of information bears 
directly on public decision making. Excluded from the protection offered by 
the need to further this public interest are the disclosure of false informa-
tion. The same applies to information that bears directly on public decision 
making, but violates private interests, such as another person’s dignity or 
privacy, in a disproportionate way. If such information has little or no rel-
evance to public education or to public decision making, it is less likely to 
pass the test of proportionality (Gordley 2006: 246-257).
These criteria are relevant to determine whether particular news qualifies for 
being in the ‘public interest,’ especially in relation to tort law (onrechtmatige 
daad or perbuatan melawan hukum) and to answer questions such as when 
reporting infringes on the rights of others, or how much evidence a reporter 
needs to be allowed to publish news going against someone’s interest.
6.3. Tort Law and Insult in Indonesia’s Civil Law
As there are important differences between countries regarding the arrange-
ments of tort law, I will first briefly explain the Indonesian system. The 
basics of tort law have been adopted from the former Dutch Burgerlijk Wet-
boek (Civil Code) and can be found in Articles 1365-1366 of the Indonesian 
Civil Code of 1848. Tort is known as a ‘perbuatan melawan hukum’ or ‘perbua-
tan melanggar hukum’ (onrechtmatige daad):1
Art. 1365: Any unlawful act causing damage to others shall oblige the person who caused 
the damage to pay compensation.2
Art. 1366: Anyone shall be responsible not only for damage caused by his action, but also 
for losses caused by his negligence or imprudence.
1 The original text is still in Dutch and uses the term onrechtmatige daad. There is no consen-
sus about the translation, some legal scholars using ‘perbuatan melawan hukum’ (Badrulza-
man, 1983; Djojodirjo, 1982; Agustina, 2003; and Satrio, 2005), others ‘perbuatan melanggar 
hukum’ (Prodjodikoro, 2000; Subekti and Tjitrosudibio, 2002).
2 This article was adopted from Article 1401 of the former Dutch Civil Code.
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Originally, Article 1365 was interpreted narrowly: ‘onrechtmatig’ (unlawful) 
was equated to ‘onwetmatig (infringing statutory law). This narrow inter-
pretation changed with the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision of 31 January 
1919 (Lindenbaum v. Cohen). In this case, the court included into the concept 
of unlawfulness behaviour infringing on “social norms deemed proper in 
social intercourse.” Indonesian courts have continued to follow this inter-
pretation (e.g. 3191/K/Pdt/1984 (Masudiati v. I Gusti Lanang Rejeg)).
The scope of liability is further regulated in Articles 1367, 1368 and 1369. 
Even more important for our purpose are Articles 1372-1380, which deal 
specifically with insult.3 The central articles are 1372 and 1373:
Art. 1372: The civil legal claim with respect to an insult shall extend to compensation of 
damages and to the reinstatement of good name and honour that were damaged by the 
offense. The judge shall, in the consideration thereof, have regard to the severity of the 
offense, as well as to the position, status and financial condition of the parties involved and 
the circumstances.
Art. 1373: The insulted party may also demand a judgment declaring that the insulting act 
is slanderous or insulting. If he demands a declaration that the insulting act is slanderous, 
then the provisions of Article 314 of the Penal Code with regard to punishment for slander 
shall apply. The sentence shall, if the offended party so requests, at the expense of the con-
victed party, be posted in public in so many copies and in the location as ordered by the 
judge.
Article 1374 adds that a declaration as mentioned in Article 1373 will not be 
applied if the defendant states before the court that “he regrets the act com-
mitted; that he therefore apologizes and that he considers the offended party 
to be a person of honour.”
These articles do not define explicitly what an insult is. The concept of insult 
is implicitly defined in Article 310 of the Penal Code:
(1)  The person who intentionally harms someone’s honour or reputation by charging him 
with a certain fact, with the obvious intent to give publicity thereof, shall, being guilty 
of slander, be punished by a maximum imprisonment of nine months or a maximum 
fine of three hundred rupiahs. (2) If this takes place by means of writings or portraits 
disseminated, openly demonstrated or put up, the principal shall, being guilty of libel 
be punished by a maximum imprisonment of one year and four months or a maximum 
fine of three hundred rupiahs.
(3)  Neither slander nor libel shall exist as far as the principal obviously has acted in the 
general interest or for a necessary defence.
If we look at the history of the law making process of the Civil Code in the 
Netherlands, it appears that the legislator intended to adjust the formula-
tion of insult in article 1372 to the meaning of slander under the Dutch Penal 
3 I use the term insult for what is originally ‘belediging’ in Dutch. This is usually translated 
in Indonesian as ‘penghinaan.’
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Code of 1884. According to Pitlo and Bolweg (1979: 363, in Satrio 2005) “[i]t 
is generally accepted that lawsuits on insult can be accepted only if there is 
a basis for criminal prosecution as stipulated under article 310 of the Penal 
Code.”
This has two consequences. First, those who defame or insult someone carry 
a ‘double liability’ under criminal and civil law (even if the two processes 
cannot be conducted simultaneously, see Art. 314(3) of the Penal Code). And 
second, on the basis of Article 1373, civil liability can only be assumed if the 
insult contains the elements stipulated in Article 310 of the Penal Code. This 
does not mean, however, that criminal liability automatically leads to civil 
liability. Article 1376 of the Civil Code adds that:
A civil legal claim with respect to the insult cannot be admitted, if it does not appear that 
there existed intent to insult. The intent to insult shall not be considered to have existed 
if the alleged offender apparently acted in the public’s interest or if he did so as an act of 
necessary defence.
Hence, there is a difference between a civil and criminal law insult. The 
‘intent to insult’ (in Dutch ‘het oogmerk om te beledigen’) cannot be found in 
Chapter XVI of the Penal Code, which says that the insult must be ‘delib-
erate.’ Satrio poses the question whether ‘intent’ in the Civil Code is simi-
lar to ‘deliberate’ in the Penal Code. Indeed, originally the Dutch Supreme 
Court in its judgment dated 10 January 1896 held that these concepts had 
the same meaning. However, in a decision of 22 January 1965 the Dutch 
Supreme Court argued that they were different, as someone might deliber-
ately state something in self-defence or to further the public interest (Satrio 
2005: 72-75). To what extent similar interpretations have occurred in Indone-
sia is unclear in the absence of relevant precedents.
The next issue is how to determine form and amount of indemnification. 
This is quite complex since there is no statutory standard. Neither Article 
1365 nor Article 1372 say anything about this, except for their reference to 
‘the losses’ caused by insults. Certainly, form and amount of indemnifica-
tion must be proportional, even if lower court rulings do not always follow 
this principle and in a very few instances the Supreme Court itself seems 
to have deliberately ignored it. As will be discussed later on in this chapter, 
some tort claims against the press even seem to have the intention of driving 
journalists or newspapers into bankruptcy.
However, the court cannot confine itself to looking at the Civil Code, but 
should also consider tortuous liability in the light of the Press Law, the 
Human Rights Law, the Public Disclosure Law, and other relevant statutes. 
In this manner the courts have to find a balance between the rights of the 
claimant, the rights of the public and the public interest in a wide sense.
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6.4. Procedural Aspects: Press Council and Civil Court 
Mechanisms
A preliminary question we need to answer is whether someone can file a 
lawsuit on account of insult to the court directly, or whether he or she first 
needs to address another forum. Some practioners answer this question in 
the negative, arguing that the Press Law does not sufficiently regulate insult, 
defamation and humiliation and how to address it. The statement of law 
enforcer, such as South Sulawesi Provincial Police Commander (Kapolda) 
Sisno, in the case of Sisno Adiwinoto v Upi Asmaradhana (2008). Sisno stated 
that [it was] unnecessary to use the ‘right to reply’ and the press mechanism 
under the Press Law, [as] journalists can be prosecuted in a criminal process 
(see this case further in the last part of this chapter). Several scholars are 
less certain, but still leave it to the potential plaintiff to decide whether to 
follow the procedure of the Press Law or to directly address the civil court. 
(Wahidin 2012: 57; Satrio 2005; Susanto et all 2010: 232). Satrio for instance 
holds that the victim of an alleged insult can simply choose whether to use 
the mechanism under the Press Law, the Penal Code or a civil lawsuit. He 
supports this position by reference to the absence of any support for a lex 
specialis argument from either the government or the Supreme Court. On 
the contrary, he argues, the government has maintained 42 articles on press 
offences outside of the Press Law and the Supreme Court has argued in 
277K/Kr./1979 that “[…] the Press Law does not reduce the defendant’s 
liability for insult or defamation” (Satrio 2005: 106-116).
There is however convincing evidence to the contrary. First, of course, a 1979 
precedent is of little value if we take into account that a completely different 
Press Law was in place at that time. Moreover, during the public hearing 
session on 6 June 2000, the parliamentary commission responsible for the 
debates about the Press Law (Commission I) unanimously supported the 
opposite opinion. It held that someone who felt he or she had been affected 
negatively by a news report should first use the right to reply provided for 
in the Press Law. If the dispute could not be resolved in that manner, the 
Press Council should be asked to mediate the dispute. Only after the media-
tion would have failed to satisfy one of the parties should the case proceed 
to court, with the opportunity that a ‘social punishment’ would be added to 
the legal one – such as the general public boycotting ‘dishonest’ news media 
(Asraatmadja and Luwarso 2001: 56-67). This idea was subsequently adopt-
ed by the Press Law, even if the intention of Parliament that this would be 
a compulsory sequence was not made fully explicit in the Press Law itself.
Hence, even if the Press Law does not provide special provisions on insult, 
defamation and humiliation, its mechanisms of ‘right to reply’ and ‘right to 
correction’ (Art. 5) are applicable. In addition, one may bring a complaint 
to the Press Council according to Article 15(2) c and d, which holds that 
the Press Council is responsible for “determining and monitoring the Press 
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Code of Ethics” and that the Press Council “gives consideration and seeks 
resolution of cases related to society’s complaints about news reports.”4 
The Press Council can issue 'legally binding decisions' in press disputes. The 
Council's procedural rules can be found in Press Council Regulation No. 3/
Rule-DP/VII/2013, which stipulates how the public complaints over cases 
related to press coverage can be lodged and how the Press Council should 
review them on the basis of the Code of Ethics of Journalism and the prin-
ciples of freedom of the press. 
There are three types of complaint (Article 2 of the Press Council Regula-
tion), concerning journalists' professional behaviour, violence against jour-
nalists and editors/press owners, and advertising (Article 13 of the Press 
Law). Such complaints must be lodged within two months after the incident 
that happened gave rise to the case, except for special cases involving the 
public interest. The Press Council does not deal with complaints that have 
been filed with the police or the courts unless the complainant withdraws 
his complaint or unless the police hands over the case to the Press Council. 
A complaint should be addressed within 14 working days, and the proce-
dure must be posted on the website of the Press Council.
The Press Council will examine the testimony of the complainant and the 
reported parties before issuing a decision. It can resolve cases through medi-
ation or through adjudication. The results of the mediation are signed by 
the parties and will not be disclosed unless the parties agree to this. If the 
mediation does not lead to an agreement, or if the case is decided in adjudi-
cation immediately the Press Council will issue a Statement of Assessment 
and Recommendations (Pernyataan Penilaian dan Rekomendasi). Adjudica-
tion takes the form of a decision in writing. Such a decision must be imple-
mented within 14 working days after the parties received the Statement of 
Assessment and Recommendations. If one of the parties fails to comply with 
the decision, the Press Council will issue a public statement specifically for 
this purpose. The civil court process is the last resort and can only be fol-
lowed after the resolution process in the Press Council has failed.
This view has been corroborated by Bagir Manan, former chairman of the 
Supreme Court and currently chairman of the Press Council:
4 According to Article 15 of the Press Law the Press Council has the following tasks: 'pro-
tecting press freedom from interference by third parties; conducting studies about  the 
development of the press;  establishing and overseeing the implementation of the Code 
of Ethics of Journalism; considering and resolving public complaints about cases relating 
to press coverage;  developing communication between the press, the public, and the 
government; facilitating press organisations in formulating regulations in the fi eld of 
press and improving the quality of journalists.'
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The 1999 Press Law must be applied at first stage prior to any court examination related 
to press cases. Law enforcers should understand the ‘speciality’ of the Press Law to exam-
ine press cases, especially when considering whether such a case has followed the mecha-
nisms of the ‘right to reply’ and the ‘right to correction,’ or mediation in the Press Council. 
Without applying the Press Law during the first stage, the case is unacceptable or inappro-
priate as a civil court case.5
In relation to Article 15(2c), there is a question whether the Press Council 
can impose a sanction for insulting news. The closing part of the Press Code 
of Ethics6 stipulates the following:
The final assessment on the violation of the Press Code of Ethics is made by the Press 
Council. Sanctions over violation of the Press Code of Ethics are imposed by journalist 
organisations and/or press companies.
Thus, the Press Council is only an examiner in this case and cannot impose 
any sanctions itself. Only after the Press Council has passed judgment find-
ing fault with the contested report may the aggrieved party address the civil 
court for compensation.
In conclusion, the plaintiff must first use his or her right to reply and/or cor-
rection. If he feels dissatisfied he must address the Press Council and only 
after that may he bring an action to the civil court.
6.5. ‘Pencemaran Nama Baik’ (Insult and Defamation): Lawsuits 
against the Press
Civil lawsuits against the press can be brought under several headings, 
but by far the most important are ‘insult’ and ‘defamation.’ These two con-
cepts do not correspond directly to the common law definitions, as already 
explained in Chapter 1. Under Indonesian law there are no clear distinctions 
between the two. I will refer either to insult, or if this happens orally I will 
refer to it as slander and if it happens in writing as libel. When I speak of a 
‘libel suit’ I refer to a lawsuit against the press because of a written insult.
I will now examine several libel suits from before and after the enactment 
of the 1999 Press Law. They have been selected on the basis of their legal 
importance, in that they contributed to new developments in press law 
(landmark decisions), but I have also added a few ‘famous’ (or notorious) 
cases, which have drawn much public attention.
5 Bagir Manan (the Press Council chairman), interview, Leiden, 26 March 2010. A similar 
statement is recorded in Kusumaningrat and Kusumaningrat (2011: 309-310).
6 Press Code of Ethics, appendix of Press Council Decision No.: 03/SK-DP/III/2006. This 
code was agreed after a workshop attended by 29 journalist associations, the Press Coun-
cil, and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, on 14 March 2006.
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6.5.1. Libel Suits before the Enactment of the 1999 Press Law (40/1999)
The number of cases before 1999 is extremely limited, in fact I could only 
find two: Ms Djokosoetono (Blue Bird Taxi) v Selecta Magazine (1981, Jakarta) 
and Anis v Garuda Daily Newspaper (1991, Medan).7 They were examined 
while different Press Laws were in place, viz. Law 11/1966 jo. Law 4/1967 
and Law 21/1982. However, both cases were brought under the Civil Code’s 
Articles 1365 and 1372-1380.
6.5.1.1. Ms Djokosoetono (Blue Bird Taxi) v Selecta Magazine (1981)
On 22 June 1981, Selecta Magazine’s issue 1031 printed an article called 
“Kasus Pengemudi Taksi Blue Bird” [The case of the Blue Bird Taxi Driver, pp. 
60, 61, 98 and 100]. The article referred to Bluebird’s owner, Ms Djokosoeto-
no, as of Chinese descent. Ms Djokosoetono objected to this description. She 
had married Mr Djokosoetono and they had been living as a Javanese fam-
ily, observing Javanese and not Chinese adat. According to the plaintiff this 
article harmed her public standing as well as her and her company’s good 
name and reputation. She felt that the effect of the article had caused public 
criticism and she felt a victim of a ‘trial by the press.’ Her company had 
since incurred financial losses and as a result she had fallen ill and her peace 
of mind had been disturbed.
Therefore, Ms Djokosoetono sued the chief editor of Selecta Magazine, Syam-
suddin Lubis, on the basis of Article 1365 of the Civil Code. She argued that 
both the defendant and the managing director of Selecta Magazine, Sahala 
R. Siregar, had been careless to the point of unlawfulness, and hence were 
liable for compensation of the damages the plaintiff had suffered morally 
and materially.
In its decision 497/1981/PN.Jak-Pst, the Central Jakarta District Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim, a decision that was confirmed on appeal by the 
Jakarta High Court through its decision 330/1983/PT. Jakarta.8 The plaintiff 
then appealed for cassation to the Supreme Court, arguing that only the 
Supreme Court was competent to decide on the interpretation of the term 
‘insult.’9 Moreover, she added legal opinions from former Supreme Court 
Chairmen Wirjono Prodjodikoro and Oemar Seno Adji. The former held 
(1993: 104, in the Plaintiff’s Cassation Note) that if a journalist publishes 
something for public purposes, it should not contain unnecessary or annoy-
7 According to Samsul Wahidin no private lawsuits were brought to court prior to his pub-
lication in 2006 (2006: 189).
8 Unfortunately, I have been unable to fi nd these decisions, only the reference to them made 
by Agustina (2004: 44-45). Hence, I could not analyse the legal reasoning in more depth.
9 Reference is made to Supreme Court Decision 27K/Sip/1972, 5 July 1972 for supporting 
this position.
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ing words. Seno Adji’s was quoted as saying that criticisms are allowed as 
long they are constructive and do not amount to a ‘formele belediging’ (a for-
mal insult). This is the case if a statement is unnecessarily harsh, without 
considering etiquette and good manners.
The Supreme Court, in its judgment 1265 K/Pdt/1984, upheld the appeal 
for cassation and found that the defendant had acted in an unlawful man-
ner. First, the Supreme Court held that the report went beyond the limits 
necessary to serve the ‘public interest,’ while hurting the feeling and reputa-
tion of the plaintiff. Second, this should be considered as defamation of the 
plaintiff, either as an individual or as the director of the Blue Bird Corpora-
tion, and therefore the defendant should pay a compensation of Rp. 100,000 
(approximately USD 58,82 in 1984) (Agustina 2004: 45).
This judgment was clearly flawed, for several reasons. First, the judgment 
limited itself to the Civil Code as the relevant legal framework and failed to 
consider the 1967 Press Law, which stipulated in Art. 15(3):
The chief editor must be responsible on redaction matters and has the obligation to serve 
the rights to reply and correction.
The plaintiff had not made use of her rights to reply and correction and 
therefore the case ought to have been dismissed. Furthermore, its reasoning 
was insufficiently clear, because the judges did not provide any criteria for 
assessing the limits of ‘serving the public interest.’
Nonetheless, Ms Djokosoetono v Selecta Magazine set a new standard for press 
freedom, in determining that it is not allowed to include an ‘unnecessary 
issue regarding race’ in the ‘assessment of an act which harms feeling, repu-
tation and also privacy.’ I have not been able to find any information about 
the influence of this judgment on journalists’ practice, but unlike most other 
cases this one has actually been referred to as a precedent in at least one civil 
court case.10
6.5.1.2. PT ALM (Anugerah Langkat Makmur) v Garuda Daily (1991)
PT ALM v Garuda Daily is probably the best-known case in the history of libel 
suits against the press. The court arguments in this case have been often quot-
ed, by journalists, lawyers and in later court decisions. It concerned a suit 
for libel under the Civil Code by the Anugerah Langkat Makmur Corpora-
tion, which had caused the removal of a school and a railway station in order 
to speed up its business operations. The locals had protested against these 
actions to the North Sumatra Parliament. According to PT ALM, this statement 
negatively affected the company and caused it to incur considerable losses.
10 In Asian Agri Corporation v Tempo Magazine.
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PT ALM then filed a suit against Garuda before the Medan District Court. In 
their judgment (14/Pdt/G/1990), the judges found that the defendant had 
acted in an unlawful manner by defaming the plaintiff, and they ordered 
Garuda to pay a compensation of Rp. 50 million (approximately USD 25,000 
in 1991). Garuda appealed to the High Court in Medan, but to no avail as the 
court confirmed the judgment in first instance (150/Pdt/1991).11
Garuda then appealed for cassation to the Supreme Court, arguing that the 
judex facti had wrongly applied the law because the news report had been 
produced in accordance with the ethical standards for journalism. The PWI 
(Indonesian Journalists Association) confirmed this, stating that the report 
could not be considered as an ‘unlawful act.’
The Supreme Court upheld the appeal in its judgment 3173K/Pdt/1991. It 
considered that on the basis of standards of ‘morals, ethics, ideals and law’ 
under Press Law 21/1982, the legal argumentation of the original plaintiff 
could not be accepted. The court clarified its finding as follows. First, Garuda 
had produced its report in a context of ‘openness and democracy,’ imple-
menting its function of social control to protect a group of people in Alor II 
Village, Sub-District of Babalan, Langkat, in the interest of the population 
of North Sumatra and the nation. Garuda had been right in not only repre-
senting the view of the government or companies, but in also making heard 
the voice of those suffering. The second reason was that the information 
published by Garuda was not coloured by ethnic, religious or racist feelings; 
it was truthful, and in accordance with moral and journalist ethics. If the 
original plaintiff felt that the facts were not true he should have used his 
right to reply, but he had failed to do so. Third, the Garuda journalist who 
had written the report had observed the standards of ‘investigative report-
ing,’ in seeking, finding, and scrutinising news sources.
The main difference between Ms Djokosoetono (Blue Bird Taxi) v Selecta Maga-
zine and PT ALM v Garuda Daily thus concerned the reference to the right to 
reply in the latter case, which was absent in the former. Apart from that, the 
cases are not as contradictory as one may think at first sight. Ms Djokosoetono 
(Blue Bird Taxi) v Selecta Magazine provided a clear message about the ‘prohi-
bition of racism’ as a limitation to press reporting. PT ALM v Garuda Daily is 
an important judgment, in being the first to take seriously ‘journalist profes-
sionalism.’ In this context the court referred to principles of ‘morality, jour-
nalistic ethics, and truthfulness.’ It also highlighted the importance of ‘open-
ness and democracy’ as the proper context for evaluating the lawfulness of 
news reports. And thirdly, for the first time the ‘right to reply,’ as stipulated 
by Art. 15 of the Press Law, was suggested as the proper preliminary mecha-
nism to deal with such cases. Even if not explicitly presenting the ‘right to 
11 Once again, I have not been able to fi nd these decisions. Their numbers have been taken 
from Supreme Court Judgment 3173K/Pdt/1991.
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reply’ as a mandatory mechanism, the court came quite close, explaining its 
importance in maintaining the balance between freedom and responsibili-
ties in reporting news in order to guarantee protection, safety, and welfare.
Anif v Garuda Daily thus introduced both new ‘substantive’ elements into 
examining libel cases as well as a procedural one and thus became a land-
mark case for press freedom.
6.5.1.3. Tommy Soeharto v Gatra Magazine (1998)
Just prior to Soeharto’s resignation from the presidency, during the chaotic 
political situation in 1998, Tommy Soeharto filed a lawsuit against Gatra 
Magazine for libel. The reason was a publication by Gatra which exposed 
Tommy’s involvement in drug trafficking in Australia. Tommy argued that 
Gatra had never asked him to confirm that the news was not true, and that it 
had tarnished his reputation.
The case was heard by the Central Jakarta District Court. In their judgment 
619/PDT.G/1998/PN.JKT.PST, the judges found that Gatra was not at fault, 
for which they provided a fairly elaborate argument. First, the report was 
‘accurate’ and did not mix up facts and opinions. The court also explicit-
ly considered that the news had been gathered ‘politely and respectfully’ 
as stipulated in Article 10 of the Press Code of Ethics. The Gatra journalist 
moreover always informed his sources about his identity.
Second, the report was professional and balanced in the sense of Article 5 
of the Press Code of Ethics. Neither did the news violate the principles of 
‘propriety, thoroughness, and carefulness,’ even if the plaintiff had not been 
found guilty of drug trafficking by a criminal court. Neither was it ‘insulting 
or sensational.’ This finding was based on the testimony of expert witness, 
R.H. Siregar, who held that the journalist had conducted a thorough inves-
tigation and had tried to check and recheck the facts he found, even if some 
of his requests for interviews to confirm had been rejected.
Hence, the court found that the way of reporting was not unlawful, or con-
stituting ‘libel,’ and rejected the claim for damages. Neither plaintiff nor 
defendant lodged an appeal. It is quite possible that Tommy decided not to 
appeal in view of the political uncertainty after his father had stepped down 
and because he was targeted as an ‘enemy’ of Reformasi.
The reasoning of the court was quite progressive in using the Press Code of 
Ethics as the standard for its evaluation, and thus went one step beyond PT 
ALM v Garuda Daily. We will now see whether this standard was also fol-
lowed in subsequent cases.
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6.5.2. Lawsuits after the Enactment of the 1999 Press Law
The enactment of the new Press Law in 1999 provided new hope for press 
freedom in Indonesia. As already discussed in Chapter 3, censorship, ban-
ning, and permits were no longer allowed under the law, but it remained to 
be seen to what extent the Press Law would also promote protection of press 
freedom in civil cases.
It is important to note that far more lawsuits against the press have been 
brought before the civil court after 1999. Furthermore, the amount of dam-
age compensation asked in most cases is extremely high, indicating that the 
main objective of the lawsuit is silencing the press through fear of bank-
ruptcy rather than trying to obtain a reasonable compensation for damage 
suffered.
This section addresses those libel suits that have attracted much attention 
from the public. Most of them were lawsuits against Tempo. I have selected 
these for two reasons, first, Tempo has a reputation for professionalism, and 
second, as the leading magazine of the country it wields considerable politi-
cal influence. These two reasons combined make the cases against Tempo 
genuine test cases for press freedom more generally. In addition I will look 
at the notorious cases of Soeharto v Time Inc. to complete this overview of 
leading cases.
6.5.2.1. Soeharto v Time Inc. (2000)
In the early post-Soeharto years, the most astonishing civil lawsuit was the 
one against Time for its article “Soeharto Inc.: How Indonesia’s Longtime 
Boss Built a Family Fortune” (24 May 1999, Volume 153 No. 20). It started 
in April 2000 and it took almost ten years before the final judgment was 
passed. According to the plaintiff, ex-President Soeharto, Time had com-
mitted tort by publishing tendentious, insinuating, and provocative state-
ments. These included, first, the picture of Soeharto and some of his luxuri-
ous properties on the cover, second, the statement that “a staggering sum of 
money linked to Indonesia had been shifted from a bank in Switzerland to 
another in Austria, now considered a safer haven for hush-hush deposits,” 
third, the statement: “Time has learned that $9 billion of Soeharto money 
was transferred from Switzerland to a nominee bank account in Austria” 
(pp. 16-17), and fourth, the statement: “It is very likely that none of the Soe-
harto companies has ever paid more than 10% of its real tax obligation” (p. 
19). According to the plaintiff this would constitute a violation of Articles 
1365 (tort) and 1372 (insult) of the Civil Code and therefore he filed a claim 
at the Central Jakarta District Court.12
12 Soeharto also reported Time to the police for violating Article 310 of the Penal Code, con-
cerning insult. This case was discussed in Chapter 5.
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The district court rejected all of the plaintiff’s arguments. The judges 
ignored the Press Law and argued that for the applicability of Article 1372, 
Article 1373 refers to Article 314 of the Penal Code. They interpreted this 
provision as requiring that such violation should be established first in a 
criminal procedure. While there is no legal basis for such an argument, the 
judges then returned to the right track when they themselves continued to 
assess whether the facts of the case transgressed the norms stipulated in 
the Penal Code. They found this not to be the case. Thus, the cover of Time, 
with the drawing of Soeharto ‘hugging’ luxurious houses, as well as Time’s 
statements mentioned above did not fulfil the criteria for being considered 
‘insult.’ Time had been sufficiently cautious in gathering its information, and 
when it asked Soeharto and his family for an interview to verify their data 
the request was declined.
Furthermore, the judges denied that Time had acted in a tortuous manner by 
stating that Soeharto’s companies never paid more than 10 percent of what 
they were due, since Time explicitly based this information on an interview 
with Teten Masduki, a leading anti-corruption activist. A lawsuit on this 
issue should therefore address Masduki, not Time.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the judges held that the Time 
report clearly intended to serve the ‘public interest.’ Referring to People’s 
Consultative Assembly Decree XI/MPR/1998 on State Governance that is 
Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, Time’s report 
was written out of concern about the misuse of power, corruption, collusion 
and nepotism and hence serving the public interest.
This judgment was confirmed by the Jakarta High Court. The plaintiff then 
filed for cassation to the Supreme Court. It took the Supreme Court some six 
years to produce an altogether different judgment (3215K/Pdt/2001), which 
it issued on 30 August 2007. The Supreme Court overturned the appellate 
court’s judgment on several grounds. First, the judges held that the lower 
courts had not considered whether Time’s report had violated the principles 
of propriety, thoroughness, and care as criteria under Article 1365 of the Civ-
il Code. Second, the lower court looked at liability under Article 1365 only, 
whereas the defendant had referred to Article 15 of the Press Law – which 
according to the Supreme Court only related to criminal and administra-
tive liability. Third, the judges accepted the plaintiff’s denial that the sources 
of the contested news report had already been published before, either in 
Indonesia or abroad, and therefore the defendant should have heeded the 
warning of the plaintiff. This in itself, according to the Supreme Court, was 
already sufficient to meet the ‘objective’ criteria of unlawfulness – the prin-
ciples of propriety, thoroughness, and care mentioned above. Therefore, 
Time’s news report was unlawful; an insult to a retired military general and 
former president, and a clear basis for a claim in material and immaterial 
damages.
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The judges decided to award part of the claim, ordering the defendants to 
apologise to the plaintiff for their news report in the following newspapers 
and magazines: Kompas, Suara Pembaruan, Tempo Magazine, Forum Keadilan, 
Gatra, Gamma, and Sinar, in three consecutive editions. Furthermore, the 
defendant was ordered to pay compensation to the plaintiff amounting to 
Rp. 1 trillion (approximately USD 100 million).13
This ruling caused a huge shock, both within Indonesia and internationally. 
NGO LBH Pers initiated a so-called ‘public examination’ in which it voiced 
serious criticism against the Supreme Court’s judgment (Wicaksono 2008). 
Many newspapers offered similar criticism,14 as did other NGOs through 
press releases. The international NGO CPJ (Committee to Protect Journal-
ists) condemned the ruling, and many lawyers, media, and journalist organ-
isations contributed to a brief to the Supreme Court (as amicus curiae) to 
support a review (peninjauan kembali) of the cassation judgment.15
Looking at the legal arguments used by the Supreme Court, one cannot 
escape the conclusion that this judgment was informed by political rather 
than legal considerations. Before this judgment was passed, the Supreme 
Court had already ruled several times in similar cases that the court should 
have prioritised the Press Law mechanism over a lawsuit on the basis of the 
Civil Code.16 The court also failed to pay attention to the ‘public interest’ as 
something that must always be taken into account in press cases according 
to Article 1376 of the Civil Code. And perhaps worst of all, the decision did 
not consider what the lower courts had established about the facts of the 
case. The Supreme Court acted as if the accuracy of the facts of the report 
and how this had been established were not important at all, whereas in 
fact the court was bound by the findings of the lower courts in this matter. 
Fifth, the judgment provided no reasons at all for determining the nature 
and amount of the damage the plaintiff would have suffered.
Two of the judges who examined Soeharto v. Time, Muhammad Taufiq and 
Bahauddin Quadri, had been clients of the lawyers for Soeharto – Indriyan-
to Seno Adji, Felix Tampubolon, O.C. Kaligis and Denny Kailimang – in a 
13 The council of judges consisted of German Hoediarto, Muhammad Taufi k, and Bahaud-
din Qaudry.
14 Atmakusumah Asraatmaja, “HAM dan Perkara Time” [Human Rights and the Time 
Case], Kompas, 13/9/2007; Nono Anwar Makarim, “Satu Lagi Saga Diskriminasi” 
[Another Story of Discrimination], Kompas, 26/9/2007, and Satjipto Rahardjo, “Apakah 
Pengadilan Itu” {What Kind of Court is This?], Kompas, 24/9/2007.
15 It was drafted and sent by 26 organisations from various countries. See: Mahkamah 
Agung Republik Indonesia: H.M. Soeharto melawan Time Inc, et al.: “Pernyataan Para 
Teman untuk Mendukung Permohonan Peninjauan Kembali’” [The Opinion of Friends 
to Support the Request for Review]. See: International Bar Association, “H.M. Suharto,” 
www.ibanet.org (retrieved on 12 March 2014).
16 These cases will be discussed below.
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case where they acted as plaintiffs when they appealed to the Constitutional 
Court for a constitutional review of Law 22/2004 on the Judicial Commis-
sion (Constitutional Court judgment 005/PUU-IV/2006). Hence, a conflict 
of interest on the part of the judges was quite possible.
Time indeed appealed for review to the Supreme Court, and eventually, 
on 16 April 2009, the Supreme Court reversed its own decision in 273 PK/
PDT/2008.17 The judges on the review panel agreed to virtually all the 
points of criticism voiced in reaction to the cassation judgment: the Time 
report should be considered in the light of the public interest, the authors 
had acted according to the Press Code of Ethics and had no intention of 
insulting the plaintiff; the report should be seen as a manifestation of the 
function of social control to protect state ownership and national interest; 
the cassation judgment had disregarded the Press Law, especially its provi-
sions regarding the importance of the public interest, as well as failed to take 
into account the requirement to look at both sides of a dispute and the right 
to reply. Soeharto had not attempted to exercise his right to reply before tak-
ing the case to court and Time had moreover already published Soeharto’s 
lawyer’s statement regarding the report in the same edition – as had indeed 
been recognised by the district court and the court of appeal. Finally, Time’s 
report was an effort to realise MPR Decree XI/MPR/1998, 13 November 
1998, concerning efforts against corruption, collusion, and nepotism.
While the cassation judgment was the Supreme Court at its worst, the review 
was the opposite: in a clear and well-reasoned judgment the Supreme Court 
applied all the relevant criteria based on the new Press Law, the Civil Code 
and legal precedents that had been established in the meantime. This judg-
ment has created more space for press freedom in Indonesia by adopting 
the Press Code of Ethics and the Press Law as basic rules for determining 
this space. The AJI was exhilarated, praising the ‘laudable argumentation’ to 
recognise the Press Code of Ethics as a yardstick for lawfulness and putting 
beyond any doubt the primacy of the ‘right to reply’ prior to court exami-
nation.18
6.5.2.2. Tomy Winata v Tempo (2003)
This heading covers four rather than a single court case in a strategic series 
of attacks on the press. It concerned four separate civil lawsuits filed by 
notorious business tycoon Tomy Winata, who has made a fortune in gam-
17 The judges’ panel for the review of the cassation judgment in Soeharto v. Time Inc. con-
sisted of Supreme Court Chair Harifi n A. Tumpa, Hakim Nyak Pa,, and Hatta Ali.
18 “Pernyataan AJI Indonesia Mengenai Pengabulan PK Majalah Time v. Soeharto: Penegak 
Hukum Harus Perhatikan Hak Jawab” [AJI Statement on Acceding the Judicial Review, 
Soeharto v. Time: Law Enforcer Must Pay Attention to Right To Reply], Press Release, 17 
April 2009.
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bling and other illicit activities.19 There are two main reasons why this case 
drew so much attention, even internationally, apart from the fact that Tempo 
– as we have seen – is the main protagonist of investigative and critical jour-
nalism in Indonesia. First, Tomy not only used ‘legal violence’ against Tem-
po, but also organised an attack by thugs against the Tempo office in Jakarta. 
Second, there were strong suspicions that Tomy connived with the police to 
prevent serious investigations against those committing the attack,20 and in 
administrating the criminal prosecution of Tempo’s Chief Editor Bambang 
Harymurti.21
Tomy’s intention to silence Tempo by all means, rather than by following a 
straight legal avenue, was already demonstrated by his not using the ‘right 
to reply’ mechanism. The table below presents an overview of the cases:22
19 In addition Tomy Winata is the owner of numerous companies, such as banks and hotels.
20 “Sangat disesalkan, Polisi Cuma diam saat Wartawan Tempo dipukul” [Very Distressing, 
Police Remained Quiet While Tempo Journalists were Beaten], Kompas, 13/3/2003.
21 This case was discussed in Chapter 5.
22 The table is adapted from Gasma (ed.) (2005: 21-23), and updated by the writer.
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Table 10: Overview of Cases after 1999 Press Law Enactment2324
No. Defendant Article Legal Case Summary Court Decision














and 5 (1) 
of Press 
Law 
Tempo IMH was sued for 
an ‘insulting statement’ 
in edition No. 6 
February 2003, with the 
title, “Governor Ali 
Mazi Denies TW 
Opening a Gambling 
Business.” It concerned 
a report alluding to 
Tomy Winata (TW)’s 
role in an investment 
into a gambling business 
in Southeast Sulawesi.
TW brought the case 
on 5 June 2003 and 
demanded 
compensation for 
material damages of 
Rp. 1 billion and for 
immaterial damages of 
US$ 2 million.
The South Jakarta 
District Court accepted 
part of the plaintiff’s 
claim and ordered 
Tempo to pay immaterial 
compensation of 
US$ 1 million and to pay 
a daily fine of Rp. 10 
million in case of non-
compliance (20 January 
2004).
The court moreover 
ordered Tempo to 
apologise through eight 
newspapers and 12 
television stations.
This judgment was 
overturned on appeal 
and the appellate 
judgment was upheld in 
cassation.
02 • Goenawan 
Muhammad 
(GM)






TW sued GM for his 
insulting statement in 
Tempo, 12 March 2003, 
that “[…] the state must 
not fall into the hands of 
gangster.”
TW brought the case on 
18 August 2003 and 
asked compensation for 
material damages of 
Rp. 1 billion and 
immaterial damages of 
Rp. 20 billion, as well as 
demanding that GM and 
Tempo apologise through 
a range of newspapers 
and television 
channels.22
The East Jakarta District 
Court awarded part of 
TW’s claims, ordering 
GM to apologise to TW 
through two national 
newspapers, with a 
daily fine of Rp. 10 
million in case of non-
compliance.
In 2009, GM and TW 
made agreement to end 
their dispute.23
23 They included Kompas, Republika, Suara pembaruan, Sinar Harapan, Suara Karya, Bisnis 
Indonesia, Asian Wall Street Journal, Herald Tribune, Gatra, Forum Keadilan, Gamma, Trust, 
Investasi, Warta Bisnis, Pilar, Time and television channels TVRI, TPI, RCTI, SCTV, ANTV, 
Indoesia, Metro TV, Trans TV, Trans 7, Lativi, CNN, CNBC, and BBC. All of this on front 
pages or during prime time.
24 This agreement has been made after the Supreme Court on 12 August 2009 decided to 
refuse GM’s cassation and ordered GM and Tempo to apologize through several medias. 
See: “Tempo dan Tomy Winata Berdamai,” Tempo, 6 October 2009, http://www.tempo.
co/read/news/2009/10/06/063201199/Tempo-dan-Tomy-Winata-Berdamai (retrieved 
on 24 March 2014).
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No. Defendant Article Legal Case Summary Court Decision















(1) and 6 
(c) of 
Press Law
TW sued Tempo for its 
report “Is Tomy in 
Tenabang?”, which he 
labelled as insult and 
defamation. The report 
suggested that TW had 
applied for market 
renovation just before 
the market concerned 
was destroyed by a fire.
TW brought the case to 
court on 5 June 2003, 
demanding material 
damage compensation 
of Rp. 100 billion and 
immaterial damage 
compensation of Rp. 100 
billion. 
The Central Jakarta 
District Court awarded 
part of the claim, on 
18 March 2004. The 
court ordered Tempo to 
pay Rp. 500 million in 
compensation, and to 
repeal the news.
The court also ordered 
Tempo to express its 
regret through several 
newspapers for three 
consecutive days, and 
to pay a daily fine of 
Rp. 300 thousand in case 
of non-compliance
This judgment was 
overturned on appeal 
and the appellate 
judgment was upheld in 
cassation.







TW brought a claim 
against Ahmad Taufik 
and Tempo IMI for 
slander and insult, 
concerning the former’s 
statement that TW must 
have been responsible 
for the attack against the 
Tempo office by Artha 
Graha’s thugs.
TW brought the case to 
court on 5 June 2003, 
and asked material 
damage compensation 
amounting to Rp. 40 
billion and immaterial 
damage compensation 
of Rp. 80 billion.
The Central Jakarta
District Court dismissed 
the case (niet ontvankelijk) 
for lack of witnesses.
The next section discusses two of these cases which led to a Supreme Court 
judgment.
6.5.2.3. Tomy Winata v Tempo IMH, Bambang Harymurti and Dedy Kurniawan
The immediate reason for this case was Koran Tempo’s news report of 6 Feb-
ruary 2003, which suggested that TW was involved in opening a gambling 
business in Southeast Sulawesi. TW brought the case to the South Jakarta 
District Court on 5 June 2003. According to TW’s lawyer the report contained
misinformation, was inaccurate, and not true. Koran Tempo was accused of 
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failing to recheck the information it had obtained and of not confirming the 
case with TW. This would be a violation of Articles 1365 and 1372 of the 
Civil Code, since the report tainted the reputation of the plaintiff. Accord-
ing to the plaintiff this was moreover in violation of Article 5(1) and (6) of 
the Press Law.25 In addition to the claims referred to in the above Table the 
plaintiff demanded the court to seize Tempo IMI’s properties.
According to the defendants the case ought to be dismissed because it was 
brought prematurely (prematuur exceptie), for the plaintiff ought to have fol-
lowed the Press Law mechanism for such matters. Second, the claim was 
unclear (exceptie obscurum libellum) because it mixed up the Press Law and 
the Civil Code. Third, it made no sense that the plaintiff only addressed the 
defendants (exceptie iurium litis consortium), for the same news had also been 
published by other newspapers or magazines – according to Supreme Court 
precedent 151 K/Sip/1972 including these in the case is obligatory. Fourth, 
the lawsuit was wrongly addressed (exceptie error in persona), because among 
those publishing this news Tempo had not been the first.
On 20 January 2004 the South Jakarta District Court passed its ruling. The 
judges refused all of the defendant’s arguments, stating that Tempo’s news 
report had been ‘defamatory and insulting’ and thus a tortuous act. The 
defendant was to publish an apology and pay a substantial sum of dam-
age compensation (see above Table). The court took no account of the Press 
Law, nor did it offer a clear explanation for why it considered the report 
‘defamatory and insulting.’ Its judgment was moreover in contravention of 
the applicable legal precedent on the use of ‘right to reply’ as set by PT ALM 
v Garuda Daily (from 1991, so before the 1999 Press Law was enacted).
Hence it is unsurprising that this judgment was overturned on appeal, a 
decision that was confirmed upon cassation. The Jakarta High Court refused 
all arguments by TW (358/Pdt/2004). However, because the appellate 
judges failed to take into full consideration the prevalence of the Press Law 
mechanism, not only TW applied for cassation but Tempo as well. In their 
ruling Supreme Court Judges Bagir Manan, Djoko Sarwoko and Atja Sonjaja 
awarded the claim by Tempo and put beyond any doubt that the ‘right to 
reply’ and ‘right to correction’ as regulated in the Press Law must be fol-
lowed before one can bring a claim to court. Not using them distorts the 
balance between the obligation to guarantee and protect press freedom and 
25 Article 5(1): The national press has the obligation to report events and opinions with 
respect for religious norms and moral norms of the public, as well as for the presumption 
of innocence. Article 6: The national press must: a. fulfi ll the public’s right to know; b. 
enforce democratic basic principles, promote the embodiment of supremacy of law and 
human rights, while at the same time respecting diversity; c. develop the public opinion 
based upon factual, accurate and valid information; d. conduct control of, provide criti-
cism against, corrections of, and suggestions regarding any public concern; e. fi ght for 
justice and truth.
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the obligation to protect individuals (931 K/PDT/2005). As we have seen, 
this argument was later confirmed in Soeharto v. Time. In fact, the judgment 
did not come as a surprise, because the Supreme Court argued the same in 
the other case by TW against Tempo, which I will now discuss (it was taken 
to the district court later, but eventually decided earlier).
6.5.2.4. Tomy Winata v Tempo IMI et al.
This case received more attention than the previous one because it also 
involved violence and terror against journalist and editors. The suit fol-
lowed the news report in Tempo Magazine (edition 3-9 March 2003, page 
30-31) that mentioned TW had applied for a market renovation in Tanah 
Abang (Tenabang) just before the market was destroyed by a fire. TW took 
issue with the suggestion that he would have been involved in arson. Such a 
suggestion was not made explicitly, but the facts mentioned by Tempo clearly 
pointed in that direction and according to TW caused unfounded suspicion 
and reflected negatively upon him. According to TW the report was tenden-
tious, insinuating, and provocative.
In his claim to the Central Jakarta District Court TW argued that Tempo had 
violated Articles 1365 and 1372 of the Civil Code, as well as Articles 5(1) 
and 6(c) of the Press Law. The defendants relied on basically the same argu-
ments as in Tomy Winata v Tempo IMH, Bambang Harymurti and Dedy Kurni-
awan, which was not surprising since they were so close in time. First, they 
stated that the lawsuit was too early because the plaintiff had not applied 
the Press Law’s mechanism of right to reply, second, that the plaintiff mixed 
up the Press Law and the Civil Code, and third, that the plaintiff should 
have addressed other parties who had published this news prior to Tempo. 
Moreover, the plaintiff did not address the responsible editor T. Iskandar 
Ali, as well as journalists Julihantoro and Wahyu Muryadi, who had been 
more involved than others who did appear on the list of defendants. The 
defendants added a counter claim (rekonvensi) for the material and immate-
rial damages they had suffered as a consequence of the mob attack by TW’s 
thugs against the Tempo office and its employees, on the basis of Articles 
1365 and 136726 of the Civil Code. Altogether Tempo claimed Rp. 200 billion 
and asked the court to pass an injunction ordering TW to apologise through 
newspapers, electronic media and magazines.
In its judgment 233/Pdt.G/2003/PN.Jkt.Pst, passed on 18 March 2004, the 
judges rejected all of the defendants’ objections and accepted part of the 
plaintiff’s claim. Just as in the other case involving TW and Tempo, without 
any serious supporting arguments the court held the defendants’ actions to 
26 Article 1367 of the Civil Code relates to the scope of liability, stipulating that: “Someone is 
not only liable for damage caused by himself, but also for damage caused by people who 
act under his responsibility or caused by things which are in his control.”
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be unlawful. It ordered Tempo to revoke its report and to express its regret 
through the newspapers Media Indonesia, Warta Kota and Tempo newspaper 
for three consecutive days, and half a page in Tempo Magazine – so not as 
excessively as had been demanded by the plaintiff. As already stated in 
the Table above, the judges awarded Rp. 500 million in immaterial damage 
compensation and a daily fine of Rp. 300,000 in case of non-compliance. 
Evidently, they rejected all of the defendants’ counterclaims. The judgment 
was quite similar to the one passed by the South Jakarta District Court in 
deciding Tomy Winata v Tempo IMH, Bambang Harymurti and Dedy Kurniawan.
However, just like in that case the district court’s judgment was reversed on 
appeal. In its judgment 314/Pdt/2004/PT.DKI dated 3 September 2004, the 
Jakarta High Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, but – again – just as in the 
earlier case, it did not rely on the Press Law. Neither did the court award the 
defendants’ counterclaims. This time Tempo et al. did not file for cassation, but 
TW did. In its judgment 903K/Pdt/2005, the Supreme Court followed the basic 
argument of the High Court, but added several considerations of its own:27
First, the cassation memorandum is unjustified, because the High Court as judex facti has 
not wrongly implemented the law and not gone beyond its jurisdiction. The press has the 
freedom to seek and impart information in order to fulfil needs for and rights to access 
information. In implementing its function, rights, obligations and role, besides respecting 
the human rights of individuals, the press must be professional, so then the public at large 
can control the press.
Second, in order to develop checks and balances, the Press Law has provided such a mech-
anism. Public control refers to the guarantee of the ‘right to reply’ and the ‘right to correc-
tion’ by watching the media and by the Press Council through various forms and ways. 
This mechanism is aimed to give equal protection to press freedom on the one hand, and 
the individual and public interest on the other hand.
Third, the ‘right to reply’ mechanism, ‘right to reply’ obligation and ‘right to correction’ are 
procedural aspects which must be passed through, before the press is required to account 
for its criminal/civil law liability, in the case of unlawful acts.
Fourth, press freedom is one of the fundamental principles guaranteed by the 1945 Consti-
tution and the Indonesian constitutional system, therefore it must be protected and guar-
anteed. However, it must be admitted that there is news which may cause suffering to 
individuals or groups in society, so then they need a procedure to protect their interests. 
Therefore, there must be order to guarantee the balance between the principle of press 
freedom and the individual’s or group’s interest. In order to create such a balance, there is 
a ‘special relation’ between the press and the individual and a group in society.
Fifth, the ‘special relation’ to guarantee press freedom and the individual interest, is regu-
lated in the special mechanism to determine the relation between press and individual or 
group. Universally, in democratic states which guarantee press freedom and the rights of 
the individual/group have a right to reply for individuals or groups who are disadvan-
taged by the press through the available press institution (in this regard, the Press Council). 
Thus, the ‘right to reply’ and the resolution through a press institution is the principle (not 
only the mechanism) which constitutes the balance between the press and the individual 
or group. As a principle, the use of the ‘right to reply’ through a press institution is the 
‘gate which cannot be denied or passed, but must be applied before engaging in other 
efforts, if not, it would deny the principle of a balance between the obligation to guarantee 
and protect press freedom and the obligation to protect individual and group rights.
27 Supreme Court Decision 903K/Pdt/2005, pp. 82-83.
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The judges also rejected TW’s objection against the use of the words ‘konon’ 
(reputedly) and ‘pemulung’ (scavenger) in Tempo’s news. The word ‘konon’ 
was used to indicate that it is an opinion held by others, so Tempo was right 
to qualify the statement in this manner. The word ‘pemulung,’ according to 
the Supreme Court, is actually neutral and not necessarily degrading. In 
fact, considering it as degrading would be humiliating to all those who are 
working as ‘pemulung.’ The Supreme Court thus rejected TW’s claim for 
cassation, a judgment passed on 9 February 2006 by Judges Bagir Manan, 
Djoko Sarwono and Atja Sondjaja.
This Supreme Court decision has further contributed to the importance of 
the press law mechanism. The right to reply and resolution through the 
Press Council have to be applied first before such a case can be taken to 
court. This promotes a balance between the obligation to guarantee and pro-
tect press freedom on the one hand and the obligation to protect individual 
and group rights on the other.
Nonetheless, these cases also show that lawfully criticising the rich and 
powerful is not easy. The press must be extremely careful in its investiga-
tions and write down the results in a very professional manner, paying full 
attention to the Press Code of Ethics. If not, it may be subjected to a civil 
lawsuit. The first instance judgments in the cases above moreover indicate 
that the lower courts – for whatever reasons – tend to side with the plaintiff 
in such cases.28 Fortunately, in the end the appellate court and the Supreme 
Court have provided clear guidelines on this matter, which, if followed, 
should make it much more difficult for the first instance courts to award 
such unjustified claims. Hence, in the end these cases represent an impor-
tant victory for press freedom.
6.5.2.4. PPM v Bambang Harymurti, Ahmad Taufik, and Leonardi Kusen (2003)
Another series of attacks against the press through the civil courts followed 
in the same year. In the first one Tempo was once again the target, but this 
time it was the Pemuda Panca Marga (PPM, a paramilitary organisation) 
which brought the case to court. The case followed a report by Tempo about 
PPM’s involvement in an attack on the office of the Commission for Dis-
appearances and Victims of Violence (KontraS) in Jakarta, on 27 May 2003. 
They said to be looking for KontraS co-ordinator Munir, who they claimed to 
have ‘destroyed the country’ by opposing military operations in Aceh. How-
ever, Munir was not at the office at that time and the group decided that the 
best thing to do was to vandalise the office. The attackers then moved to the 
28 International organisations also addressed the matter. Press freedom protagonist Article 
19 said that this ‘unjustifi able and exceptional action against a leading magazine sends a 
clear signal that criticism of the rich and powerful will not be tolerated’ (“Indonesian 
Magazine Guilty of Defamation,” Article 19: Press Release, 19 March 2004).
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PBHI (Indonesian Human Rights and Legal Aid Association) office to look 
for Hendardi, another activist opposed to military operations in Aceh. At 
the PBHI office, however, the group apparently ran out of steam and they 
did not cause any further damage.
These actions were widely discussed in public and covered by many news 
media. KontraS activists suspected military involvement in the attacks. 
Activist/priest Romo Sandyawan in a press release said that “it is clear who 
the people were who committed this violence. Their address is also clear. 
They have a secretariat at Kodim (Makodim Kemayoran 0501, or Military 
Office at District Level) [..].”29
Tempo magazine reported about these events on 8 June 2003 under the title 
“If Private Soldiers Act” [Kalau Tentara Swasta Bergerak]. PPM took issue with 
this report for using the words ‘gerombolan’ (gang) and ‘keluarga bekas ten-
tara’ (ex-soldiers’ family), which they claimed discredited their organisation. 
They brought a claim before the Central Jakarta District Court against Bam-
bang Harymurti (chief editor of Tempo), Ahmad Taufik (the journalist who 
wrote the report) and Leonardi Kusen (director of Tempo Inti Media Inc.). 
Judges Mulyani, Agus Subroto and H. Hamid started examining the case on 
11 August 2004. During one of the court sessions expert witness on journal-
ism, Abdullah Alamudi, testified before the court that,
the title “If Private Soldiers Act” fulfils the requirements of a news title. The use of the 
word “private soldier” is appropriate, because it uses quotation marks. The reason is that 
the group of people coming to the KontraS office were wearing camouflage/military uni-
forms [..]. From a journalist point of view, the use of such a title is relevant to describe the 
incident. If then those concerned feel discredited by such news, they must use their right to 
reply as stipulated under the Press Law.
Unlike in the earlier cases against Tempo the judges in their judgment (502/
Pdt.G/2003/PN. Jkt.Pst) rejected the plaintiff’s claim, which they held 
to be ‘excessive, obscure, and unclear.’ They argued that the plaintiff did 
not detail why the acts of each individual defendant could be qualified as 
unlawful. The plaintiff had moreover argued that the defendants had violat-
ed Article 1365 juncto 1372 of the Civil Code. The court accepted the defen-
dant’s argument that these articles, 1365 about tort and 1372 about insult, 
could not be combined. These articles furthermore only allow for compensa-
tion, while the plaintiff also asked the court to revoke Tempo’s permit and to 
halt its operations for two years. In addition, the plaintiff asked the defen-
dant to apologise as deemed fit by the plaintiff. This combination of claims 
was considered ‘ambiguous.’ In fact, the judges argued, the plaintiff tried 
to use the court in order to ban Tempo, an authority the court does not have. 
Revoking a non-existing permit (such a permit was abolished by the 1999 
29 “Kantor Kontras Diserang Massa” [Kontras Offi ce Attacked by Mob], Suara Merdeka Daily, 
28/5/2003.
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Press Law) made no sense either. On these grounds the court dismissed the 
case (niet ontvankelijk verklaard).
The court could actually have relied on the Press Law mechanism to obtain 
the same result, but then the Supreme Court had not yet passed judgment 
in the other Tempo cases discussed above. However, the court provided a 
few interesting arguments. First, in claiming damage compensation, the 
plaintiff must prove how the contested news report has caused damage to 
the plaintiff. Second, Articles 1365 and 1372 cannot be mixed up, but must 
be deployed separately, requiring different elements, as they serve different 
purposes.
6.5.2.5. PT RAPP v Tempo and S. Malela Mahargasarie (2007)
This case and the next one were brought during the second term of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Both concerned harm that had allegedly been 
inflicted on the SBY bureaucracy. The first one involved three reports by 
Tempo Magazine about the involvement of several high ranking government 
and police officials in illegal operations by the pulp and paper business in 
Riau. Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper, Inc. (PT RAPP) filed a lawsuit against 
Tempo and Tempo Magazine’s chief editor S. Malela Mahargasarie at the South 
Jakarta District Court, on 16 August 2007, for inaccuracy in reporting, vio-
lating the presumption of innocence, judgmental argumentation, spreading 
false information and tarnishing the reputation of PT RAPP. This would be 
in violation of the Press Code of Ethics.30
In fact the news about PT RAPP had already been reported by other media 
and had also been disseminated by the Indonesian Anti-Deforestation Com-
mittee.31 Nonetheless, according to PT RAPP Tempo had committed a viola-
tion against the Press Law and Article 1365 juncto 1372 of the Civil Code.32 
PT RAPP demanded that the court would state that the defendant had com-
mitted a tortuous act, creating losses for the plaintiff and degrading its repu-
tation. By way of fulfilling the ‘right to correction’ and ‘right to reply’ the 
defendant should publish an apology to the plaintiff and the readers of Tempo 
30 The news reports were the following: “Pertikaian Menteri Ka’ban dengan Polisi Memanas” 
[The Clash between Minister Ka’ban versus the Police Heats Up], Tempo Magazine 2181/
VII/6 July 2007; “Polisi Bidik Sukanto Tanoto” [The Police Targets Sukanto Tanoto], Tempo 
Magazine 2187/VII/12 July 2007, and “Kasus Pembalakan Liar di Riau, Lima Bupati Diduga 
Terlibat” [Illegal Logging Cases in Riau, Five Regents Allegedly Involved], Tempo Maga-
zine 2188/VII/13 July 2007.
31 The Indonesian Anti-Deforestation Committee (Komite Anti-Perusakan Hutan Indonesia), 
included Aliansi Buruh Menggugat, AJI Jakarta, Walhi, Sahabat Walhi, Sawit Watch, LS-
ADI, HUMA, ICEL, PBHI, Sarekat Hijau Indonesia, dan LBH Pers.
32 Interestingly, one of the lawyers representing RAPP was Hinca Panjaitan, who used to be 
a Press Council member (Tim LBH Pers, 2010: 213). He therefore must have understood 
that he ought to have referred his client to the Press Council instead of to the civil court.
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Magazine, express its regret and withdraw the report in the first full page of 
Tempo Magazine. The substance of this apology would be determined by the 
plaintiff. Further, the court was asked to declare sequestration of the defen-
dant’s property, as well as to order immediate execution of this judgment.
The demand to implement’ the ‘right to reply’ and ‘right to correction’ in 
this manner was a novel type of claim. The substance of the press law mech-
anism remained undisputed, but PT RAPP brought its claim before the civil 
court instead of submitting a complaint to the Press Council. In fact, origi-
nally the plaintiff did follow the Press Law procedure, for he had immedi-
ately sent a letter to Tempo in which he demanded that Tempo Magazine pub-
lish a reply and a correction. However, for some reason PT RAPP decided to 
subsequently sidestep the procedure. Tempo only followed the demand for 
publishing a reply after it was summoned to appear in court and did this in 
a small column in Tempo Newspaper only.
In its defences Tempo partly relied on this column, arguing that it had already 
fulfilled the requirement to publish a reply and a correction.33 Second, 
it argued that the court could not examine the case under the Press Code 
because this is a professional and not a legal norm. Only the Press Council, 
as a professional association, holds this authority, as stipulated under Article 
15(2) of the Press Law. Furthermore, Tempo argued that the lawsuit was ‘pre-
mature’ because the plaintiff had not first taken the case to the Press Coun-
cil. It would also be ‘premature’ because there was no executable criminal 
judgment about insult yet. The defence continued that the claim was unclear 
and obscure because it confounded the accountability of the first (Tempo Inti 
Media Harian Inc.) and the second defendant (chief editor S. Malela Maha-
rgasarie). It moreover combined Articles 1365 and 1372 of the Civil Code, 
which is not allowed. Finally, the news had already been reported by other 
media as well, and these should have been included in the lawsuit.
Substantively, Tempo argued that the report was written in serving the public 
interest and that it complied with the standards of careful reporting. Tempo 
had checked the facts with the Riau Police, which had confirmed that in 
order to supply raw materials PT RAPP was suspected of illegal logging in 
the Riau forest.34 The defendant also submitted a counterclaim, demanding 
that the court would stipulate that the lawsuit was a violation of press free-
dom and therefore a tortuous act itself.
33 The correction had been published in Tempo Newspaper 2202, 27 July 2007 and 2208, 2 
August 2007.
34 “Hakim Diminta Tolak Gugatan RAPP terhadap Koran Tempo” [Judge Asked to Refuse 
Claim of RAPP against Tempo Newspaper], Tempo Interaktif, 3 July 2008. <http://www.
tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2008/07/03/brk,20080703-127375,id.html> (retrieved on 
24 December 2011).
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In their judgment of 3 July 2008 (1089/Pdt.G/2007/PN.Jkt.Sel), the judges 
rejected all of the defences. They argued that the court had the authority to 
examine the lawfulness of the report on the basis of the Civil Code. In regard 
to the combination of Articles 1365 and 1372 the court held that 1365 could 
be used as a separate basis and that therefore this combination was not bar-
ring the proceeding of the case. As regards the alleged mixing up of the 
defendants, the court said that this would be taken into account in discuss-
ing the substance of the case.
According to the judges, the fundamental issue was the implementation of 
the ‘right to reply’ and the ‘right to correction.’ According to Articles 1(11), 
5(2) and 5(3) of the Press Law,35 so the judgment said, it is the obligation of the 
press to serve the ‘right to reply’ or ‘right to correction.’ How this should be 
done is not further elaborated in the Press Law and therefore the judges quot-
ed the statement of Widyatmoko Kukuh Sanyoto, expert for the plaintiff, who 
had explained that the ‘right to reply’ aims to create a balance between press 
and public. According to Widyatmoko, if the use of the right to reply does 
not lead to a satisfactory result, the aggrieved party can take the case to court.
Because the correspondence between the parties had never led to an agree-
ment about the reply and the correction, the judges concluded that the 
right to reply had not been implemented. The defendant had only made an 
erratum to the wording and the data, which according to the plaintiff was 
insufficient. Hence, the court found that the defendant had not served the 
plaintiff’s ‘right to reply,’ which is unlawful according to Article 5(2) of Press 
Law. The plaintiff had moreover suffered material and immaterial losses as 
a consequence of the defendant’s publication, which had harmed the plain-
tiff’s reputation. This was enough to fulfil the elements of Article 1365 of the 
Civil Code and the court ordered the defendant to pay compensation and 
apologise to the plaintiff in the manner demanded by the plaintiff, as well as 
through other media.36 The only slightly positive note for the defendant was 
the finding of the court that
Article 180 HIR juncto SEMA No. 3 of 2000 and SEMA No. 4 of 2001 prevent-
ed immediate execution. Obviously, the court rejected the counterclaim, by 
the notable argument that the Press Law did not strictly demand that such a 
case would be taken to the Press Council first.
35 Article 1(11): The ‘right to reply’ is the right of an individual or group to respond to or 
deny any news facts that are unfavourable for his or her good reputation. Article 5(2): 
The press has the obligation to serve the right to reply.
36 Magazines included Tempo, Forum Keadilan, Gatra, and Trust. Newspapers included Kom-
pas, Suara Pembaruan, Media Indonesia, Riau Pos, The Jakarta Post, Bisnis Indonesia, and 
Investor Daily. Electronic media included RCTI, SCTV, Metro TV, Trans TV, and Riau TV.
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It will be obvious that this judgment completely disregarded the case law 
developed on this matter by the Supreme Court in 903K/Pdt/2005 and 
931 K/PDT/2005. These judgments clearly stipulate the precedence of the 
Press Council procedure over a tort suit. Moreover, the South Jakarta Dis-
trict Court did not even consider the substance of the news and whether 
standards of proper reporting had been observed or not. In fact, the court 
should leave this to the Press Council, which has the expertise and legal 
authority for this, but if the court denies the precedence of the Press Council 
procedure it should at least look into this matter. Now the court found that, 
no matter what are the facts of the case, the press must obey the wishes of 
the aggrieved party.
Tempo appealed to the Jakarta High Court on 31 August 2009, and fortu-
nately Judges Parwoto Wignjosumarto, Jurnalis Amrad and I Putu Widnya 
demonstrated more legal sense. The court found that the reply and correc-
tion mechanisms had been used as intended by the Press Law. The question 
whether this had been performed properly, they argued, had been wrongly 
answered by the first instance court. Moreover, this question was not to be 
answered by the court but by the Press Council, as stated in Article 15(1) 
and (2) of the Press Law. Press Council Regulation 9/Peraturan-DP/X/2008 
about Guidance on the Right to Reply provides the standards for assessing 
whether reply and correction have been performed in a satisfactory manner. 
This was also in line with the requirement that parties should always try 
mediation before taking a case to court. On this basis the judgment from the 
South Jakarta District Court was quashed.
Although the High Court decision did not quote explicitly from the Supreme 
Court precedents, it used the same arguments. While in the end Tempo was 
put in the right, this case does show how continuously wrong interpretation 
of the Press Law by the first instance court, caused by paying no attention to 
legal precedent, creates a serious burden for the press. It then needs to spend 
time, energy and money on defending itself in court. This allows parties to 
use court procedure as a form of harassment, ultimately undermining press 
freedom in Indonesia.
6.5.2.6. Asian Agri v Tempo (2008)
The case of Asian Agri v Tempo was similar to PT RAPP v Tempo, again with 
the performance of the right to reply as the main issue. In an article with 
the title “Akrobat Pajak” (Tax Acrobats) Tempo reported about suspicions of 
tax fraud against the Asian Agro Abadi Group37 (Asian Agri). On the cover 
37 The Asian Agri Group refers to Asian Agro Abadi Inc., which consists of Inti Indosawit 
Subur Inc.; Rigunas Agri Utama Inc.; Raja Garuda Mas Sejati Inc.; Gunung Melayu Inc.; 
Supra Matra Abadi Inc.; Indo Sepadan Jaya Inc.;Rantau Sinar Karsa Inc.; Andalas Inti 
Agro Lestari Inc.; Mitra Unggul Perkasa Inc.; Tunggal Yunus Estate Inc.; Dasa Anugerah 
Sejati Inc.; Saudara Sejati Luhur Inc.;Nusa Pusaka Kencana Inc.
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Asian Agri owner Sukanto Tanoto was depicted as a somersaulting acro-
bat.38 According to Asian Agri, Tempo’s report fell short of the standards of 
accuracy and covering both sides, and had not properly served its obliga-
tion to allow Asian Agri to reply. Therefore, on 14 January 2008 Asian Agri 
brought a claim against Tempo for violation of Articles 1365 and 1372 of the 
Civil Code. Tempo basically used the same defences as in PT RAPP v Tempo, 
with the central defence that the case should have been first brought before 
the Press Council.
Just as in previous cases, the court in first instance acted as if there were no 
Press Council mechanism and no case law confirming its priority. Instead 
they focused on the question whether the elements of tort of Article 1365 
had been fulfilled. Two conflicting statements were produced by the experts 
asked to testify for either party to the dispute. Hernani Sirikit argued that 
the title and picture referring to ‘acrobatics’ was clearly insulting. Further-
more, the words ‘penyelewengan pajak’ (tax fraud) were used without quota-
tion marks, and therefore ought to be considered a conclusion drawn by 
the journalist himself. This could be qualified as ‘trial by the press’ because 
there was no court decision to this intent. Sirikit claimed a journalist would 
not be allowed to produce such an opinion. Thirdly, neither would journal-
ists be allowed to use ‘words of suspicion,’ unless they referred to an exter-
nal source holding them. If these guidelines were not followed, the media in 
Indonesia would end up producing ‘reports of suspicion’ (berita duga-dugaan 
saja) only.
By contrast, Atmakusumah Astraatmadjah argued that the media have the 
obligation to disseminate news, regardless whether it concerns facts or opin-
ions, which provides information, knowledge, education, entertainment, and 
should not impose limits on their topics. There is no need for a court decision 
before a journalist can use the words ‘suspecting,’ ‘preaching,’ or other terms 
deployed in the context of media reporting to describe possibilities, suspi-
cions or uncertainties. Those words are allowed in journalism, as long as the 
reporters have done their investigation with sufficient care.
In its judgment the court dismissed Atmakusumah’s arguments and, fol-
lowing Sirikit, agreed that Tempo’s news constituted a ‘trial by the press.’ 
Therefore Tempo’s report could be categorised as ‘insulting and attacking 
the dignity and reputation of another,’ thus violating Articles 1365 and 1372 
of the Civil Code.
Before coming to that conclusion, however, the court first had to consid-
er the question of whether Tempo had served the right of reply or not. The 
plaintiff had summoned Tempo to publish its reply and a correction three 
38 Tempo magazine 47/XXXV/15-21 January 2007.
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times, through its letters dated 21 December 2007, 8 January 2008, and 11 
January 2008. Tempo published Asian Agri’s reply in the form of a letter to 
the editor in its edition of 14-20 January 2008, which appeared on precisely 
the same day the lawsuit was registered at the Central Jakarta District Court. 
This reply, according the plaintiff, was insufficient. Tempo’s letter to the edi-
tor covered only 33 lines, followed by an explanation of the editor, whereas 
the plaintiff had wished to address 36 problems in 13 pages. The judges 
therefore found a lack of proportionality between the reply demanded and 
the one published, even more so because of its form as a letter to the edi-
tor and because the reply had been published more than one year since the 
original publication. This, they argued, was ‘insufficient and unprofessional’ 
and in violation of Article 11 of the Press Code of Ethics.
In their decision 10/Pdt.G/2008/PN.Jkt.Pst, the judges ordered the defen-
dants to pay a compensation of Rp. 50 million, and to publish an apolo-
gy to the plaintiff for the contested report in Tempo Magazine, Kompas, and 
Tempo Newspaper for three days, as well as a daily fine of Rp. one million 
for non-compliance with this judgment. The judgment made reference to 
Jakarta High Court Decision 113/1970/PT.Jakarta and Supreme Court 
27/K/Sip/1972, which hold that even if the Press Law guarantees freedom 
of expression, insult is still unlawful.
It needs little imagination to see the weakness of these judicial arguments. 
The judges referred to precedents from 1970 and 1972, based on a Press Law 
that had been replaced in 1982 already, and they disregarded the more recent 
decisions, such as 903K/Pdt/2005 (TW v Tempo on “Tomy in Tenabang?”) 
and 931 K/PDT/2005 (TW v Tempo on “TW in Gambling Business?”). In this 
manner they ignored the prevailing rules on the mechanism for resolving 
press cases before the civil court. Neither did they rely on the available prec-
edents for interpreting the proportionality of the reply and correction, nor 
did they ask the Press Council, as the most authoritative body in this field, 
to consider this matter.
No wonder Tempo was successful on appeal. The Jakarta High Court 
reversed the first instance judgment, arguing in the first place that PT RAPP 
ought to have addressed the Press Council first. The judges moreover found 
that the proportionality of the reply as published by Tempo could not be 
dismissed so easily, but had to be assessed in the light of the purposes of 
the ‘right to reply’ as determined by Press Council Regulation 9/Peraturan-
Dp/X/2008.39 Once again, the Press Council is the most appropriate insti-
tution to consider such a claim, hence this is where complaints should be 
39 Press Council Regulation on Right To Reply Guidance (Peraturan Dewan Pers No. 9/Per-
aturan-Dp/X/2008). It contains 17 points.
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addressed first (see point 17 of 2008’s Right To Reply Guidance).40 Neither 
party appealed for cassation.41
This case thus repeats the pattern we found earlier: the district court does 
not pay attention to precedent or the Press Law, but decides to adjudicate 
the case on its own terms. Fortunately, in this case the High Court acted as 
it should, thus strengthening precedent in the context of press legal cases in 
the civil court system and reinforcing legal certainty. It moreover added new 
arguments to sustain the priority of the Press Council in deciding all aspects 
of the right to reply.
During the period that this case was heard on appeal, the Supreme Court 
published Circular Letter 14/Bua.6/Hs/SP/XII/2008 on Asking Infor-
mation of Expert Witnesses (30 December 2008). It requires the civil and 
criminal court to invite experts from the Press Council in court proceedings 
dealing with press cases. It is likely that this circular letter will have more 
influence over the first instance courts than precedents (cf. Pompe 2005) and 
therefore this circular letter may at least bring some relief for the press.
6.6. Intimidation through Lawsuits
Because court decisions in press cases have often been inconsistent and 
uncertain, at least at the district court level, the civil court has become an 
institution which can be deployed to harass journalists, editors and press 
publishers. Nearly every journalist I interviewed considered civil lawsuits 
against the press as a means of ‘intimidation’ rather than as a process to 
sustain accurate reporting. I found this feeling to be spread widely all over 
Indonesia and not only in Jakarta.
Several reasons may account for this impression. The first one is the amount 
of money demanded as compensation. For individual journalists this stands 
in huge contrast to their limited salaries and modest social position. But 
even if it is not the individual journalist who is targeted, such compensation 
may potentially cause bankruptcy of the press or media company. It may 
also cause internal problems within boards of editors and journalists, with 
the former trying to shift responsibility to individual journalists – even if 
the Press Law clearly states that journalists are not directly and personally 
40 Point 17: A dispute with regards to the implementation of the right to reply is to be 
resolved by the Press Council.
41 “Adu Silat setelah Akrobat,” [Martial Arts Fighting after Playing the Acrobat], Tempo 
Online, 7 March 2011 <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2011/03/07/
KEC/ mbm.20110307.KEC136070.id.html> (retrieved on 28 December 2011).
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liable.42 Thirdly, the judicial process is usually time consuming, complicat-
ed and costly. It diverts the attention of journalists from their real job and 
disturbs their routines in gathering and disseminating information. Those 
without a legal background must learn about legal procedure, and even if 
the other side loses in the end and must pay for the costs of the lawsuit, a 
case may still require considerable spending on lawyers, experts, etc. Finally, 
some of these lawsuits are initiated by powerful figures who do not hesitate 
to add threats and mob violence to their claim.
Even if a lawsuit is generally accepted as the ultimate mechanism for dis-
pute resolution under Indonesia’s legal system, a lawsuit cannot be justified 
if it is merely used to attack journalists, editors and owners. In this section 
I will explore the criteria for labelling a lawsuit against the press as ‘unjus-
tifiable.’ Before turning to the ‘unjustifiable lawsuit’ I will first discuss the 
so-called ‘SLAPP’ (Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation), as these 
have been widely discussed in the scholarly literature and offer a good point 
of departure.
6.6.1. Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs)
The term ‘Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation’ or SLAPP, was 
introduced by Penelope Canan and George Pring (Canan and Pring, 1988a 
and 1988b). It resulted from empirical research into 100 lawsuits involving 
the press and how these impacted political values and participation in pub-
lic decision-making in the United States. SLAPP start with a civil complaint 
or claim, filed against individuals or organisations, about communication 
regarding an issue of public interest or concern. Canan and Pring (1988a: 
387) developed a four-pronged operational definition to capture the phe-
nomenon. To be a SLAPP, a case must be:
(i) a civil claim for money damages;
(j) filed against non-governmental individuals and organisations;
(k) based on advocacy before a government branch official or the electorate; and,
(l) about a substantive issue of some public or societal significance.
SLAPP are often brought by corporations, real estate developers, govern-
ment officials and other relatively powerful figures against individuals and 
community groups, who claim compensation for injury resulting from citi-
zens’ efforts to influence the government or sway voters on an issue of pub-
lic significance.
42 This applies specifi cally to those journalists who are not permanent staff, such as free-
lancers, correspondents, and stringers (interview with group of journalists at AJI Mata-
ram offi ce, Mataram, 25 June 2010). This was also mentioned by many journalists when 
they told their story during the “Press Legal Training for Journalists” in Surabaya, 4-5 
August 2012 and in Kediri, 11-12 August 2012 (LBH Pers and AJI Surabaya/Kediri).
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SLAPP are usually disguised as ordinary civil lawsuits based on traditional 
theories of law, including defamation, interference with contract or econom-
ic advantage, or conspiracy. Albeit most SLAPP are unsuccessful in court, 
they ‘succeed’ in the public arena. This is because defending oneself against 
a SLAPP, even when the legal defence is strong, requires a substantial 
investment of money, time and resources. The effect is the ‘chilling’ of pub-
lic participation in, and open debate on, important public issues, not only of 
the SLAPP defendants themselves, but also of other people who will refrain 
from speaking out on issues of public concern because they fear being sued 
for what they say. SLAPP thus impede proper public reasoning and decision 
making, by removing interested parties from this process. Thus, the court is 
used for ‘political retaliation’ and/or as a weapon in social conflict in such 
a manner as to discourage political participation (Canan and Pring, 1988b: 
507, 515).
In the United States there have been hundreds, or perhaps thousands of 
SLAPP against expressions ranging from circulating petitions, submitting 
letters to officials or newspapers editors, reporting police misconduct, com-
plaining to school officials about teacher misconduct, to even speaking at 
public or academic meetings (Canan and Pring, 1988b: 506). To counter 
the phenomenon, more than 20 states in the United States now have ‘anti-
SLAPP’ statutes that protect citizens’ rights to free speech and to petition 
the government. A key feature of these anti-SLAPP statutes is that they offer 
immunity from civil liability for citizens or organisations participating in the 
processes of government, for instance by written or oral statements made 
before a legislative, executive or judicial body or in any other official pro-
ceeding. When a citizen or organisation is sued for protected activities, anti-
SLAPP statutes provide for expedited hearing of a special motion to dismiss 
the SLAPP.
Albeit Canan and Pring did not explicitly discuss the press or the role of 
media, their main idea of SLAPP closely relates to how journalists and edi-
tors contribute to influencing opinions regarding public concern issues. 
Since the press has this strategic but difficult role, it has often been sued 
by those who are in power or have an interest in silencing public debate. 
It is therefore not difficult to apply the concept of SLAPP to refer to those 
lawsuits, where issues of public participation, democracy, and freedom of 
expression are at stake.
However, I feel that the concept of SLAPP does not fully cover the range of 
legal actions to stifle freedom of expression, especially in lawsuits against 
the press, and that we need a more specific and appropriate concept. First, 
SLAPP cover much more than cases against the press, which is a special 
sub-category. The press has a distinct character, due to its specific societal 
task. Second, while SLAPP are specifically about monetary compensation, 
many of the cases we discussed in this chapter are about other actions as 
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well. And third, these lawsuits are not always related to advocacy before a 
government branch official or the electorate, but to a broader range of public 
debate. I therefore suggest using the more specific concept of Unjustifiable 
Lawsuits against Press Freedom (ULAP).
6.6.2. Unjustifiable Lawsuits against Press Freedom (ULAP)
The idea of ‘Unjustifiable Lawsuits against Press Freedom’ (ULAP) first 
came to me after my reading of a Reporters Without Borders report with 
the title Unjustified Lawsuits by Church against Press Condemned.43 It describes 
how followers of the Brazil-based evangelical Universal Church of the King-
dom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus) filed dozens of lawsuits 
against the media. The sheer number of claims is important, because this is 
likely to go beyond affecting the accountability of a particular newspaper or 
magazine to freedom of the press more generally.
The findings of my research show a similarity between the Indonesian situ-
ation and the stifling of freedom of speech through SLAPP in the United 
States, but it differs in a number of respects (as I have argued above). Many 
of the lawsuits in Indonesia specifically target the press and are sometimes 
accompanied by violence in order to make sure that journalists and editors 
do not criticise the rich and powerful. These lawsuits do not target inaccu-
racy or unreliable information.
Nearly every journalist I interviewed said that if a journalist will make an 
investigative report on corruption or illegal business, he or she must not 
only consider the professionalism of his or her work based on the Press 
Code of Ethics, but also the readiness of the press company and its staff 
to face harassment.44 This can take the form of legal actions, intimidation, 
occupation and destruction of media offices, kidnapping, torturing and 
even murder. Editors and media owners must assure journalists of sufficient 
protection before the latter can write an investigative report.
If the main objective of a lawsuit is to intimidate the press, it qualifies as an 
ULAP.45 It consists of the following elements: first, an ULAP aims at profes-
sional journalism, i.e. journalism that is consistent in keeping up its qual-
ity standards and in following the Press Code of Ethics. Journalists must 
provide information in an accurate, comprehensive, reliable, timely and 
43 See http://en.rsf.org/brazil-evangelical-church-loses-two-more-26-02-2008,25861.html 
(retrieved on 29 December 2011).
44 Anonymous (a journalist in Mataram), interview, 24 June 2010; Damyanus Ola (editor of 
Pos Kupang newspapers), interview, 22 July 2010.
45 For Javanese, the term ‘ULAP’ is easy to remember, as it means ‘blinding.’
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understandable manner. Moreover, professional journalism requires consis-
tent and fair responses to the ‘right to reply’ and the ‘right to correction.’ 
Second, the lawsuit intends to cause damage to the media, in order to dis-
courage professional and critical journalism. Usually, the plaintiff demands 
an extraordinary amount of compensation, which exceeds the defendant’s 
financial capacity. A good example is the case of Radar Tegal v Cipta Yasa 
Multi Usaha Inc. (CYMA Inc.) in which CYMA Inc. sent a reply to Radar Tegal 
that was published almost immediately without any revision of its content.46 
Nevertheless, two weeks later CYMA filed a lawsuit against Radar Tegal 
claiming Rp. 247,4 billion, a sum that if awarded would cause bankruptcy of 
a newspaper the size of Radar Tegal.47 The lawsuit moreover aims at retalia-
tion rather than redressing incorrect reporting or reparation of damage.
An indicator that a claim concerns an ULAP is that a lawsuit is accompanied 
by intimidation, violence or forms of pressure on the court. It does not mean 
that a lawsuit without intimidation cannot be an ULAP, but this is an indi-
cator. Another indicator is that the news report concerns certain political-
economic interests, for instance the relationship between the government 
and business elites.
The use of the concept of ULAP extends beyond mere scholarly purposes. 
During my fieldwork I found that journalists often have difficulties in label-
ling this kind of attack on their work. The plaintiff uses legal action, but it 
is clear to the journalist concerned that this legal action is in fact concealed 
intimidation. Yet, it is difficult for the journalist to say it concerns an illegal 
action, but speaking of an ‘unjustifiable’ action provides a way out of this 
problem.
Applying the concept of ULAP to the cases discussed above, those of Tomy 
Winata against Tempo clearly qualify as such. Tomy Winata filed several law-
suits against Tempo reports that were the fruits of investigative journalism.48 
The investigation and reporting were conducted in a professional manner, 
with Tempo following the law and the Press Code of Ethics. The case more-
over concerned business interests and relations between business and offi-
cials, and was accompanied by mob violence.
46 It concerned the report PT. Cyma Belum Kantongi Izin [CYMA Does Not Have a Permit Yet].
47 Fortunately, in this case the court dismissed the claim because CYMA Inc. did not follow 
the Press Law procedure (10 May 2011). “Radar Tegal Lolos dari Gugatan” [Tegal Radar 
Free from Claim], Hukum Online, 10 May 2011, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/
baca/ lt4dc8f256a4039/iradar-tegali-lolos-dari-gugatan.
48 See above, Tomy Winata v. Tempo Inti Media Inc.
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6.6.2.1. Raymond Teddy v Seven Media (2009)
I will now discuss one other ULAP: Raymond Teddy v. Seven Media.49 The 
plaintiff, a well-known businessman, was reported to have been arrested 
while gambling in a luxury hotel in Jakarta, in October 2008. At the time of the 
arrest, Raymond had the status of ‘suspect,’ facing a criminal indictment for 
involvement in a gambling business in Jakarta. He disputed the publication of 
the news reports that he had been arrested by the police, for this, he argued, 
would lead readers to believe that he was considered guilty of the charges.
In response Raymond filed claims for damages on account of insult against 
seven media in four separate lawsuits in four different district courts. The 
amounts claimed varied from one case to the other. Suara Pembaruan for 
instance, sued by Raymond in the East Jakarta District Court, was confront-
ed by a USD 3 million claim. In the South Jakarta District Court, Raymond 
claimed USD 3,5 million from Republika and Detik.com. Harian Sindo (Seputar 
Indonesia) was sued for USD 2,5 million before the Central Jakarta District 
Court, and in the West Jakarta District Court, Kompas, Warta Kota and RCTI 
were faced by a USD 16 million claim. It was completely unclear how Ray-
mond had calculated his losses and what the relation was between these 
losses and the publications.
What made the case even stranger was that according to the police Ray-
mond had actually been arrested, and the information about the gambling 
was also gathered from official police statements. Yet Raymond argued that 
the information provided in the contested news reports was incorrect and 
‘false,’ even if he could not clearly point out how it differed from the official 
police sources. He also asserted in court that he had used his right to reply 
and lodged a complaint with the Press Council.
All district courts refused Raymond’s claims, on similar grounds. West 
Jakarta District Court Judgment 520/Pdt/G/2009/PN.Jkt.Bar. therefore 
suffices as an example. The court argued that the law allows one to bring a 
claim against the press if its reports hurt a private person, a group of people, 
an organisation or a legal institution, in order to require a reply to or cor-
rection of a news report. In case of a dispute on such a matter, section 17 of 
Press Council Regulation 9/Peraturan-DP/X/2008 determines that it must 
be resolved by the Press Council. The judges found that Raymond had not 
used this right to reply and right to correction, as he claimed, but had sent 
a legal summons to the defendants (somasi). Raymond then complained to 
the Press Council, but did not await its conclusion, the so-called ‘Statement, 
Assessment and Recommendation.’ Instead he also took the case to court, 
which is only allowed if the defendant refuses to follow the recommenda-
49 They were Suara Pembaruan, Republika, Detik.com, Harian Sindo, Kompas, Warta Kota, and 
RCTI.
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tion of the Press Council to publish a reply or correction. Finally, the news 
published was taken from police sources, and therefore Raymond ought to 
have addressed the police and not the press.
Margiono commented that Raymond’s lawsuits were efforts to instil the 
press with ‘fear.’50 Raymond Teddy’s claims are clear examples of ULAP. 
These lawsuits intentionally attacked professional journalism, claiming a 
huge amount of damages with a retaliatory purpose. His gambling business 
interests were apparently in need of protection from further scrutiny.
The outcome of all court cases was satisfactory, and they drew much atten-
tion from a wide variety of societal actors. Even the president spoke out 
about Raymond’s cases.51 Perhaps they backfired against the plaintiff. 
Most important perhaps is that the first instance courts finally followed the 
Supreme Court precedents with regard to the application of the press law 
mechanism and actually referred to the relevant Supreme Court Circular 
Letter as well as to the relevant judgments. All courts in this case considered 
the role of the special mechanism under the Press Law, including the use 
of the ‘right to reply’ and the ‘right to correction.’ If consistently followed, 
as argued earlier, these will lead to legal certainty and a solid guarantee for 
developing press freedom in Indonesia. In that case an ULAP loses much of 
its power.
6.6.2.2. The ‘Terminated Civil Lawsuit’: Sisno Adiwinoto v Upi Asmaradhana 
(2008)
A particular form of ULAP is the ‘terminated civil lawsuit.’ It starts as a 
‘normal’ ULAP, by a huge claim for damage compensation against journal-
ists, editors and/or media owners, which is beyond their financial capacity. 
The special feature of this type of lawsuit is that in the middle of the court 
process the plaintiff terminates his lawsuit, probably because he under-
stands that in the end he is not going to win the case. Yet, the lawsuit itself is 
already an effective form of harassment.
50 “AJI: Tak Ada Masalah Hukum di Perkara Raymond” [AJI: There is no Legal Issue in the 
Raymond Case], Republika, 12 May 2010.
51 “Tersangka Judi, Satgas Mafi a Hukum Soroti Kasus Raymond” [Gambling Suspect, Task-
force Legal Mafi a Clarifi es the Raymond Case], Republika, 19 April 2010; “Satgas Mafi a 
Hukum Dorong Penuntasan Kasus Judi Raymond” [Taskforce Legal Mafi a Urges the 
Resolution of the Raymond Gambling Case], Republika, 29 April; “Ketua MPR Minta 
Kapolri-Jaksa Agung Dipertemukan” [Chair of the People’s Congress Asks Head of the 
Police and Chief Public Prosecutor to Meet], Republika, 6 May 2010; “PBNU: Jangan Jadi-
kan Pers Korban Kasus Judi” [Leadership of the Nahdlatul Ulama: Never Let the Press 
Fall Victim to Gambling Cases], Republika, 7 May 2010.
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A well-known example of this form of ULAP is Sisno Adiwinoto v Upi Asma-
radhana. The dispute started with South Sulawesi Provincial Police Com-
mander (Kapolda) Sisno’s statement that it would be “…unnecessary for 
government officials to use the ‘right to reply’ and the press mechanism 
under the Press Law… journalists can be prosecuted in a criminal process.”52 
Upi was a Metro TV journalist, who in his capacity as a coordinator of the 
Makassar Koalisi Jurnalis Tolak Kriminalisasi Pers (KJTKP, Journalist Coalition 
Refusing Press Criminalisation) organised a three-day protest on account of 
Sisno’s statements (from 1-3 June 2008). The KJTKP’s action aimed at promot-
ing professional journalism and respect for the Press Law, also from officials.
First, Sisno lodged a complaint with the police, requesting that Upi be pros-
ecuted for violating Articles 207, 311 and 317 of the Penal Code for defama-
tion and insult.53 Next to this complaint, Sisno filed a civil lawsuit at the 
Makassar District Court, asking Rp. 30 million for material compensation 
and Rp. 10 billion for immaterial compensation, as well as a daily fine of Rp. 
100,000 in case of non-compliance with the court’s decision. Probably scared 
by this intimidation, Metro TV decided to fire Upi.
While Upi and his coalition criticised Sisno for a statement he made in his 
capacity as police commander, Sisno’s counterattack addressed Upi person-
ally. It was quite clear that Upi would never be able to pay the amount of 
compensation demanded. Maryadi, from AJI’s advocacy department, stated 
that “If the civil lawsuit is accepted by the Makassar District Court, Upi will 
be finished (habis). How is it possible that a former journalist, who was just 
fired by his employer (Metro TV) for his conflict with the police commander 
would be required to pay a compensation in billions of rupiahs?” (Mary-
adi 2009). AJI officially stated that Sisno’s lawsuit was a threat against press 
freedom in general54 – in particular because this case was extraordinary in 
the personal nature of the attack.
On 28 May 2009 Sisno withdrew his claim.55 By that time Upi had lost his 
job and had been in constant fear about the damage claims he was facing 
and his future as a journalist. It is likely that Sisno felt sufficiently revenged.
52 Sisno said this on 19 May 2008, during an offi cial meeting with all district heads in South 
Sulawesi.
53 This case was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
54 “Gugatan 10 Miliar Sisno Adiwinoto Merupakan Tekanan terhadap Kebebasan Ber-
pendapat” [Sisno Adiwinoto’s Claim of 10 Billion Appears to be Pressure against the 
Freedom of Opinion], press release of AJI Indonesia, 16 April 2009.
55 “Sisno Adiwinoto Batal Gugat Upi Rp 10 Miliar, Kuasa Hukum Mantan Kapolda Cabut 
Gugatan” [Sisno Adiwinoto Halts Claim against Upi, the Former Police Head’s Legal 
Attorney Withdraws the Claim], Tribun Timur, 29 May 2009.
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6.7. Conclusion
Before Soeharto stepped down, the number of civil lawsuits related to press 
freedom was relatively low in comparison to the number of criminal law 
cases. During the authoritarian regimes of Guided Democracy and the New 
Order the state dominated the press, among others by deploying the crimi-
nal court system in order to silence dissident voices. Atmakusumah, speak-
ing from his experience as a journalist during the New Order, said that at 
that time there were several reasons for this preference for criminal law. 
First, the criminal law system requires relatively little investment in time 
and money: after one has filed a complaint with the police, police and public 
prosecutor do the work. Second, a criminal conviction means a straight win 
in case of a conviction, as opposed to the sometimes equivocal outcomes of 
a civil lawsuit.56 After 1998 a combination of more democracy, decentralisa-
tion, and the rise of regional business elites caused an increase in civil law-
suits against the press and a decrease in criminal cases.57
As we have seen in this chapter, the main private law issue regarding the 
press is insult. This may be due to the absence of provisions on this issue in 
the Press Law. As argued by Effendi Gazali: “Our Press Law needs articles 
on ‘insult’ that are quite detailed, so that legal cases are not brought under 
other legal regulations because the provisions in the Press Law are unclear.”58 
However, we have also seen from the discussion of cases in this chapter that 
there is a legal development with judges increasingly often referring to the 
Press Code of Ethics as a supplementary source of rules to judge whether 
journalists have lived up to the standards of professional reporting. These 
standards then determine whether or not a news report is unlawful and 
hence insulting.
Nevertheless, procedurally speaking claims can only be made to the civil 
court after the procedures stipulated in the Press Law have been followed 
first. Thus, an aggrieved person should first use his ‘right to reply’ and ‘right 
to correction,’ and if the result is unsatisfactory he should address the Press 
Council. As we have seen in this chapter, in several judgments the Supreme 
Court has put beyond doubt that this mechanism holds priority over a case 
being brought to civil court.
Furthermore, we have found that the lower courts have been inconsistent in 
heeding these Supreme Court precedents. Moreover, they have also allowed 
plaintiffs to use the general Article 1365 of the Civil Code (usually in combi-
nation with 1372) to seek compensation, instead of the more specific Articles 
56 Atmakusumah Asraatmadja, personal communication, 6 December 2011, Tribuana Said, 
personal communication, 3 December 2011.
57 See Chapter 5.
58 Kompas, 24 November 2003.
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1372-1380 about insult, and they have been inconsistent in their interpreta-
tion of these articles. The most simplified interpretation of Article 1365 we 
encountered was that the press has acted in an unlawful manner and needs 
to pay compensation, without indicating in any detail how these injuries or 
losses have been measured or whether the ‘public interest’ was served by 
the report.
Another problem is that Article 1372 of the Civil Code refers to Articles 310-
321 of the Penal Code for specifying the requirements for the unlawfulness 
of an insult or defamation, whereas these articles are not sufficiently spe-
cific themselves. Elements of insult and defamation commonly referred to 
in other jurisdictions receive no attention in Indonesia, such as that the per-
son concerned must be identifiable, whether it concerns an intentional or 
unintentional communication of the defamatory statement to a third party, 
and that a false statement must cause harm or damage in order for it to be 
actionable. Other issues not well regulated in Indonesia – either by legisla-
tion or by precedent – are whether the plaintiff must establish that the com-
munication was false and published with negligence and, if so, how this 
must be established. Likewise, there are no clear rules on the specification of 
damages and its consequences for the compensation due, such as damage to 
esteem or social standing, damage through ridicule, damage to trade, occu-
pation, professional ability, etc. (cf. Overbeck 2011: 123-128).
Yet, several ‘landmark decisions’ can be pointed at which contain building 
blocks for a legally certain and proportionate protection of the press. Mrs. 
Djokosoetono (Blue Bird Taxi) v Selecta Magazine (1981) set boundaries to press 
freedom in referring to racial issues irrelevant to a case in assessing wheth-
er an act ‘unlawfully harms feeling, reputation and privacy.’ In PL ALM v 
Garuda Daily (1991) the Supreme Court introduced the Press Code of Ethics 
as the standard for determining whether a news report is unlawful or not, a 
position confirmed in Tomy Soeharto v Gatra Magazine (1998) and the review 
in Soeharto v. Time Inc. (2009).
In this ruling the Supreme Court moreover determined that the ‘right to 
reply’ and the mechanism for complaints to the Press Council, as regulated 
in the 1999 Press Law, have to be followed first before a tort case can be 
taken to the civil court. This decision has reinforced the special position of 
the press in issues concerning freedom of expression, thus recognising the 
importance of press freedom for the well-functioning of a democratic state. 
The way in which the right to reply should be exercised has been further 
clarified by the Press Council in its Right to Reply Guideline of 29 October 
2008. In the same year the Supreme Court issued Circular Letter 13/2008 on 
press expert witnesses, underlining once again the precedence of the Press 
Law over the Civil Code.
240 Chapter 6
Although these judgments and guidelines have reinforced the protection 
of press freedom, civil lawsuits are still used to harass journalists, editors 
and newspaper companies. Nearly all journalists I interviewed, regardless 
whether in Jakarta or elsewhere, said that many lawsuits aimed at intimidat-
ing them rather than at resolving a dispute. Such lawsuits can be labelled 
Unjustifiable Lawsuits Against Press Freedom, or ULAP. They are directed 
against professional journalism, demand an extreme amount of compensa-
tion, are often accompanied by intimidation and usually serve to promote 
political-economic elite interests.
Several cases taken to the civil court described in this chapter qualify as 
ULAP. The good news is that all of these cases were dismissed in first 
instance. Nonetheless, they do interfere with a proper functioning of the 
press, as they force journalists, editors and media owners to invest time and 
money in defending themselves. In my opinion, the fact that some of these 
cases were terminated by the plaintiff before the court passed judgment 
confirms that these plaintiffs are not serious about their demands and only 
deploy the lawsuit for the purpose of intimidation or retaliation. Perhaps 
one way to address ULAP would be to bring claims for tort against those 
using the ULAP. As far as I know, this has not been attempted, however.
Despite the ULAP and the problems with first instance courts not recognis-
ing the precedence of the right to reply and the Press Council procedure, 
the civil court seems to be developing into the mechanism of last resort as 
intended by the legislator when it passed the 1999 Press Law. If it would fur-
ther develop the criteria for tortuous action as indicated above, it may well 
become a legal mechanism capable of balancing the protection of individu-
als and/or a group interests against press freedom.
7.1. Introduction
Administrative court review is the third form of litigation that is of impor-
tance for press freedom. Most of the cases taken to the administrative courts 
relate to various publication or broadcasting permits. Before the administra-
tive courts were established in 1991 through Law 5/1986 (Law on Admin-
istrative Courts or LAC), such cases could be taken to the civil courts on 
the basis of government tort. In addition, cases against lower legislation of 
a general nature can be taken directly to the Supreme Court on the basis of 
Supreme Court Regulation 1/1993. Although there are far fewer administra-
tive law cases concerning press freedom than civil or criminal ones, some of 
them are very well-known; those of Prioritas (1992) and Tempo (1994) have 
perhaps even transformed the public debate about the relation between citi-
zen and state in Indonesia’s legal system.
The enactment of the new Press Law in 1999 meant a radical change in the 
field of administrative law control of the press. The law stated clearly that 
banning, censorship or permits were no longer allowed. Nonetheless, even 
if cases concerning the written press have become rare, the new law has 
not abolished the mechanism of administrative court or Supreme Court 
review. There are still instances of administrative law intervention in press 
activities, mostly in relation to broadcasting permits for radio and television. 
Moreover, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indo-
nesia or KPI), which falls under the Ministry of Communication and Infor-
mation Technology (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika or Menkominfo), 
may impose administrative sanctions which can be challenged before the 
administrative court. Such interventions and sanctions have indeed materi-
alised into several claims before the administrative court. These constitute 
the only cases relating to radio or television broadcast in Indonesia, for there 
have been no criminal or civil cases concerning these media.
This chapter examines whether the legal cases taken to the administrative 
court have been examined in a fair manner and whether the court has ade-
quately protected the interests of the justice seeker and press freedom. As it 
concerns relatively few cases nearly all of them will be discussed, starting 
with the New Order and continuing until the present.
7 Press Freedom and Administrative Court 
Review
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7.2. Administrative Court Review
Although ideas about establishing administrative courts circulated during 
colonial times, such courts were not established until 1991 (Bedner 2001: 
Chapter 2). The basis for the LAC was present in Law 14/1970 on Basic Prin-
ciples of the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which assigned 
judicial review of individual acts (or actions) to special courts under the 
authority of the Supreme Court and determined that regulations below the 
level of act of parliament could be challenged directly before the Supreme 
Court.1 After a failed attempt in 1982 (Bedner 2001: 26-31), the LAC was 
finally enacted in 1986, but would not come into force until 1991. Its man-
date is quite limited, with individual administrative decisions (keputusan) 
as the basic point of departure for jurisdiction and the explicit grounds 
for review limited to statutory violations and misuse of power, even if in 
practice the courts also applied principles of proper administration (Bedner 
2001: 97-99).
The LAC has been amended twice, by Laws 9/2004 and 51/2009. The first 
amendment introduced general principles of proper administration as a 
ground for review2 and provided a sanction for officials who refused to exe-
cute court decisions.3 Altogether it remains a rather limited system of review 
because of the limitation to administrative decisions that are “individual, 
concrete, and final.” Nonetheless, the administrative courts have adjudicat-
ed some important cases related to press freedom.
7.3. Administrative Law Cases Concerning Press Freedom prior 
to Administrative Court Review
Unlike criminal trials and civil lawsuits, cases concerning press freedom 
of an administrative law nature are very few in number. As already stat-
ed above, provisions allowing for censorship, banning and permits were 
removed from the Press Law in 1999 and the role of the administrative 
courts, which served to challenge such actions, diminished correspond-
ingly. However, even during the New Order, there were few cases, in spite 
of the government’s extensive use of administrative measures against the 
press. As noted by Mochtar Lubis, the New Order government perceived 
the publicity surrounding court proceedings against the press as potentially 
undermining its legitimacy and preferred to use administrative controls. 
1 Article 10 section (4).
2 The principles of good governance, as stipulated in Article 53 of Law 9/2004, are now 
based on the defi nitions of the Anti-Corruption Law (20/2001). This may make their 
application in an administrative court context problematic (Bedner 2010: 363).
3 Law 51/2009’s changes all pertained to management matters which hold no direct rele-
vance for the subject of this chapter.
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Newspapers and journals which fell victim to such measures doubted the 
effectiveness of challenging them in court. When Lubis asked Goenawan 
Mohamad of Tempo why he did not go to court to question the legality of the 
ban by the government of Tempo (see below), Mohamad dismissed this sug-
gestion as politically unrealistic. Kompas Chief Editor Jacob Oetama stated 
that “there is no way for the press to take an adversarial position against the 
government” (Lubis 1993: 267).
Undoubtedly, the most powerful instrument of press control by the Soeharto 
regime consisted of permits. As already discussed in Chapter 3, before 1982 
the government used two types of permits: the printing permit (Surat Izin 
Cetak or SIT) and the publishing permit (Surat Izin Penerbit or SIP). Indo-
nesia Raya, Abadi, and Nusantara were all banned permanently in 1974 by 
the withdrawal of these permits. Kompas, Sinar Harapan and Merdeka were 
banned in the same way in 1978, followed by Tempo and Pelita in 1982. None 
of these bans were challenged in court, even if this was possible on the basis 
of government tort in the absence of an administrative court. The 1982 Press 
Law and its implementing regulation, Minister of Information Regula-
tion 1/1984, then merged these permits into the one single publishing and 
printing enterprise permit (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbit dan Pencetak or SIUPP, 
henceforth publication permit). As argued in Chapter 3, officially the new 
publication permit could not be refused or revoked for reasons of censor-
ship (Bedner 2001: 179).
The first press ban after the introduction of the new publication permit 
was against Sinar Harapan in 1986, but the paper took no legal action.4 This 
was different in the second case, when in 1987 the minister of information 
banned the journal Prioritas because it ran reports on issues that were con-
sidered “too sensitive.”5 In the absence of an administrative court which 
he could address directly, Prioritas owner Surya Paloh decided to challenge 
Minister of Information Regulation 1/1984 on the basis that its provisions 
on the publication permit were in conflict with the 1982 Press Law as well 
as with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and opin-
ion.6 Eventually, he did this when the administrative courts were already in 
place, on 16 November 1992,7 but then the statute of limitation barred him 
from addressing the administrative court. This challenge attracted broad 
public attention and press coverage.
4 See Chapter 4.
5 See Chapter 4.
6 Surya Paloh was likely following Purwoto S Gandasubrata’s statement who announced 
in the press that if a judicial review were brought to court, he would consider it (Media 
Indonesia, 3 November 1992, in Pompe 2005: 144).
7 The judicial review application was made on 8 November 1992.
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In its decision 01P/TN/1992 of 4 January 1993, the Supreme Court dis-
missed the claim. The court did confirm its authority to hear such an appli-
cation of judicial review, as stipulated by Law 14/1970 on the Judiciary 
juncto Law 14/1985 on the Supreme Court. It held that judicial review could 
be applied in two ways, either indirectly when a plaintiff suffered the conse-
quences from the application of a regulation that was in violation of a higher 
statue. Such a case could then be taken to the first instance court, with the 
possibility of appeal and finally cassation to the Supreme Court. Alterna-
tively, the provision concerned could be challenged directly at the Supreme 
Court. However, in accordance with the legal principle of ‘audi et alteram 
partem’ (hearing both sides to a dispute), in this particular case the Supreme 
Court considered that a procedure for the review of Minister of Informa-
tion Regulation 1/1984 should involve the minister of information. Since the 
application for review did not address the latter as a defendant, the claim 
could not be further processed. The Supreme Court promised that in future 
it would provide a procedure for judicial review, to prevent such unclarities.
Surya Paloh was reportedly dejected by the decision, but later on expressed 
his satisfaction when within two weeks of this ruling the Supreme Court 
promulgated Supreme Court Regulation 1/1993.8 According to Pompe, 
opening up this possibility made both the Supreme Court and the govern-
ment vulnerable to criticism and forced them to justify their rejection of judi-
cial review actions (Pompe 2005: 146). Thus, the Prioritas case had implica-
tions that stretched far beyond mere press freedom.
The next press bans concerned Tempo, Detik and Editor in 1994. Tempo’s deci-
sion to challenge the revocation of its permit led to the first administrative 
court case in relation to the press, and is still one of the best-known in the 
history of administrative court cases.
7.4. Administrative Court Review of Press Bans
7.4.1. Goenawan Mohamad v. Ministry of Information
The first challenge to a press ban before the administrative court concerned 
the Tempo ban of 1994. The case was brought before the Jakarta adminis-
trative court by Tempo’s Chief Editor Goenawan Mohamad, and 40 Tempo 
journalists, against Minister of Information Harmoko.9 As already discussed 
in Chapter 3, this case evoked a strong societal response, both because of 
8 “Hikmah dari Kasus Prioritas” [Wisdom from the Prioritas Case], Tempo, 26 June 1993.
9 Actually, two claims were submitted to the administrative court, one by Goenawan 
Mohamad and his colleagues, the other by 43 employees of Graffi ti Pers corporation. Graf-
fi ti Pers corporation is the owner of Tempo and holder of the publication permit. The judg-
es followed their decision in the fi rst case in the second suit.
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Tempo’s stature as the leading journal in Indonesia and the hope for a change 
in the political situation. It has moreover been discussed by many political 
observers and academic scholars, also outside Indonesia.10
The case started with the revocation of the publication permits of two of 
Indonesia’s most famous weekly magazines, Tempo and Editor, and the tab-
loid, Detik, by Minister of Information Decree 123/KEP/Menpen/1994. The 
decree referred to Minister of Information Regulation (Permenpen) 1/PER/
Menpen/1984 and Minister of Information Decree on the Procedure and 
Conditions for Obtaining a Publication Permit 214A/KEP/Menpen/1984. 
These regulations had always been controversial, because they opened the 
way for press bans despite the prohibition of such bans by Article 4 of the 
1982 Press Law.
The lawsuit brought by Goenawan Mohamad and his colleagues was gener-
ally considered as having little chance of success, but against most predic-
tions and despite the ‘bureaucratic-authoritarianism’ of the New Order state 
the judges of the Jakarta administrative court decided that the revocation of 
the publication license had been unlawful.11 They found that the article that 
had been used as a basis for the revocation (Article 33 of Permenpen 1/1984) 
was indeed in violation with Article 4 of the 1982 Press Law. Yet, even if 
Article 33 of Permenpen 1/1984 had been valid, the minister had not fol-
lowed the correct procedure. According to Article 33 the minister can revoke 
a license only “if in the opinion of the Press Council [...], the press publisher 
and the publication no longer reflect a press that is sound, a press that is 
free and responsible,” and the Press Council had never stated such a thing. 
Third, the judges concluded that the decision was arbitrary. The defendant 
had paid no attention to the opinion of the Press Council, the interests of the 
publisher, and had not even heard the aggrieved party. Moreover, Mohamad 
and his colleagues could reasonably have expected that no such measure 
would be taken, as they had already published 12 issues of Tempo after hav-
ing received a warning in response to the contested publication that eventu-
ally led to the revocation of Tempo’s license.
The surprising outcome was reinforced when the Jakarta Administra-
tive High Court on appeal confirmed this judgment.12 The minister then 
appealed for cassation. In its decision 25K/TUN/1996, dated 13 June 1996, 
the Supreme Court judges undid all that had been achieved by the judges 
in first instance and appeal. The council of judges, chaired by Chief Justice 
Soerjono, and further consisting of Sarwata and Th. Ketut Suraputra, first 
argued that Article 33 under letter ‘h’ of Permenpen 1/1984 was not in viola-
tion with Article 4 of the Press Law, which prohibits press banning. For sup-
10 E.g. Bedner (2001: 179-182); Millie (1999: 269-278); Pompe (1997: 75-78).
11 094/G/1994/IJ/PTUN-JKT, dated 3 May 1995.
12 111/B/1995/PT.TUN.JKT, dated 21 November 1995.
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port they referred to the statement of expert witness A. Soekarno, a former 
official of the Department of Information, that the revocation of a publica-
tion permit differs from press banning because a press ban is permanent, 
while one can always apply for a new publication permit.
The second argument of the lower courts, namely that the procedure had 
not been followed correctly, was also rejected. According to the Supreme 
Court judges:
[…] the consideration of the judges in first instance and appeal stating that the Minister of 
Information in revoking the publication license had not yet heard the considerations of the 
Press Council as intended in Article 33 letter ‘h’ for the reasons according to the consider-
ations of the judges in first instance, is not correct and not true according to the Supreme 
Court, because the Minister of Information in issuing his decision had already heard the 
considerations of the Press Council which held a meeting on 21 June 1994, and moreover 
the decision of the Minister of Information does not have to be in accordance with the 
advice of the Press Council [...] because the power of the defendant to take this decision is 
a discretionary power of the Minister of Information, and moreover Article 9 of Permenpen 
No. 1 of 1984 says that the Press Council ‘may’ [which means that it does not have to] give 
its opinion by providing the Minister of Information with its considerations.
Third, the Supreme Court judges argued that the decision was not arbitrary, 
as Tempo had received six warnings prior to the revocation and had not 
bothered to address the minister to defend itself “nor shown any concern 
about the warnings, although between the last warning and the revocation 
of the publication license about four months had passed.” And finally, the 
Supreme Court stated that on the one hand the judges concerned argued
that Permenpen No. 1 of 1984 violated the Press Law and therefore the said regulation had 
been put aside or eliminated, while on the other hand they still have based their consid-
erations on Article 9 of Permenpen No. 1 of 1984 and finally [...] ordered the defendant to 
issue a new license for Tempo magazine, hence still on the basis of Permenpen No. 1 of 1984.
Bedner (2001: 179-182) has criticised the Supreme Court judgment as fol-
lows. First, the distinction between imposing a press ban and revoking a 
publication permit made no sense because the defendant had used the revo-
cation of the permit as a ban instead of limiting itself to the grounds for 
which a publication permit can be refused. This argument is in line with Mil-
lie’s opinion, who states that the most disappointing aspect of the Supreme 
Court decision is the ‘facile distinction’ it makes between the withdrawal of 
a SIUPP and a ban (Millie 1999: 275).
Bedner’s next point is that the Supreme Court’s argument of procedure was 
wrong on both counts. First, the Press Council had not discussed the Tempo 
case during its 21 June 1994 meeting, so the Minister could not claim that 
he had heard its opinion. Secondly, the revocation of the publication permit 
was based on Article 33 (h), which does not give the minister discretionary 
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power, but allows him/her only to quash a publication permit if the Press 
Council agrees.13
Blaming Tempo for not ‘actively defending itself’ against a warning made no 
sense, given that no such response is required. The Supreme Court further-
more disregarded the argument of the first-instance court that the measure 
had been disproportionate and that Tempo should have been heard before 
it was taken. The Supreme Court did not mention that the six warnings 
against Tempo had been given over a period of ten years.
Finally, Bedner claims – correctly – that the Supreme Court judges demon-
strated ignorance of basic concepts of administrative law. The first-instance 
court never quashed Permenpen 1/1984, but declared that its Article 33 (h) 
violated the Press Law and therefore could not be used as the basis for the 
litigated decision. The regulation itself remained unaffected. Hence, it could 
serve as a basis for a new permit, in particular because the issuance of a new 
permit involved provisions other than Article 33 (h).
I would like to add a few points to those made by Bedner. First, the adminis-
trative court judges at first instance or appeal level deserve our praise. They 
did not succumb to political pressure and produced excellent judgments. 
Unfortunately, this case bears testimony to Pompe’s thesis that under politi-
cal pressure the Supreme Court “may relapse into truly absurd reasoning in 
order to save the government” (Pompe, 1997: 75-78), and therefore the hope 
that the new administrative courts would better control and balance execu-
tive power had been in vain.
Second, the Supreme Court decision focused on issues of formality, espe-
cially claiming that the lower courts held no authority to review Permenpen 
1/1984. While this may seem a problem, as Bedner has argued, the admin-
istrative court did not go as far, but considered whether Article 33h was 
applicable in the case at hand.14 Moreover, this was not a primary argument 
of the lower court decisions, which focused on the substantive issue of why 
Tempo’s SIUPP was withdrawn.
Thirdly, I would like to add another argument against the opinion expressed 
by expert witness, A. Soekarno, who differentiated between press banning 
(pembredelan) with permanent consequences, or the withdrawal of the pub-
13 “… [a] publication permit that has already been given to a press publisher can be quashed 
by the minister of information after he has heard the Press Council, if [...] according to the 
opinion of the Press Council [...] the press publisher concerned no longer refl ects a press 
life that is sound, a press that is free and responsible.”
14 The Supreme Court did not refer to its previous decision 01P/TN/1992 [4 June 1993], in 
Surya Paloh v Minister of Information, where it explicitly left open the avenue of indirectly 
addressing a regulation below the level of act of parliament through the fi rst instance 
courts.
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lication permit, which theoretically could be reapplied for. In my opinion, 
these actions have similar consequences, as the press can no longer operate 
and the company must be closed down.15 This suggests a similarity between 
the SIUPP and the permit based on the Persbreidel Ordonantie 1931. Soeara 
Oemoem was banned on 23 June 1933 by the Governor-General after several 
warnings. Even if the owner of the newspaper was able to reapply, the with-
drawal of the permit was nonetheless called a ban. In general, there are no 
known cases of successful reapplication for a SIUPP enabling recommence-
ment of publication under the same title as before the withdrawal (Millie 
1999: 275). On the other hand, as explained in Chapter 3 and 4 of this book, 
the term ‘breidel’ (banning) itself did not necessarily indicate a permanent 
prohibition. The ban on Indonesia Raya is a clear example. On 23 April 1957, 
this daily was prohibited from being published by the CPM (Military Police 
Corps) Commander. Yet, it soon appeared again, until the next press-curb 
on 30 May 1958, based on Regulation 34/1958. Nevertheless, Indonesia Raya 
appeared again on 26 July 1958. Then Indonesia Raya was banned again by 
the Soekarno regime, until it received a publishing permit from the Minister 
of Information in 1968 (0632/SK/DIR/PDLN/SIT/1968). Hence, H.A. Soek-
arno’s interpretation of ‘once and for all’ for ‘breidel’ and the possible reap-
plication for a SIUPP after withdrawal is a-historical and not legally valid.
From Goenawan Mohamad v Minister of Information we can conclude that 
the early administrative court constituted a promising new mechanism 
for offering citizens protection against the government. However, this was 
quickly undone by the Supreme Court, which thus further removed public 
trust in the court system. This can also be concluded from Goenawan Moha-
mad’s statement after the Supreme Court judgment was handed down: “I 
am not surprised that this happened. The struggle of the press through the 
law track [procedure] is over, now we turn to the struggle through anoth-
er track. In the current political constellation we should not expect the 
Supreme Court to be willing to make a sound and independent decision.”16
15 Chair of the council of judges in the Jakarta Administrative High Court, Charis Subijanto, 
stated in response to the Supreme Court decision, “[…] A prohibition to talk or be 
silenced is similar to banning. Banning to publish or curbing has a similar meaning as the 
withdrawal of a SIUPP. It means it cannot be published. Hence, according to our opinion 
in the Higher Court, withdrawing a SIUPP means banning and curbing, not only the 
editorial team, but also the management of the company is discarded.” “Wawancara Cha-
ris Subijanto: Memang Persepsinya Sudah Berbeda” [Interview with Charis Subijanto: Indeed 
our Perceptions Differ], Tempo, 15 June 1996. <http://www.tempo.co.id/ang/
har/1996/960615_4.htm> (retrieved on 9 January 2012).
16 “Pernyataan Goenawan Mohamad: Usaha Melalui Hukum Sudah Selesai Dilakukan” [State-
ment by Goenawan Mohamad: The Effort through Law Has Already Been Halted], Tem-
po, 15 June 1996, <http://www.tempo.co.id/ang/har/1996/960615_5.htm> (retrieved 
on 8 January 2012).
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7.4.2. Developments regarding Administrative Court Review after 1999
As discussed several times in this thesis, the enactment of the new Press 
Law in 1999 constituted a landmark in press freedom. This applied perhaps 
most to the field of administrative controls, which for the written press were 
lifted altogether. It is presently no longer necessary to apply for a govern-
ment permit to publish a newspaper or a journal, with only an obligation 
to register as a legal body (Art. 1(2) juncto 9(2) of the Press Law). Despite 
this regulation, broadcasting media still need to obtain permits and dis-
putes about these have arisen. The permits concerned are defined in Law 
32/2002 on Broadcasting (BL), viz. the ‘broadcasting permit’ (Art. 1.14 jo. 
33, Izin Penyelenggaraan Penyiaran or IPP), and the ‘subscription broadcast-
ing permit’ (Art. 25(1), Izin Penyelenggaraan Penyiaran Berlangganan or IPPB), 
which should be obtained before one can apply for the former permit. Both 
must be obtained from the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi 
Penyiaran Indonesia or KPI) and the minister of communications and infor-
mation technology of Indonesia (MOCI).17
Just as with the publication permit (SIUPP), under the BL a broadcasting 
permit can be withdrawn. The reasons are specified in Article 34(5):
A broadcasting permit is withdrawn due to, (a) not passing the trial period of broadcast-
ing as predetermined; (b) violation of the use of the radio frequency spectrum and/or 
broadcasting coverage area as predetermined; (c) not having broadcast for more than three 
months without any notification to the KPI (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission); (d) 
transferring [the permit] to another party; (e) violation of the basic plan of broadcasting 
techniques and the technical requirements of broadcasting tools; (f) violation of the provi-
sion of the broadcasting programme standard according to an executable court decision.
Administrative sanctions may also be imposed on broadcasting media, as 
stipulated in Art. 55(2) of the BL:
Administrative sanctions as mentioned in section (1), can be: (a) a written warning; (b) a 
temporary sanction of a problematic programme after having gone through certain stages; 
(c) a limitation of broadcasting duration and time; (d) an administrative fine; (e) suspen-
sion of a broadcasting programme for a certain amount of time; (f) no renewal of a broad-
casting permit; (g) revocation of the broadcasting permit.
Such restrictions on broadcasting media are not particular to Indonesia – 
in a 1993 comparative study, Barendt found that broadcasting is generally 
more heavily regulated by the government than newspapers and other print 
media. Three reasons account for this: first, the airwaves are regulated as 
a public resource, and thus the government is authorised to license their 
use for broadcasting; second, frequencies for broadcasting are limited which 
further justifies that the government deploys licenses for sharing them; and 
17 KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia) is a new institution established by LB 2002, Article 1.13 
jis. Articles 7-12. At the lower level, it is named KPID (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia Daerah).
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third, the character of broadcasting is distinct from that of printed media, 
because broadcasting is much more pervasive and also uniquely accessible 
to children (Barendt 1993: 4-5).
When Indonesian broadcasting media encounter problems related to 
their permits, they may take such cases to the administrative court. In the 
next sections I will discuss the two cases I found where journalists indeed 
applied for administrative court review of administrative decisions relating 
to their broadcasting permits.
7.4.3. Radio Era Baru v Minister of Communication and Information
Radio Suara Harapan Semesta corporation (or also known as Radio Era Baru, 
REB) is a local radio station based in Batam, Riau. REB is the local affiliate 
of the Sound of Hope Radio Network, which is closely related to the Falun 
Gong movement. The station started broadcasting mainly Chinese-language 
news in Indonesia in March 2005, after having obtained recommendations 
from the mayor of Batam City (21 June 2004) and the governor of Riau (12 
August 2004), as well as a frequency permit from the Riau Branch Office of 
the Ministry of Telecommunication and Transportation (3 September 2004). 
At the time it commenced operations REB held no broadcasting permit yet, 
because the Riau Islands Branch Office of the Indonesian Broadcasting Com-
mission was only established in June 2005 and applications for broadcasting 
licenses (IPP) could only start to be filed in September of the same year. In 
December 2006 REB applied for an IPP.
A complication arose when the KPI enacted Regulation 3/2007 on the 
Change of the Broadcasting Programme Standard, which defined that only 
a maximum of 30 percent of all programmes broadcast could be in a foreign 
language. In response REB adjusted its offer of programmes to comply with 
the new standard. Nonetheless, in December 2007 REB found out from a 
newspaper announcement in the Batam Post that it had not been recom-
mended to the minister to obtain a permit and on 17 July 2008 the minister 
of communication and information officially rejected REB’s application in 
decision 162A/M.KOMINFO/VII/2008. Between December 2007 and the 
refusal in August, REB had already received two administrative warnings 
to stop broadcasting. After it received a third warning in October 2008, REB 
filed a claim with the Jakarta Administrative Court to challenge the refusal 
of the IPP.
According to their lawyer from the Legal Aid Center for the Press (LBH 
Pers), the refusal violated several principles of proper administration, par-
ticularly the principle of transparency, the principle of legal certainty, and 
the principle of accountability. Besides, the defendant would have exceeded 
the time allowed for releasing a decision as stipulated in GR 50/2005 on 
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Private Broadcasting Institutions, as the decision was taken on 5 October 
2007, but the letter of rejection was not sent until 17 July 2008. According to 
Article 5(2) the decision must be communicated within 30 days rather than 
nine months and 12 days.18
The violation of the principles of proper administration was sustained by 
the absence of any justification in the decision. This not only created uncer-
tainty for REB, but also for others who wanted to apply for an IPP in the 
future. Furthermore, during one court session it turned out that the minutes 
of the coordination meeting to prepare for the minister’s decision on the 
application (7 September 2007) showed that at that moment the KPID Riau 
Islands ranked REB second out of seven applicants for an IPP. No explana-
tion was provided why REB was dropped from this list entirely.
However, the Jakarta Administrative Court could not be convinced and 
rejected the claim. Judges Wenceslaus, Sri Setyowati and Bonnyarti Kala 
Lande argued that REB had been inconsistent in applying the 30 percent for-
eign language norm in its broadcasting. This violation of Article 38(2) on the 
Broadcasting Programme Standard, as stipulated in KPI Regulation 3/2007, 
would suffice to warrant the rejection of REB’s application.
The judges found that Article 5(11) of GR 50/2005 had not been violated. 
The KPID Riau Islands had good reasons to take more time in order to pre-
vent problems at a later stage. The judges moreover refused to admit as 
evidence a letter from the Chinese Embassy in which it complained to the 
Indonesian government about the activities of REB, as it considered this let-
ter a matter of politics and not of law. In other respects too, the processing 
of the contested decision had been carried out in a careful manner, in accor-
dance to the mechanism stipulated in Article 33(4) BL 2002 jis Articles 4, 5(6), 
5(10) and 6 of GR 50/2005.
REB appealed against this judgment on 24 April 2009, but the Jakarta 
Administrative High Court confirmed the first instance decision on 20 Octo-
ber 2009. REB then appealed to the Supreme Court. We will later provide an 
analysis of these judgments, but first we will look at another problem REB 
had to deal with in the meantime. This led to another administrative court 
case, which we will now discuss.
18 Article 5(12): “The approval or disapproval of the IPP as mentioned in section (10) shall 
be released by the minister within a maximum of 30 working days after the Joint Meeting 
Forum agreement.”
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7.4.4. Radio Era Baru v General Director of Post and Telecommunication 
(GDPT)
While the Supreme Court continued to undertake the administrative review 
of the rejection of REB’s application for an IPP, REB continued receiving 
warnings from the Monitoring Office of Frequency Spectrum (MOFS) in 
Batam that it should stop broadcasting.19 Then, without any legal basis,20 
and before the Supreme Court had passed judgment, on 24 March 2010 the 
MOFS and the police broke into REB’s radio station and seized all broad-
casting equipment.21 The Riau police started an official criminal investiga-
tion against REB Director Gatot Supriyanto for violating Law 36/1999 on 
Telecommunication. On top of this, the general director of post and telecom-
munication (GDPT) provided a Radio Station Permit (Izin Stasiun Radio or 
ISR) to Radio Suara Marga Semesta (RSMS), better known as Radio Sing, by 
Decision 01386004-000SU/2020092010, on 30 October 2010. The problem for 
REB was that the permit allocated Radio Sing the frequency of 106.5 MHz 
for its broadcasting, which was the same frequency as that had been given 
to REB in 2004 and which it had used since. REB only found out about this 
decision on 15 February 2010, when the MOFS sent a warning letter to REB 
to not use this frequency.
REB then filed a claim with the Jakarta Administrative Court, this time 
against the decision of the general director of post and telecommunication. 
REB argued that after the recommendations of the mayor of Batam and the 
governor of Riau on 3 September 2004, REB was given a permit to use the 
frequency of 106.5 MHz by the Provincial Office of Transportation (Dinas 
Perhubungan, which also dealt with telecommunication at the provincial 
level). REB had also used this frequency in its application for an IPP. The 
Certificate of Recommendation (Sertifikat Rekomendasi Kelayakan) from the 
KPID Riau, on 20 June 2009, also assigned REB the frequency of 106.5 MHz. 
REB’s lawyer argued that the decision to allocate this frequency to Radio 
Sing was premature and unlawful, whilst the administrative court review of 
REB’s IPP refusal case was still pending cassation. This would be in viola-
tion with almost all principles of proper administration, including (1) the 
principle of legal certainty; (2) the principle of orderly state governance; (3) 
19 These warnings were given on 16 December 2009 and 9 March 2010. In response REB 
fi led a complaint with the Press Council and the National Human Rights Commission 
(Komnas HAM) in Jakarta. The Press Council sent a letter to the minister of communica-
tion and information and the KPI, requiring an explanation for the rejection of REB’s 
permit application (23 March 2010).
20 The MOFS and police referred to the continued broadcasting as the basis for their action, 
but there is no regulation allowing seizure in such a case.
21 REB disputed the seizure and expropriation in the Batam District Court, but saw its claim 
rejected for the court argued that it held no jurisdiction to investigate these matters with-
in the limitations of the pre-trial process (praperadilan) (this decision was released on 27 
April 2010).
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the principle of public interest; (4) the principle of openness; (5) the prin-
ciple of proportionality; (6) the principle of professionalism; and (7) the 
principle of accountability. In addition it would go against Articles 5 and 7 
of GR 50/2005, which prescribe which procedure is to be followed before a 
frequency can actually be allocated.
The defendant countered REB’s arguments by saying that the statute of 
limitation had expired, and that the defendant was not the right author-
ity to bring a claim against (an ‘error in persona’). Substantively, the main 
line of defence was that a Certificate of Recommendation gave no right to a 
particular frequency. This meant that it was exchangeable and could easily 
be given to another station, in this particular case to Radio Sing. The defen-
dant also argued that there was no reason to postpone the implementation 
of the ISR for RSMS, because there had been no suspension order by the 
administrative court in the previous case of REB v Minister of Information 
(166/G/2008/PTUN-JKT.) Moreover, even if the Supreme Court would 
uphold the claim of the plaintiff, this did not create an obligation for the 
minister to approve REB’s IPP. Radio Sing, acting as an interventionist in the 
case, argued that it had followed all requirements of GR 50/2005 and that 
therefore REB had no reason to complain.
This time REB proved more successful. On 5 October 2010 the Jakarta 
Administrative Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim (61/G/2010/PTUN.
JKT). Referring to Supreme Court judgments 41K/TUN/1994 and 270 K/
TUN/2001, the judges argued that the plaintiff’s interest had been suffi-
ciently damaged to allow him to bring a claim and that the statute of limita-
tion had not expired because the plaintiff had brought his claim within 90 
days from the moment he found out about the allocation of the frequency to 
Radio Sing. The main findings on substantive matters were also in favour of 
the plaintiff. The basic argument was that indeed the General Director had 
been too quick in allocating REB’s radio frequency to another radio station. 
The Joint Meeting Forum22 had violated Article 5(9) of GR 50/2005, because 
it has no authority to change the frequencies proposed. Second, the court 
argued that the Joint Meeting Forum had violated article 115 of the LAC, 
which stipulates that “… [o]nly court decisions which have become final 
(in kracht van gewijsde) can be implemented.” As the court case between REB 
and the minister of communication and information had not been decided 
yet by the Supreme Court the Joint Meeting Forum’s decision was prema-
ture. Therefore, the defendant had not been sufficiently careful, and it ought 
to revoke the contested decision.
22 Proceedings of Joint Meeting Forum No. 01/FRB/KEPRI/10/2007 (particular for private 
broadcasting institutions in Riau).
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This judgment was confirmed upon appeal by 272/B/2010/PT.TUN.JKT, 
on 24 May 2011 and by the Supreme Court in 285/K/2011. The below table 
provides an overview of these cases.
Table 11: Radio Era Baru in Administrative Court
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7.4.5. Analysis of the REB cases
The two administrative court cases discussed above were quite different in 
terms of substance of matter. Yet, the fact that the results were so different 
requires some further explanation. Therefore, I will now first provide a legal 
analysis, before linking these cases to the broader political context.
The first case, as we have seen, focused primarily on the issue of language 
in broadcasting or more precisely on the 30 percent limit on the use of a 
foreign language in radio programmes. Given that REB had broadcast for 
five years in mainly Chinese before this limit was put into place, and given 
the fact that REB had immediately changed its policy after the prohibition 
was imposed – which it had proven by submitting the minutes of an internal 
meeting – both the refusal by the government and the rejection by the court 
legally made no sense.
Even less understandable from a legal point of view was the court’s rejection 
of the argument that the defendant had violated the prescribed procedure 
by only releasing its decision some nine months after the meeting of the 
Joint Forum whereas GR 50/2005 prescribed a term of 30 days. Whereas the 
article concerned leaves no room for digression, the judges merely held that 
the possibility of problems later on would provide sufficient ground for the 
minister to go against this procedure.
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The second case was problematic as well, though in a less fundamental 
manner. First, on the main issue, the judges rightly decided that giving the 
106.5 MHz frequency to Radio Sing after REB had been using it for five years 
already was in violation of the principles of legal certaintyand reasonable-
ness, given that the first REB case had not been settled yet. Moreover, the 
procedure to obtain a permit by Radio Sing was clearly manipulated by the 
defendant GDPT and therefore the judges were right in their decision to 
uphold the claim on this point. The same applied to the legal argument 
that “no law allows the Joint Forum to change the frequency, the main task 
of that meeting is to approve or disapprove.” The Joint Forum had clearly 
exceeded its powers here.
However, on the third point the judgment was highly problematic. The 
court’s argument that the Joint Forum had violated article 115 of the LAC 
showed how the court misjudged a basic issue of its own competence. Now 
that REB’s claim in the first case had been rejected twice, the administrative 
decision had not been suspended and was still of full effect. So it was not 
a matter of implementing a court judgment, but simply one of implement-
ing the original decision. It is worrying that an administrative court after so 
many years still makes such elementary mistakes.
Another important feature of this case was the refusal by the Batam District 
Court to protect REB’s property under the pre-trial procedure. This may 
have been a mistake on the part of the lawyers of REB, who could have also 
filed a government tort case – it is not immediately clear whether the seizure 
of equipment can also be brought under the pre-trial procedure – but this 
kind of legal uncertainty weighs heavy on those engaged in such a proce-
dure. This shows how the administrative court can offer only partial protec-
tion against the arbitrary exercise of power by the government.
There is little doubt that the key to understanding the REB case is the role 
of the Chinese Embassy and the response of the Indonesian government to 
its wishes. REB indicated in its chronological overview of the case that on 
8 May 2007, the website of the KPI made reference to the objection of the 
Chinese Embassy to the broadcasting of REB and its request to the KPI to 
closely monitor the station because it would allegedly spread political pro-
paganda discrediting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Embassy 
also accused REB of receiving funds from the Falun Gong organisation.23 
Another indication was the copy of a letter obtained by the management 
of REB, addressed to the minister of foreign affairs of Indonesia, the minis-
ter of internal affairs of Indonesia, the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency 
(Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN), the minister of communication and informa-
23 “Kronologi Kasus Radio Era Baru 2005-2011” [Chronology of the Radio Era Baru Case 2005-
2011], Era Baru News, 1 April 2011, http://www.erabarufm.com/2011/04/kronologi-
kasus-radio-erabaru-2005-2011.html (retrieved on 15 January 2012).
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tion and the KPI. This letter asked the Indonesian government to close down 
REB.24 According to REB Director Gatot Supriyanto the closing down of REB 
was a direct result of pressure from the Chinese Embassy. This rendered all 
attempts by REB to adjust to the conditions set by the KPI in vain.25
The behaviour of the Indonesian government agencies involved in this case 
indeed seem to indicate that they were heeding the advice of the Chinese 
Embassy. To what extent this also influenced the courts is hard to say, but it 
very likely did. The eventual outcome of the criminal procedure against REB 
Director Gatot Supriyanto consisted of him being sentenced for violation of 
the Telecommunication Law by the Batam District Court to six months in 
jail with a probation of one year and a fine of Rp 50 million (Batam District 
Court Decision 180/Pid.B/2011/PN.BTM).26
There are other cases which bear testimony to the susceptibility of the Indo-
nesian government to such pressure. For instance, on 7 May 2011, when a 
number of journalists were attending and recording the parade on the occa-
sion of the anniversary of the Falun Gong in Surabaya, they were harassed 
by Surabaya district police officers. The police also forced journalists to stop 
recording how a colleague was arrested and beaten.27
The REB case does not provide us convincing evidence of the effectiveness 
of the administrative courts in upholding freedom of the press in cases about 
broadcasting permits, but it does show that administrative review is badly 
needed. The case certainly demonstrates how the Press Law can be (and has 
been) ignored and how broadcasting permits may be used in a way remind-
ing of Guided Democracy and the New Order, to silence dissenting voices.28
24 Ibid., and “Kedutaan China, Ancaman Kebebasan Pers,” [Chinese Embassy, Threats to Press 
Freedom], Era Baru News, http://erabaru.net/nasional/50-politik/255-kedutaan-china-
ancaman-kebebasan-pers, 16 September 2008 (retrieved on 15 January 2012). The interna-
tional organisation for press freedom RSF also paid attention to this case. “We fear that 
this obstruction is the result of pressure by China […]. Media freedom is a constitutional 
right in Indonesia, so no foreign government should have the right to infl uence offi cial 
decisions on such an important subject. If Radio Era Baru is forced to close, it will be a 
serious violation of the freedom to report news.” Vide: “Radio Era Baru Closed by the 
Police,” Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF), 24 March 2010 <http://en.rsf.org/indonesia-
radio-era-baru-closed-by-the-24-03-2010,36765> (retrieved on 15 January 2012). Komnas 
HAM sent a letter of protest to the Chinese Embassy (10 March 2010).
25 Gatot Supriyanto, personal communication, Jakarta, 9 February 2010.
26 “Dirut Radio Era Baru Batam Divonis Diskriminatif” [President Director of Radio Era Baru 
Sentenced in a Discriminatory Way], Kompas, 6 September 2011.
27 “Surabaya Police Beat Journalists, Regional Police Cover up the Case,” LBH Pers Surabaya: 
Berita, 2011, http://www.lbhperssurabaya.org/?p=134 (retrieved on 15 January 2012).
28 The regulation capping the use of foreign languages also recalls the regime regarding the 
printed press during Guided Democracy and the early New Order, embedded among 
others in Peperti 3/1960 which prohibited the use of regional languages in Latin or Ara-
bic scripture.
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7.5. RCTI v KPI
The next administrative review case discussed in this chapter concerns a 
sanction by the KPI against ‘Eagle Image Television Indonesia’ (Rajawali 
Citra Televisi Indonesia or RCTI). The reason for the sanction was a broad-
cast of Silet, an entertainment programme of RCTI, about an eruption of the 
Merapi volcano near Yogyakarta, on 7 November 2010. The programme con-
tained many interviews with locals, paranormals, experts (volcanologist), 
government officials, etc. One of the paranormals interviewed referred to 
King Joyoboyo’s prediction in the twelfth century that Yogyakarta would 
experience a more serious disaster than the Merapi eruption on 8 November 
2010, so some time after the broadcasting of the programme. Volcanologists 
confirmed that a more serious disaster might happen, but were less spe-
cific on the date than King Joyoboyo. Apparently, the broadcast caused a 
big stir in Yogyakarta and many people who watched Silet tried to leave the 
city to reach a safer place. In the mean time, more than 1000 people sent a 
complaint to the KPI about the broadcast.29 Eventually, 8 November passed 
without much happening and the Merapi volcano’s activity slowing down.
The KPI acted immediately upon these complaints and found that the con-
tentious RCTI’s Silet broadcast about the Merapi eruption contained ‘falla-
cies’ and ‘lies.’ This would constitute a violation of the Broadcasting Law, 
and therefore KPI, through its letter 667/K/KPI/11/10, dated 8 November 
2010, invited RCTI to discuss an administrative sanction. On 9 November 
RCTI attended the meeting in the KPI office, which lasted for only about a 
quarter of an hour. After ten minutes the KPI gave letter 669/K/KPI/11/10, 
also dated 8 November 2010, to the representatives of RCTI. The letter 
repeated that RCTI had violated the law by broadcasting fallacies and lies, 
had been provocative and irresponsible by causing disquiet, fraud, fright, 
trauma, and more suffering to the victims of the Merapi eruption. Therefore, 
for the time being the KPI prohibited any further broadcasting of Silet. The 
KPI also reported RCTI to the police, thus subjecting the television station to 
both an administrative sanction and a criminal prosecution.
Following this meeting RCTI stopped running Silet, after a final broadcast on 
15 November 2010 in which it redressed some of the remarks made during 
the contested broadcast and in which RCTI openly apologised for having 
caused anxiety to those living near the Merapi volcano. Yet, the television 
station disagreed with KPI’s decision, which it considered unfair, incorrect, 
and unlawful. Therefore, on 29 November 2010 RCTI filed a claim with the 
Jakarta Administrative Court to challenge KPI’s decision. In the words of 
Arya Sinulingga, corporate secretary of RCTI’s mother company MNC Inc., 
29 By 30 November 2010 the KPI had received 1,032 objections, against 40 expressions of 
support of Silet (“Perseteruan Setajam Silet” [A Confl ict as Sharp as Silet], Tempo, 4 April 
2011).
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“… we do not object to the sanction, but to the processes carried out by KPI.”30 
The plaintiff also requested suspension of the sanction, which it obtained on 
10 December 2010.
RCTI’s lawyers listed nine points to sustain its claim against KPI’s decision 
669/K/KPI/11/10:
... First, the KPI’s decision was incorrect and incomplete […]. Second, the KPI has misused 
its authority by suspecting and publishing that RCTI violated Article 36(5)A of the BL31 
and Article 55 of the Broadcasting Programme Standard (Standar Program Siaran),32 and by 
sentencing RCTI by imposing a sanction based on different articles, Article 56D and E of 
the Broadcasting Programme Standard.33 Third, the KPI has decided beyond its authority 
by assessing whether or not a criminal offence has been committed by RCTI. Fourth, the 
KPI’s sanction to discontinue Silet as a product of journalism violates the Press Law which 
provides the right to the national press to broadcast information without prohibition to 
broadcast (press freedom). Fifth, the KPI violates Article 71 of the Broadcasting Programme 
Standard and the principle of formal care and legal certainty by imposing a sanction of 
temporary cessation without providing the opportunity to RCTI to give a clarification and 
to defend its decision. Sixth, the KPI violates the principle of legal certainty and the prin-
ciple of proportionality by imposing a sanction of temporary cessation without mentioning 
a clear time frame. Seventh, the KPI violates the principle of legal certainty by stating that 
RCTI has violated Article 55 of the Broadcasting Programme Standard and punished RCTI 
by a sanction of temporary cessation. Eighth, the KPI violates Article 67 of the Broadcast-
ing Programme Standard, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality, 
and also the principle of non-discrimination (equality before the law) by stating that RCTI 
has violated Article 56D and E of the Broadcasting Programme Standard and by imposing 
a sanction of temporary cessation; and ninth, the KPI has acted beyond its authority and 
violated the principle of legal certainty by imposing a sanction on RCTI to demand a state-
ment of apology.
The KPI denied all of these points. It maintained that the contested Silet 
broadcast had contained fallacies and lies. Therefore RCTI would have vio-
lated Article 33 of the Guidelines on Broadcasting Behaviour and Broadcast-
ing Programme Standard (Pedoman Perilaku Penyiaran dan Standar Program 
Siaran, P3SPS),34 and Articles 55 and 56 of the Broadcasting Programme 
Standard (of 2009). In the commission’s view this required the heaviest sanc-
30 “Dilaporkan ke Polisi, RCTI Melawan ke PTUN: Kami Bukan Keberatan kepada Sank-
sinya, Tetapi pada Proses-Proses yang Dilakukan KPI” [Reported to the Police, RCTI 
Resists through the Administrative Court], Viva News, 1 December 2010. http://us.show-
biz.vivanews.com/news/read/191586-dilaporkan--rcti-adukan-keberatan-ke-ptun 
(retrieved on 17 January 2012).
31 Article 36(5)a BL: “The content of a programme is prohibited if: a. it is defamatory, incit-
ing, misleading and/or untruthful.”
32 The SPS (Standar Program Siaran) is based on KPI Regulation 03/P/KPI/12/2009 on the 
Broadcasting Programme Standard. Article 55: “Broadcasting programmes that cover 
natural disasters or calamities shall take into consideration the recovery process of the 
victim, families, and/or communities who are affected by the natural disaster.”
33 Article 56D of the SPS: “[…] exposing images of victims or corpses in detail (close up, 
medium close up, extreme close up); and/or Article 56E: “[…] exposing images of severe 
wounds, bloody, and/or pieces of body organs.”
34 KPI Decision 009/SK/KPI/8/2004 of 30 August 2004.
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tion, which is temporary cessation of broadcasting. To support its argument, 
the KPI provided a recorded video of the Silet programme on 7 November 
2010, and copies of the complaint letters it had received. It moreover argued 
that in imposing the sanction it had gone through all the steps prescribed 
for imposing a sanction, starting with examining the evidence of the viola-
tion, investigation, an assessment of the violation, and a clarification. All of 
this had been communicated clearly to RCTI. The KPI also presented several 
witnesses in court, who testified to the fear they had experienced by the con-
tested broadcast.35 Furthermore, the KPI denied that Silet could be a quali-
fied product of journalism, because the programme lacked any reference to 
an editor in chief. According to the Press Law and Press Council Regulation 
4/Peraturan-DP/III/2008 on the Press Corporation Standard, a press corpo-
ration should provide name and address of the person accountable for the 
contents of a product of journalism openly through its media.
On 23 March 2011 the council of judges, consisting of Bambang Heryanto, 
Sri Setyowati and Herman Baeha, passed judgment (174/G/2010/PTUN-
JKT). The judges upheld the claim by RCTI. They argued that the KPI had 
failed to go through the procedure required for imposing the contested sanc-
tion, and notably that the KPI had already taken its decision on 8 November 
2011, before having heard RCTI. This was in violation of Article 71(1) of the 
Broadcasting Programme Standard. Moreover, the KPI had acted in viola-
tion of Article 70 of the Broadcasting Programme Standard.36 A violation of 
Article 55 of the Broadcasting Programme Standard should first be followed 
by a ‘written warning,’ and not immediately by a ‘temporary cessation.’ The 
judges also checked whether RCTI’s Silet programme had violated Articles 
56D and E, as held by the KPI, by watching the recording of the contested 
programme. They found that indeed victims had been exposed, but that 
RCTI had blurred the images so that exposure of ‘severe wounds’ could not 
be assessed. Such images could be found in other television programmes as 
well. The court further dismissed the testimonies of the victims as irrelevant, 
because they could not underpin the decision. The judges thus applied a 
form of ‘marginal review,’ assessing whether the KPI could have ‘reason-
ably’ arrived at its decision. They concluded that the KPI had acted in an 
arbitrary manner (sewenang-wenang) and thus in violation of the principles 
of proper administration, as well as of the Broadcast Programme Standard. 
35 The witnesses on part of the KPI were Putri Asmarani, Ivony Arti Jiwani and an adminis-
trative law expert, from the Indonesian Islamic University (UII), Ridwan. RCTI asked Leo 
Batubara and Abdullah Alamudi as expert witnesses (“Saksi KPI dalam Sidang PTUN” 
[KPI Witnesses in Administrative Court Session], 9 February 2011. http://www.kpi.
go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2823%3Asaksi-kpi-dalam-
sidang-ptun-&catid=14%3Adalam-negeri-umum&lang=id, retrieved on 16 January 
2012).
36 Article 70 of the Broadcast Programme Standard details a ‘written warning’ for several 
violations, including those in Articles 34, 54, 55 and 56.
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The KPI was ordered to withdraw its decision, which had become unen-
forceable as from the moment the judgment was passed.
One day before the Jakarta Administrative Court passed judgment, the 
police halted its investigation of the Silet programme for ‘lack of evidence’ 
and not meeting the standards of criminal liability. This was officially laid 
down in a Letter of Discontinuation of Investigation (Surat Penghentian 
Penyelidikan Perkara or SP3).
This did not keep the KPI from appealing to the Jakarta Administrative 
High Court. In its press release on 23 March 2011, the commission regretted 
the administrative court’s judgment as well as the decision by the police. 
The KPI also complained that the court had not considered the letters of 
objection sent by the governor of Yogyakarta Special Region and the may-
or of Yogyakarta.37 Fortunately for RCTI the Jakarta Administrative High 
Court confirmed the judgment of the court of first instance in 127/B/2011/
PT.TUN.JKT.
One of the positive features of this case has been the attitude of RCTI to obey 
the KPI’s decision and to challenge it through the administrative court. Only 
after it had obtained the suspension of the KPI sanction did RCTI resume 
the broadcasting of Silet. What is really disturbing is that the KPI appar-
ently understood so little of administrative court procedure that it com-
plained about RCTI’s failure ‘to respect the law’ and even addressed the 
matter in parliament.38 The Jakarta Administrative Court moreover seems to 
have investigated this case fairly and thoroughly, as confirmed by the High 
Court. The judges recognised the position and role of the KPI, but made 
clear that it cannot ignore procedures and substantive law.
Most unfortunate is that the KPI went as far as to turn the issue into a crimi-
nal law case as well. As argued in previous chapters, the use of criminal law 
is a serious threat to press freedom. That a government institution such as 
the KPI misjudges this matter and files a report to the police is quite dis-
turbing, even more so as the commission itself has the tools to address this 
issue and since it appeared that the administrative court even found the use 
37 “PTUN Kabulkan Gugatan RCTI Terkait Silet, KPI Banding” [The Administrative Court 
Upholds the Claim of RCTI about Silet, the KPI appeals], Detik News, 23 March 2011. 
http://us.detiknews.com/read/2011/03/23/170600/1599730/10/ptun-kabulkan-
gugatan-rcti-terkait-silet-kpi-banding?nd992203605 (retrieved on 16 January 2012).
38 “Munculkan Kembali Silet, RCTI ‘Kangkangi’ KPI: Penayangan Kembali Silet Menunjuk-
kan Gejala Pembangkangan Industri TV terhadap Kewenangan KPI selaku Lembaga 
Negara” [Silet Reappears, RCTI Humiliates the KPI: Rebroadcasting Silet Points at the 
Symptoms of a Rebellion by the TV Industry Against the Competence of the KPI as a 
State Agency], Skala News, 2 March 2011. http://www.skalanews.com/baca/
news/4/9/90535/sengketa/munculkan-kembali-silet--rcti--kangkangi--kpi.html 
(retrieved on 17 January 2012).
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of these tools excessive. In fact such cases should be reported to the Press 
Council, which can examine them using the Press Code of Ethics. More gen-
erally, as long as a case is under administrative court review, criminal pros-
ecution should wait.
7.6. Conclusion
Even if the number of cases is small, administrative court review has played 
a significant role in protecting press freedom. Especially in cases of press 
banning the courts have formed an important avenue for legal protection. 
While under the New Order this applied to the written press, with the Tempo 
case as the most prominent example, it currently concerns cases about tele-
vision and radio broadcasts: with regard to the written press, the publication 
permit was abolished by the 1999 Press Law, but the 2002 Broadcasting Law 
still requires a permit for radio and television stations.
Here the record of the administrative courts is mixed. The case of REB has 
demonstrated how the licensing regime is of tremendous influence on press 
freedom and how it is open to abuse by the authorities. In order to obtain a 
permit, REB had to bring two separate cases to the administrative court, one 
for the broadcasting and the other for the radio station permit. The admin-
istrative court judgments in first instance and appeal about the refusal to 
obtain a broadcasting permit were seriously flawed and demonstrated a 
serious lack of understanding by the court, including of its own procedure. 
By contrast, in the case about the radio station permit the courts’ judgments 
in first instance and appeal were up to the standard. Both administrative 
court cases are currently under review by the Supreme Court, which will 
hopefully straighten out matters, as it has in so many civil law cases (see the 
previous Chapter).
The REB case furthermore shows how politics still matter in press freedom. 
It is hard to believe that the Chinese Embassy played no role in the deci-
sion taken by the minister of information and communication about REB’s 
broadcasting permit. The subsequent actions by the police against REB and 
the conviction of REB’s director by the criminal court add fuel to this inter-
pretation. The role of the government in this case strongly recalls the situa-
tion under the New Order, with the minister of information and communi-
cation and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission as a ‘reincarnation’ of 
the New Order’s minister of information and his department.
The case of RCTI v KPI was of a different nature. In this case, there was not 
as much political pressure as in the REB case. This probably made it easier 
for the administrative court to uphold RCTI’s claim, but then the KPI’s case 
was extremely weak. Many aspects of the case indicate that the KPI made 
its decision without following its own procedure or paying attention to the 
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substantive rules applicable to the matter. The case also showed the impor-
tance of a suspension order by the court, for this may limit the financial 
losses incurred by a television or radio station as a result of an administra-
tive sanction to stop broadcasting.
It seems important that the administrative court carefully considers such 
a request in view of the need for the sustainability of a particular media as 
essential to press freedom.
In addition to the findings about the role of administrative court review I 
would like to argue here that the BL of 2002 should be amended. As dem-
onstrated above, the BL permits can be used against broadcasting media in 
the same way as the publication permit could be used against the printed 
press during the New Order. This could be resolved by recognising the Press 
Council as the proper instance for judging broadcasting media behaviour 
instead of the KPI, which has no expertise in this matter and whose role 
should be limited to judging technical issues. Thus, prohibitions as those 
mentioned in Article 36(5)A of the BL, including defamatory and inflamma-
tory language, fallacies and/or lies, religious defamation, attacking Indone-
sian human dignity, and damaging international relations, should be judged 
by the Press Council. This would lead to a much more balanced situation.
Before reformation, press freedom was jeopardised, or deficient. But 
now after reformation, press freedom is working well, there is even a 
surplus of it…. (President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 3 June 2010)
…an ‘overdose’ of press freedom cannot be seen separately from the 
umbrella law, as during the lawmaking process, Indonesia was over-
whelmed by a post-Soeharto drunkenness of freedom. (Professor Tjipta 
Lesmana, Oase, Kompas, 9 December 2010)
Press freedom in Indonesia is very, very strong! … such freedom is 
indicated by a more diverse content and ownership than during the 
Soeharto regime. (Vice Minister of Law and Justice, Professor Denny 
Indrayana, lecture at Leiden Law School, 8 March 2013)
8.1. Introduction
Many claim that presently press freedom is well guaranteed in Indonesia 
and according to some it is even ‘excessive’ (‘pers kebablasan!’). But is this 
true? Is there a ‘surplus’ or ‘overdose’ of press freedom in Indonesia, and is 
press freedom ‘very strong’?
This thesis has demonstrated that there is much evidence undermining such 
assessments. The research has found that indeed there is far more freedom 
of the press now than there was under the New Order or Guided Democ-
racy, and that the diversity of news sources has increased. However, there 
is still a pattern of legal and non-legal attacks against the press. While news 
coverage is generally broad in scope and critical in nature, the pressure on 
the press to exercise self-limitation is high. After the removal of the major 
legislative restrictions of the past, new limitations have been put into place 
through the Pornography Law (2008), the Electronic Information and Trans-
actions Law (2008) and the General Elections Law (2008). An important 
change in practice is that while before 1998 it was mainly the state that lim-
ited press freedom, it is now rather non-state actors, such as business elites 
and their vigilantes, or religious fundamentalists who threaten the press.
What is worrying is the finding of this research that the government has 
done little to prevent or punish such actions, and neither has it taken much 
8 Conclusion
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effort to protect journalists. Another worrying finding is that the courts have 
been frequently misused in order to intimidate journalists, editors and press 
owners, both through civil and criminal law suits. On a positive note, the 
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that cases against the press should be 
dealt with by the Press Council, but so far lower courts have continued to 
sideline this policy.
While these are some important findings about the present situation of press 
freedom in Indonesia, the conclusions to this study are much broader. The 
next sections attempt to bring together the findings presented in the previ-
ous chapters to help answer the questions formulated at the start of this 
book. How has the concept of freedom of expression and press freedom 
evolved in Indonesian law? How has press freedom as one of the main pil-
lars of constitutional democracy been guaranteed or curbed by the Indone-
sian legal system? How has press freedom been shaped by various govern-
ment and non-government actors? And how we can judge all of this from 
a rule of law perspective? Such evaluation is necessary to understand how 
press freedom can be more effectively guaranteed in the framework of Indo-
nesia’s rule of law, for which at the end of this chapter I will present a num-
ber of suggestions and recommendations.
8.2. Press Freedom in Indonesia: An Overview
It is clear from this study that until Soeharto stepped down, press freedom 
in Indonesia was hardly ever legally guaranteed. Indonesia has a long his-
tory of legal control of the press which already started before the country 
became independent, during the time of the VOC. Through the years the 
constituent elements of press control through law have varied and so has 
their implementation, which became stricter or less strict according to the 
socio-political situation. This history is characterised by strict and often 
vague rules, censorship, permits, and (excessive) punishment or fines for 
transgression of the rules. The abolition of censorship and permits by the 
1999 Press Law is therefore a historical moment, even if other laws and regu-
lations have continued to impose restrictions on the press since.
The history of systematic state control of the press started under the colonial 
government with the Drukpersreglement in 1856, which introduced a pre-cen-
sorship system that was eventually abolished in 1906 by Governor-General 
Van Heutz. This meant the abolition of administrative controls on the press 
and the start of a period of relative freedom. However, the situation deterio-
rated after Governor-General Idenburg introduced the new Penal Code for 
the Netherlands-Indies, which contained several new provisions that could 
be used to prosecute the press. With the enactment of the Press Banning 
Ordinance (Persbreidel Ordonanntie) in 1931 criminal law became even more 
dominant in controlling the press.
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After they conquered the Netherlands-Indies in 1942, the Japanese reintro-
duced the pre-censorship system that had characterised press control in the 
Netherlands-Indies until 1906. The Japanese were no less authoritarian than 
the Dutch had been, and both systems combined the absence of democracy 
with a weak rule of law and strong state intervention. The example they set 
to the Indonesian Republic that became their successor was hence not very 
favourable to press freedom.
After independence in 1945, the guarantee of press freedom was not clearly 
and explicitly formulated in the new Indonesian Constitution. Most legal 
commentators note that press freedom was normatively guaranteed by the 
reference to freedom of expresssion in Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution. 
There is support for this view in the minutes of the constitutional debates 
in 1945, where press freedom and freedom of expression were labelled as 
inseparable, but the ultimate text of the article was a compromise: it refers 
to freedom of expression only and states that it should be regulated by acts 
of parliament. From the perspective of press freedom the formulation is too 
broad and indeed subsequent practice has showed how its interpretation 
led to legislation suppressing the press. Second, the acts of parliament regu-
lating freedom of expression have seldom interpreted the constitutional ref-
erence as meaning that it should principally be upheld, instead often intro-
ducing explicit restrictions. And finally, on the basis of transitional Article 2, 
all colonial legislation not in conflict with the 1945 Constitution remained in 
place. On this basis Indonesia continued to apply colonial press regulations.
As the early years of independence were characterised by colonial war and 
internal conflicts, it is no surprise that press freedom did not feature promi-
nently on the agenda of the Indonesian Republican government. Indeed, 
during this period the first ‘Indonesian’ press banning occurred, as a result 
of the communist uprising in Madiun in 1948. The banning used the colonial 
law legacy to this purpose. When the Dutch finally recognised Indonesian 
independence, Indonesia replaced its revolutionary constitution by a much 
more liberal one, which unequivocally recognised freedom of expression. 
However, the colonial press laws remained in place once again.
The situation regarding press freedom only improved after the revocation 
of the Press Banning Ordinance in 1954. Unfortunately this led to a situa-
tion proponents of press regulation had always warned against. Most news-
papers strongly associated with particular ideologies and were aligned to 
political parties, and in the heated political atmosphere of the time what 
followed was a cacophony of mutual accusations, incriminations, scandals, 
feuds, and frauds. Newspapers became channels for political propaganda 
instead of vehicles for professional journalism.
This situation was not to last for long. The imposition of martial law in 1956 
led to the arrest and detention of journalists and editors, often extra-judicial, 
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and the brief episode of press freedom quickly came to an end. By contrast, 
the simultaneous deliberations in the Constitutional Assembly (Konstituante) 
demonstrated virtually unanimous support for enacting a special provision 
to support press freedom. This provision never came into force, however, as 
in 1959 Soekarno dissolved the Assembly and proclaimed the return to the 
1945 Constitution. This marked the start of Guided Democracy, which was 
the worst period in Indonesian history in terms of press freedom from rule 
of law perspective. The new regime introduced a ‘revolutionary press’ and 
‘guided press’ as the leading concepts. Any criticism of Soekarno and his 
leadership would be punished, with the military playing a central role in 
both regulation and enforcement without judicial control, including impris-
oning journalists or editors. Many newspapers were closed down.
The demise of Soekarno and the start of the New Order raised hopes about 
a freer press, which were reinforced by the adoption of Indonesia’s first 
Press Law in 1966. The new law contained new guarantees for press free-
dom, notably the prohibition of censorship and banning. However, it soon 
appeared that these guarantees did not keep the new regime from inter-
fering with press freedom by banning newspapers, using criminal lawsuits 
against journalists and editors. The New Order moreover used an effective 
strategy of co-opting newspapers to promote its interests.
Just as Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, Soeharto’s New Order produced 
ideological discourses in order to discipline the press, promoting concepts 
as ‘development press,’ ‘Pancasila press’ and ‘socially responsibile press.’ 
If discourse was insufficient to instill obedience, the system of permits for 
newspapers was used to silence critical voices – even if this was in clear 
contravention of the 1966 Press Law and its successor, the 1982 Press Law. 
Most notoriously, the government revoked the publication permits of maga-
zines Tempo, Detik and Editor in 1994. The subsequent manipulation of the 
Supreme Court to legalise the bans by quashing the lower court judgments 
that defeated the government sent a clear message that the government 
could arbitrarily abuse the licensing system to control the press.
In short, Indonesian press freedom from independence until the end of 
the New Order was characterised by disciplining discourses, incoherence 
between principles and rules, manipulation of rules, an important role for 
the military and absence of judicial control.
This situation changed after the enactment of a new press law in 1999. Cen-
sorship, press bans, and press permits are strictly forbidden under this law. 
President Abdurahman Wahid furthermore dissolved the Department of 
Information, which had played a central role as an implementing agency 
of government policies for press control. However, the changes in political 
climate under the subsequent governments of presidents Megawati Soek-
arnoputri (2001-2004) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) reintro-
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duced repression of the press. Several laws threatening press freedom were 
enacted, such as the Law on General Election, the Electronic Information 
and Transaction Law and the Pornography Law. These threaten newspapers 
with banning and heavy punishment for journalists. As already mentioned, 
civil lawsuits on account of press publications are now more frequent than 
criminal law suits, but occasionally the government still acts against press 
freedom and in any case it does little to protect it. So far many journalists 
have managed to remain critical and professional, but if the pressure contin-
ues this may change for the worse with the increasing political competition.
If we try to picture the relation between government regimes and press free-
dom in Indonesia in different moments in time on the basis of the model 
set out in the introduction (which combines a continuum of the degree of 
democracy/rule of law with one on the degree of state intervention (or state 
strength), we get the following scheme:
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8.3. Freedom at Present
As I have described, press freedom is determined by various legal factors, 
including regulation/legislation, judicial decisions, and law enforcement, 
political-economic factors, such as shifts in power balances following decen-
tralisation, as well as by legal and non-legal actors, including government 
officials (police, judicial actors, professional organisations) and private 
actors (media owners, civil society groups, political elites, capital owners, 
and vigilantes). This section starts with the main findings as to how press 
freedom is presently regulated and practiced, especially discussing the Press 
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Council which has special authority to solve press legal cases in the present 
situation. It also elaborates on the patterns of violence against press free-
dom.
8.3.1. The Constitution and the Press Law
The constitution is an important foundation for maintaining press freedom 
in any legal system. Presently, there is no explicit guarantee on press free-
dom in the Indonesian constitution. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the absence 
of a specific article on press freedom in the 1999-2002 Constitutional Amend-
ments reflects a lack of recognition by the constitutional legislators of the 
importance of press freedom in a democracy under the rule of law, despite 
the insistence of journalist groups and press freedom experts involved in 
the process. Press freedom therefore still falls under freedom of expression, 
which is admittedly better guaranteed now than was the case under the 
1945 Constitution.
The legal cornerstone of protection of press freedom is therefore the 1999 
Press Law (40/1999). As we have seen, however, much of the old legislation 
regulating press freedom was never explicitly repealed, and even though it 
should be considered to have lost its binding power implicitly through the 
enactment of the 1999 Press Law, in practice several actors have continued 
to use it to control the press. This started after Abdurrahman Wahid was 
removed as president. Both civil and criminal lawsuits have been conducted 
against the press, mainly on the basis of the numerous articles on defamation 
as stipulated in the Civil and the Penal Code. Such cases should have been 
brought to the Press Council on the basis of the 1999 Press Law, but even if 
the Supreme Court has consistently defended this line in its judgments, pub-
lic prosecutors and lower court judges have continued to handle such cases.
As already mentioned earlier, the Press Law has also been subverted by sub-
sequent statutes, notably the Pornography Law, the General Election Law 
and the Electronic Information and Transaction Law. Numerous draft laws 
which have not been enacted yet, such as the draft Penal Code, the draft 
Secrecy Law and the draft National Security and Defense Law likewise con-
tain articles which take no account of the basic mechanism formulated in 
the Press Law that such cases should be taken to the Press Council first. 
Some protection has been offered by the Constitutional Court, which has 
declared unconstitutional several articles on press banning under the 2008 
General Election Law. However, the reintroduction of press banning only 
ten years after Soeharto stepped down reflects a worrying shift in attitude 
of executive and parliament, without them having any indication that the 
Press Council mechanism does not function well. Cases such as the one dis-
cussed in Chapter 7 about Radio Era Baru (REB) show how easy it is for the 
government to misuse its licensing powers for banning purposes.
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8.3.2. Actors Limiting Press Freedom
Problems of press freedom have been shaped by various factors and actors. 
These are not only related to law and the judicial system, but also to the 
political context of decentralisation in post-Soeharto Indonesia. This section 
singles out two actors who have been central in influencing press freedom 
and are particularly influential today: the judiciary and regional elites who 
attempt to get rid of press control of their actions.
The judiciary: insufficient and inconsistent protection
Despite the efforts of subsequent governments in Indonesia to remove the 
judiciary from its role of protecting freedom of the press and to control the 
press by way of administrative policies, as I have elaborated in Chapter 3 
and 4, the judiciary has always continued to play a role in interpreting laws 
guaranteeing or undermining freedom of the press. Even during the worst 
days of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy judge Abdul Razak Sutan Malelo 
bravely acquitted prominent editors Mochtar Lubis and Kustiniyati Mochtar 
from Indonesia Raya. While Soeharto’s New Order manipulated the judiciary 
in more subtle ways and thus managed to secure convictions of several jour-
nalists and editors, there were occasional acts of resistance such as the judg-
ments by the Jakarta Administrative Court and the Jakarta Administrative 
High Court in the banning of Tempo. In the post-Soeharto period the judicia-
ry’s independence has steadily increased. Yet, the courts should play a very 
limited role in press cases after the 1999 Press Law determined that all press 
disputes should be decided by the Press Council. As indicated earlier, the 
practice of civil parties – and sometimes the public prosecutor – to take cases 
to the general court and the resistance of lower court judges to refer these 
cases to the Press Council has continued to provide a role for the courts – 
but not a positive one. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court 
has been a positive exception by producing a consistent line of precedents 
referring cases to the Press Council.
What has been shown by this study is that civil lawsuits have gained in 
importance compared to criminal lawsuits (see notably Chapter 6).1 This 
can be explained partly by the shift from an authoritarian state to a demo-
cratic one, as well as by the change from a centralised to a decentralised 
state. As to the first point, there is no longer an authoritarian state which 
by all means tries to impose its ideology on society as happened during 
1 Some observers do recognise this as well. The Head of the National Law Development 
Agency (the Badan Pembangunan Hukum Nasional), Ahmad Ramli said that “the threat 
against the press is not only criminalisation, but the massive private lawsuits against the 
press… there are no limits to how much compensation must be paid by the press, and 
this leads to a serious threat against press freedom.” “Gugatan Perdata Ancaman Kebe-
basan Pers,” Antara News, 20 May 2010, http://www.antaranews.com/berita/187658/
gugatan-perdata-ancaman-kebebasan-pers (retrieved on 5 May 2013).
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Guided Democracy and the New Order. Using administrative policies and 
the criminal courts to silence a critical press were typical means to achieve 
this. The decentralisation has engendered a shift in monetary capital from 
the centre to the regions which has led to the capitalist regional elites using 
the civil courts to protect their interests against a critical press. This ought 
to change the role of the government from an aggressor to a protector, but 
this is seldom to be perceived. In several cases (e.g. Tomy Winata v. Tempo), 
a combination of a civil court case, criminal prosecution and mob violence 
demonstrates how private interests may coalesce with those of particular 
state agencies and may lead to serious threats of press freedom.
To end this discussion about the judiciary on a more optimistic note, as 
already mentioned, the Supreme Court has played a positive role in guar-
anteeing press freedom during the past years. Under the New Order the 
Supreme Court’s ruling of Anif v. Garuda Daily Newspapers in 1991 already 
introduced the importance of the right to reply in resolving press legal cases 
before going to court, but this was still a sort of ‘incident.’ Since the enact-
ment of the 1999 Press Law the Supreme Court has firmly stuck to its posi-
tion that the Press Council holds precedence over court proceedings, which 
it first laid down in Tomy Winata v. Tempo (1608 K/PID/2005). It is to be 
hoped that the Supreme Court will manage to (re)establish its authority 
over lower courts and that this precedent will be effectively followed. Now 
that Supreme Court judgments have finally become accessible, it is to be 
hoped that this can counterbalance the regional business interests and politi-
cal configurations influencing the courts in press cases (cf. Bedner 2013).
Regional elites and patterns of threats and violence
As discussed above, the decentralisation process has led to a shift from 
criminal to civil lawsuits in press cases. The same process has also created 
regional patterns of violence against the press. Decentralisation in this con-
text must not be understood as the mere transfer of political authority from 
central to local government levels. Decentralisation has shifted power rela-
tions more broadly and deeply influenced the connection between politi-
cal elites and local providers of capital. Business networks and bureaucratic 
elites now cooperate to differing extents in different constellations to secure 
their interests (Hadiz 2007, 2010, Tans 2012).
Some business elites whose interests are insecure will use any strategy avail-
able to them to protect these interests, including the law, courts or other for-
mal mechanisms, but also violence. Since decentralisation started, there has 
been a remarkable rise of violent incidents involving journalists and others 
working for the press. More concretely, the press often publishes about local 
issues concerning corruption, illegal logging or mining, and other forms of 
exploiting natural resources, and as a result it has become a target for attacks. 
The killing of Prabangsa in Bali (16 February 2009), Ardiansyah Matrais in 
Merauke (30 July 2010) and Alfrets Mirulewan in Maluku (17 December 
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2010) are just a few instances. This growing violence by regional elites and 
their thugs is becoming an increasingly worrying phenomenon.
Violence against journalists also occurred during Guided Democracy and 
under the New Order, but was never as common as it is now. Underlying 
this violence is of course the fact that the press is now far freer to address 
what it thinks should be addressed and thus is more likely to make enemies 
than it was in the past. This requires the state to be actively involved in 
protecting the press. The decentralisation that led to the violence in the first 
place also makes it difficult to do something about it. Often political con-
figurations in a decentralised context involve powerful coalitions of inter-
ests at national and sub-national levels, which Hadiz (2007) calls ‘predatory 
elites.’ In order to maintain such configurations, these elites create ‘priva-
tised gangsterism’ (Hadiz 2010). As a result few of them are ever brought to 
trial and such impunity has become a fundamental problem for the press.
Impunity is sometimes also promoted by the willingness of the newspaper 
management to accept an amicable settlement. Offences against journalists 
are in those cases resolved by an agreement which usually requires ceasing 
judicial proceedings. Surprisingly, one of the findings of this research it that 
the Press Council itself has been involved in mediating criminal offences – 
in the end unsuccessfully and the judicial proceedings were subsequently 
continued (see the case of Mrs. Paulina Pradini in Gresik, in 2012, discussed 
in Chapter 4). Impunity is also promoted because many journalists, press 
associations, and civil society groups are hesitant to take legal action against 
those committing violence, and prefer to resolve problems by making agree-
ments, often euphemistically called “sama-sama nggak rugi” (win-win solu-
tion) (see Chapter 4).
This impunity goes against Indonesia’s obligations under international law. 
Indonesia ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) in 2006. The Guidelines on Article 19 (see General Comment No. 34 
(2011), paragraph 23) stipulate that “State parties should put in place effec-
tive measures to protect against attacks aimed at silencing those exercising 
their right to freedom of expression. Paragraph 3 may never be invoked as 
a justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multi-party democracy, 
democratic tenets and human rights. Nor, under any circumstance, can an 
attack on a person, because of the exercise of his or her freedom of opin-
ion or expression, including such forms of attack as arbitrary arrest, torture, 
threats to life and killing, be compatible with article 19. Journalists are fre-
quently subjected to such threats, intimidation and attacks because of their 
activities. So too are persons who engage in the gathering and analysis of 
information on the human rights situation and who publish human rights-
related reports, including judges and lawyers. All such attacks should be 
vigorously investigated in a timely fashion, and the perpetrators prosecut-
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ed, and the victims, or, in the case of killings, their representatives, be in 
receipt of appropriate forms of redress.”2
Hesitation to address legal and non-legal attacks against the press in 
the end leads to failure in developing a secure legal system for protection 
of press freedom. Currently the press on the whole is still pluriform and 
daring, but the combination of elite attempts to ‘buy’ news reports support-
ing their interests, to buy media, and to intimidate those media who refuse 
poses a serious threat. This is not yet a serious problem at the national level, 
but in certain regions it has already led to monopolies on reporting which 
sustain coalitions of business and political interests.
8.4. Indonesian Press Law: Legal Debates and Press Freedom Theory
The main objective of this research is to contribute to a comprehensive under-
standing of the role of law in relation to press freedom in Indonesia. The 
study has attempted to achieve this purpose by looking at the development 
of legislation, precedents and doctrine and combining this with an analysis 
of the role of these legal sources in practice. This section compares some of 
these findings which earlier research on Indonesian press law. It then contin-
ues reviewing theoretical issues on press freedom and ends with a discussion 
about legal unclarity and uncertainty, the tendency to avoid the judiciary, 
and ULAP (Unjustified Lawsuits Against the Press) as a new concept.
8.4.1. Studies on Press Law
The main study I address is the dissertation by Wahidin of 2006. This study 
is of a doctrinary nature, yet, on this doctrinary basis it draws several con-
clusions which would have far-reaching consequences for press freedom in 
practice. I will not go into Wahidin’s claim to completeness,3 but evaluate 
the five fundamental legal policies he proposes at the end of his thesis. First, 
Wahidin argues that the procedure for the ‘right to reply’ mechanism should 
be regulated more in detail in combination with procedures before the court. 
Then he suggests to establish a new ‘mediation institution’ (lembaga musy-
awarah), where the press is required to respond to the request for exercising 
the ‘right to reply’. His third suggestion is heavier punishment for anyone 
2 General Comment No. 34 of Human Rights Committee on Article 19: Freedoms of opin-
ion and expression (102nd session, Geneva, 11-29 July 2011), (CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 Sep-
tember 2011).
3 Wahidin (2006: 180-189) alleges that when he carried out his research there had been no 
civil lawsuits against those affected by news versus the press. By contrast, this research 
found six such cases: Ms Djokosoetono (Blue Bird Taxi) v. Selecta Magazine (1981, Jakarta) 
and Anis v. Garuda Daily Newspapers (1991, Medan), Tommy Soeharto v. Gatra Magazine 
(1998); Soeharto v. Times (1999); Tommy Winata v. Tempo (2003); Pemuda Panca Marga (PPM, 
a Veteran’s Youth group) v. Tempo (2003).
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using violence against journalists, and fourthly, he argues for clear ethical 
standards and a professional organisation of journalists overseeing them. 
Finally, he calls for applying criminal law to journalists who violate the law 
or the code of ethics. This, he argues, would lead to better self-control (Wahi-
din 2006: 182-186).
The conclusions of this research are different from Wahidin’s. First, as I have 
discussed in Chapter 4, the right to reply could be regulated more clearly, 
but certainly not in connection with court procedure. Neither is there any 
reason to establish an alternative organisation for the Press Council, which 
seems to be functioning well enough – in any case Wahidin provides no 
evidence to the contrary. The true problems are the lack of political com-
mitment to support the Press Council against parties who have no interest 
in using their right to reply, but look for ways to harass the press. Next, 
heavier punishment for those who use violence against the press will not be 
a solution, because the problem is impunity of aggressors, not the absence of 
legal sentences. This is due to the practices described in the previous section. 
However, I most seriously disagree with Wahidin’s suggestion that heavy 
punishment would be beneficial in order to promote self control of journal-
ists.
This self control is a matter of professionalism and the application of the 
code of ethics is meant to ensure it. There is no indication whatsoever that 
there would be a problem with journalists violating the law or even the code 
of ethics. As described in chapters 5 and 6 in all cases against journalists or 
editors, they were eventually acquitted by the court. It may make sense to 
further support professionalism and the application of the code of ethics, 
but at present journalists are sued for absurd reasons and thus intimidated 
to the extent that they will think twice before publishing anything that could 
jeopardise their position. Therefore, the last thing we need is heavy pun-
ishment in order to teach journalists self-control. I hope to have shown the 
limitations of a legal analysis which has not looked at case law, and even less 
at press freedom in practice. By departing from untested assumptions about 
this practice, conclusions may be drawn which will effectively worsen an 
already problematic situation.
An issue of a more purely legal nature I want to address next is the argu-
ment found in several dissertations on press law, namely that press law is 
still dominated by criminal law (Syamsuddin 2008; Wahidin 2006; Mukan-
tardjo 2002). As argued in Chapter 5, this is no longer the case. Indeed, 
under the authoritarian regimes of Guided Democracy and the New Order 
criminal law played an important role, even if then administrative permits 
were a more effective means of control. The shift to a more democratic 
regime under the rule of law has entailed a shift from criminal courts to the 
Press Council. Criminal law has thus lost its prevalent role and this actually 
promotes press freedom.
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I therefore disagree with Mukantardjo’s argument (2002: 371) that the use of 
criminal law has the advantage that it allows journalists or editors to defend 
themselves before a court and thus achieve acquittal of all charges. There is 
no need for this, and as we have seen in Chapter 5 (but also in Chapters 2 
and 3), defending oneself in a criminal court is no sinecure.
8.4.2. Indonesia and Theories of the Press
In the introduction to this thesis I discussed several general theories present-
ing a typology of the press in its political environment. Looking at Indonesia 
through the lense of these theories we can make a few observations. First, my 
study confirms the point of departure of the press theories discussed that the 
political environment is crucial in determining the functioning of the press. 
And second, the case of Indonesia over time does not fit neatly into the cat-
egories offered by Siebert et al. (1956) or Oloyede (2005), but their typologies 
are still helpful to describe the functioning of the Indonesian press.
During Guided Democracy and the New Order Indonesia certainly resem-
bled the authoritarian regime model discussed by Siebert et al., with both 
regimes controlling the press through licensing, banning, and arresting jour-
nalists or editors. Both regimes sentenced anyone who questioned the state’s 
ideology or challenged its policies. At the same time Soekarno’s demand 
that the press be a ‘revolutionary press,’ and Soeharto’s creation of a ‘Pan-
casila press’ or ‘pers pembangunan’ (developmental press) went beyond the 
common authoritarian model. These features remind us of Oloyede’s devel-
opment journalism, but with the authoritarian nature of the state always in 
the foreground.
The situation of the press in post-Soeharto Indonesia is more difficult to 
categorise according to Siebert et al.’s and Oloyede’s typologies. Although 
Indonesia has become more democratic, the press system can neither be 
described as a libertarian nor a social responsibility model. Indeed, the 
media have become more plural and now better reflect the diversity of soci-
ety, and the press is no longer an instrument of the government. Neverthe-
less, in practice some features of the authoritarian model are still present, 
with some repressive legislation still being applied (see Chapter 4) and the 
state offering insufficient protection for attacks against the press by ‘preda-
tory elites.’
My research confirms what Romano (2003) has observed about the Indo-
nesian press in Indonesian culture post-Soeharto. Indeed, the role of the 
state in shaping and influencing press freedom is still important, but in the 
present political culture press curbing is now initiated by societal actors, 
depending on the regional political configuration (cf. Yin 2003). My research 
has demonstrated that this development has continued after Romano con-
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cluded her study. One point I may add is that next to ‘privatised gangster-
ism’ judicial proceedings are used as well to intimidate the press.
This study has not provided a ‘media ecology’ as called for by Hill and Sen 
(2007). Yet, I hope to have added a few insights which can be used for such 
a study. What this study does show is that examining press freedom with an 
exclusively doctrinary legal approach misses essential parts of the puzzle. 
This is even more of a problem given the present custom in Indonesian legal 
academia to pay no or only scant attention to judicial rulings. Drawing con-
clusions about press freedom in reality cannot be done on the basis of leg-
islation only. This presents a dual challenge for Indonesian law researchers, 
who should to be more open to include other disciplines in order to under-
stand press freedom more comprehensively, and who should pay attention 
to legal decisions made by the court.
Having said that, I will now look more closely at the conclusions concerning 
the judicial rulings discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.
8.4.3. Legal Unclarity and Uncertainty
Since 1999 press bans are no longer allowed in Indonesia, but civil and 
criminal lawsuits have still been conducted against journalists, editors and 
media owners. Judicial protection for the press has therefore remained very 
important. This study has found that the inconsistencies characteristic of 
legal interpretation of press law under the New Order are still commonly 
found today.
There are at least three possible reasons why court rulings have been incon-
sistent. First, court judgments are often still unavailable or quite difficult 
to obtain. Legal information is better accessible now than it was under the 
New Order (Churchill 1992: 1), but in particular regarding judgments the 
situation has not much changed. It is true that the Supreme Court publishes 
its judgments on its website now, but the system is not well-organised so 
that finding judgments on particular topics is very difficult. As regards judg-
ments of lower courts the situation has not changed at all, so it seems. The 
use of precedent has fallen into disuse in Indonesia and this goes against 
uniformity in adjudicating similar cases (Bedner 2013).
The second reason is that many lower court judges seem unable or unwilling 
to understand the special mechanism of the 1999 Press Law, which unequiv-
ocally requires cases to be taken to the Press Council before they may end 
up in court. This is even more remarkable given the Supreme Court’s consis-
tency in its judgments in prioritising the Press Council mechanism. It is to be 
hoped that in the end judges will no longer step out of line with the Supreme 
Court in this matter. Perhaps the appointment of former Supreme Court 
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Chairman Bagir Manan as Chairman of the Press Council will support this 
process. Only in this way can ‘real legal certainty’ (Otto 2002) be achieved.
Thirdly, several cases in chapters 5, 6, and 7 demonstrated, or contained 
indications, that the judicial process was influenced by political or economic 
interests. Under the New Order this political influence was centralised in 
order to serve regime’s interests, whereas presently political and capital 
interests are more diverse. That such influence is likely to be important is 
sustained by the broadly sustained thesis that corruption in the judiciary is 
still widespread.
Ultimately such inconsistency leads to legal uncertainty. The research found 
inconsistency in rulings between lower courts and the Supreme Court, but 
also within the Supreme Court itself. In Soeharto v Time (2000) the Supreme 
Court reviewed its own decision in cassation, and in the criminal defamation 
cases against Tempo’s Bambang Harymurti (2003) and Risang Bima Wijaya 
(2006) the Supreme Court took completely different decisions based on simi-
lar constellations of facts – acquitting Bambang and sentencing Risang.
The following scheme portrays how the failure to give priority to the ‘right 
to reply’ mechanism leads to cases being taken to an array of courts and 
instances, and thus to problems of forumshopping (cf. Bedner 2010). The red 
line shows which institutions a complainant may address in practice.
Press Conflict Mechanism in Indonesia
[process reality]
Complainant Right to Reply 
Right to 
Correction 



















This forumshopping not only leads to inconsistency in procedures and out-
come, but also to unpredictable time frames. In order to establish legal cer-
tainty state institutions should therefore stick to the law and use the right 
to reply mechanism as the point of departure for any complaints against the 
press.
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8.4.4. Avoiding the State Legal System for Protection
As I already remarked, journalists and in particular editors are inclined 
to settle or ‘lump’ cases of violence rather than report them to the police. 
They fear for retaliation and more violence if they do press charges. Crimi-
nal proceedings are moreover cumbersome in terms of time and the stress 
involved. Another reason to prefer private agreements is that the majority of 
newspapers in Indonesia have no lawyer to assist their journalists in cases of 
harassment. Therefore, there seems to be a preference for ‘peace agreements’ 
(kesepakatan damai), which may involve professional associations, such as the 
medical one at the Adam Malik Hospital in Medan, and the taxi drivers’ 
association in Denpasar. Journalists have sometimes employed the services 
of the Independent Journalists Association to this end.
Not all journalists agree to this line of behaviour. They fear that private set-
tlements instead of pressing charges in the end leads to systematic impunity. 
It may prevent violence in particular cases, but on the whole the deterrent 
effect of the criminal law will lose its power. In order to enable journalists 
to make a well-informed choice on this matter, in recent years a number of 
press legal aid institutes have been established, sometimes with the help 
of law faculties. This may lead to a different approach in such cases than is 
common at present.
8.4.5. ULAP as an Oppressive Strategy
Many lawsuits against the press in post-Soeharto Indonesia have neither the 
intention to protect the public interest nor support press freedom, but mere-
ly aim to drive certain newspapers or media businesses into bankruptcy. 
Examples are the cases of Tomy Winata v. Tempo and Raymond Teddy v. Seven 
Medias. Such cases remind of so-called SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation), but I argue they can better be described by a new term: 
ULAP (Unjustifiable Lawsuits Against the Press). I found that in Indonesia 
ULAP were mainly conducted against newspapers and magazines that are 
well-known for their high professional standards, reliability, and quality of 
information.
There are two reasons for introducing this new concept. First, it provides a 
clear identification of a particular kind of case against the press that, unfor-
tunately, occurs quite often. Second, it is important to have a working notion 
to explore the distinction between a ‘pure’ legal action and a form of politi-
cal suppression by means of the courts. It may also assist journalists, edi-
tors or even judges in more easily identifying the true reasons behind a case 
against the press.
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As discussed in Chapter 6, not all lawsuits against the press are ULAP. These 
are extraordinary cases with several particular features: they target profes-
sional journalism, try to drive news media into bankruptcy, and often have 
a motive of retaliation. ULAP are often accompanied by intimidation and/
or physical violence against journalists, they are usually inspired by certain 
political and/or economic interests. ULAP are typically aimed to silence 
media conducting investigative journalism and thus they harm the public 
interest. In the present political conditions in Indonesia, where ‘predatory 
elites’ have gained ascendancy in many regions, public access to good, reli-
able news is of great importance and needs to be protected by all means.
8.5. Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research
8.5.1. Recommendations
This research has demonstrated that not all is well with press freedom in 
Indonesia. However, some of the findings actually point in the direction of 
possible solutions for the problems I registered. In this section I will formu-
late a number of recommendations in order to improve the current situation. 
Some of them are of a legal nature, others institutional.
Public Interest
As we have seen in this research, ‘public interest’ has been a problemat-
ic legal concept in press law. In particular during Guided Democracy and 
the New Order it has been misused in suppressing opinions critical of the 
regime which were entirely peaceful. Syamsuddin (2008) has also pointed 
at this problem in his dissertation and argues that “public interest in press 
activities must be interpreted as the people’s interest, instead of state inter-
est, group interest, organisations’ interest or the nation’s interest.”
However, this approach still leaves a broad range of possible interpretations 
which may lead to arbitrary repression of the press. This research therefore 
suggests to reinforce the procedural guarantees to ensure that ‘public inter-
est’ is interpreted in a reasonable, proportionate manner. These guarantees 
are already in place, in the form of the right to reply as the primary mecha-
nism to respond to press reports that would go against the public interest, 
the priority of the Press Council over other mechanisms of redress against 
alleged press offences and in the self-regulating mechanism by the journal-
ists’ association, its code of ethics, and its capacity for education and training 
of its members. Finally, I would argue (unlike Syamsuddin) that it is never 
in the public interest to send a journalist to jail for his professional actions.
Decriminalising Press Offences
This takes me to the next point, which is that there are several good reasons 
to remove criminal law entirely from the repertoire of press regulation. The 
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main one is that criminal law is simply too dangerous. From the colonial 
period until the present, criminal law has been used to harass journalists 
and to silence press voices not in line with the government or certain elite 
interests. This insight is shared by many countries in the world, which have 
replaced criminal law with civil law provisions. According to Atmaku-
sumah Asraatmadja more than 50 countries have moved charges for libel, 
slander, defamation etc. from criminal law to private law.
This position finds support in the ICCPR, as already pointed out in the 
Conclusion of Chapter 5. In paragraph 47 of the General Comments No. 
34 about the application of Article 19 the HRC says that “Defamation laws 
must be crafted with care to ensure that they comply with paragraph 3, 
and that they do not serve, in practice, to stifle freedom of expression.” In 
addition, paragraph 47 stipulates that “States parties should consider the 
decriminalization of defamation113 and, in any case, the application of the 
criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and 
imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.”4This certainly is not present 
practice in Indonesian yet.
In fact, legally speaking we are already almost there. All press cases should 
be decided on the basis of the Press Law instead of the Penal Code. This 
has been confirmed by the Supreme Court (1608 K/PID/2005), which stated 
that using criminal law against the press endangered press freedom and 
hence the rules under the Press Law should be prioritised (point 84). This 
should become more widely publicised and acknowledged, and ultimately 
lead to a different discourse. I would even suggest to go one step further 
and remove all criminal provisions regarding the press from the Penal Code 
and other legislation – even if I am aware that the present tendency in Indo-
nesia is to add criminal provisions related to the press.
Unfortunately, most law schools in Indonesia do not contribute much to 
this. The main courses about press law still emphasise criminal law, with 
titles such as ‘Press Offences’ or ‘Criminal Offences by the Press’ (Delik Pers 
or Hukum Tindak Pidana Pers). Instead, laws schools should offer courses 
called for instance ‘Law and Press Freedom,’ which offer more space to dis-
cuss press law as an amalgamate of constitutional law, human rights, civil 
law, administrative law, and public policy issues.
The Press Council and the Civil Court as the Last Resort
As stipulated above, having a choice of various alternatives for resolving 
press legal cases leads to legal uncertainty. State institutions should there-
fore adhere to the law and support the clear and straightforward route of 
resolving press disputes through the Press Council if applying the right 
4 Made by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in its 102nd session, in Geneva, 11-29 July 
2011.
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to reply and the right to correction has not provided sufficient relief. This 
research has found that the Press Council functions quite well and deserves 
to get the practical support it is legally entitled to. It has been seeing a grow-
ing number of press legal cases for mediation or for obtaining a recommen-
dation. In order to protect and improve the press freedom situation, it has 
also developed standards for journalists and for monitoring the implemen-
tation of the journalist code of ethics.
It should be acknowledged that the Supreme Court has provided such sup-
port for the Press Council already. Not only has it recognised the priority of 
the Press Council in its case law, but it has also published a Circular Letter in 
2008 asking judges to invite the Press Council as an expert witness in court 
when handling cases where the press is involved.
This research does not argue that there is no role at all for the civil courts in 
press cases. The civil courts should be the ‘ultimum remedium,’ if the special 
mechanism does not lead to a sufficient level of satisfication of those bring-
ing the complaint. The court can then apply a marginal test to the judgment 
of the Press Council. The mechanism looks as follows:
Press Conflict Mechanism in Indonesia
[proposed process based on Press Law and Press Code of Ethics]
Complainant Right to Reply 
Right to 
Correction 







A final note regards the form and amount of compensation in the civil court. 
Measuring proportionality is not easy, but in any case the court should 
take into account the financial means of the press firm involved and never 
drive it into bankruptcy. As discussed in Chapter 6, there are no guidelines 
in precedents or legal doctrine to determine proper compensation in press 
cases. It is beyond this thesis to propose such guidelines, but the bottomline 
should be that they may never lead to a weapon that turns compensation 
into a press ban.
Removing Misconceptions about Press Law
As this research has indicated, there are many misconceptions on the part of 
judges, lawyers and the general public about the current press law in Indo-
nesia, but there are hardly any mechanisms for clarification. I think that law 
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scholars and judges have a special task in this. They ought to refer to many 
more resources than is currently common, including to Supreme Court prec-
edents, experts’ opinions and research publications. Hence, the role of legal 
documentation is quite significant. The role of and reference to precedents 
by judges is clearly of central importance.
Supporting the Press
I already mentioned the current development of providing legal aid to jour-
nalists and others accused of violations of the Press Law and other statutes. 
This is particularly important in the regions, where many press organisa-
tions do not dispose of sufficient funding to have access to proper legal 
assistance. Yet, undoubtedly the role of journalists associations is significant 
in promoting journalists' interests by designing strategies to reinforce press 
freedom.
And finally, conducting this research has taught me how difficult it is to 
gather data about challenges to press freedom. Therefore, not only should 
journalists’ associations themselves be concerned with this challenge, but 
NGOs should monitor press freedom as well. Given the political and eco-
nomic strength of those who stand to benefit from the absence of a critical 
press, organised efforts to back up a critical press are badly needed, and this 
starts with adequate information.
8.5.2. Suggestions for Further Research
This research suggests several themes and topics that merit further research. 
They include both legal and non-legal issues.
The first topic is of a legal nature and was already mentioned above: it con-
cerns developing guidelines for compensation in civil proceedings against 
the press. It should start with gathering all the information available from 
court cases and then carefully looking at their consequences before turning 
to the more practical side of weighing all the interests involved and valuing 
these in monetary terms.
The second topic is more of a political nature. It relates to a side of press 
freedom that has hardly been explored in this book, but that is quickly gain-
ing in importance. It concerns the media-ownership and how this influences 
the pluriformity of the press. On the one hand the press has been growing 
fast since Soeharto stepped down and the public has more choice in access-
ing media and its contents, but media ownership has become increasingly 
concentrated in a few hands, such as Media Nusantara Citra (MNC), Media 
Group, Bakrie and Brothers, Kompas-Gramedia and Jawa Pos Group, and a 
few others (Lim 2012). The question is how these media networks influence 
the public opinion and political power, an issue that was hotly debated with 
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regard to television reporting about the presidential elections of 2014. There 
is clearly a legal side to this, with the regulation of ownership and broad-
casting licenses.
For Indonesia to become a truly democratic country under the rule of law 
good press regulation guaranteeing freedom of the press in all of its aspects 
is a sine qua non. I truly hope that this study will form the start of much 
more socio-legal research into this matter that will contribute to realising 
this objective.
Summary
Press Freedom, Law and Politics in Indonesia
A Socio-Legal Study
Press freedom in Indonesia is still under pressure, despite the demise of 
Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. The political transition 
of ‘Reformasi’ has promoted a decentralised model of governance, which 
has led to new types of attacks on the press. Extra-judicial killings, physical 
violence, bringing criminal or civil claims against journalists and impunity 
of those perpetrating such acts have made it difficult for many journalists to 
conduct their work in a proper manner and without fear.
This study aims to present a comprehensive overview of how press laws 
and court cases involving the press have influenced press freedom in Indo-
nesia. Adopting a socio-legal approach it looks at the history of press laws, 
their implementation through government institutions and courts, and the 
debate concerning these laws and their implementation. Four key research 
questions serve as the point of departure: (i) how has the concept of freedom 
of expression and press freedom evolved in Indonesian law; (ii) how has 
press freedom as one of the main pillars of constitutional democracy been 
guaranteed by the Indonesian legal system; (iii) how has press freedom been 
shaped by various actors, and (iv) do these dynamics reflect the rule of law?
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the topic and elaborates the theoreti-
cal framework underlying the research. This includes a discussion of what 
it means to take a socio-legal perspective, the legal concept of the press, the 
relation between press freedom and freedom of expression, theories of the 
press, limitations to press freedom, and the relation between press freedom, 
democracy and rule of law. The chapter also discusses the methods used for 
the research.
Chapter 2 looks at press freedom as a main element of freedom of expres-
sion in the light of constitution making processes. It explores the history of 
constitutional debates about freedom of expression, starting with those con-
cerning the 1945 Constitution, continuing with the debates of 1949, 1950 and 
1956-1959, and ending with those of the constitutional amendment process 
of 1999-2002. The chapter provides an overview of the political situation at 
the time in order to situate the discourses encountered. It demonstrates how 
freedom of the press has always received much attention of constitution 
makers, but how this never led to its protection by a separate constitutional 
clause. Its subsumption under freedom of expression has proven insufficient 
to offer sufficient protection, up until the present.
284 Summary
The next two chapters deal with the history of press laws and policies. 
Chapter 3 runs from the Netherlands Indies to Soekarno’s Guided Democ-
racy and Chapter 4 continues with the New Order and Reformasi, up until 
the present. They show how press freedom was shaped and influenced by 
different political regimes.
From the start the colonial regime introduced strict controls over newspapers 
and other publications by pre-censorship, censorship, banning, criminal pro-
visions, etc. The ‘ethical policy’ that was implemented at the start of the 20th 
century introduced more freedom for the press, as most evident in the revi-
sion of the Drukpersreglement in 1906. This allowed for the development of a 
vernacular, Indonesian (Bumiputera) press. However, press freedom declined 
after the introduction of the Netherlands Indies Penal Code in 1914. Several 
of the latter’s articles were applied against the vernacular press in a discrimi-
natory manner, marking a transition from preventive to repressive control. 
The Press Banning Ordinance of 1931 was a further blow to press freedom 
and was used by the regime to exert strict control on press publications.
When the Japanese occupied the Netherlands Indies in 1942, the military 
administration made few changes to the repressive system in place. Grad-
ually, press control became rigorously authoritarian and in the end the 
press turned into a mere vehicle for Japanese propaganda. After Indone-
sia declared its independence in 1945, many restrictions on the press and 
attacks on journalists followed during the period of conflict between Indo-
nesia and the Netherlands, most of them initiated by the Dutch government 
that reclaimed its former colony. The first press ban by the new Indonesian 
government was promulgated in 1948, against the Indonesian communist 
press after the so-called “Madiun affair”, on the basis of Law 6/1946.
After the Dutch recognised Indonesia’s independence in 1949, press free-
dom improved considerably. In 1954 the Press Banning Ordinance of 1931 
was revoked, which in the politically polarised atmosphere of the time 
opened the gates to extremely partisan reporting. Press publications fea-
tured accusations and recriminations, scandals, feuds, and frauds – often 
without much fact-checking. This period was not to last very long however, 
as the introduction of martial law in 1956 allowed the army to arrest and 
detain journalists and editors at will without judicial process. Since then 
press freedom declined dramatically. Under Soekarno’s Guided Democracy 
journalists, editors, and publishers were subjected to all kinds of anti-press 
actions. Part of this control was ideological – Soekarno’s call for a ‘revolu-
tionary press’ – part of it consisted of legal measures.
Upon the reintroduction of the 1945 Constitution in 1959, the government 
intensified its anti-press policies by military, presidential and ministerial 
legislation. The control of ideology, organisation, personnel, and circulation 
of publications through ‘Press Guidance’ allowed Soekarno to act quickly 
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and effectively against journalists who criticised his administration or his 
leadership. The military administrative legislation enabled the government 
to immediately close down critical newspapers. Journalists and editors were 
sent to jail without judicial process, which for the government was less both-
ersome than a trial on the basis of the Penal Code.
The change to the New Order regime in 1965 started ominously. In the words 
of David Hill, “the arrests and killing of Communist and sympathizing jour-
nalists in 1965-66, carried out against a background of large-scale massacres 
in the countryside, cast a very long shadow over the press for a subsequent 
decade” (Hill 1995: 34-35). The New Order soon developed its own press 
discourse. Concepts as ‘development press’, ‘Pancasila press’ and ‘social 
responsibility press’ helped underpin new legal and psychological forms of 
press control. The Press Law (first Law 11/1966, later Law 4/1967, and final-
ly Law 21/1982) served as the legal basis for press banning or prosecution 
of journalists and editors. The cornerstone of the system was the publication 
permit (in various forms), which in 1994 was key to the notorious bans on 
Tempo, Detik and Editor. The undermining of judicial independence moreover 
ensured that the press had little to expect from court review.
In the early post-Soeharto years after 1998 press freedom was at a peak. The 
new Press Law (40/1999) prohibited censoring, banning and licensing, and 
President Abdurrahman Wahid abolished the Department of Information 
– the New Order’s institutional bulwark of press control. Yet, after Mega-
wati became president the situation started to deteriorate, as she regularly 
and publicly took issue with the press. Prosecution of journalists and editors 
started again, sometimes at her personal initiative. This tendency continued 
under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Newly introduced laws, 
such as the Pornography Law,1 the General Election Law,2 and the Electronic 
Information and Transaction Law,3 reversed parts of the 1999 Press Law. The 
number of criminal and civil lawsuits against journalists, editors and media 
owners has continued to rise, and has put much financial stress on news-
papers. Instead of the Press Law, which should hold priority, once again 
the Penal Code is used as a basis for prosecution. On top of this, violent 
attacks by hired thugs and mobs against journalists and media offices have 
increased in number. Those committing such acts usually get away with 
them, which adds to the general feeling of impunity for violations of press 
freedom. Institutionally, SBY re-established the Department of Information 
and Communication, and introduced a new agency (the KPI) for licensing 
and monitoring broadcasting media. These bodies lack the power and influ-
ence of their predecessors, but they do exercise institutionalised political 
control on broadcasting.
1 Law No. 44 of 2008 on Pornography
2 Law No. 42 of 2008 on General Election
3 Law No. 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions
286 Summary
When we compare the current situation to the New Order, the most con-
spicuous difference is that violence against journalists has become more 
‘localised’ and ‘privatised’ – usually benefiting predatory elites at the dis-
trict level rather than the national government. This change is closely related 
to the decentralisation process. As argued by Heryanto and Hadiz (2005: 
261): “freedom of the press continues to be challenged, not by an authoritar-
ian state, but by a variety of vested business interests or by the exercise of 
societal political violence.” One may add that exposing issues of corruption 
and natural resource exploitation by local elites are most likely to lead to 
violence against the press.
Despite these serious drawbacks, there is still much more press freedom 
now than under the New Order. There is a Constitution which has been 
amended to clearly guarantee freedom of expression. This freedom is also 
sustained by the Human Rights Law of 1999 and the Press Law of the same 
year. New restrictive or even suppressive laws have been enacted, but they 
are not specifically targeted at the media. Under the New Order the limits of 
press freedom were moreover never clearly defined and Soeharto’s speeches 
played an important role in their interpretation, whereas today the Press 
Council and the court articulate the rules.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 focus on the administration of justice in cases concern-
ing the press – Chapter 5 on criminal law cases, Chapter 6 on private law 
cases, and Chapter 7 on administrative court review. These chapters are of 
a legal nature, and also take into account the socio-political context. This 
helps explain how and why prosecutors and courts have remained within 
the boundaries of the rule of law, or transgressed them.
The criminal courts have been used by all kinds of political regimes to sup-
press opposition or criticism. The Penal Code for the Netherlands Indies 
proved an effective tool for the Indonesian government to silence dissenting 
voices. In post-Soeharto Indonesia the state no longer is the dominant actor 
in subjecting the press to criminal trials, but businesses and certain ‘civil 
society organisations’ have been able to instigate prosecution of journalists 
and editors.
Presently, Indonesia’s legal system has many criminal provisions that can 
be used against the press, some in the Penal Code, others in special stat-
utes. Several of them have indeed been used to ‘discipline’ newspapers, 
including legislation on hate speech (haatzaai-artikelen), insult, spreading 
false news, and violating public decency. The way in which they have been 
applied shows that in many cases prosecutors and judges have demonstrat-
ed little consideration for the importance of press freedom and its goals of a 
democratic society. Many judges have even disregarded the availability of 
a new statute, the Press Law of 1999, and they have continued to apply the 
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traditional criminal law provisions in such cases. In the end, however, the 
Supreme Court has in the large majority of cases upheld the primacy of the 
Press Law and clearly stated that cases concerning the press should refer to 
this statute. If judges feel bound to this fairly unequivocal line of precedents, 
many future problems would be prevented.
The Supreme Court has not only stimulated this development through its 
case law, but also by disseminating a Circular Letter to the courts in which 
the latter are summoned to involve a representative from the Press Council 
as an expert witness in cases involving the press (Supreme Court Circular 
Letter 13/2008). Nonetheless, even if the outcome of a criminal case is posi-
tive for the defendant, the trial itself impacts negatively on press freedom, 
as this involves tension, time and costs. Therefore, the research supports 
Susanto et al.’s argument that the Press Law should be amended to put 
beyond doubt that it prevails over any common criminal procedure (2010: 
232). However, contrary to Susanto et al. the chapter argues that the Press 
Council’s review on the basis of the Press Law and the Press Code of Ethics 
should completely replace criminal procedure. This also requires a shift in 
thinking and teaching of Press Law at Indonesian universities.
Chapter 6 demonstrates how civil law suits also pose a threat to press free-
dom. Many cases against the press have been brought to the civil court, 
mostly asking the court for damage compensation and/or rehabilitation 
because of news reports. This mechanism is open to abuse and has at times 
been deployed by political and business elites to silence critics by the threat 
of serious material losses or even bankruptcy.
The use of private law to sue journalists or media owners reflects the ten-
sion between private and public law in the contestation between privacy, 
dignity, reputation and personality versus the public right to information. 
Although this is not stipulated explicitly in the Press Law (40/1999), the 
civil court mechanism is applicable as the last resort when the mediation 
process through the Press Council has failed.
During the authoritarian regimes of Guided Democracy and the New Order, 
the number of civil lawsuits related to press freedom was relatively low in 
comparison to the number of criminal law cases. The state dominated the 
press and deployed criminal and administrative law to silence dissident 
voices. This changed after 1998, when a combination of more democracy, 
decentralisation, and the rise of regional business elites caused an increase 
in civil lawsuits against the press. The Supreme Court has put beyond doubt 
that the use of the ‘right to reply’, the ‘right to correction’ and mediation by 
the Press Council should precede litigation before the civil court, but this 
consistent line of precedents has not prevented cases from being heard by a 
civil court early on.
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The chapter shows that the main civil law issue regarding the press has been 
insult. Several ‘landmark decisions’ contain building blocks for a legally cer-
tain and proportionate protection of the press against this accusation. Mrs. 
Djokosoetono (Blue Bird Taxi) v Selecta Magazine (1981) set boundaries to press 
freedom in referring to racial issues irrelevant to a case in assessing wheth-
er an act ‘unlawfully harms feeling, reputation and privacy.’ In PL ALM v 
Garuda Daily (1991) the Supreme Court introduced the Press Code of Ethics 
as the standard for determining whether a news report is unlawful or not, a 
position confirmed in Tomy Soeharto v Gatra Magazine (1998) and the review 
in Soeharto v. Time Inc. (2009).
Despite these developments, political and business elite figures still deploy 
civil lawsuits to harass journalists, editors and newspaper companies. Law-
suits aiming for intimidation can be labelled Unjustifiable Lawsuits against 
Press Freedom, or ULAP. They are directed against professional journalism, 
demand an extreme amount of compensation, are often accompanied by 
intimidation, and usually serve to promote political-economic elite interests. 
Although generally dismissed by the courts, they do interfere with a proper 
functioning of the press, as they force journalists, editors and media own-
ers to invest time and money in defending themselves. Perhaps one way to 
address ULAP would be to bring claims for tort against those using it.
Chapter 7 discusses how administrative court review has changed from 
cases concerning the printed press to ones concerning radio and television. 
Administrative court cases concern administrative decisions, and licenses in 
particular, and the printed press no longer requires these. Although few in 
number, some administrative court cases about the press have drawn much 
public attention. Under the New Order the Prioritas case (1993) led to a new 
mechanism of judicial review of administrative regulation by the Supreme 
Court. Most famously, the Tempo case (1994) in first instance and on appeal 
suggested that administrative court review would provide genuine protec-
tion for the press against the New Order government, until the Supreme 
Court crushed all hopes. Still, administrative court review to some extent 
became a stepping stone for the larger democratisation process in Indone-
sia’s bureaucratic authoritarian regime, and offered at least a degree of pro-
tection against arbitrary decisions by the government.
The post-Soeharto case of REB demonstrates how press freedom in the field 
of radio and television is still under the influence of the ‘licensing regime’ 
and how the state may abuse its powers in this field. In this case the gov-
ernment moreover exerted political pressure on the administrative courts 
of first instance and appeal not to annul the two litigated decisions (it con-
cerned two permits). This may have led the administrative courts of first 
instance and appeal to follow suit, with the Supreme Court overturning one 
judgment while confirming the other (so the opposite of Tempo). The entire 
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event demonstrates how in the field of broadcasting the government has 
returned to administrative censoring policies, and how this may challenge 
the independency of the administrative court.
The final chapter brings together the most important findings of the thesis, 
situates them more explicitly within the theoretical framework elaborated in 
the first chapter, and provides a number of recommendations. In summary, 
the research has found that from colonial times until the present Indonesia 
has struggled with press freedom. During the history of the country many 
draconian laws against the press were enacted, and the press has more or 
less continuously been under attack from state officials, police, military offi-
cers, business and political elites, and political and religious mobs. In case 
of attacks by non-state actors the government has done little to prevent and 
or punish such actions. There is a rather good Press Law, but it is not imple-
mented the way it should be.
Overall, this reflection on press freedom, law and politics in Indonesia 
shows that the struggle for press freedom must be relentlessly continued if 
we wish the fourth pillar of constitutional democracy to function properly 
in Indonesia’s future.

Persvrijheid in Indonesië staat nog steeds onder druk, ondanks de val van 
Soeharto’s autoritaire Nieuwe Orde regime in 1998. De politieke overgang 
naar ‘Reformasi’ heeft geleid tot een gedecentraliseerd bestuursmodel, dat 
tot nieuwe typen van aanvallen op persvrijheid heeft geleid. Oneigenlijk 
gebruik van het strafrecht en van civielrechtelijke vorderingen en geweld 
maken het voor veel journalisten moeilijk om hun werk zonder angst te ver-
richten. Dit effect wordt versterkt doordat de overheid hier niet of nauwelijks 
tegen optreedt.
Dit onderzoek biedt een uitgebreid overzicht van de manier waarop wetge-
ving en rechtszaken betreffende de pers de persvrijheid in Indonesië heb-
ben beïnvloed. De studie gaat in op de geschiedenis van perswetgeving, de 
implementatie door overheidsinstanties en rechtbanken, en het openbare 
debat rondom deze wetten en hun implementatie vanuit een sociaal-rechts-
wetenschappelijk (‘socio-legal’) perspectief. Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op 
de volgende vier onderzoeksvragen: (i) hoe hebben de concepten van vrij-
heid van meningsuiting en persvrijheid zich ontwikkeld in de Indonesische 
wetgeving?; (ii) hoe wordt persvrijheid als een van de belangrijkste pilaren 
van een constitutionele democratie gegarandeerd door het Indonesische 
rechtssysteem?; (iii) hoe is de persvrijheid beïnvloed door de verschillende 
actoren? en (iv) zijn deze processen in overeenstemming met de eisen van de 
rechtsstaat?
Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een inleiding tot het onderwerp en zet het theoretisch 
kader uiteen dat aan het onderzoek ten grondslag ligt. Dit hoofdstuk bevat 
ook een discussie over wat een sociaal-rechtswetenschappelijk perspectief 
inhoudt en behandelt daarnaast het concept van de persvrijheid in juridische 
zin, de verhouding tussen persvrijheid en vrijheid van meningsuiting, theo-
rieën over de pers, beperkingen van persvrijheid, en de verhouding tussen 
persvrijheid, democratie en de rechtsstaat. Ten slotte worden ook de metho-
den die gebruikt zijn voor dit onderzoek besproken.
Hoofdstuk 2 kijkt naar persvrijheid als een belangrijk element van de vrij-
heid van meningsuiting in de context van grondwetgevende processen. Het 
bespreekt de ontwikkeling van constitutionele debatten over de vrijheid van 
meningsuiting, in 1945, 1949-1950, 1956-1959, en ten slotte die van 1999-2002. 
Deze worden geplaatst in de politieke context van hun tijd. Het overzicht 
laat zien hoe persvrijheid altijd veel aandacht kreeg, maar dat dit nooit heeft 
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geleid tot bescherming door een aparte clausule in de grondwet. Gebleken 
is dat alleen de vrijheid van meningsuiting onvoldoende waarborgen biedt 
voor effectieve bescherming van de persvrijheid.
De volgende twee hoofdstukken gaan in op de geschiedenis van perswetge-
ving en –beleid. Hoofdstuk 3 betreft loopt van Nederlands-Indië tot aan Soe-
karno’s Geleide Democratie, hoofdstuk 4 gaat verder met de Nieuwe Orde 
en Reformasi. Deze hoofdstukken laten zien hoe persvrijheid is vormgegeven 
en beïnvloed door de verschillende politieke regimes.
Vanaf het begin introduceerde het koloniale regime strenge controles op 
kranten en andere publicaties door middel van voorafgaande censuur, 
gewone censuur, en straf- en administratiefrechtelijke bepalingen. Het ‘ethi-
sche beleid’ dat werd ingezet aan het begin van de twintigste eeuw zorgde 
voor meer vrijheid voor de pers, zoals vooral blijkt uit de herziening van 
het Drukpersreglement in 1906. Deze zorgde voor de ontwikkeling van 
een eigen, Indonesischtalige (‘Bumiputera’) pers. Na de introductie van het 
Nederlands-Indische Wetboek van Strafrecht in 1914 ging het echter weer 
bergafwaarts met de persvrijheid. Een aantal artikelen uit het WvS werd op 
discriminerende wijze gebruikt tegen de Indonesischtalige pers, wat duidde 
op de overgang naar een repressiever regime. De Persbreidel Ordonnantie 
uit 1931 betekende een nieuwe klap voor de persvrijheid; deze werd door het 
regime gebruikt om strenge controle uit te oefenen op publicaties.
Tijdens de Japanse bezetting van Nederlands-Indië vanaf 1942, veranderde 
de militaire overheid weinig aan het repressieve systeem. Langzamerhand 
werd de controle op de pers steeds stringenter en uiteindelijk was de pers 
weinig meer dan een instrument voor Japanse propaganda. De onafhan-
kelijkheidsverklaring van Indonesië in 1945 werd opgevolgd door talloze 
beperkingen van de pers en aanvallen op journalisten gedurende de periode 
van het conflict tussen Indonesië en Nederland (1945-1949). De meeste maat-
regelen tegen de pers werden genomen door het teruggekeerde Nederlandse 
gezag, dat aanspraak maakte op de voormalige kolonie. Het eerste verschij-
ningsverbod dat werd uitgevaardigd door de nieuwe Indonesische regering 
dateert van 1948 en was gericht tegen de Indonesische communistische pers 
na de zogeheten “Madiun affaire”, op basis van Wet 6/1946.
Nadat Nederland de Indonesische onafhankelijk erkende in 1949, verbeterde 
de persvrijheid aanzienlijk. In 1954 werd de Persbreidel Ordonnantie afge-
schaft, wat op dat moment in het politiek sterk gepolariseerde landschap 
leidde tot extreem partijdige berichtgeving. Publicaties in de pers werden 
gekenmerkt door beschuldigingen en verwijten, schandalen, vetes en fraude 
– vaak zonder dat de feiten werden gecontroleerd. Deze periode zou ech-
ter niet lang duren, omdat de invoering van de staat van beleg in 1956 het 
leger in staat stelde om journalisten en redacteuren willekeurig en zonder 
vorm van proces in hechtenis te nemen. Nadien ging het snel achteruit met 
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de persvrijheid. Onder Soekarno’s Geleide Democratie werden journalisten, 
redacteuren en uitgevers onderworpen aan allerlei vormen van repressie. 
Deze bestond deels uit ideologische maatregelen – zoals Soekarno’s oproep 
tot een ‘revolutionaire pers’ – en deels uit wettelijke regelgeving.
Na de herinvoering van de Grondwet van 1945 in 1959 versterkte de regering 
haar repressieve beleid t.a.v. de pers door militaire, presidentiële en minis-
teriele wetgeving. De controle over de ideologie, organisatie, personeel en 
verspreiding van publicaties door de zogenaamde ‘Geleide Pers’ leidde ertoe 
dat Soekarno snel en effectief kon reageren op journalisten die kritiek had-
den op zijn regering of zijn leiderschap. De militaire wetgeving stelde de 
regering in staat om kritische kranten direct te verbieden en journalisten en 
redacteuren werden veelvuldig opgesloten zonder enige vorm van proces.
De periode van de Nieuwe Orde begon in 1965 niet bepaald positief voor 
de persvrijheid. In de woorden van David Hill, “the arrests and killing of 
Communist and sympathizing journalists in 1965-66, carried out against a 
background of large-scale massacres in the country side, cast a very long 
shadow over the press for a subsequent decade” (Hill 1995: 34-35). Soeharto’s 
regime ontwikkelde al snel haar eigen discours met betrekking tot de pers. 
Concepten als ‘ontwikkelingspers’, ‘Pancasila pers’ en ‘sociaal verantwoor-
delijk pers’ vertegenwoordigden nieuwe juridische en psychologische vor-
men van perscontrole. De Perswet (Wet 11/1966, gevolgd door Wet 4/1967, 
en uiteindelijk Wet 21/1982) vormde de juridische basis voor een verbod op 
de pers of vervolging van journalisten en redacteuren. De hoeksteen van 
het systeem was de publicatievergunning (in verschillende vormen), die in 
1994 een belangrijke rol speelde in het beruchte verschijningsverbod van de 
tijdschriften Tempo, Detik en Editor. Bovendien zorgde het ondermijnen van 
rechterlijke onafhankelijkheid ervoor dat de pers weinig kon verwachten van 
toetsing door een rechtbank.
De eerste jaren na de val van Soeharto in 1998 vormden een hoogtepunt 
voor de persvrijheid. De nieuwe Perswet (Wet 40/1999) verbood censuur, 
verschijningsverboden en vergunningen, en President Abdurrahman Wahid 
schafte het Departement van Informatie af, het institutionele bolwerk voor 
controle over de pers gedurende de Nieuwe Orde. Zijn opvolgster Mega-
wati ging echter soms openlijk de strijd aan met de pers. In deze periode 
vond ook weer vervolging van journalisten en redacteuren plaats, soms op 
haar persoonlijke initiatief, en deze ontwikkeling zette door tijdens het presi-
dentschap van Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Nieuwe wetten, zoals de 
Pornografiewet,1 de Wet op de Algemene Verkiezingen2 en de Elektronische 





Het aantal strafrechtelijke en civiele zaken tegen journalisten, redacteuren en 
media eigenaren begon weer toe te nemen. Deze ontwikkeling heeft doorge-
zet en zorgt op dit moment voor grote financiële druk op sommige kranten 
en tijdschriften. In plaats van de Perswet, die op juridische gronden voorrang 
zou moeten hebben, wordt het Wetboek van Strafrecht weer vaker gebruikt 
als basis voor vervolging. Bovendien vinden regelmatig aanvallen plaats op 
journalisten en mediakantoren door ingehuurde criminelen. Degenen die 
hierbij betrokken zijn komen er vaak mee weg, wat bijdraagt aan het alge-
mene gevoel dat schending van de persvrijheid niet bestraft wordt. Verder 
heeft SBY het Departement van Informatie en Communicatie heropgericht, 
en houdt een nieuwe instantie (de KPI) zich bezig met het verlenen van ver-
gunningen aan en het uitoefenen van toezicht op radio en televisie. Deze 
organisaties hebben minder macht en invloed dan hun voorganger, maar zij 
vormen toch een bron van politieke controle op de media.
Als we de huidige situatie vergelijken met die tijdens de Nieuwe Orde, lijkt 
het duidelijkste verschil dat het geweld tegen journalisten meer gelokaliseerd 
en ‘geprivatiseerd’ is. Vooral roofzuchtige elites op provinciaal en districtsni-
veau maken zich schuldig aan dit soort schending van de persvrijheid. Deze 
verandering is nauw verbonden met het proces van decentralisatie dat na 
1998 is ingezet. Zoals ook wordt beargumenteerd door Heryanto en Hadiz 
(2005: 261): “freedom of the press continues to be challenged, not by an aut-
horitarian state, but by a variety of vested business interests or by the exer-
cise of societal political violence.” Men kan hieraan toevoegen dat geweld 
pers vaak volgt op onthullingen van corruptie en ongeoorloofde exploitatie 
van natuurlijke grondstoffen door lokale elites.
Ondanks deze negatieve ontwikkelingen, heerst er in Indonesië op het 
moment een grotere mate van persvrijheid dan tijdens de Nieuwe Orde. Er 
is een herziene grondwet die de vrijheid van meningsuiting duidelijk garan-
deert, net als de Mensenrechtenwet van 1999 en de Perswet uit hetzelfde 
jaar. Nieuwe restrictieve of zelfs repressieve wetten zijn ingevoerd, maar zij 
richten zich niet specifiek op de media. Bovendien waren de beperkingen 
op de persvrijheid tijdens de Nieuwe Orde juridisch slecht gedefinieerd, en 
speelden Soeharto’s toespraken een belangrijke rol bij de interpretatie van 
deze beperkingen – nu zijn het in ieder geval de Persraad (‘Dewan Pers’) en 
de rechtbanken die de regels opstellen.
Hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7 richten zich op de rechtspraak in zaken betreffende 
persvrijheid. Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over strafrecht, hoofdstuk 6 over privaatrecht 
en hoofdstuk 7 houdt zich bezig met toetsing door de bestuursrechtbanken. 
Deze hoofdstukken zijn juridisch van aard en besteden tevens aandacht 
aan de sociaal-politieke context van de behandelde zaken. Centraal staat de 
vraag in hoeverre rechtbanken en officieren van justitie binnen de grenzen 
van de rechtstaat zijn gebleven in hun interpretaties en optreden.
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De strafrechtspraak is door allerlei verschillende politieke regimes gebruikt 
om oppositie of kritiek te onderdrukken. Na de onafhankelijkheid bleek het 
Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlands-Indië van 1918 nog steeds een effectief 
middel om politieke tegenstanders te vervolgen. In het Indonesië van na Soe-
harto is de regering niet langer de dominante partij in het onderwerpen van 
de pers aan strafrechtelijke processen, maar zijn het bedrijven en (religieuze) 
bewegingen die er soms in slagen het Openbaar Ministerie te bewegen tot 
vervolging van journalisten en redacteuren.
Het Indonesische rechtssysteem kent nog steeds een groot aantal strafrech-
telijke bepalingen die tegen de pers kunnen worden gebruikt, waarvan som-
mige in het Wetboek van Strafrecht staan en andere in speciale wetgeving. 
Enkele daarvan zijn inderdaad gebruikt om kranten en tijdschriften te ‘disci-
plineren’, zoals de zogenaamde ‘haatzaai-artikelen’, en bepalingen m.b.t. tot 
het verspreiden van onjuiste berichten en het schenden van fatsoensnormen. 
De wijze waarop zij deze wetgeving toepassen laat zien dat sommige rech-
ters en officieren van justitie weinig aandacht hebben voor het belang van 
persvrijheid in een democratische samenleving. Veel lagere rechters negeren 
zelfs de Perswet van 1999, en passen nog steeds rechtstreeks de traditionele 
strafrechtelijke bepalingen toe. Gelukkig heeft het Hooggerechtshof in bijna 
alle zaken die aan haar zijn voorgelegd voorrang gegeven aan de Perswet en 
duidelijk gemaakt dat zaken betreffende de pers onder deze regeling dienen 
te worden behandeld. Als rechters zich aan deze vrijwel eenduidige jurispru-
dentie houden, zou dit veel problemen in de toekomst kunnen voorkomen. 
Het Hooggerechtshof bevordert deze ontwikkeling niet alleen door haar 
jurisprudentie, maar ook door een rondschrijven (‘Surat Edaran’ 13/2008) 
aan de rechtbanken, waarin deze worden opgeroepen een vertegenwoordi-
ger van de Persraad in te roepen als expert in zaken betreffende de pers.
Men mag niet uit het oog verliezen dat zelfs als een proces wordt beslist in 
het voordeel van de beklaagde, een strafrechtszaak toch een negatief effect 
op persvrijheid heeft door de tijd, geld en spanning die de rechtsgang met 
zich meebrengt. Om die reden steunt dit onderzoek het voorstel van Susanto 
et al. om de Perswet aan te passen, zodat elke twijfel wordt weggenomen 
dat deze voorrang heeft boven andere wetgeving in een strafproces tegen de 
pers (2010: 232). Anders dan Susanto et al. betoogt de auteur van dit proef-
schrift dat de rechtsgang voor de Persraad op basis van de Perswet en de 
Gedragscode van de Pers de strafrechtelijke procedure volledig dient te ver-
vangen. Dit vraagt ook een verandering in de huidige doctrinaire benadering 
van de Perswet in het huidige juridische onderwijs.
Hoofdstuk 6 toont hoe ook civiele zaken een bedreiging voor persvrijheid 
kunnen vormen. Vaak wordt de rechtbank in een civiele vordering gevraagd 
om een schadevergoeding en/of het rehabiliteren van de goede naam. Dit 
mechanisme leent zich voor misbruik om kritische media het zwijgen op te 
leggen met als dreiging substantiële materiële verliezen of zelfs faillissement.
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In de toepassing van privaatrecht in een zaak tegen journalisten of 
media-eigenaren zien we de de spanning tussen het private belang van pri-
vacy, waardigheid en reputatie tegen het publieke belang van het openbare 
recht op informatie. Hoewel dit niet expliciet is bepaald in de Perswet van 
1999 is juridisch gezien volgens de auteur van dit proefschrift het mechanis-
me van het civiele recht slechts van toepassing als een laatste toevluchtsoord 
indien het klachtmechanisme bij de Persraad niet heeft gewerkt.
Tijdens de autoritaire regimes van de Geleide Democratie en de Nieuwe 
Orde was het aantal civiele rechtszaken tegen persvrijheid relatief klein in 
vergelijking met het aantal strafrechtelijke zaken. De staat zette strafrecht en 
administratief recht in om andersdenkenden tot zwijgen te brengen. Dit ver-
anderde na 1998, toen een combinatie van meer democratie, decentralisatie, 
en de opkomst van regionale economische elites voor een toename in civiele 
zaken tegen de pers zorgde. Het Hooggerechtshof heeft eenduidig geoor-
deeld dat het gebruik van ‘het recht op antwoord’, ‘het recht op correctie’ en 
het klachtmechanisme bij de Persraad voorrang heeft op een civiel proces. 
Net als in het strafrecht heeft een eenduidige jurisprudentiële lijn van die 
strekking toch niet kunnen voorkomen dat sommige zaken nog steeds direct 
door een civiele rechtbank in behandeling worden genomen.
Verder laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat ‘belediging’ de belangrijkste civiele grond-
slag voor een vordering tegen de pers is. Verschillende vonnissen en arresten 
bevatten bouwstenen voor rechtszekerheid in dergelijke zaken en voor een 
proportionele bescherming van de pers tegen een dergelijke vordering. Mrs. 
Djokosoetono (Blue Bird Taxi) v Selecta Magazine (1981) stelt beperkingen aan 
persvrijheid door erop te wijzen dat racistische aspecten relevant zijn wan-
neer de rechter moet nagaan nagaan of een daad ‘op onrechtmatige wijze het 
gevoel, de reputatie en privacy schaadt.’ In PL ALM v Garuda Daily (1991), 
introduceerde het Hooggerechtshof een gedragscode voor de pers als stan-
daard om na te gaan of een nieuwsbericht onrechtmatig is of niet. Deze werd 
bevestigd in de zaak Tomy Soeharto v Gatra Magazine (1998) en de herziening 
in Soeharto v Time Inc. (2009).
Ondanks deze ontwikkelingen, maken politieke en economische elites nog 
steeds gebruik van civiele procedures om journalisten, redacteuren en kran-
ten lastig te vallen. Rechtszaken die tot doel hebben om te intimideren kun-
nen ‘Unjustifiable Lawsuits against Press Freedom [ULAP, ‘Niet te Recht-
vaardigen Rechtszaken tegen Persvrijheid’] worden genoemd. Deze zaken 
richten zich tegen professionele journalisten, eisen een extreme groot bedrag 
ter compensatie, gaan vaak samen met intimidatie, en dienen meestal om de 
belangen van de politiek-economische elite te bevorderen. Ondanks het feit 
dat deze zaken over het algemeen worden afgewezen verstoren zij het functi-
oneren van de pers, doordat zij journalisten, redacteuren en media-eigenaren 
ertoe dwingen om tijd en geld in hun verdediging te investeren. Eén manier 
om ULAP zaken tegen te gegaan zou bestaan uit het indienen van een klacht 
van onrechtmatige daad tegen de personen die zich van ULAP bedienen.
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Hoofdstuk 7 bespreekt de wijze waarop toetsing door de bestuursrechtbank 
is veranderd van zaken betreffende de gedrukte pers naar zaken m.b.t. radio 
en televisie. Deze gaan over vergunningen in de vorm van administratieve 
beschikkingen en voor de gedrukte pers zijn deze niet langer vereist. Hoe-
wel het om een klein aantal zaken gaat, hebben een aantal van deze veel 
aandacht getrokken. Tijdens de Nieuwe Orde resulteerde de Prioritas zaak 
(1993) in een nieuw mechanisme van juridische toetsing van administratieve 
regelgeving door het Hooggerechtshof. De meeste bekende zaak, de Tempo 
zaak (1994) zorgde voor grote opschudding doordat zowel in eerste aanleg 
als in hoger beroep de rechter de intrekking van de publicatievergunning 
van ‘Tempo’ als onrechtmatig beoordeelde. In een zeldzaam slecht beargu-
menteerd arrest maakte heet Hooggerechtshof echter duidelijk dat men voor 
effectieve bescherming van de pers tegen de regering onder de Nieuwe Orde 
niet bij de rechtbank moest zijn.
De enige zaak bij de bestuursrechtbank na 1998, REB, toont hoe persvrijheid 
op het gebied van radio en televisie nog steeds onder invloed staat van het 
vergunningsregime, en op welke manier de staat haar bevoegdheid op dit 
gebied voor oneigenlijke doelen kan aanwenden. In deze zaak oefende de 
regering bovendien politieke druk uit op de bestuursrechtbanken in eerste 
aanleg en in hoger beroep om de bestreden beschikkingen in stand te laten. 
Uiteindelijk verwierp het Hooggerechtshof het oordeel in de ene zaak, maar 
bevestigde dat in de andere. Deze kwestie laat zien hoe op het gebied van 
radio en televisie de regering opnieuw een beleid van administratieve cen-
suur toepast, en hoe dit de onafhankelijkheid van de administratieve recht-
bank in gevaar kan brengen.
Het laatste hoofdstuk brengt de belangrijkste resultaten van dit onderzoek 
samen, plaatst deze op een meer expliciete wijze in het theoretisch kader, en 
doet een aantal aanbevelingen. Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat vanaf 
de koloniale tijd tot heden Indonesië moeite heeft gehad om persvrijheid te 
garanderen. Het historische overzicht wordt gekenmerkt door de vele draco-
nische wetten die de persvrijheid aan banden moesten leggen, en de pers is 
min of meer voortdurend het mikpunt geweest van aanvallen door overheid-
sambtenaren, politie, militairen, bedrijfs- en politieke elites, en politieke en 
religieuze bewegingen. In het geval van aanvallen door niet-statelijke acto-
ren heeft de regering meestal weinig gedaan om dergelijke acties te voorko-
men of te bestraffen. Op dit moment is er is een goede Perswet, maar deze 
wordt niet naar behoren geïmplementeerd.
Dit onderzoek over persvrijheid, recht en politiek in Indonesië laat zien 
dat de strijd om persvrijheid onafgebroken moet worden voortgezet als we 
ervoor willen zorgen dat de vierde zuil van een constitutionele democratie 
nu en in de toekomst op de juiste manier kan functioneren.
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Margiyono, AJI Manager Advocacy Program, Jakarta, 9 March 2011.
Miftakhudin, photographer of Radar Bali, Denpasar, 27 July 2010.
Mukhramal Azis, Head of Bureau, Sindo, Makassar, 3 February 2010.
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Roby Alampai, SEAPA/Southeast Asian Press Alliance, Executive Director, Bangkok, 
12 January 2011.
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